Case Number: 469
Mnemonic: CUBANUKE
Name: Cuba Nuclear Reactor and the Enviorment
I. Identification
Over the last several decades the island nation of Cuba has been faced with an ongoing energy crisis. Depending heavily upon imported oil, the Cuban government has attempted to seek an alternative to oil through nuclear energy. In cooperation with the Soviet Union, Cuba embarked on a project to construct and operate a nuclear power plant in Cienfuegos, known as Juragua. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union halted construction atJJuragua. Recent bilateral cooperation between Cuba and Russia has re-ignited the possibility of Juragua's completion in the near future. This has drawn condemnation from the United States, which views a nuclear reactor in Cuba as a threat to its national security. The U.S. has cited numerous safety concerns associated with Juragua, believing in the event of an accident it would be exposed to radioactive fallout. This case study will examine the trade and environmental aspects of Cuba's attempts to establish a nuclear power plant.
In 1976 Cuba and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to construct two 440-megawatt nuclear power reactors in the south central province of Cienfuegos, near Juragua, about 180 miles south of Key West, Florida. Juragua's nuclear reactors are the newest model (known as the VVER-440 model) of Soviet design and are the first Soviet-designed reactors to be built in the Western Hemisphere in a tropical environment.
This arrangement was aimed at alleviating Cuba's dependency upon foreign oil while bolstering its electricity capacity. The importation of oil has drained Cuba of its sparse hard currency. At the same time the country's production of electricity has been fraught with difficulties. As of 1992 Cuban power plants have been working at only 47% of their capacity, leading to frequent blackouts. It is believed that this figure has fallen further due to the relative decline in the Cuban economy since 1990. Upon competition, the first reactor, Juragua #1, would generate approximately 15% of Cuba's energy demands.
Actual construction of the reactors began in 1983. The Soviet Union supplied a majority of the reactor parts, dispatched technicians to supervise construction, and trained Cuban engineers to operate the reactors. According to 1992 GAO report, Russia tentatively scheduled the first reactor to be operational in late 1995 to early 1996. This was due in part to the Cubans constructing the reactor lacking experience and with all critical work being performed by Russians or under their supervision.
However, the breakup of the Soviet Union disrupted construction at Juragua. The newly formed Russian Federation in conjunction with its transitioning into a market economy established new economic ties with Cuba. Current bilateral ties between Russia and Cuba, now, involve providing technical assistance to Cuba on a commercial basis. At the same time the loss of Soviet subsidies to Cuba after 1990 has sent the Cuban economy into decline. As a result, on September 5, 1992, Cuban President Fidel Castro announced a suspension of construction at Juragua due to Cuba's inability to meet the financial terms set by Russia to complete the reactors. A September 1992 GAO report estimated that civil construction on the first reactor ranged from 90 to 97% complete with only 37% of the reactor equipment installed. About 20 to 30% of the civil construction on the second reactor was completed with the status of the equipment unknown.
Cuban-Russian attempts to resume construction at Juragua took place in October 1995. A high-level Russian delegation with full backing of the government arrived in arrived in Havana to conclude an agreement to complete construction. To raise the estimated 800 million dollars necessary to complete the reactors, Russia and Cuba decided to form a syndicate with potential third parties. Companies in Britain, Brazil, Italy, Germany and Russia expressed interest in an economic association, but as of yet have not concluded an agreement that moves them to take Juragua further than the maintenance phase. Yet, Cuba was rewarded with a 50 million dollar loan from Russia for support work at Juragua.
Cuba now receives financial support for the Juragua plants from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA has provided nuclear technical assistance in atomic energy development and in the application of isotopes and radiation. The IAEA has provided from 1991 to 1996 about $680,000 to Cuba to develop the ability to conduct a safety assessment of Juragua reactors, and in preserving or "mothballing", the reactors while construction is suspended. According to a 1997 GAO report, IAEA appropriations to Cuba from 1961 to 1996 totaled 12 million dollars.
Recent events have led to the speculation of resumption of construction in the near future. Although Cuba announced in January 1997 an indefinite postponement in construction, an official from the Ministry of the Russian Federation told General Accounting Officials in February that Russia intends to resume construction of Juragua in 1998. This will be accomplished through an international consortium of countries including Russia.
Cuba's attempt to establish a nuclear power plant has been met with substantial opposition. Think tanks such as the Center for Security Policy (CSP) believe that the Juragua reactors must not be allowed to operate. In his 1995 testimony before Congress, Roger W. Robinson, Jr, member of CSP's board of advisors, indicated that the Juragua reactors are inundated with safety problems: structural defects in support structures in key reactor components, integral reactor systems, including the reactor vessels, steam generators and primary cooling pumps were exposed to highly corrosive tropical sea weather, and that as many as 15% of 5,000 approved welds in key reactor equipment were found to be defective. Robinson's testimony's indicated that Cuban intelligence knowingly destroyed evidence proving the extent of the reactor's flaws, making it impossible to take effective corrective action to repair the welds.
CSP's concerns over safety issues at Juragua have been echoed by academic scientists. A Cuban geophysicist defector observed that Cuba lacks the sophisticated and technological infrastructure needed to support a safe nuclear reactor program. Vladimir Cerverra, who led quality control at Juragua, stated 60% of the Soviet material shipped for the two reactors was defective. Dr. Manuel Cereijo stated that although the Juragua reactors are not similar to the Soviet Chernobyl model they are nonetheless dangerous. Four similar Juragua type reactors (VVER-440) in East Germany were immediately shut down by West Germany upon reunification. Similar plants in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are currently under inspection, shut down or have received extensive modification.
The critics of Juragua's viability to operate properly point to the following concerns: deficiencies in construction, lack of safety and quality control during the installation process, the poor Russian design of the instrumentation and control systems, the poor training and experience level of the Cuban personnel who were trained on Soviet model 230 reactors which were different from Juragua. Historically, accidents at nuclear power plants (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl), were due in large part to human error. As a result, critics see the possibility of an accident occurring at Juragua as a strong possibility and the effects of which would be environmentally cataclysmic to the Caribbean, Latin America and the United States.
The construction of a nuclear power plant in Cuba has drawn staunch opposition from the United States. U.S. policy towards a Cuban nuclear power plant reflects the same attitudes of Juragua's critics, those of great concerns over possible safety problems. A 1992 GAO report addressing the current status of Juragua concluded that, if the reactors were completed, the possibility of an accident was likely. As a result, the U.S. adopted a policy that opposes the completion of both reactors, and discourages other countries from providing assistance except for safety purposes to Cuba's nuclear program.
U.S. policy to prevent the completion of Juragua has led to increased pressure on Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act of March 1996 unequivocally stated congressional opposition to Juragua. The first article of the law declared a nuclear reactor in Cuba to be "an act of aggression", establishing a provision that requires U.S. sanctions against any countries that attempt to assist Cuba in finishing the Juragua reactors. From 1981 to 1996 the U.S. withheld its proportional funding to the technical cooperation fund of the IAEA for Cuba. Although this restriction has been rescinded, between 1981 and 1995, Cuba was denied a total of 2 million dollars. At the same time the U.S. Energy Department has refused to include Cuba in its 180 million nuclear safety program established with Russia and former Soviet Bloc states in Eastern Europe, totaling 59 reactors. Currently, Congress introduced legislation to cutoff U.S. funding to the IAEA, 16 million dollars, unless the IAEA suppresses its funding of Juragua. Cuba was slated to receive 1.7 million dollars for the 1997-1990 period.
II. Legal Clusters
In 1995 Russia formed a partnership with Cuba with the purpose of finding foreign investors necessary to raise the 800 million dollars necessary to complete the two reactors. The German firm Siemens, a British bank and Brazilian private firms have displayed interest in participating in a consortium with Russia and Cuba.
Since 1995 Russia has provided installments totaling 50 million dollars to Cuba. These funds have served to restore Juragua's status to pre-1992 conditions before construction was halted.
In June 1997, Russia and Cuba concluded an agreement to finish construction on both Juragua reactors in Cienfuegos. Upon resumption of construction, both Juragua reactors are expected to be operational within a 16 month timespan. Despite the threat of U.S. sanctions under the Helms-Burton Act against any country that financially assists the Juragua project, Russia remains willing to invest 200 million dollars to see the project completed.
The Cuba and Soviet Union 1976 agreement allowed the Soviets to construct two 440-megawatt nuclear power reactors in Cienfuegos that remains binding.
Cuba and Russia
Cuba, a non-signatory to the Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty, prevents any international inspections. Despite receiving limited nuclear technical assistance from the IAEA, Juragua is not suspect to mandatory inspection of its facilities.
III Geographic Clusters
A. Geographic Domain: North America
B. Geographic Site: North and South America
C. Geographic Impact: Cuba, United States, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua
The United States has placed pressure on Russia attempting to dissuade them from completing the project. At the same time Congress enacted stronger sanctions against Cuba in 1996 by passing the Helms-Burton Act. This law's first provision states that a nuclear reactor in Cuba to be an act of aggression. This legislation calls for U.S. sanctions against any country that attempts to assist in the completion of the Juragua plants.
At the same time the U.S. has initiated unilateral actions against Cuba. The United States has maintained an embargo with one of its aims being to prevent Cuba from raising the capital necessary to finish both reactors. Congress moved to pressure the IAEA to end its funding of nuclear technical assistance to Cuba. With the U.S. providing 30% of the IAEA's budget, legislation has been introduced that would reduce funding to the IAEA for every dollar it gives to Cuba.
A. Directly Related to Product:YES
In the event of an accident during Juragua's operation radioactivity could leak from the plant. Such an incident would have an severely adverse affect upon Cuba's two sources of income, sugar cane and tourism. At the same time wind patterns would allow radioactive fallout to cover the southeastern United States, Mexico, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.
Once the reactors are operational, Cuba will have to develop plans to deal with nuclear waste generated by the reactors. Currently there are no appropriate sites to deposit nuclear waste. The Cuban government plans to dump waste in an area at sea level near the Juragua plant. This would contaminate the flora, fauna and Cuban population.
B. Indirectly Related to Product:
C. Not Related to Product: NO
D. Related to Process: Radiation
The Cuba and Soviet Union 1976 agreement allowed the Soviets to construct two 440-megawatt nuclear power reactors in Cienfuegos. The U.S.S.R. provided a majority of the reactor equipment. It did not provide civil construction, nuclear fuel, or training of Cuban engineers to work the reactors.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, economic cooperation with Cuba broke down as Russia adopted a market economy, shifting assistance to Cuba on a commercial basis
>From the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s the Soviet Union maintained a special trade relationship with Cuba. The Soviet Union provided Cuba with 13 million tons of oil each year below the level of world prices. Cuba re-exproted portions of the oil on the market, making a yearly profit of $300 million dollars. However, this revenue was was not enough for Cuba. Hence the Soviet Union aggreed to purchase Cuban sugar at preferential prices. This meant that the Soviet Union paid $1,400 per ton of sugar--over six times the world market price.
The collaspe of the Soviet Union changed the nature of trade towards Cuba. In May 1990, a senior Soviet offical announced that Cuba would lose in excess of $3.2 billion dollars due to drop in price paid for sugar from $1,400 per ton of sugar to $600. As a result in 1994 Cuba concluded to sell sugar to Russia at market prices.
Cuba currently is in an economic depression that resulted from the termination of foreign aid from the Soviet Union in 1990. At the same time Cuba's chief export, sugarcane, has declined significantly. Currently Cuba depends heavily upon imported oil for meeting its energy needs. These imports greatly reduce Cuba's much needed hard currency. The Juragua reactors upon completion will generate an estimated 15 percent of Cuba's electricity from nuclear energy.
Cuba experiences problems with power generation, suffering from frequent blackouts. Cuba's 3,900 megawatt power plants, as of 1992, generated at only 47% of its capacity. It is believed this figure has decreased over time in step with Cuba's economy.
The cessation of economic subsidies caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, combined with U.S. economic pressure, has sent Cuba into economic collapse. From 1990 to 1994, Cuba's Gross National Product has fallen 34.8%.
In 1997 a British oil company Premier Oil Plc spearheaded an attempt to find petroleum deposits in Cuba. Initial drilling revealed rock structures that might contain between 500 million to a billion barrels of oil. However Premier on March 4th 1998 announced a pullout out of Cuba amid political pressure from the United States. Under threat of American sanctions from the Helms-Burton Act, Premier withdrew from Cuba for political reasons.
In the event of an accident, the possibility of radioactive fallout blanketing northwestern Cuba, the Caribbean, Latin America and the United States is a major concern. A large nuclear accident could easily have devastating effects on Cuba's two main sources of income, tourism and agriculture. Even the negative perception of a minor nuclear accident would create great relutance by foreign markets to consume Cuban sugar or choose Cuba as a tourist destination.
This problem is further highlighted by allegations made by Cuban engineers who formally worked at Juragua stating the power plant suffers from serious construction flaws. A large amount of the equipment, including the steam supply system, was exposed for over 18 months to highly corrosive salt air, thus increasing the risk of severe damage. It is estimated that up to 15% of the welds of the auxiliary piping of the containment dome are defective. X-ray testing demonstrated that many of the pipe unions were weakened as a result of poor welding, air bags and overheating. Monolithic concrete pours required to eliminate leak creating joints pursuant to international safety standards did not occur do to lack of materials. Instead, pours occurred when materials were available, creating many cold joints, reducing the ability of the structure to prevent leakage. The first reactor's containment dome was designed to stand the pressure of only seven pounds per square inch. This is insufficient to support the pressure of a meltdown. The standard in the United States is 50 pounds per square inch, over seven times the pressure of the Cuban system.
The possibility of an accident occurring at Juragua, upon its operation according to experts, is fifteen percent. This probability should be less than one percent. The environmental damage and ecological risks involved would be disastrous because of the poor construction of the power plant. Juragua does not have testing facilities to measure radioactive leaks. Currently, Cuba lacks a comprehensive system to perform systematic readings that monitor radioactivity to prevent potential accidents. According to air weather patterns around Cienfuegos, it would take only 24 hours for radioactive materials to reach southern Florida and approximately 48 hours before they reached the eastern United States. Experts believe in the final analysis that if the Cuban government be able to complete the plant, the possibility of a major disaster is extremely high.
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In 1994 Eric Lawson, at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University, proposed that Cuba adopt biomass generation of electricity by using the residue from their annual sugarcane harvest. After conducting a visit to Cuba, Lawson concluded that if Cuba were to adopt high-pressure steam turbines co-generation technology at all of its sugar mills, it could produce an amount of electricity from sugarcane twice the total present utility electricity production from oil. If biomass-gasifier/gas-turbine technology were used, the potential for electricity generated is quadruple present electricity production from oil.
In February 1996 a delegation from the Natural Resources Defense Council(NRDC) and Citizens Energy Corporation visited Cuba to propose the viability of biomass generation. Meeting with Cuban Vice-President Pedro Miret and President Fidel Castro they raised the benefits of alternative energy sources. The delegation believed that biomass generation could generate massive amounts of electricity from the 40 million tons of waste from the sugar-cane harvest. Cuba has 156 sugar mills and is already producing a sizeable amount of electricity from burning bagasse( the fiber remaining when the sugar is squeezed from the cane ). The Vice-Director of the Institute claimed to Cuban officials that over a half a million tons of oil could be saved each year if these sugar-cane residues were combusted for electrical generation.
VI. Other Factors
There is a strong possibility of radioactive materials being released from the Juragua plant in the event of an accident. The effects of such an incident occurring would reach far beyond Cuba's borders. Leakage of radioactive waste would contaminate waters in the Caribbean, permanently damaging the ecological life around Cuba's seacoast. Also, a dispersion of radioactive materials would spread massive environmental destruction over a good portion of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, the Caribbean and Latin America.
Source: NEI SOURCE BOOK
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1995. URL
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Inherent Danger of the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant . [ Online ]. 3
May 1996 URL http://www.canfet.org/english/press/e960503a.html
Landberg, Reed. British Firm to Search for Oil in Cuba. [ Online ]
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Mendelsohn, Jack. Huddling with the Honchos from Havana [ Online ].
September 1993. URL
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U.S. Congress. General Accounting Office. Nuclear Safety: Concerns
About the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba. 101th Cong., 2nd session
RECD-92-262. Washington D.C. 1992.
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11 April 1997. URL
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Robinson, Roger. Cuba and the Juragua Nuclear Power Complex.
Testimony. from a hearing of the House International Relations
Committee
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. 1 August 1995. Washington D.C.
1995.
Rohter, Larry. Cuban A-Plant Worries U.S. Over Safety .[ Online ].
25 February 1996 URL http://www.latinolink.com/news/cuba0225.html.
Russians Announce Cuban Visit to work out Nuclear Plant Deal [ Online].
October 1995. URL
http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world/100695/world585_9.html
Smith, Wayne. Help Cuba with Nuclear Power [ Online ]. September
1995. URL http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/so95/so95.guest.html.
The Cuban Energy Crisis [ Online ]. 13 February 1996. URL:
http://www.nrdc.org/nrdc/bkgrd/nucuener.html.
The Juragua Nuclear Power Plant [ Online ]. 12 Febuary 1996 URL
http://www.nrdc.org/bkgrd/nucujur.html
VII
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Principal Deficiencies:
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