From Finland to NokiaLand
I. Identification
1. The Issue:
Since the devastating depression at the beginning of the 90s, Finland has arisen to become a technological wonderhouse of the North. This quick rise, for a great part, has had to do with the phenomenal rise of Nokia from a company that originally made cartires and rubber boots into the biggest cell phone manufacturer of the world. Nokia is indeed heralded around the world as a success of entrepreneur inqenuity, technological innovation and good business management. In Finland the success of Nokia often evokes sentiments of national pride. Yet, what has often gone unnoticed is the effects this trade of cellphones has had on Finnish culture; like ripples in a pond, these effects have reverbarated to all parts of the Finnish society. The trade of cellphones, however, are merely symbolic of a bigger change occuring: a change in which the old global political realities that Finland, like any other small nation, has traditionally had to deal with have in the recent years changed to the new realities of the globalization of finance. In Finland, this change is slowly bringing about a demise of the welfare-state in which co-operation and equality used to be prioritized before competition and profit.
2. Description
Historically, Finland has always been caught up in the power politics of surrounding and more powerful nations. Thus, as a result, the Finnish people have had to struggle to find their place among nations in the world. Moreover, these surrounding nations have had enormous impacts on the culture of Finland. The latest of these changes is what I call Nokianization, the transformation of the Finnish society from a welfare state based more on cooperation and equality to a society based more on competition and profit.
Traditionally, Finland has been dominated by two spheres of influence. To the West, Finland has been a part of the Western European sphere, dominated first by the kingdom of Sweden for 700 years, later becoming a part of the European Union. To the East, Finland has been under the sphere of first the Russian influence and later the influence of Soviet Union. At times, the struggle for the cultural integrity of Finland has been gruesome and bloody. Nonetheless, in the history of Finland, four distinct periods of cultural changes can be traced out. These are: one, the 700-years when Finland was under the cultural and political influence of Sweden. Two, the years when Finland was under the Grand Duchy of Russia. Three, the post WW II years during which Finland's neutrality and independence was threatened by the Cold War politics of the Western bloc and Soviet Union. And four, the post- Cold war period, in which Finland has become increasingly intertwined to the globalization of trade and finance that has swept the globe.
For the first 700 years (the beginning cannot be really traced out, because Finland has always been a sparsely populated country of snow, swamps and forests) Finland was a part of Sweden. It was, both politically and culturally, directly linked to the kingdom of Sweden. The language of education administration was Swedish and for a Finnish-speaking person, the only the only road to advancement was assimilation into Swedish culture." Thus, because of this close relationship to Sweden, some scholars have argued that "had Finland remained part of Sweden, the Finnish-speaking population, whatever would be left of it, might today be one of the many frustrated linguistic minorities that angrily clamor for recognition (1)." ( To see maps about the changes in Finland's borders click here.)
However, due to changes in the geo-political situations of Northern Europe, Finland suddenly gained a new master. In 1807, after a brief war between Russia and Sweden, Finland became an autonomous province of greater Russia. "In terms of geopolitics, Finland became part of the Russian empire; in cultural terms Finland remained part of the West (2)," many scholars like to point out. Finland was at the time a very egalitarian society without vast estates nor serfs that were at the time characteristics of the Russian society. This period also marked a change in Finnish cultural identity. Despite there having been some prior burgenoning of the so-called Finnish cultural identity, this period marked a radical shift in consciousness. Suddenly, the Finnish people had to fear a new master - and the fear for a possible Russianization program that would threaten Finnish independence was indeed very real (3).
Thus, the Finnish culture shifted from being in a state of symbiosis with Sweden to resistance against the new rulers. The initial fear of Russification, however, did not become a reality until 1898, when General Nicolai Ivanovich Bobrikov was handed over the province of Finland with the goal of integrating it both culturally and politically into the larger Russian empire(4). The language of schools was gradually switched over from Swedish (at the time) to Russian and other methods of repression were carried systematically throught out Finland. The resistance also grew, mounting a national civil disobedience campain that resulted to the independence of Finland in 1917, following the Bolshevik revolution. The heart-felt feeling of a common enemy had crystallized the Finnish nationalist sentiment that had dormant during most of the 700 years unders Sweden. This nationalism has remained strong ever since.
The third period of cultural change came about after World War II. During the 1939-1945 period, Finland had fought two bloody wars with Soviet Union that had resulted in the loss of about 25 percent of Finnish national territory. After World War II, however, the world was divided into two antagonizing blocks, neither of which Finland (stuck in the middle) could be a part of. Historically and culturally, Finland was closer to the Western bloc, yet Soviet Union was too close to allow any disgression away from Finland's neutrality. Thus, the new problem Finland faced was the "problem of reconciling Finnish national aspirations with Russian interests (5)." The result of this compromising position was a blanket of self-censorship that descended upon the Finnish society, retrospectively coined by historians as Finlandization. Finlandization was not outright censorship towards anything critical of the Communist superpower to the East. Rather it was an all-encompassing consensus in society which dictated that nothing really critical was to be said about the status quo of neutrality that seemed to protect Finland from becoming another pawn in the power politics of the Cold War. The position, scholars have argued, did not provide much leeway. "Just as Moscow grew uneasy about the implications of Finnish neutrality for Eastern Europe, so did Western critics of detente fear the Finnish example might seduce West European nations into imagining that it would be possible to live in peace with the Soviet Union without the protection of a strong military alliance (6)."
However, the culture of Finlandization and the policy of neutrality allowed Finland with the other Nordic countries - spearheaded by Sweden - to create a culture that aimed at being a sort of a watered-down version of cut-throat capitalism, soft capitalism or social democracy. Under the auspices of Finlandization, Finland had to remain neutral from the more hard-core laissez-faire capitalist policies of the US, but at the same time its historically close ties to the West allowed it to be a part of a free market system, protecting it from a Communist takeover. This gave the Nordic countries space to create what later became to be known as 'welfare states,' a system where the welfare of all the citizens were often placed before profits or competitive markets. Moreover, this also toned down the class divisions in Finland, evening out the biggest spikes of class inqueality in the country. "At the beginning of the 1970s, the Communist strongholds in the rural areas were being rapidly depopulated. The Scandinavian-style welfare system built up in the 1960s and 1970s removed much of the sense of insecurity and discontent that had fueled the Communist movement. In urban areas, the traditional working class subculture with its own newspapers and clubs was dissolved by the spread of middle class living and suburban values (7). "
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to an entirely new situation. A "catastrophe hit Finland in 1990 when an asset bubble and bankin crisis came on the heels of collapse of the Soviet Union. In the past Finland kept peace with the Soviets by selling a quarter of its exports across the border for bartered oil. But Finland tanked with the Communist regime: real GDP fell 10% between 1990 and 1993, and the budget deficit of this welfare-obsessed nation hit 7% of the GDP. Finland's weak companies folded at 1930s rates and unemployment hit 18% (8)." Moreover, at the height of the recession, and partially affected by the break-up of the priorly all-encompassing Eastern threat, Finland moved towards tighter Western intergration with the European Union. And finally in 1993, Finland joined the European Union as well as later on the European Monetary Union (EMU) as well as began a structural crash adjustment to the new demands of globalization of trade and finance (9).
This structural crash adjustement also marked the beginning of the latest phase of a new period of cultural change happening in Finland. Nokia and its trade of cellphones is but the latest manifestation of this period when Finland became intrinsically intertwined with the sweeping globalization of trade and finance. Nonetheless, since the serious derpression in 1990-1993, Finland's phonenix-like recovery has been apllauded around the world. A great deal of this recovery has been accredited to the rapid rise in high-tech industries. After 1993, Finland has enjoyed a continuing steady growth, averaging growth rates of 4.5% between 1993-1998 (10). In 1999, the stock market in Finland grew the most rapidly in the world: what is called the hex-index grew 162 percent and what is called the portfolio-index grew 66.2 percent (11). In all accounts, Finland's recovery from the somber times of the early nineties when the Salvation Army bread lines grew to be blocks long has indeed been very successful.
Nonetheless, these latest transformations have also had enormous impacts on the Finnish culture and its role on the world. Prior to the collapse of Soviet Union, Finland's role in the world had to primarily do with its geographical position within the power-political nexus of nations - first a buffer zone between Sweden and Russia, later a neutral country squeezed in between the Eastern and the Western blocs. But, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the role of Finland has dramatically changed. Since the early 1990s, the most prevalent force of cultural change in Finland has become economical, not political. The example of Nokia (and the trade of cellphones) symbolizes this change. It is very hard to quantitatively describe the influence Nokia has on the culture of Finland, ranging from consumption habits to views about the role of the state and society.
But examples are abound: In 1999, according to a Norwegian Dagens Naringsliv magazine, "the Finns swallow all the decisions of the European Commission and smile of top of it all, even if they would like to disagree. The Finns want to be full-blooded Europeans...for them Nokia is more important that the Nordic countries (12). " According to the same article, these delegates are sarcastically referred to as the 'Nokia boys' by other European Union delegates (13). In a poll conducted by the Finnish daily Helsingin Sanomat, Jorma Ollila, the chairman of Nokia was placed as the second most powerful influencing person in the Finnish society. Moreover, according to Erkki Karvonen, the Editor of the Finnish Journal for Mass Communications Research, the magazine of the University of Helsinki was reprimanded for saying a negative word against the chairman of Nokia, a company that also happens to be a big sponsor of the University (14). In addition, Karvonen said that it is very hard to find a critical word about Nokia in the media in Finland (15).
More quantitatively, Nokia's brand is now the 11th powerful brand in the world, and some marketing speliasist have somewhat sarcastically recommended that maybe Finland should try to somehow link up with the brandname of Nokia to improve the brandname of the country of Finland (16). Morevover, out of the around 5 percent economic growth Finland has been enjoying, 1.5 percent is attributable to Nokia (17). Nokia makes as much money as all the other companies combined in Finland, and it has hired 2.5 times as many employers in Finland as any other company (18). It also accounts for about 65% of the trade in the Helsinki stock market (19). In addition, Nokia's stock had added between 9.000 to 20,000 millionaires into Finland, a society that for long had prided in being egalitarian (20). In addition, despite the immense influence Nokia has arguably had on the society of Finland, only 14,4 percent is owned by Finnish people. 85 is abroad, with the American financial capital owning about 80 percent (21). If one wishes to play devil's advocate, as some more critical observers have done, Finland was first controlled by Sweden, then Russia, then Soviet Union - and now finally the stockholders of Nokia.
Finally, the best example of the cultural change is the fate of one historically important countercultural music venue in Helsinki. This alternative concert hall, a historically important training place for bands was originally illegally occupied by students and youngsters. It later became an institution of youth culture in Finland. For more thant twenty years this brick building painted with colorful grafitti served as the heart of Finnish counterculture virtually at the center of Helsinki.
Yet now it is being torn down to be replaced by a shining glass and steel branch office of Nokia.
All these examples are, however, just the symptoms of the fourth phase of cultural change in Finland. This cultural change, unlike other times in history, is not brought about by political or military agression from the East or the West, but by the post Cold War onslaught of the liberalization of trade and finance. Or more specifically, as it is with this case of Nokianization, brought about by the side-effects of the trade of cellphones that resulted from the liberalization of trade and finance - side-effects that cannot be quantitatively assessed or placed a prize-tag on as the current trade legistlative infrastructures demand.
3. Related Cases
Due to numerous reasons, one being that Finland is such a more small player in the world economy, no specific studies exist about Finland in the Trade and Environment Database. Likewise, no other cases exist specifically dealing with the impacts the trade of a product has on the culture of a society. Nonetheless, here are som other Trade and Environment Database case that might be useful in understanding the complex role culture plays in conjuntion with trade.
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/borders.htm
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/english.htm
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/indbeef.htm
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/bride.htm
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/pokemon.htm
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/traffic.htm
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/costume.htm
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/mummy.htm
4. Draft Author:
Matti Pohjonen
Note Date: April 11, 2000.
II. Legal Clusters
The case of Nokia is unique in the sense that it does not directly fit under the auspices of any legal agreement. And, not that it necessarily should, as the side-effects of cell-phones on a culture (as hopefully demonstrated above) cannot really be placed under any existing legal framework relating to trade. The question is much more a political one - and relating to the role civil society plays in the development of a nation and a culture. Also, as Erkki Karvonen, the editor for the Finnish Journal of Mass Communications Research remarked, Nokia has been a blessing to the post-depression Finland. It has literally pulled Finland from the depths of depression it experienced during the early 1990s, to make Finland one of the most competitive and technologically innovative nations in the world today. So to be critical of Nokia's success is also to be partially critical of the whole economic success and recovery of Finland. There is nothing really instrinsically bad about this; oustide some of the more obvious misuses of corporate power, there is nothing that should or could, for that matter, be regulated by law. It is important to note, however, that for the functioning of a true democracy, it is important to at least notice the dangers and benefits of a corporate-led economic development model. Only then, by the participation of the civil society, could the diversity of the voices heard in a democratic debate.
Nonetheless, a couple of legal things can be said about the trade of cellphones legally, as well as the issues of investment it brings along. However, it should be stressed once again, that this kind of legislative language is very incommensurable with the more qualitiative aspects of the change the trade of cellphones is causing on the culture of Finland.
5. Discourse and Status:
Disagreement and Allegation.
6. Forum and Scope:
Finland and unilateral; possibly multilateral.
7. Decision Breadth:
Not applicable.
8. Legal Standing:
Legally, the trade of cellphones falls under the WTO rules on the trade of information technology. These rules concerning information technology follow the Ministerial Declaration issued in Singapore, 1996. In this declaration, the parties - Australia, Japan, Canada, Korea, Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Norway, European Communities, Singapore, Honk Kong, Switzerland, Iceland, Turkey, Indonesia, United States - agreed to the following:
1. Each party's trade regime should evolve in a manner that enhances market access opportunities for information technology products.
2. Pursuant to the modalities set forth in the Annex to this Declaration, each party shall bind and eliminate customs duties and other duties and charges of any kind, within the meaning of Article II:1 (b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, with respect to the following:
(a) all products classified (or classifiable) with HArmonized System (1996) ("HS) headings listed in Attachement A to the annex of the Declaration; and
(b) all products specified in Attachment B to the Annex to this Declaration whether or not they are included in Attachement A; through equal rate reductions of customs duties beginning in 1997 and concluding in 2000, recognizing that extended staging of reductions and, before, implementation, expansion of product coverage may be necessary in limited circumstances.
3. Ministers express satisfaction about the large product coverage outlined in the Attachements to the Annex to this Declaration. They instruct their respective officials to make good faith efforts to finalize plurilateral technical discussions in Geneva on the basis of these modalities, and instruct these officials to complete this work by 31 January 1997, so as to ensure the implementation of this Declaration by the largest number of participants.
4. Ministers invite the Ministers of other Members of the WTO, and States or separate customs territories in the process of acceding to tge WTO, to provide similar instructions to their respective officials, so that they may particpate in the technical discussions referred to in paragraph 3 above and participate fully in the expansion of world trade in information products.
More about the legal aspect can be found on the WTO website. See also more about WTO rulings.
III. Geographic Clusters
9. Geographic Locations
a. Geographic Domain: Europe
b. Geographic Site: Northern Europe
c. Geographic Impact: Finland.
10. Sub-National Factors:
Yes, the success of Nokia has a lot to do with the active government promotion of national infrastructure as well as the historically strong communication system that has existed in Finland. The reasons lie deep in history.
Already during the Czarist era, the telephone (at that time the telgraph) was a device that held a lot of symbolic value. As Czarist Russia took over Finland, one of the first things it also did was take control of the nations telegraph industry (22). "But the Finns managed to wrestle control of the newfangled telephone from the Czar Alexander...and from 1882 on, Finland began building local phone companies. (23) " Thus, the phone became a symbol of Finnish autonomy, and shortly after independence in 1917, "some 800 independent local phone companies dotted the country.(24)" In the dephts of the recession, the Finnish goverment went to back to this model of independent phone companies, and privatized the telecomm industry to be more suitable with the demands of the global market.
As a result, telecommunications operations in Finland has undergone liberalization since 1985 and it has not been as difficult as in many other countries due to the pre-existing tradition of privatelt owned telecommunications providers. In addition, Finland was one of the first countries to open its telecommunications market and has one of the lowest tariff rates today. The volume of telephone lines and telephones is one of the highest today, the network is hundered percent digitalized. Finland is currently the largest user of cellular phones with the ratio around 60% today (25).
Thus, a great deal of this success already is built upon an already-functioning local telecommunications infrastrtucture. Also, it is good to remember that Finland has publicly-funded school and university system that has been central to providing skillful employees to feed the growing demand for engineers and technicians in Finland. (At the present moment, Nokia would hire all the graduating engineers if it could).
11. Type of Habitat:
Cool. Non-applicable.
IV. Trade Clusters
12. Type of Measure:
Trade liberalization. The trade of cellphones is only a manifestation of the larger scope of trade liberalization.
13. Direct v. Indirect Impacts:
Indirect.
14. Relation of Trade Measure to Environmental Impact
a. Directly Related to Product:
Electronics.
b. Indirectly Related to Product:
Culture. The dynamics within the culture of Finland is changing from a more egalitarian-minded society to a society based on profit and competition.
c. Not Related to Product:
No
d. Related to Process:
Morals. People begin to see the neo-liberal paradigm and competition as the only possible organizational principle of society. The third way that Scandinavian and Finland used to represent, is seen more and more a fleeting utopian dream of the past - not a viable alternative to the current Washington Consensus of 'hard capitalism' heralded by the Unites States.
15. Trade Product Identification:
Product type: cell phone, Nokia. Nokia is the leading cell-phone manufacturer in the world. It holds about a 30% market-value over the sale of cellp-hones globally. Moreover, as the predictions show, this share is increasing very rapidly. Following is a table about the global cellphone markets.
MAJOR CELLULAR HANDSET SUPPLIERS: worldwide shipment in millions of units.
'99 Ranking/ Company
1998 unit. shipment
1998 share 1999 unit ship. forecastesd 1999 share forecasted Nokia 41 25% 81 31% Motorola 32 20% 42 16% LM Ericsson
23 14% 32 12% Panasonic 12 7% 17 7% Samsung 7 4% 13 5% Alcatel 7 4% 11 4% Siemens 4 2% 11 4% Qualcomm/Sony 6 4% 10 4% Other 31 19% 41 16% Total 163 100% 258 100% In addition, Nokia's brand is among one of the most respected in the world, among the most powerful brands such as Marlboro, AT&T and McDonalds. See the following table:
BRAND VALUE BRAND SHARE OF COMPANY VALUE Coca-Cola $83,9 billion 59% Microsoft $56,7 billion 21% IBM $43,8 billion 28% General Electric $33,5 billion 10% Ford $33,2 billion 58% Disney $32,3 billion 61% Intel $30,0 billion 21% McDonald's $26,2 billion 64% AT&T $24,2 billion 24% Marlboro $21,1 billion 19% NOKIA $20,7 billion 44% Mercedes $17,8 billion 37% Nescafe $17,6 billion 23% Hewlett-Packard $17,1 billion 31%
16. Economic Data
Despite Nokia's leading role in the world market, the key exporter and importer in telecommunications equipment is still naturally the Unites States. The data primarily shows the rapid increase in the the trade of telecommunication equipment.
In numerical value the exports are the following:
YEAR AMOUNT 1994:
$13,954,677,00 1995: $16,976,880,000 1996: $17,693,776,000 1997: $21,401,024,000 1998: $21,030,160,000
In numerical value, the imports are the following:
YEAR AMOUNT 1994: $17,030,464,000 1995: $18,764,360,000 1996: $17,812,992,000 1997: $19,389,440,000 1998: $22,497,040,000
Moreover, when one looks at the exports of telecommunications equipment form Finland, the data shows a rapid, if not phenomenal, increase. It is, however, good to note that Nokia does not account for all the numbers, but its importance overshadows other minor telecommunications importers. I include data both for the general electrical machinery as well as telecommunications only to show the larger scope of the technological development in FInland. (No data exists for the year 2000 yet, but that data would even further demonstrate this rapid increase in exports).
In numerical value, exports from Finland in electrical machinery and equipment and parts there of; sound recorders, and reproducers, television recorders and reporducers, parts and accessories.
YEAR: VALUE: 1996 $175,395,000 1997 $194,376,000 1998 $265,246,000 1999 $298,229,000
Percentage of total exports:
1999: 10,193%
More specifically, in telecommunication exports, Finland, despite its small size, is number 11. This data also shows the rapid growth in trade of telecommunications, i.e cellphones. In addition, newer data would also show a continuation of this rapid increase.
In numerical value, its telecommunications exports were:
YEAR VALUE 1994 $1,764,916,000 1995 $3.277,884,000 1996 $3,946, 132,000 1997 $4,574,822,000
In telecommunications imports, Finland is number 37. Finland's telecommunication imports are a fraction of its telecommunication exports. In numerical value, they are:
YEAR VALUE 1994 $515,735,000 1995 $699,260,000 1996 $790,570,000 1997 $811,057,000
17. Impact of Trade Restriction:
None.
18. Industry Sector:
Manufacturing.
19. Exporters and Importers:
Finland and many.
The key exporer of telecommunication products is Unites States. In numerical value, its exports in telecommunications equipment was:
YEAR VALUE 1994 $13,954,677,000 1995 $16,976,880,000 1996 $17,693,776,000 1997 $21,401,024,000 1998 $21,030,160,000 Likewise, the key importer of telecommunications equipment was also the Unites States. Its imports were:
YEAR VALUE 1994 $17,030,464,000 1995 $18,764,360,000 1996 $17,812,992,000 1997 $19,389,440,000 1998 $22,497,040,00
V. Environment Clusters
20. Environmental Problem Type:
Mainly morals. There has been some discussion about the actual pollution effects of cellphones, yet a consensus about this is still lacking. One of the most in-depth studies about this was conducted by the Worldwatch Institute. in its State of the World 2000. See especially the section called "Harnessing Information Technologies for the Environment" by Molly O'Meara. Nonetheless, whether the promise of new information technology, including cell phones, is good or bad for the environment is still not known. The manufacturing processes of cellphones requires great deals of water and electricity, the devices themselves have for the most part not been designed to last long, yet information techonology also helps to detect and notice environmental problems as well as helps non-governmental organizations campaign against them more easily (26).
However, this is not directly relevant to the case study at hand. For more information, look at the State of the World 2000 report.
21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species
Name: Homo Sapiens
Type: Speech, societal discourse, cultural autonomy.
Diversity: Threatened.
22. Resource Impact and Effect:
Low and Product
23. Urgency and Lifetime:
Low. 5-10Years.
24. Substitutes:
In theory there are many substitutes to this monoculture of cell-phone trade. However, Nokia is central to the success - maybe even survival of the Finnish economy. This creates a whole set of new problems. Like the agricultural monocultures of the developing world, it is extremely hard to find a substitute that would still be economically viable. In the case of Nokia, it is uncertain if a substitute is even desirable. Due to the complexity of the problem, information and debate about the situation would probably be the most viabla alternative, not necessarily the creation of any substitutes This, however, also relates to a bigger question of civil society and politics, which within the scope of this case study can not be adressed. However, a good point to stress, if nothing else, then is is at least crucially important address the unquantifiable side-effects a trade of a certain product has.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case with WTO so far; nor has it been the case of Nokia in Finland.
VI. Other Factors
25. Culture:
Yes: Finnish culture plays a role in this story. As the Petri Rutanen, an managing director of an online brokerage, EQ online, commented: " Finns are not very communicative and we have lots of dark months and bad weather. We are engineers, quietly tinkering in our home. The Internet came like a storm to Finland (27)." Indeed, the arguement could be made, that the national characteristics of the Finns - introspective, reserved, sparsely populated, backward - enabled telecomm industries to flourish. But, it is also not entirely within the scope of this case study. Read books about the national characteristics of the Finns for more about this.
26. Trans-Boundary Issues:
Yes.
27. Rights:
Yes.
28. Relevant Literature
Anholt Simon, "Getting on the Brandwagon," International Finance Corporation, as found at http://www.worldbank.org/ifc/p...I99/brandwagon/brandwagon.html
Austin, F.C Daniel, "Finland as a Gateway to Russia: Issues in European Security," Avebury, Aldershot: 1996
Bruun, Staffan, "Boken om Nokia," Stockholm: Fischer & Co: 1999
"Helsingin Porssissa Maailman Rajuin Kurssinousu," Helsingin Sanomat, Talous, 31.12.1999
"Kommentti - Antti Lassila," Helsingin Sanomat, Talous, 4.3.2000
"Norjalaskirjeenvaihtaja Suomen EU-puheenjohtajuudesta: Suomelle Nokia on Tarkeampi kuin Pohjoismaat," Helsingin Sanomat, Kotimaa 16.9.1999
Jakobson, Max, "Finland in the New Europe," The Washington Papers, Published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, Praeger: 1998.
"L'express: Matka Nokialandiaan.," Suomi Ulkomaisessa Mediassa, as found at http://www.finland.fi/news/sho...WSAID=3397&intNWSCategoryID=11
Makinen, Marco, "NOkia Saga: kertomus yrityksesta ja ihmisista, jotka muutivat sen," Jyvaskyla, Gummerus: 1995
Morais, Richard C. "Smoked Reindeer and WAP Phones," Forbes, Dec 27, 1999, New York.
editor. Tagil Sven, "Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World," Souther Illinois University Press, Carbonsdale and Edwardsville: 1995
29. Sources.
(1) Jakobson Max, "Finland in the New Europe", The Washington Papers/175, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers: 1998, p. 12.
(2) Jakobson Max, "Finland in the New Europe", The Washington Papers/175, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers: 1998, p. 12.
(3) Jakobson Max, "Finland in the New Europe", The Washington Papers/175, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers: 1998, p. 12.
(4) Jakobson Max, "Finland in the New Europe", The Washington Papers/175, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers: 1998, p. 16-18
(5)Jakobson Max, "Finland in the New Europe", The Washington Papers/175, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers: 1998, p.52
(6) Jakobson Max, "Finland in the New Europe", The Washington Papers/175, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers: 1998, pp. 84-85
(7)Jakobson Max, "Finland in the New Europe", The Washington Papers/175, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers: 1998, pp 92-94
(8) Morais, Richard C. "Smoked Reindeer and WAP Phones," Forbes, Dec 27, 1999, New York.
(9) Jakobson Max, "Finland in the New Europe", The Washington Papers/175, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger Publishers: 1998, p. 6-7
(10) Morais, Richard C. "Smoked Reindeer and WAP Phones," Forbes, Dec 27, 1999, New York.
(11) "Helsingin Porssissa Maailman Rajuin Kurssinousu," Helsingin Sanomat, Talous, 31.12.1999
(12) "Norjalaskirjeenvaihtaja Suomen EU-puheenjohtajuudesta: Suomelle Nokia on Tarkeampi kuin Pohjoismaat," Helsingin Sanomat, Kotimaa 16.9.1999
(13) Norjalaiskirjeenvaihtaja Suomen EU-puheenjohtajuudesta: Suomelle Nokia on Tarkeampi kuin Pohjoismaat," Helsingin Sanomat, Kotimaa 16.9.1999
(14) An e-mail interview with Erkki Karvonen, the Editor of the Finnish Journal for Mass Communications Research
(15) An e-mail interview with Erkki Karvonen, the Editor of the Finnish Journal for Mass Communications Research.
(16) Anholt Simon, "Getting on the Brandwagon," International Finance Corporation, as found at http://www.worldbank.org/ifc/p...I99/brandwagon/brandwagon.html
(17) "L'express: Matka Nokialandiaan.," Suomi Ulkomaisessa Mediassa, as found at http://www.finland.fi/news/sho...WSAID=3397&intNWSCategoryID=11
(18) "Nokia Teki Tulosta Yhta Paljon Kuin Muut Yhteensa," Helsingin Sanomat, Talous, 22.2.2000
(19) "L'express: Matka Nokialandiaan.," Suomi Ulkomaisessa Mediassa, as found at http://www.finland.fi/news/sho...WSAID=3397&intNWSCategoryID=11
(20) Morais, Richard C. "Smoked Reindeer and WAP Phones," Forbes, Dec 27, 1999, New York.
(21) "Kommentti - Antti Lassila," Helsingin Sanomat, Talous, 4.3.2000
(22) Morais, Richard C. "Smoked Reindeer and WAP Phones," Forbes, Dec 27, 1999, New York.
(23) Morais, Richard C. "Smoked Reindeer and WAP Phones," Forbes, Dec 27, 1999, New York.
(24) Morais, Richard C. "Smoked Reindeer and WAP Phones," Forbes, Dec 27, 1999, New York.
(25)see "Finland: Leading Sectors for US investment" as found in http://www.tradeport.org/countries/finland/sectors.html
(26)"Tietotekniikka Tuhlaa ja Saastaa: Uuden Tekniikan Ymparistosaldo on kysymysmerkki jopa WorldWatch-instituutille," Helsingin Sanomat, Ulkomaat, 13.2.2000
(27) Morais, Richard C. "Smoked Reindeer and WAP Phones," Forbes, Dec 27, 1999, New York.