Nuclear Weapons Sumggling and the Environemnt
Russian Nuclear Smuggling
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CASE NUMBER: 271
CASE MNUMONIC: NUKESMUG
CASE NAME: Russian Nuclear Smuggling
A. IDENTIFICATION
1. The Issue
Since the end of the Cold War, a new nuclear weapons black
market has sprung up in Moscow, Germany, and many other European
countries. The growing black market, known to national security
experts as the 'loose nukes' problem, has grown at such an alarming
rates that it seems that just about any one can buy uranium,
plutonium, and other weapons grade material on the street. U.S.
allies, recognized nuclear states,1 and non-nuclear
powers alike worry about the possible consequences of loose nukes:
terrorist organizations like the Russian Mafia and the antifada
becoming nuclear powers or the likelihood that some of this
dangerous material being transferred to rogue states like Iran,
Iraq, or North Korea. Even if the uranium and plutonium are not
used to build nuclear technology, these materials are radioactive
and therefore intrinsically dangerous to any one who comes in
contact with them, particularly the smugglers themselves.
2. Description
A multi-million black market in nuclear materials has grown at
a frightening rate in the past several years. Before the end of
the Cold War, only five states were recognized as nuclear powers.
The fall of the Cold War has resulted in a the creation of three
more nuclear states which are ill-prepared to protect weapons-grade
material from potential smugglers. Despite the thawing of the Cold
War, preventing the illicit proliferation of nuclear materials has
perhaps become one of the most important national security policy
issue. "This [the smuggling of nuclear material] is the primary
security challenge, I think not only the United States, but the
world faces for the next, at least five to 10 years, perhaps
longer," said former Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Sam
Nunn (D-GE).2
According to a Western European intelligence report, the
principal suspects in many of the smuggling cases are "renegade
military officers and civilian nuclear technicians from Russia,
Ukraine, and Romania. . ."3 The nuclear weapons black
market has grown so large that the number of cases of actual or
attempted nuclear smuggling from former communist countries in 1994
increased to 124 -- more than double the amount reported in 1993.
4 Though International Atomic Energy Agency Director
General Hans Blix said that no information indicates that foreign
countries were actively hunting for weapons-usable materials stolen
from Russian stockpiles,5 'loose nukes' remains a hot
global security issue. It's become such a high profile issue that
it was depicted in the recent movie True Lies. In the
movie, two CIA officers (played by actors Tom Arnold and Arnold
Scwartzenegger) pursue the fictitious terrorist group Crimson Jihad
which explodes a warhead in the Florida Keys after becoming a
nuclear power.6
Reporter Chris Wallace demonstrated the extent of the 'loose
nukes' problem during a recent edition of Primetime Live in which
he interviewed a black market nuclear arms dealer named
Tatiana:
CHRIS WALLACE: [interviewing] So, if I come to Moscow and I have
enough money, what can I buy?
TATIANA: Everything.
CHRIS WALLACE: Everything? Uranium?
TATIANA: No problem.
CHRIS WALLACE: Plutonium?
TATIANA: Yes.
CHRIS WALLACE: Nuclear triggers?
TATIANA: No trouble. Without any problem.
CHRIS WALLACE: It's really that easy?
TATIANA: It's really that easy.
CHRIS WALLACE: You're saying that I can buy the
materials.
TATIANA: In order to do good bombs. Yes.7
CIA analysts say that though Russian President Boris Yeltsin
supports nuclear nonproliferation, he does not have the power to
implement any agreements aimed at halting the spread of mass
destruction. According to a CIA special estimate, "[p]rogress
toward fully satisfying U.S. concerns on Russian proliferation will
require that Yeltsin resolve ongoing rivalries among government
ministries and policies."8 Concerns that CIA outlined
in their special estimate included:
In June 1994, Russia agreed to
shut down three plutonium- producing reactors by 2000, but the
director of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) is delaying
implementation "indefinitely to gain time to build two new reactors
with U.S. assistance. The new reactors cannot be built until well
after 2000.
Yeltsin recently formed a new
intelligence commission to monitor nuclear smuggling, but no single
person has the authority to compel bureaucrats to cooperation with
its mandates
Yeltsin is grappling with more
pressing domestic economic and political problems to be able to
focus on nonproliferation commitments.
Defense Ministry officials and
other agencies are engaged in deliberate foot dragging on
nonproliferation issues.9
During a September 26-27, 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin summit on
disarmament, which ended cheerfully according to Agence France
Presse, both Clinton pledged to help provide funding to build a
storage facility for fissile material as part of new measures to
combat nuclear smuggling.10
Several smuggling or attempted smuggling incidents in Germany,
Russia, and other European countries and unsubstantiated reports
that some of the nuclear materials were headed for North Korea,
Iraq, and Basque terrorists have resulted in requests for the IAEA
to expand its role. At the German government's request, the IAEA
General Conference passed a resolution to involve the agency in the
prevention of nuclear smuggling.11 According to the
director general of the IAEA, the IAEA's role in stemming nuclear
smuggling will probably be modest. "We are not a police
organization," Blix said. "We have taken the position that the
most important task is to control the trafficking of thesematerials
at the source," he added.12
Despite intelligence reports that smuggling incidents have
increased dramatically in former communist nations, counter-
proliferation officers are confounded by the sophistication of the
smugglers. In February, 1995 a Polish dealer in used cars, meat,
and sausage was given a 30-month sentence in Germany for offering
2.2 pounds uranium to a German who reported the incident to the
police.13 In another case, a Colombian hid 12.6 grams
of potentially fissionable plutonium-239 in oxide form in a
shielded cylinder in his suitcase on a flight from Moscow to
Munich. Police posing as customers in a $250 million deal arrested
him and his suspected Spanish accomplices.14
IAEA Director General Blix nevertheless said several months
after the Colombian and the Spaniards were arrested, "thus far, the
evidence shows that the individuals trying to smuggle nuclear
material . . . are more likely to get irradiated than get money."
15 German intelligence services are optimistic about
the consequences of the nuclear smuggling incidents, according to
Der Spiegel news magazine. "It [nuclear smuggling] is going through
a quantum leap with consequences that will be extremely difficult
to control," the magazine reported.16 The report blamed
corrupt Russian officers for many of the cases and said that Turkey
had emerged as the preferred transit route to Western Europe.
17 This charge is not outrageous as one smuggling incident
in 1993 involved renegade Russian officers who stole 8.9 pounds of
30 percent-enriched uranium-235 from former Soviet weapons stocks.
18
According to an unnamed European official, Russians are
balking at offers of outside help because of national pride.
19 Even worse, an expert at the French Atomic Energy
Commission said that the Russians often do not even check their
inventories of radioactive materials. "It is not clear that even
the Russians know how much material they actually have,"20
the expert said. And despite four sting operations in
Germany and the Czech Republic [no time period for sting operations
provided], nuclear proliferation experts fear that large quantities
of weapons-grade material is still missing and may already have
been sold for illicit use.21
"It's likely that there has already been a diversion of
material," said Anthony Fainberg, a senior analyst at the U.S.
Office of Technology Assessment. This is a very serious problem;
it is not going to go away, and it is not going to get better,"
22 Fainberg said. In an interview with The Atlanta
Journal and Constitution, Fainberg noted that based on the
difficulty U.S. authorities face in halting the flow of illegal
drugs, he estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of what is slipping
through the borders of the former Soviet republics is being
intercepted.23 During a visit to one Kazakhstan plant
in 1994, he saw an area that stored about 600 of enriched uranium.
According to Fainberg, the only signs of security were a double lay
of barbed wire and a few young Army recruits with hunting
knives.24
That security is lax at many nuclear materials storage sites
in former Soviet republics becomes more alarming when we consider
that European Community member-states have begun relaxing their
borders. "Before people start insisting that all the borders are
removed, they should ensure that there is a European police system
capable of dealing with a borderless Europe...Otherwise we will be
giving the gangsters a free ride,"25 a British official
explained. Despite the increased smuggling incidents, the
Chicago-base Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set back the
Doomsday Clock to 17 minutes before midnight in early 1995. In the
mid-1980's the clock had been set to 3 minutes before mid-night,
indicating the increased peril of nuclear weapons during the
tensions of the Cold War.26
Recent events have made the Clinton Administration anxious to
implement the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation, which
was recently extended. "The most important beneficiaries of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty are the non-nuclear states," said former
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. "If their neighbor is
prevented from obtaining a nuclear weapon, they are more secure and
they are not forced themselves to move toward obtaining nuclear
weapons.27 To help former Soviet republics enforce
nonproliferation, American consultants are helping them upgrade
their nuclear arsenals to use high technology security cards and
other technology. 28 Projects like this and other ones
that help research centers track nuclear material are spreading
across Russia and other former Soviet republics.
The timeliness of the security projects couldn't be better.
Yeltsin has agreed not to renew an arms contract with Iran when a
1988 contract runs out, but in March 1995 The New York Times
reported that Iran was smuggling nuclear technology through an
international network that included Russia.29 Moscow
officials denied the report. "At the given moment, our nuclear
supplies are hermetically sealed,30" said Tatyana
Samolis, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Intelligence
Service. Despite assurances from Moscow that it has accounted for
its inventory of fissile material and that nothing is missing,
European security officials rejected claims. "Their claims that
they know where all their materials are...are technically
worthless,"31 said one german nuclear materials
accounting official.
It's clear that health and environmental implications of
'loose nukes' and surplus weapons fuel has become "a clear and
present danger to national...security,"32 as noted by
the National Academy of Sciences. At hearings chaired by Senator
Richard Lugar (R-IN) in the summer of 1995 the senator called
Russian 'loose nukes' the number one security risk facing the
United States. "Will this new threat be given the priority it
deserves only on the morning after the first act of nuclear
terrorism? What will we wish we had done then?,"33 the
senator asked.
Jessica Mathews of the Council on Foreign Relations advises
that three lessons regarding this issue ought to be remembered: 1)
dealing with Russian plutonium is a security threat that we
continue to ignore at our peril; 2) Congressional cuts in the
programs to improve Russian nuclear security are unwise in the
extreme; 3) knowing how hard it is to get rid of separated
plutonium, we should be doing everything possible to stop countries
from making more.34 In an effort to move advance
nuclear arms reductions and thus nuclear proliferation, Secretary
of Defense William J. Perry met with his Ukrainian and Russian
counterparts in Ukraine to confer on the topic and to destroy a
strategic missile silo built in the Soviet area.35
Under trilateral agreements, Ukraine's remaining nuclear warheads
are to be shipped to Russia for disassembly and storage by June
1996.
Other efforts to protect Russia, the United States and their
allies from the dangers of nuclear weapons include pushes to ratify
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-II (START-II) and continuing
support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. In the
original START I (1991) agreement between Russia and the United
States (1991) both countries pledged to reduce the number nuclear
warheads they owned by one-third of the amount they had when the
treaty was signed. The START-II treaty, signed in 1993, provides
for both countries to limit their nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500
each by the year 2003.36 "Only by the consistent
prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons of mass destruction
will it be possible to prevent the uncontrolled expansion of
nuclear capabilities,"37 two advocates of disarmament
wrote in The Daily Yomiuri. "Continuing, substantial
disarmament...on the part of nuclear powers...and the agreement on
the part of the nonnuclear states not to...develop their own
nuclear weapon...potential...would also have a beneficial effect
from the environmental standpoint,"38 they continued.
The U.S. Senate ratified START-II in an overwhelming 87-4 vote
on January 26 after months of being stalled by Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC),39
but the treaty has been held up in the Duma, lower house of
Russia's parliament. Although Yeltsin urged the Duma to ratify
START-II by April, the treaty is being held up because the Duma is
dominated by anti-Western Communists and nationalists who fear
losing power relative to the United States, because the United
States has been unable to come up with the money it promised Russia
to replace the electric power and heat generated by the Russian
plutonium-producing reactors, and because the upcoming Russian
presidential election in June has politicized the negotiations.
40
The ABM Treaty between President Richard Nixon and Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to limit the Cold War arms race by
banning the deployment of multiple land-based defenses against
strategic missiles. The ABM Treaty is still important today,
because nuclear warheads can be put in these ballistic missiles and
because dissemination of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads
increases the opportunities that independent arms dealers and
terrorists would have to steal these materials. Though Senator
Helms has introduced a bill that would require the U.S. to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty because he says that the Clinton administration
is ignoring the "real threats" in China, North Korea, Iran, and
possibly Russia, most congressmen and congressional staffers doubt
the senator's legislation will draw much support.41
Both treaties are important as symbolical and practical means to
prevent nuclear proliferation.
3. Related Cases
Trade Product : METAL
Bio-geography : TEMPERATE
Environmental Problem: HABIT Loss
While much of the uranium and plutonium smuggled has been to
Germany, a TEMPerate area, these radioactive elements could
potentially end up anywhere on the globe.
IRANNUKES CASE,
TEMELIN CASE,
CHERNOB CASE,
ARCTIC CASE,
MOCHO CASE,
JAPANSEA CASE,
JAPANPL CASE, and
MURUROA CASE
4. Draft Author: Jay Krasnow
B. LEGAL CLUSTER
5. Discourse and Status: AGRee and INPROGress
Whether or not the discourse is AGRee or DISagree depends on
what aspect of this issue the actors are discussing. Are 'loose
nukes' dangerous? The answer given would be yes unless it was
given by the heads of rogue stages or some nuclear weapons
smugglers. Can the Russian government account for and protect its
nuclear arsenal materials? Many Russian statesmen would say yes,
but the CIA says no it can't.42 In general, the leaders
of Western and former Soviet republics agree that 'loose nukes' is
a problem, it is dangerous, and it won't go away.
6. Forum and Scope
Forum: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Scope: MULTILATeral
As the signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have
agreed, the only five states that have the right to own nuclear
warheads are the United States, Great Britain, France, China, and
Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union created three new nuclear
states (Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) which recognize that they
do not have the right to keep these weapons. Nevertheless these
three states still have nuclear warheads for the time being. When
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was first ratified, the member-
states did not consider that individuals or terrorists could become
the greatest danger to nonproliferation.43
The scope of the issue is multilateral because any number of
states, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental
organizations are concerned about it. Nuclear proliferation is not
just the nuclear powers' problem. Because of the inherent danger
and instability of nuclear materials nuclear proliferation affects
many parties. The radioactive materials involve many health and
environmental risks. In addition to hazards already mentioned,
experts say that excessive amounts of radiation causes thyroid
cancer. These doctors draw their evidence from studies of the
Chernobyl explosion. Excessive amounts of radioactive iodine, for
example, is easily absorbed by the thyroid gland and therefore can
be especially dangerous to infants.44
7. Decision Breadth
Number of Parties involved: 172
The principal parties in this case are the former Soviet
states that have nuclear warheads including Russia, the five
recognized nuclear powers, aspiring nuclear powers, Eastern and
Central European countries where the nuclear weapons material has
been (or may be) smuggled, the consumers of nuclear material, and
the smugglers themselves. As the most powerful state in a unipolar
world system, the United States has become an actor by its own
right. It must be noted that there is clearly some overlap in
these seven groups. It should also be pointed out that since we
often don't know who is buying the material, we have to guess
whether the consumer is an aspiring nuclear state, a terrorist
group, or some one else. Since we do not always know where the
nuclear materials is going and cannot account for missing nuclear
materials, every state, group, and individual is a potential party.
8. Legal Standing: Treaty
As the most of the principal parties (except the smugglers and
the consumers) have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
they have affirmed that nuclear weapons are dangerous and therefore
proliferation should be severely limited. The increased demand for
nuclear materials by the consumers, whoever they may be, seriously
jeopardizes the integrity of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
THE NPT Treaty recognizes the "devastation that would be visited
upon all mankind by nuclear war...[and] the nuclear proliferation
of nuclear weapons..."45 The 1969 treaty obligates the
signatories to abstain from transferring nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devises to non-nuclear states46 and
obligates them to accept all safeguards (such as verification) as
agreed to in the treaty.
C. GEOGRAPHIC FILTERS
9. Geography
Geographic Domain: Europe
Geographic Site: East Europe
Geographic Impact: Russia
While 'loose nukes' is a global problem, it's almost
impossible to say for sure what the geographic sites or geographic
impacts are without knowing more about who the consumers are and
that their agendas are. Anthony Fainberg, a senior analyst at the
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment pointed out the seriousness of
this problem in February 1996. "If we don't do something about the
situation soon, it will get worse,"48 Fainberg said.
10. Sub-National Factors: NO
11. Type of Habitat: GLOBAL
The habit of the areas affected by 'loose nukes' varies
depending on where the smugglers and consumers take them. National
security officers in Europe, Russia, and the United States seldom
know the destination of the nuclear materials and therefore it is
impossible to say what type of habitat will be affected in this
case.
D. TRADE FILTERS
12. Type of Measure: EXportBAN (EXBAN)
The type of trade measure can be seen from several
perspectives. On the one hand, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
mandates that only five states have the right to own nuclear
warheads. Other states are not allowed to have any nuclear
warheads. This can been viewed as a QUOTA. On the other hand
German and Japanese policymakers don't want warheads in their
country either. The open statements that leaders of these
countries and other countries like it can be seen as an informal
IMportBAN. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty also gives the five
nuclear powers informal LICENsing to own these warheads. And
finally, while the Treaty recognizes that five states have the
right to own nuclear warheads, the signatories have generally
agreed that less warheads are better than more nuclear warheads.
The treaty itself mandates that the goal is to move towards zero
nuclear warheads. This can be seen as another type of QUOTA.
Accordingly, the smugglers of nuclear materials and the likely
consumers do not have the right to own weapons-grade material. The
provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty orders an
IMportBAN and EXportBAN against these parties.
13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: DIRect
The impact of the trade measure is direct because it bans the
production and ownership of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons-
grade material in states other than the five recognized nuclear
powers.
14. Relation of Measure to Impact:
Directly Related to Product: YES - NUCLEAR
Indirectly Related to Product: NO
Not Related to Product: NO
Related to Process: YES - [POLL]
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty limits ownership and
severely restricts the trade of weapons-grade nuclear material
because of its intrinsic dangers.
15. Trade Production Identification: METAL
The product identification refers to plutonium and uranium.
16. Economic Data: See below
The uranium and plutonium black market is a multi-million
industry for the smugglers and the consumers. The Colombian who
was arrested in August (see category one) for trying to sell
plutonium in Germany was offered $250 million for it by an
undercover police agent.49 For the states involved, the
case is more of a high politics and national security issue than an
economic issue. In Russia and the 'new nuclear power' states there
is a great need to account for their nuclear materials. US
agencies are prepared to spend millions of dollars to ensure that
the nuclear states in Eastern Europe can protect their nuclear
materials.50
17. Degree of Competitive Output: HIGH
Most parties involved see this as a national security issue
rather than an economic. The countries with money are willing to
spend as much as necessary to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons material. Most of the countries that signed the treaty and
are prepared to observe it, want nuclear weapons as far away from
them as possible. Most of the countries that have nuclear weapons
are beginning to dismantle them anyway because they don't feel as
much a need to have a them. For the smugglers and consumers the
nuclear proliferation is a multi-million dollar industry. The
general global consensus that nuclear proliferation should be
stopped does not concern them. The black market dealers, then,
will continue to try smuggle and sell weapons material to their
consumers. For the most part, economic output is lost only when
the smugglers and their consumers are caught.
18. Industry Sector: METAL
The industry identification refers to plutonium and uranium.
19. Exporters and Importers: Russia and Many
We know very little about who's buying and selling nuclear
materials and for how much. Most of the material originates in the
former Soviet states, but the governments of these states do not
appear to be involved the smuggling operations.
E. ENVIRONMENTAL FILTERS
20. Environmental Problem Type: HABIT
The number of possible environmental problems that could
result from uranium and plutonium trading is countless. But in
general, it threatens our general habitat.
21. Species Information: See below
Name: Many
Type: Many
Diversity: 754,958 hectares of natural forests
51
The species affected depends on where the material is brought
and who uses it, and for what purpose. Most people are more
concerned though, about the impact it would have on people more
than those who don't have voices such as wildlife and those who
have not yet been born.
22. Impact and Effect: HIGH and STRuCTure
23. Urgency and Lifetime: HIGH and 1000s of years
The urgency of the issue is extremely high because many of the
smugglers are not familiar with the danger to themselves and others
involved in the business. The urgency is high because the number
of cases increase in year. While humans and wildlife are equally
in endangered by the impacts of a possible accident or merely
coming in contact with the material, no species is yet in danger of
extinction.
24. Substitute: BIODEGRADABLE?
There is no substitute for these weapons-grade material and
there is no good reason for the smugglers to have them. It is
assumed that the consumers will use separated plutonium or uranium
to manufacture nuclear warheads. The idea of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty is to prevent this from happening. Since
the thawing of the Cold War in the late 1980's, many countries that
have nuclear warheads want to get rid of them. The possibility
that nuclear weapons grade material is not promising, but must be
mentioned.
F. OTHER FACTORS
25. Culture: NO
26. Human Rights: YES
At the very basic level human rights is a key issue in this
case. While scientists have not been able to tell us the exact
effects that it has on people, U.S. experiments from the 1940's
clearly showed that radiation is dangerous to humans.52
"[I]t's most important to stress that we don't really know what
radiation does. People are still unsure,"53 said Holly
Barker, Senior Advisor to the Ambassador of the Marshall Islands to
the United States. According to Barker, people exposed to
radiation on the Marshall Islands have been born without knees,
with only three toes, or without limbs.54
27. Transborder Issues: YES
Since the nuclear materials have been transported from country
to country, there are many transborder issues in this case.
28. Relevant Literature
Atlas, Terry, "A Threat of Nuclear Terrorists Lingers After End of
the Cold War," The Houston Chronicle 24 Feb. 1995: A23.
Belluck, Pam, "Kiev to Queens: Plot Fit For Fiction -- U.S. Customs
Agent Tells What It's Like to Run A Sting," The New York Times 26
June 1995: B1.
Broad, William J. "Quietly U.S. Converts Uranium into Fuel for
Civilian Reactors," The New York Times 19 June 1995: A10.
"Clinton Favors Keeping All 3 Nuclear Labs: Continued Research
Eliminates Need for Weapons Tests, He Says," The Washington Post
26 Sept. 1995: A17.
Coughlin, Con, "FOCUS IMMIGRATION: Trojan Horse at the Heart of
Europe Customs Officials Are Already Fighting a Losing Battle.
Fleck, Fiona, "German Spy Chief Denies Plutonium Coup Was Set Up,"
Reuters World Service, 21 Apr. 1995: no page provided.
Gallagher, James P., "Nuclear Sites in Russia Get New Security,"
Chicago Tribune 16 Mar. 1995: 22.
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich and Shimbun, Yomiuri, "INSIGHTS INTO THE
WORLD; Nuclear-Free Environment Indispensable for Stability and
Security in the World, The Daily Yomiuri 18 Dec. 1995: 6.
"German Agents Record Big Rise in Nuclear Smuggling," Reuters World
Service, 18 Feb. 1995: no page provided.
Gertz, Bill, "Yeltsin Can't Curtail Arms Spread; Bureaucracy Too
Powerful CIA Believes," The Washington Times 27 Sept. 1994: A3.
Hecker, Charles, "Russians Say No Nuclear Smuggling to Iran," The
The Moscow Times 16 Mar. 1995: no page provided.
Hibbs, Mark, "Europeans Term 'Worthless' Minatom Claim That No HEU
or PU is Missing," Nuclear Fuel 27 Mar. 1995: 12.
---., "Schmidbauer, Agencies To Be Probed on Bonn Plutonium Sting
Operations," 24 Apr. 1995: 2.
Lee, Gary, "Clinton Apologizes for U.S. Radiation Tests, Praises
Panel Report," The Washington Post 4 Oct. 1995 : A8.
Lyon, Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling will be
Limited Blix Says," Nucleonics Week 6 Oct. 1994: 1.
Landry, Carole, "Yeltsin, Clinton Crown Summit with Trade,
Disarmament Gains," Agence France Presse, 28 Sept 1994: no
page provided.
Lippman, Thomas W. "First Shipment of Uranium Arrives From Russia:
Delivery Comes Amid Argument Over Terms of Deal That Threatens to
Cancel Agreement," The Washington Post 24 June 1995: A21.
---., "U.S. Vows Faster Payment To Russia in Uranium Deal: Action
Aimed at Persevering Disarmament Agreement," The Washington Post
6 July 1995: A17.
"'Loose Nukes' -- Update on Nuclear Weapons Sales" on ABC's
Primetime Live, 19 Aug. 1994, 10:00 PM ET; guests: Franz
Mittelstaedt, Nuclear Black Market Dealer; Senator Sam Nunn, (D),
Georgia, Armed Services Committee Chairman; Dmitri
Muratov, Reporter, "Nova Gazetta"; Gennady, Nuclear Black
Market Dealer; Tatiana, Black Market Nuclear Arms Dealer;
Victor Mikhala, Russian Nuclear Energy Minister.
Mathews, Jessica, "Beware the 'Loose Nukes,'" The Washington Post
13 Oct. 1995: A13.
"Moscow accuses Germany over Plutonium Smuggling," East European
Energy Report 26 Apr. 1995: no page provided.
Randal, Jonathan C., " Planned German Reactor Fuels Controversy,"
The Washington Post 20 July 1995: A24.
Toner, Mike, "AAAS in Atlanta Nuclear Smuggling on the Rise,
Experts Say," The Atlanta Journal and Constitution 19 Feb.
1995: A7.
Walsh, Mary Williams "Plutonium Smugglers Convicted in Germany,"
Los Angeles Times 18 July 1995: A4.
Whitney, Craig, "Smuggling of Radioactive Material Said to Double
in a Year," The New York Times 18 Feb 1995: 2.
---., "Report Tracks a Big Jump in East's Nuclear Smuggling,"
International Herald Tribune 18 Feb. 1995: no page provided.
---------
ENDNOTES
---------
1. The recognized nuclear states are the United States. Great
Britain, France, China, and Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union
crated several new nuclear states: Ukraine, Belorus, and
Kazakhstan. Countries considered secret nuclear powers are India,
Pakistan, Israel, and probably North Korea. See John Macartney,
Readings Packet 433, for Govt. 53.526.01, US Intelligence
Community, The American University Bookstore, Washington, DC, Fall
Semester, 1995, p. 24.
2. Former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Sam Nunn
on "'Loose Nukes' Update on Nuclear Weapons Sales," on ABC's
Primetime Live, 19 Aug. 1994. 10:00 PM.
3. Craig Whitney, Smuggling of Radioactive MAterial Said to Double
in a Year, The New York Times 18 Feb. 1995: 2.
4. Ibid. 56 cases were reported in 1993 and 53 cases were reported
in 1992
5. Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling Will Be Limited,
Blix Says," Nuclear Week 6 Oct. 1994: 1. Blix's statement
contradicted statesments made by German officials in August 1994.
6. The idea that two CIA officers try to arrest or otherwise
incapacitate the terrorists is a misrepresentation of the Agency's
charter. The CIA has never had policing authority. 7. Primetime
Live.
8. Bill Gertx. "Yeltsin Can't Curtail Arms Spread; Bureaucracy Too
Powerful CIA Believes," The Washington Times 27 Sept. 1994: A3.
9. Ibid.
10. Carole Landry, "Yeltsin, Clinton Crown Summit With Trade,
Disarmament," Agence France Press 28 Sept. 1994: no page provided.
11. "IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling . . ."
12. Ibid.
13. "Smuggling of Radioactive Material Said . . ."
14. Ibid.
15. "IAEA Role in Containing Smuggling . . ."
16. "German Agents Record Big Rise in Nuclear Smuggling," Reuters
World Service 18 Feb. 1994: no page provided.
17. Ibid.
18. Craig Whitney, "Report Tracks a Big Jump in East's Nuclear
Smuggling," International Herald Tribune 18 Feb. 1995: no page
provided.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Mike Toner, "AAAS in Atlanta: Nuclear Smuggling on the Rise,
Experts Say," The Atlanta Journal and Contsitution 19 Feb. 1995:
A7.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Con Coughlin, "Focus Immigration: Trojan Horse at the Heart of
Europe Customs Officials Are Already Fighting a Losing Battly. Con
Coughlin Fears It Can Only Get Worse," Sunday Telegraph, 19 Feb.
1995: 15.
26. Terry Atlas, "A Threat of Nuclear Terrorists Lingers After End
of Cold War," The Houston Chronicle, 24 Feb. 1994: A23. 27. Ibid.
28. James P. Gallagher, "Nuclear Sites in Russia Get New Security,"
Chicago Tribune, 16 Mar. 1995: 22.
29. Charles Hecker, "Russians Say No Nuclear Smuggling to Iran,"
The Moscow Times, 16 Mar. 1995: no page provided.
30. Ibid.
31. Mark Hibbs, "Europeans Term 'Worthless' Minatom Chaim That No
HEU or PU IS Missing," Nuclear Fuel, 27 Mar. 1995: 12. 32. Jessica
Mathews, "Beware the 'Loose Nukes," The Washington Post 13 Oct.
1995: A13.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. "Perry Confers in Ukraine," The Washington Post 5 Jan 1995:
A27.
36. Hans Dietriech Genscher and Yomiuri Shimbun, "Nuclear Free
Environment Indispensible for Stability and Security in the World,"
The Daily Yomiuri 18 Dec. 1995: 2.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.,
39. Michael Dobbs, "Senate Overwhelmingly Ratifies 1993 Arms Treaty
With Russia," The Washington Post, 27 Jan 1996: A1. Senator Helms
had stalled ratification of the treaty for five months because the
Clinton administration rejected his plan to shut down USIA, USAID,
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
40. Thomas W. Lippman, "Russia Balks at Arms Accord: Failure to
Improve Clinton-Yeltsin Agreements Frustrates U.S. Officials," The
Washington Post 21 Feb. 1996: A24.
41. Thomas W. Lippman and Bradley Graham, "Helms Offers Bill to
Force U.S. Out of ABM Treaty: Aides Give Measure Little Chance of
Approval," The Washington Post 8 Feb. 1996: A20.
42. "Yeltsin Can't Curtail Arms Spread . . ."
43. Greenpeace fax, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons," 1 July 1968, faxed to author by Tome Clements, Nuclear
Disarmament Campaigner, Greenpeace, 1436 U Street, NW, Washington,
DC.
44. "Chernobyl, Cancer, and Creeping Paranoia," The Economist 9
Mar. 1996: 81-2.
45. "Treaty on the Nonproliferation . . ."
46. Ibid., Article I.
47. Ibid., Article III, section 1.
48. "AAA In Atlanta . . ."
49. "Smuggling of Radioactive Material . . ."
50. "Nuclear Sites in Russia . . ."
51. "Table 19.1, Forest Resources," World Resources 1994-95 A
report by the World Resources Institute in Collaboration with the
United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations
Development Programme (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 307. Figure represents hectares of natural forests
in the former Soviet Uniion in 1990. The amount of plant species
in Russia was not yet available in the 1994 edition of World
Resources
52. David Brown, "Study Details the Culture That Drove Experiments:
Scientists Worried About Safety, Not Consent," The Wasington Post
4 Oct. 1995: A8.
53. Ms. Holly Barker, Senior Advisor to Ambassador, Emassy of the
Marshall Islands, "Paradise Lost?," Forum on French Nuclear
Testing, The American University, School of International Service,
19 Oct. 1995, moderated by Professor Paul Waupner, Ph.D. 54. Ibid.
