FROM ONTOLOGY TO ANALYTICAL THEORY

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Ontology as a Rigorous Science

Sociology and philosophy seem to have this in common: in
spite of notable progress in special fields, **each** discipline
as a whole lacks unity and fails to accumulate knowledge.
Both disciplines are split into separate schools between
which exist no clearly defined relationship. For example,
philosophers continue to be divided into nominalists and
realists, empiricists and rationalists, etc., with no nota-
ble accumulation of insight.

   Likewise, Talcott Parsons' (1937) daring attempt to
elaborate a common denominator for four of the classics in
sociological theory (viz. Pareto, Alfred Marshal, Durkheim
and Max Weber) seems to have come to nothing. Sociological

theory continues to veer between diverse paradigms (Kuhn 1970) with diverse rationales which do not betray any prospect of convergence. Disarray and eclecticism reign supreme in both disciplines, much as the Crisis of Western Science (Husserl 1936/54) appears to be permanent.

Yet philosophy itself tells us that this need not be so. From Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and Comte a special discipline, "first philosophy," has existed which purports to go beyond all special disciplines and to integrate them into one overarching system: ontology. Unfortunately, following a usage going back to Aristotle, ontology has been equated, and continues to be equated, with metaphysics and vapid speculation. Half a century after North Whitehead, Husserl and Nicolai Hartmann a critically revised ontology awaits its rehabilitation under the aegis of analytical theory.

To begin with, it is not true that ontology implies metaphysics. Rather, in a strictly non-metaphysical, "positive" sense, "ontology" denotes the one comprehensive discipline that encompasses all others. As Auguste Comte put it, it is the science whose specialty it is to be universal. This holds for Comte's (1830) Positive Philosophy, for Marx's materialism, and Carnap's (1967) Logical Structure of the

<u>World</u> as well as for Nicolai Hartmann's (1954) <u>New Ontology</u> and for Talcott Parsons's (1966,1978) structural functional-ism.

Factual Truth and Logical Truth

Next to being comprehensive, ontology represents a system of rational truths <u>a priori</u> which transcend mere factual truth. As such, ontology faces another obstacle which has haunted it since Plato and Aristotle: conceptual realism. To put it bluntly: **It is not the task of ontology to "mirror," reflect or describe reality any more than the Linnean System mirrors nature or Mendeleev's Periodic Table of Elements mirrors matter. Rather, ontology provides the taxonomy which serves to systematize and analyze our knowledge.** As such it con-structs a system of coordinates which, like the longitudes and latitudes of the globe, are instruments for mapping reality without being part of it.

   Thus, **new light falls on ontology and analytical theory: The latter is a critically revised ontology. By the same token, it is not the function of theory to describe reality. Rather, its function is to elaborate the mapping functions (i.e., the categories) under which reality is mapped.** We

thus eliminate the basic fallacy of classical ontology: its belief in immutable, eternal ideas, substances or truths which either preexist or inhere in reality. To correct this archaism the appropriate way is not to dismiss ontology, but to redefine it in a strictly nominalist, and that is, con-structivist, fashion.

In order to understand this argument it is crucial to realize that human cognition veers around two focal points: observation and reasoning and that there exist two fundamen-tally different kinds of truth: factual, contingent truth and rational, apodictic truth. While factual truth (F-truth) satisfies our immediate empirical needs, it is rational truth, or in terms of Carnap (1954) and Quine (1990), log-ical truth (L-truth) which constitutes strict science, with ontology as its wrongly scorned predecessor[1].

<u>Universality and Necessity</u>

A closer look at Popper's (1934) <u>Logic of Scientific Dis-covery</u> and on modal logic will be illuminating. To say that all swans without exception ($\forall(x)$) are white ($Q(x)$) is tantamount to saying that there does not exist one single swan ($-\exists(x)$) that is not white ($-Q(x)$), i.e.,

$$\forall(x) \ Q(x) \ = \ -\exists(x) \ -Q(x).$$

By contrast, the statement that there exists a swan ($\exists(x)$) which is not white ($-Q(x)$) is tantamount to saying that not all swans ($-\forall(x)$) are white ($Q(x)$), i.e.,

$$\exists(x) \ -Q(x). \ = \ -\forall(x) \ Q(x).$$

What is usually termed quantification thus turns out to denote judgment. By the same token, all our knowledge is either universal (apodictic) or empirical (contingent), as the two "quantors" $\forall$ and $\exists$ indicate. Accordingly, there exist two kinds of truth: **vérités de raison** and **vérités de fait** (in terms of Leibniz), or truths **a priori** and **a posteriori**, or in terms of Carnap, **factual** and **logical truth**.

At the same time, judgment is isomorphic with modal logic: To say that all swans are white is tantamount to saying that swans are **necessarily** white (N $Q(x)$), and that it is **impossible** ($-P$) that there are any (x) that are **not** Q, i.e.,

$$N \ Q(x). \ = \ -P \ -Q(x).$$

Modal logic thus teaches us an important lesson: **Necessity does not inhere in reality, but in our judgment about it**. To say that x is necessarily Q is to say that it is impossible (inconceivable, unthinkable, not imaginable, etc.) that x is non-Q. By the same token, saying that Q(x) is impossible is to say that, for all we can imagine, it is not possible (conceivable) that x is Q, i.e.,

$$N -Q(x). = -P Q(x).$$

In every case, necessity -- and by the same token, possibility -- inhere in our judgment. Once this is understood it becomes clear that the days of determinism are over. By the same token, **objectivity no longer reflects reality, but is the achievement of the active, discerning intellect**, as Kant discovered with resounding success. **Rather than mirroring reality, objectivity originates by human fiat.** A new avenue thus opens for theory construction. To the deluge of empiricism, pragmatism, and subjectivism, analytical theory opposes objectivity (Popper 1972) and constructivism (Paul Lorenzen 1987).

By the same token, the myth of the "transcendental Ego" evaporates. Apodictic statements constitute both logical

truth and objectivity. To paraphrase Althusser (1968), objectivity represents "epistemology without a subject," as the judgment, "2+2=4" illustrates: In contrast to existential (empirical) judgments logical truths are valid regardless of person, place or time. As Popper has made clear, they are intrinsically transempirical and in this sense, "transcendental[2]."

Foundation as a Logical Function

The preceding analysis has shown the common foundation of strict science and ontology in logic. Still, rational truth <u>per se</u> is not sufficient to constitute ontology. What distinguishes the latter from the sciences besides its universality is the hierarchical order between its constituent parts. **As its specific contribution to analytical theory ontology elaborates an hierarchical order of ascending complexity, disponibility (freedom) and transparency and, reciprocally, a descending order of diminishing compactness, inertia and entropy.**

For example, let us choose nature and society as two domains whose interrelationship we want to determine. Then it

is evident that society presupposes nature as a necessary condition, whereas nature is independent of society. By the same token, the incidence of a society is a sufficient reason to assume a physical basis which sustains it. In other words, society is founded in, or dependent on nature; conversely, nature is indifferent to society.

As the reference to necessary condition and sufficient reason indicates, foundational relationships easily translate into symbolic logic: Saying "A is the necessary condition of B" is equivalent to saying "B only if A," i.e.,

$$A <= B,$$

which is tantamount to saying "Without A, no B," i.e.,

$$A <= B. \quad = \quad -A => -B,$$

which is equivalent to saying that "Non-A excludes B," i.e.,

$$A <= B. \quad = \quad -A => -B. \quad = \quad -A \mid B.$$

By the same token, while B cannot exist without A, A is indifferent to B, i.e., for the same A, B and a wide variety

of non-B's are both possible:

$$A <= B. = Av-B. = P A\&B, A\&-B, -A\&-B; -P -A\&B.$$

In other words, the foundational function is open-ended. For all its stringency it is not deterministic[3].

We have thus identified the logical function which has ruled ontology since Aristotle and which provides the key to the construction of sociological theory on strictly analytic terms. Whatever the specific variables which will replace A and B -- such as, for example, social existence and social consciousness, material basis and ideological superstructure, forces of production and social relations -- the formal nexus that determines their relationship is the foundational function.

At the same time, the foundational function merely determines the relationship between variables regardless of their material content. **In order to produce substantive theory the point is to replace the "unsaturated" algebraic variables A and B by "saturated" variables with a substantive content** such as basis and superstructure, economy and society, etc.

We are thus taking up an ingenious, but widely neglected idea of Gottlob Frege (1893) whose distinction between saturated and unsaturated variables provides the key to analytical theory, whose stringency lies in the truth functions. **The point is that truth functions such as foundation or entailment, conjunction or disjunction, do not inhere in reality. Rather, to find the right truth function that fits reality, truth values have to satisfy the intended syntactic meaning that connects the saturated variables.** In every case logical truth, and that is, stringency and objectivity, is the product of human judgment rather than mirroring ontological truth.

Aristotle's Ontology as Foundational Hierarchy

To illustrate the case, let us use one of the oldest, and indestructible, examples of foundational thought: Aristotle's pyramid of forms of the soul which ascends from inanimate matter (PHYSIS) through plants (FLORA) and animals (FAUNA) to mankind. Obviously, the "higher," more intelligent forms presuppose the "lower," more elementary ones. We thus arrive at the following foundational formula:

PHYSIS <= FLORA <= FAUNA <= HUMANITY,

which reads: Humanity is founded in fauna, which is in turn founded in flora, just as the latter is founded in matter. To put it differently, physis is a necessary condition for flora, which is in turn a necessary condition for fauna, which is in turn a necessary condition for humanity.

We thus end up with three fundamental insights:

(1) Foundational hierarchies imply neither causal determinism nor entelechies.

(2) The component parts of the hierarchy are mutually irreducible.

(3) The foundational relationship is purely analytical. In terms of Auguste Comte it constitutes pure, "positive" science.

The Key to Analytics: Set Theory

This far, our foundational hierarchy is founded merely on intuition: It stands to reason that humanity presupposes animals, animals, plants, etc. Significantly, Aristotle went beyond intuition. He identified the distinctive quality, i.e., the **differentia specifica** which distinguishes each

domain from its antecedent, and which we will mark by **bold** letters. Thus matter is characterized by mass and motion, or **inertia**; plants, by metabolism and reproduction, or **life**; animals, by the faculty to move, or **volition**, just as humanity is characterized by **reason**.

In defining the distinctive qualities of each domain Aristotle anticipated set theory and in particular, mapping theory: the "higher," more complex form presupposes (materially implies) the "lower" one; conversely, the lower form is indifferent to the higher form:

```
                             TABLE 1
                     Specificity and Complexity

                                    reason    Philosophy
                         volition   volition  Psychology
                 life    life       life      Biology
        inertia  inertia inertia    inertia   Physics
        _____

        PHYSIS <= FLORA <= FAUNA <= HUMANITY    Ontology
```

We thus end up with a sort of step pyramid in which the distinctive qualities of the higher level dominate those of the lower level and relegate them to subsidiary status. **Life**

thus dominates inertia; **volition** dominates life and inertia, just as **reason** dominates volition, life and inertia and converts them into subsidiaries. *s*

At the same time the dominant forms depend on their subsidiaries. Thus **reason** dominates volition, but remains dependent on it; **volition** dominates life, but remains dependent on it, just as **life** dominates matter, but remains dependent on it. **The foundational hierarchy thus combines two contradictory principles: dominance and dependence, subsidiarity and indispensability.** By the same token, it is intrinsically dialectical, a quality which the static metaphor of basis and superstructure fails to articulate.

The Intricacies of Theory Construction

The foundational hierarchy goes beyond mere taxonomy, as a closer look at the horizontal and the vertical axis elucidates. The **horizontal** axis is based on **distinctive qualities.** Accordingly it maps abstract **ideal constructs** and cuts across the various domains of reality. Reading in the **vertical** produces quite a different picture. While the horizontal reading produces **unifunctional** (homogeneous) and **abstract**

Ranges (which will be marked by capital initials), reading in the vertical maps **multifunctional** (heterogeneous) and **concrete DOMAINS** (which will be marked by upper case).

There exists, then, an intricate relationship between the vertical and the horizontal axis: Reading in the vertical reveals the analytical composition, as it were, the **structure** or the **blueprint of complex real entities**. By contrast, the horizontal cuts across reality and **abstracts** from all but **one single quality**. In every case, the horizontal axis is **analytic and unidimensional**, i.e., it excludes everything that does not fall under its mapping function. By contrast, the vertical axis is **synthetic and multidimensional**. By the same token, it provides the analytical blueprint of reality.

The preceding analysis indicates the way to construct analytical sociological theory, viz. to identify the various mapping functions and Ranges which are distinctive of SOCIETY, and then to reconstitute reality by combining the various Ranges which constitute it -- the method, incidentally, with which Althusser (1968, ch.9) credited Marx and Hegel and which underlies his concept of "history without a subject." **In no case does the analytical method mirror or copy reality. Rather, it provides the blueprint which allows one to reconstruct reality.**

Most important, the blueprint of reality which the analytical method produces is identical with its structure. Indeed the analytical method provides the key to structuralism. **In the last analysis, ontology, and its siblings, cosmology and anthropology, in many regards anticipate structuralism.** By the same token ontology sheds the last traces of metaphysics and reveals itself as guide to theory construction.

Core and Periphery

In the light of the preceding analysis it is obvious that, far from being sterile, logic plays an eminent cognitive role: it is the instrument which makes science possible. In terms of Quine (1986), it is instrumental in creating a hard **core** of consistent logical truths which are surrounded by a soft **periphery** of contingent stimuli and factual truths which constitute ordinary, empirical knowledge and which wait to be incorporated into the core.

At the same time a fundamental difference exists between core and periphery: **The core is apodictic and structural; the periphery, contingent and descriptive.** Since apodictici-

ty and contingency are irreducible to each other, science faces an ineluctible dilemma: either to adapt logical truth to experience, or to adapt experience to logical truth. As W.V. Quine (1986:1ff.) has shown, each of the two opposites resists revision: For the empiricist, facts are sacred and resist reinterpretation ("obviously," the sun rotates around the earth, the whale is a fish, etc.). On the other hand, once a system of consistent logical truths has been established, change in the system affects all its components and thus triggers resistance.

As Thomas Kuhn (1970) has argued against Popper, a disproven paradigm may continue to be used so long as it works for practical purposes (e.g., the Ptolemaic system after Copernicus, or Newtonian physics after Einstein). Moreover, W.V. Quine (1986:2) rightly points out that "a thick cushion of indeterminacy" separates the core from the periphery and protects the core from the fallibility of the senses, as it protects the periphery from the imperialism of reason (cf. Feyerabend 1975, 1988).

In any case, knowledge is dual: It combines the continuous flux of contingent experience with the uncompromising identity of ideal constructs. Accordingly, knowledge grows

in two different <u>tempi</u>: On the one hand, everyday experience
proceeds continuously and tends to cumulate; on the other
hand, analytical science depends on discrete paradigms which
must be destroyed in order to construct, i.e., in terms of
Bakunin: <u>détruire pour construire</u>.

Scientific Revolutions and Normal Science

Thomas Kuhn's discovery of <u>Scientific Revolutions</u> has shaken
the belief in the continuous cumulation of knowledge. As we
should have known since Hegel, or at least since Bachelard,
scientific progress occurs in leaps and bounds and is basi-
cally unpredictable. Unfortunately, Kuhn dilutes his para-
digms with conventionalism and sociological relativism.
Seemingly unaware how closely his theory parallels Hegelian
dialectics, he confounds ideal constructs (<u>noemata</u>) with the
(individual and historical) acts (<u>noeseis</u>) that produce them
and thus blunts the dialectics that obtains between them..

   Because Kuhn sacrifices apodicticity (**apriority**) to
conventionalism and sociological relativism it comes as no
surprise that he failed to produce an adequate conception of
normal science. The latter must not be confused with rote
everyday experience. As Wolfgang Stegmüller (1976, 1986) has

pointed out, no revolution is complete without subsequent consolidation. Likewise, no scientific revolution is complete without subsequent consolidation, or else, as Popper (1970:52) has sarcastically remarked, one could only feel sorry for the "normal" scientist.

Nor does science grow simply by error elimination (cf. Popper 1978). Since, thanks to the "thick cushion of indeterminacy," observations and factual truths (F-truths) remain separated from logical truth, there exists no mechanism to ensure adaptation, cumulation and continuity. Like error elimination, the latter are limited to the domain of everyday empirical facts. Rather, as W.Stegmüller (1976) put it, it is through "the proliferation of the new paradigms into networks of refined, expanded or localized, global or partial, paradigms" that science grows. It is the latter process which marks "normal" science. In a sharp turn against empiricism it must be clear that science is apodictic or it is not science at all.

Sociology as a Strict Science

Sociological theory makes no exception. It too is predicated on paradigms, i.e., on ideal constructs rather than on

observation, and it too develops in leaps and bounds, i.e., unevenly. If at the present stage it appears overly fragmented, it is because of the lack of "normal" social science and the failure to let its paradigms proliferate into global networks. Analytical sociology promises to perform this arduous job for which no theory of the middle range can ever provide a substitute. It is the denunciation of grand theory which is to be held responsible for the present state of eclecticism and disarray.

PART I

FUNDAMENTALS

OF ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY

Chapter 1

THE DOMAINS OF ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY

1.1   The Old and the New Ontology

In introducing his New Ontology, Nicolai Hartmann (1942/53)
contrasts it with the "old" ontology as being predicated on
categories rather than on substances and entelechies. Rather
than on different types of souls, Hartmann bases his ontolo-
gy on the Cartesian division of res extensa and res cogi-
tans, the first external and corporeal, the second, internal
and incorporeal, which he then subdivides into inanimate and
animate Physis (thus conflating Aristotle's Flora and Fauna)
and into subjective Psyche and objective "Geist" (thus
doubling Aristotle's Reason).

In spite of the changed principium divisionis Hartmann's
New Ontology differs little from Aristotle. The classical
sequence of matter, life, self-movement and reason is only
slightly modified into the sequence of inanimate Matter,
organic Life, subjective Psyche (in a sense which is not
shared with animals) and objective, impersonal "Geist." For

all its sophistication, it seems that ontology is incapable
to progress beyond Aristotle.

1.2 From Montesquieu to Marx

In view of this situation, radical change can only be
expected from an infusion of fresh content into the Aristo-
telian pattern. The one single work that has been most
influential in promoting this change has been Montesquieu's
(1748) Spirit of the Laws, which surprisingly satisfies the
criteria we have stipulated for ontology: It aims at ratio-
nal truths about society (with a remarkable wealth of empir-
ical illustrations); it elaborates domains of social reality
which are qualitatively defined, and it suggests an hierar-
chical order of physical, social and moral factors: Forms of
government and societal structure are determined (condi-
tioned) by their geophysical setting and in turn determine
(condition) the spirit which rules the laws, i.e.,

SETTING <= FORMofGOVERNMT <= SPIRITofLAWS.

Whatever the differences between Montesquieu and Marx,
the foundational function informs their paradigms: For both
thinkers, social consciousness (CONSC) is no longer an inde-

pendent variable, but is founded in social structure, re-
spectively in social existence (EXIS), i.e.,

```
        SOCIAL EXISTENCE <= SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
                =     -EXIS => -CONSC.
                =  -(-EXIS & CONSC).

                =      EXIS v -CONSC.
```

At the same time, the young Marx flaunts his freshly made
discovery, which would enthrall him for the rest of his
life: underlying (i.e., materially conditioning) social
relations, and ultimately explaining them, are the forces of
production, which replace Montesquieu's geographical deter-
minism.


```
        FORCESofPROD <= RELATIONSofPROD <= IDEOLOGY.
```


The "family affinity" of Montesquieu's and Marx's para-
digm is striking. It adumbrates the main axis of social
theory and at the same time revises the structure of ontolo-
gy. Aristotelian metaphysics gives way to French sociology.
At the same time Montesquieu anticipates what Durkheim would
call the dual nature of society: the social and the moral
order lie at the center of the new ontology which no longer
culminates in divine reason and immortality.

1.3   <u>Society and its Physical Basis</u>

The previous analyses have shown the ambiguities of ordinary language. The notion of society makes no exception. Besides combining status and values, which mark concrete, historical societies, there exist a "materialistic" notion of society which combines status with its material basis, as reflected in the Marxian notion of "modes of production," which combines "forces of production" (mostly labor power) and "means of production" with "relations of production," a misnomer which in Marx's own interpretation denotes property relations (and that is, social class).

We need therefore not be surprised that Marx had to relent on his crass economism and equate his "modes of production" with "social formations." In terms of our own analysis, social formations combine **status** with **physis**, and that is, social Structure with inputs from NATURE as their material basis.

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                         TABLE 2
         Forces of Production and Relations of Production


    status    Relations of Production = social Structure
    physis    Forces of Production  =  Input of Energy
    _____
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│    FORCES <= RELofPROD  =  ENERGY INPUT <= SOC STRUCTURE      │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

1.4   The Social and the Moral Order

The Marxian dichotomy of social existence and social con-
sciousness is substantiated and enriched by Durkheim's acute
dichotomy of external social order and internal moral order
and their different functions: the first results in regula-
tion, the second, in cohesion. Both types of order thus con-
tribute to integrate society, although in opposite ways:
Likeness of status repels; likeness of sentiments attracts.
In other words, society is held together by negative con-
straint as well as by positive attraction. Society is no
longer seen as a monolith, but as dual.

   Confusingly, society is no longer identical with the
social order: The first is a multidimensional, concrete
entity; the second is an abstraction. Different terms should
therefore be used to avoid confusion: **Status** maps social
Structure, and **values,** the personal Ethos, or Conscience.
Together, the two constitute "real," concrete Society in the
ordinary sense of the word, or in terms of Parsons (1951)

the "Social System." The latter is no longer restricted to
social Structure but combines two mutually irreducible
constituents: status and values.

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│┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐│
││                       TABLE 3                          ││
││            The Social and the Moral Order              ││
││                                                        ││
││ values   moral Order = moral Sentiments = Legitimation ││
││ status   social Order = social Structure = Regulation  ││
││ _____ ││
││                                                        ││
││ SOCIAL ORDER <= MORAL ORDER  =  STRUCTURE <= SENTIMENTS ││
│└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘│
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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   The preceding analysis sheds light on the lack of preci-
sion in everyday language. Notions like society, nation,
social consciousness, the mind, culture, etc. all combine
status and values and thus conceal their analytical composi-
tion in the same way as water conceals the oxygen and the
hydrogen that compose it. This holds particularly true for
other collective entities such as the "spirit of the epoch"
(Voltaire), Volksgeist (Herder), the "objective mind" (He-
gel), conscience commune and conscience collective (Durk-
heim), public opinion, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, etc.

   Confusingly, the same holds for the human Person, or in

terms of Parsons, the Personality System. Like the collec-
tive entities mentioned, it combines values with status. It
would therefore seem isomorphic with social Consciousness,
or the Mind, which indeed it constitutes.

1.5   Ethos and Intellect

Like society, consciousness is dual. It too combines two
disparate elements, viz. subjective and objective meaning
(cf. Schutz 1967). The first is identical with moral sen-
timents and the moral order; the latter, with impersonal
calculi, formal systems and ideal constructs. The first
constitutes the personal Ethos, the second, the Intellect.

Accordingly, a strict line must be drawn between the
Intellect, which is impersonal, "universalistic" and value-
neutral, and the Ethos, which is personal, determined by
sentiment, and partisan (rather than "particularistic"). The
first is determined by subjective **values** and produces com-
mitment whose intensity is in permanent flux; the second is
determined by objective **calculi** and produces immutable ideal
constructs and material artifacts.

Thus consciousness, too, is dual. On the one hand, it ex-

presses values, is full of vitality and as such is an integral part of the personal Ethos. On the other hand, the Intellect creates objective, ideal Form which is immutable and resists change. It is for this reason that consciousness is full of ambiguity, as are Hegel's notions of subjective, objective and absolute mind and Marx's notion of "ideological superstructure," which veers between false consciousness and a scientific World-View.

```
                         TABLE 4
                    Ethos and Intellect

 calculi    impersonal Intellect  =  objective Systems
 values     personal Ethos  =  subjective Meaning
 _____

 ETHOS <= INTELLECT  =  personal VALUES <= obj SYSTEMS
```

1.6   Artifacts: History Without a Subject

The distinction between Culture and Civilization reminds us that culture is a multifaceted notion. In normal, every-

day usage, culture expresses values, and in this sense externalizes social consciousness. Culture, and most prominently, the fine arts, expresses the values of a set of people and in this sense is founded in society.

By contrast, the artifacts that express sentiments and values are ideal constructs which follow a different rationale and culminate in objective "Culture Systems" (Sorokin 1947). It is in this sense that Civilization is different from Culture. Confusing as it may sound, Culture in the ordinary sense is value-infused; by contrast, Civilization, and in particular technology, are value-free.

The discovery of civilization for social theory goes back to Auguste Comte (1822), who identified civilization as the prime mover of social evolution. In Comte's view, Civilization is the Cartesian product of the arts, the sciences and "industrie" which determines the progress or failure of society. As Comte put it:

> What is at issue is man's actual influence on the external world, the gradual development of which constitutes without doubt one of the main aspects of social evolution. Indeed, ... without its development this entire evolution would have been impossible... The political as well as the moral and intellectual development of humanity is absolutely inseparable from its material progress.

It is not difficult to see that the Marxian dichotomy of means (instruments) and modes of production stands in the same tradition. In fact Marx's materialism is as much technological as it is economic. If Marx is not a metaphysical materialist in the vein of Büchner or Feuerbach it is because of the Comtean legacy.

In addition to being external to society, artifacts are value indifferent, i.e., _wertfrei_ in the Weberian sense. In every case, their relationship to society is an instrumental one, and the outcome of their use, pragmatic. It is in this regard that Civilization differs fundamentally from Culture.

We thus arrive at a more positive appraisal of Althusser's (1968) provocative thesis about "history without a subject." Althusser has a point (which he shares, among others, with Dilthey): Material interests as well as subjective values articulate in artifacts which objectify society and the mind regardless of individual identity. Thus Roman Law expresses (objectifies) the material interests and the values of the Roman lawyers and their clientele, just as pottery and temples trace ancient civilization. It is in this sense that civilization represents, as Althusser (1968) provocatively put it, "history without a subject."

1.7   Analytical Ranges and Synthetic Domains

We are now prepared to draw the picture as a whole: In
contrast to classical ontology analytical sociology subsumes
MATTER, FLORA and FAUNA under NATURE and differentiates
REASON into three domains, viz. SOCIETY, MIND and FORMAL
SYSTEMS, each of which follows its own rationale, with
physis, **status**, **values**, and **calculi** as their **distinctive
qualities** and mapping functions, and **physical** Energy, **social**
Structure, **personal** Sentiments, and **objective** Form as their
respective Mappings and, as we shall see, the **core Ranges** of
their respective domains (reading in the vertical):

```
                         TABLE 5
              Analytic Mappings and Synthetic Domains

          distinctive qualities:        Mappings:

                            calculi    objective Form
                    values  values      personal Sentiments
            status  status  status     social Structure
    physis  physis  physis  physis     physical Energy
    _____

    NATURE v SOCIETY v MIND v FORMAL SYSTEMS  =  REALITY
```

The above table is full of insight into analytical theo-
ry: Precise, analytical concepts which reach beyond indexi-
cality (i.e., in terms of Russell (1910), which reach beyond
knowledge by acquaintance) are attained only by abstraction,
 i.e., by mapping under a determinate mapping function to
the exclusion of everything else. By the same token, none of
the Mappings we thus obtain is capable of independent "real"
existence (as realism assumes). Rather, **Mappings are sets
whose unity is founded in their mapping function. By the
same token analytical sociology is inherently qualitative,
and its Mappings, ideal constructs.**

By contrast, reading in the vertical reveals the analyti-
cal composition of "real," empirically observable domains
which, in an ascending order of dependency constitute an
ontological hierarchy such that SOCIETY presupposes NATURE;
MIND (SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS) presupposes SOCIETY, and FORMAL
SYSTEMS presuppose MIND, i.e.,

$$(NAT<=SOC) \ <= \ (SOC<=MIND) \ <= \ (MIND<=SYS).$$

1.8   Dominance: Core Ranges and Subsidiaries

At the same time it is no accident that the number of

mapping functions and Mappings (in the horizontal) equals the number of DOMAINS (in the vertical). For whatever their composition -- which remains to be elaborated -- each domain is determined by a **dominant** mapping function whose Mapping constitutes its **core Range** and which relegates the other functions and their Mappings to secondary status.

Thus **status** maps **social Structure** as the core Range of SOCIETY; **values** map personal Sentiments, or the **personal Ethos,** as the core Range of the MIND, just as **calculi** map **pure, ideal Form** as the core Range which dominates FORMAL SYSTEMS. In sum, **each DOMAIN is dominated by a core Range which relegates all other Ranges to secondary status and which is at the same time coterminous with the DOMAIN,** as the following table brings out:

```
                          Table 6
                   Domains and Core Ranges

                                              ideal Form
                                   personal Ethos
                        social Structure
      physical Energy
   _____

      NATURE    v    SOCIETY    v    MIND   v  FORMAL SYSTEMS
```

The notion of **core Range** (to be marked by bold face) adds an important element to our theoretical instrumentarium. While mapping functions are strictly qualitative and transcend time and space, their Mappings are substantive and get down to particulars. Accordingly, every function which is distinctive of a domain maps its **dominant Range,** which constitutes its **core** and relegates all other Ranges to secondary status without eliminating them.

Thus SOCIETY combines **status** with physis as dominant and subsidiary mapping functions. The first maps **social Structure** as the core Range; the second maps Input of physical Energy as subsidiary Range. A specific relationship thus marks and directs SOCIETY: On the one hand, the **social Structure** determines the kind and amount of Energy that SOCIETY extracts from NATURE; on the other hand, the **social Structure**, like SOCIETY, depends on the inputs from NATURE, which exists independent of and is indifferent to SOCIETY. In sum, **the core dominates and at the same time depends on its subsidiari(es). The relationship between core and subsidiaries is therefore dialectical: While they are inseparable, they constitute a unity of opposites whose balance is inherently precarious.**

The same rationale obtains for the MIND: It is dominated and determined by the **personal Ethos** as its core Range which relegates Structure and Energy to subsidiary status. Thus organizations and associations exist independent of, and are indifferent to personal values and commitments, yet once the latter dominate, they relegate social organization to subsidiary status in the vein of Althusser's (1968) "ideological apparatuses" to propagate values.

No less important, though widely neglected until recently, the **personal Ethos** has considerable impact on the way in which the human body is supported or suppressed, highlighted or concealed as an integral part of the MIND (cf. Bryan Turner's (1989) work on the Human Body). Looked at more closely, sexuality, age and gender, race and ethnicity, health and illness, etc., although natural givens, are mostly defined in terms of subsidiaries of the **personal Ethos** such that not much is natural about sex and age, gender, race and ethnicity.

The dominance of the **core Range** over its DOMAIN is complete with FORMAL SYSTEMS. Dominated by objective **calculi,** the latter reduce the Ethos to disinterestedness and uncon-

ditional devotion to the arts, sciences, or religion, just
as they reduce their social basis to highly trained profes-
sionals and experts, just as the input from Nature reduces
to Talent and intellectual energy. In stark contrast, NATURE
is the domain which has a core Range, but no subsidiaries,
as the following table brings out:

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │                       Table 7                           │ │
│ │          Dominance: Core Ranges and Subsidiaries        │ │
│ │                                                         │ │
│ │                                          ideal Form     │ │
│ │                           personal Ethos Dedication     │ │
│ │             social Structure  ethic Norms    Experts    │ │
│ │  physical Energy  kinetic Energy  vital Energy  Talent  │ │
│ │  _____  │ │
│ │                                                         │ │
│ │    NATURE    v    SOCIETY    v   MIND v FORMAL SYSTEMS   │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

1.9 Towards a Unified Social Theory

In the light of the preceding analyses, it dawns on us
that a common calculus informs not only analytical sociology
and Talcott Parsons' (1956, 1966) structural functionalism,
but also Marx's materialist interpretation of history and
French positivism from Montesquieu to Comte. They all repre-
sent different versions of a master pattern which goes back
to Plato and Aristotle: ontology.

This holds in particular for Parsons' four subsystems of his Social System (1956) each of which is marked by a specific function and which form an hierarchical order of increasing control and decreasing dependence on energy. Thus the "Fiduciary" controls the "Societal Community," much as the latter controls the Polity, which in turn controls the Economy. At the same time each subsystem is marked by a specific function: the Economy is marked by **adaptation (A);** the Polity, by **goal attainment (G),** the social Community, by **integration (I),** and the Fiduciary, by **latent pattern maintenance (L).**

As a further step, Parsons applied the same functions (1961, 1966,1977) to his Action Systems, each of which combines all four functions. **Adaptation (A)** dominates all functions of the Behavioral System; **goal attainment (G)** dominates all functions of the Personality System; likewise **integration (I)** dominates the Social System, and **latent pattern maintenance (L),** the Culture System.

We have only to replace Parsons' functional matrix of A G I L by our own mapping functions, viz. **physis, status, values** and **calculi,** to see how closely both theories converge.

It is therefore all the more unfortunate that as a conces-
sion to Freud's sequence of the Id, the Ego and the Super-
ego, Parsons confused the order among his Action Systems:
his "Behavioral System" is followed by the Personality Sys-
tem rather than the Social System, which should precede the
Personality System -- a confusion that is surprising for a
sociologist. As a consequence Parsons' theory is stricken
with inconsistencies and contradictions which are a constant
source of confusion and may be one of the reasons for the
contempt for "grand theory." Still, if corrected, structural
functionalism falls easily in line with analytical theory.

The analogy of Parsonian functionalism with Montesquieu
and Marx is no less striking, although for a few exceptions
(Göran Therborn 1976; DiTomaso 1982; Bryan Turner 1986), it
has gone almost unnoticed. Althusser's (1965,1968) and
Balibar's (1968) distinction of four different types of
praxis deserves special recognition: The sequence of eco-
nomic, political, and ideological practices is obviously in
line with Montesquieu and Comte, while the addition of a
fourth, theoretical praxis falls in line with Parsons's four
functions.

To be sure, much more will have to be said about the

relations between Marxism and positivism: All protestations to the contrary, the Marxian conception of history derives from St.-Simon and in particular from Comte's <u>fascicule fondamental</u> (1822) and from <u>The Doctrine of St.-Simon</u>, which was rampant in the Paris of 1829/30 (cf. Iggers 1958). By contrast the much overvalued influence of Feuerbach constitutes only a transitory stage in the genesis of Marx's thought. (Quite ironically, rather than on matter, "historical materialism" is ultimately based on St.-Simon's technological determinism).

In any case a common ground, a sort of master key to sociological theory, exists and has ever existed since Montesquieu's pathbreaking work -- an insight as old as Durkheim's (1892) Latin thesis. The following analyses are no mere intellectual pastime. They represent a renewed effort to detect the code which underlies sociological theory, thus taking up where Parsons left off.

Chapter 2

SOCIAL DYNAMICS

2.1

To start from scratch, let us define society as the domain
of social interaction, i.e., of individuals interacting
under certain rules and values which are as much socially
determined as they in turn determine society. Then anything
that is not covered by this definition constitutes an envi-
ronment to society.

The environment to society thus defined falls into two
fundamentally different parts:

   (a) The environment which exists independently of society
and on which society depends for its survival: Nature.

   (b) The environment which is a creation of society and
which cannot exist without it: Culture.


```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                                       │
│                     Table 8                           │
│              Society and its Environments             │
│                                                       │
│      NATURE:          SOCIETY:         CULTURE:        │
│                                                       │
│      Input          (entropic)         Output         │
│       of              social             of           │
│      Energy         Interaction        Artifacts      │
│                                                       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

2.2

These two environments relate to society like input and out-
put. Society in the broadest sense, i.e., the combination of
the social and the moral order, or of status and values,
thus constitutes a dual cybernetic system: one which con-
trols the input of energy from Nature, and another one which
produces artifacts, which in turn serve to transform Nature.

In this way, Nature, Society and Culture fall into two
cybernetic systems each of which is self-regulating and
aimed at a balance with its environment. At the same time,
each of the two systems follows its own rationale and is
relatively autonomous. The two systems are therefore non-
transitive, i.e., they cannot be reduced to each other nor
can they be forced into a permanent equilibrium. Together,
they form a complex overarching system which is geared to
energy as the common denominator which underlies and unites
all four domains. As Mach and Ostwald correctly saw it, it
is energy rather than matter that underlies everything that
goes on in society.

2.3
The relation between nature and society which characterizes
the first of the two cybernetic subsystems consists of what

Marx (1867) called the metabolism between man and nature. The part of nature which is not involved in this metabolism is therefore of no interest to sociology; it is the subject of the natural sciences. By the same token analytical sociology reduces nature to energy input. The latter falls into three main categories:

(a) **Anorganic** energy reaches from solar energy as its most elementary form to warmth, wind and water (the climate) to minerals, metals, fuel, electricity etc.

(b) **Caloric** energy is equivalent with plants and food. In its most comprehensive form, it is identical with biology.

(c) **Kinetic,** or **mechanic** energy in its most elementary form is automotion. In terms of sociological theory it reduces to labor power, i.e., mechanic energy derived from animals as energy converters.

Table 9
The Types of Energy Inputs from Nature

MATTER	PLANTS	ANIMALS
Raw Materials = anorganic energy	Food = caloric energy	Labor Power = kinetic energy

The invention or discovery of any new energy input causes a revolution in the survival of Society. As Gordon Childe, (1942;1951) Leslie White (1959), Lewis Mumford (1934;1956) and Fred Cottrell (1955) have shown, the taming of fire marks the decisive step from animaldom to humanity. The domestication of animals and the cultivation of plants, the invention of the water mill and wind mill, the steam engine and the motor are all hallmarks in the increased input of energy into Society and in the evolution of Society. It is in this sense that human history proceeds from aboriginal society to low neolithic energy and finally to modern high energy society.

2.4

Next to the **maximal extraction** of energy from nature, its **optimal use** has been the most powerful spring in the evolution of society. The Principle of Least Effort (Zipf 1949), or in terms of Mach, the **economy of effort** (Kraftökonomie), i.e., to achieve the same effect with less effort or, with the same effort, to achieve more than before, has been, and continues to be, the most powerful and pervasive stimulus in the differentiation and the stratification of society.

As Adam Smith elaborated in his pathbreaking study of The

<u>Wealth of Nations</u>, it is in dealing with their environment that people develop **skills** to make work easier. By the same token, people develop **provision** to avoid penury, and **organization** to reduce friction. Rousseau's (1755) railings about the rise of inequality to the contrary, it is in this way that differentiation in skills, property and power sets in wherever people start using energy more effectively.

2.5

In the metabolism with nature, labor thus plays a dual role: labor power, i.e., mechanic energy, is a part of nature; by contrast, as far as people use energy, they produce intelligent labor and in particular, skills, provision, and organization. In sum, labor combines two quite different factors:

(1) raw labor power, or mechanic (kinetic) energy, which throughout history has entailed drudgery for the vast majority of mankind, and

(2) intelligent labor, which is attractive, inspiring side of work the negentropic counterpart to labor power.

Significantly, the distinction between the two types of labor and between Energy input and Energy use which marks the difference between the physical basis of society and Society entails two different types of attitudes: The ex-

traction of energy from nature aims at <u>maximizing</u> the **input**, including labor power from slaves, women and children. By contrast, the use of energy aims at <u>optimizing</u> the **methods** in which it is spent.   In terms of Marxist theory, the extraction of input from nature creates <u>absolute</u> surplus value; by contrast, the optimization, and that is, rationalization of its use creates <u>relative</u> surplus value. It is in this way that the wealth of nations reduces to two sources: the availability of natural resources and their rational use. The first is a given, the second, an achievement.

```
Table 10
The Maximization and Optimization of Input

     Energy input:              Energy use:

     Maximization              Optimization
      absolute                   relative
    surplus value             surplus value
```

What in Marx's <u>Kapital</u> constitutes a diatribe against capitalism thus turns into a basic theorem of analytical theory and a leading issue in contemporary policies: the increasing depletion of the natural environment in the pursuit of maximal profits, on the one hand, and the insight

that social activity is inevitably geared to effectiveness, on the other hand. Quite obviously, the latter must guide capitalist politics as much as socialist politics, just as social stratification turns out to be not only inevitable but indispensable.

2.6
It is thus evident that managing energy drives rationalization and by the same token, interaction and results in social stratification. It is in this sense that the energetic interpretation of society is at the core of social differentiation and of the materialistic interpretation of history and society.

What holds for social differentiation holds even more obviously for the invention, production and use of artifacts, or in terms of Hegel, of "objectified mind." As Hegel rightly sensed, artifacts represent meaning imprinted on matter and in this sense, externalized thought. What Hegel realized less, given his idealistic orientation, is that artifacts require human effort, i.e., labor, in order to produce them and that they constitute investments, no matter whether they pay off, as do tools, machines and facilities, or do not pay off, as do works of art, the sciences and

religion, which follow their own raison d'être.

In any case, artifacts constitute frozen labor and thus
constitute investments, or in Marxian terms, **fixed capital**:
The more often it is used, the more it pays off. It is for
this reason that, along with labor power and intelligent
labor (skills, provision and organization), artifacts, and
most prominently, tools, buildings and machines, are the
hidden demiurge that promotes the evolution of society.

2.7
The Principle of the Least Effort (Zipf 1949), or of Kraft-
ökonomie (Mach; Ostwald) thus turns out to be the universal
and most fundamental principle that rules the universe as
well as society and the mind. It also lies at the bottom of
Herbert Spencer's thesis which explains evolution as the
progress from indeterminate incoherent homogeneity to deter-
minate coherent heterogeneity, which lies also at the bottom
of Durkheim's interpretation of social evolution as progress
from "mechanic" solidarity to "organic" solidarity."

Like the Law of Entropy, the Principle of the Least
Effort derives from the first Law of Thermodynamics. **Just as
Entropy applies to closed systems, the Principle of the**

**Least Effort applies to open systems -- the first is as
inherently entropic as the second is inherently negentropic.**
The same complementarity rules social action: On the one
hand, all interaction is energy consuming and hence entro-
pic; on the other hand, the use of artifacts is inherently
negentropic. This includes social institutions and in par-
ticular law courts, which, as George C. Homans (1961) has
superbly shown, serve one paramount purpose: to stave off
the loss of energy.

Table 11
Entropy vs. Negentropy

Energy Input: (closed systems)	Energy Use: (open systems)
Law of Entropy	Principle of Least Effort
entropic **dynamic Fields** direct Interaction	negentropic **ideal Structure** use of Artifacts

Chapter 3

TRIADS, DYADS, AND MONADS

3.1

The strict separation of the Mind and the Intellect (or as
Alfred Schütz (1932) put it, subjective and objective mean-
ing) opens a new chapter both for ontology in general and
for sociological theory in particular. In turn, subjective
consciousness, or the Mind, must be strictly separated from
Society. While the two are closely intertwined empirically,
they are analytically quite disparate. The first is deter-
mined by status, the second, by values.

It is obvious from these considerations that, on the one
hand, the Mind is virtually inseparable from Society and the
Intellect and that the three domains constitute a compact
empirical unit. On the other hand analytical rigor commands
that the three domains be clearly distinguished. Whatever
their common empirical extension, each domain is clearly
marked off intensionally: Society is marked by status, the
Mind, by values, and the Intellect, by calculi.

3.2

Most remarkably, this qualitative (intensional) analysis is
borne out by a quantitative analysis which has gone almost
unheeded, viz. Georg Simmel's (1908) ingenious observation

that the number of participants which are minimally required varies with different domains.

As Simmel found out, social structure presupposes a minimum of _three_ participants, or a _Triad_ in order to be suprapersonal and to survive the individual participants: What is most significant about social structure (i.e., groups, organizations, institutions, etc.) is that it is able to survive the individuals. By contrast, _Dyads_ do not survive if one of the partners leaves. They are obviously strictly interpersonal and hence fit with personal commitments and values (a conclusion Simmel did not explicitly draw).

Moreover, we have only to look on the production of artifacts to understand that the Intellect, being predicated on impersonal algorithms, does not depend on any personal partner. We thus supplement Simmel's dichotomy by the notion of the _Monad_ and end up with a trichotomy which sheds additional light on Society, the Ethos, and the Intellect. Social Structure implies Rules which are suprapersonal and survive its agents; Values are interpersonal and do not survive any shift of conviction or commitment; Calculi and Systems are impersonal and can be transferred from individu-

al to individual.

```
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                                │
│                    Table 12                    │
│            Triads, Dyads, and Monads           │
│                                                │
│       Triads         Dyads          Monads     │
│                                                │
│    suprapersonal     personal     impersonal   │
│       Rules           Values        Calculi    │
│                                                │
│      material        ideals &     construction │
│      interests      convictions    ex nihilo   │
│                                                │
│       PRAXIS          ETHOS        INTELLECT    │
│                                                │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

3.3

Social structure is necessarily triadic (and hence suprapersonal) because of its inner dynamics. To use Theodore Caplow's (1966) poignant phrase, it presupposes a coalition of Two Against One in which two partners (or parties) agree on a common code which they impose on the third.   This holds true whether the partners involved are individuals or groups (parties, castes, classes, corporations, etc.): Power and constraint are inherent in social structure. It is only as long as the relative strength of the partners stays the same that coalitions and social structures endure.

In the last analysis, social structure is triadic because it is identical with the allocation of power. In fact, unallocated power is characteristic of unstructured (and hence dynamic) fields whose order is founded on unstable equilibrium rather than on fixed structure. (It is for this reason that Luhmann (1984;1987) insists on a sharp distinction between (spontaneous) interaction, on the one hand, and (structured) social systems, on the other hand).

3.4
In contrast to social structure, **values** are intrinsically spontaneous. They cannot be directly enforced by coercion; to be accepted, they require consensus. Consequently, value consensus cannot but be interpersonal. It is not in any case suprapersonal. It lasts only as long as both partners share common values. Whenever one partner defects, the consensus collapses. In sum, consensus is inherently dyadic.

3.5
However, the dyadic structure does not rule out that more than two people may share the same values. The point is, rather, that personal loyalties as well as ideological and moral communities depend on continually renewed voluntary support of each individual partner. However multitudinous,

they are strictly interpersonal. **There exists no such thing as a monolithic suprapersonal objective mind, general will, conscience commune, etc. They all are, as Ernest Renan put it, the outcome of daily renewed plebiscites.** Barring coercion, there is nothing that could lure personal convictions into some suprapersonal frame: On penalty of extinction, the Ethos is predicated on face-to-face relationships.

3.6
In contrast to **suprapersonal** social codes and to **personal** values, objective systems are **impersonal** and **formal**. Due to the objective character of their calculi, they presuppose neither triads nor dyads; rather, their setting is **monadic.** Thus the great breakthroughs in the arts, sciences and religion happen in the form of sudden inspiration, illumination, or revelation regardless of class, ethnicity or political conviction.

3.7
At the same time, the special dynamic inherent in triads and dyads is replaced by a special mechanism which is intrinsic to objective systems, viz. the dialectics of form and substance, the general and the particular, the a priori and the a posteriori, the temporal and the eternal. As a corol-

lary objective systems do not grow gradually and continual-
ly; rather, they change by leaps and bounds in a sort of
paradigmatic upheaval or cataclysm.

It is at this juncture that the monadic character of
objective systems comes into play: In contrast to social
triads and moral dyads, objective systems require no more
than one single nonconformist to topple them. Once he can
prove inconsistencies and contradictions he or she is not
hampered by social constraints or moral commitments.

3.8
Along with the numerical distinctions between the three
domains goes an ascending order of flexibility combined with
a descending order of durability: To be dissolved or modi-
fied, social structure requires a majority of two out of
three. In contrast, partisanship and commitment resolve or
change if one of two withdraws, whereas the intellect recog-
nizes the absolute sovereignty of the individual artist,
scholar, or religionist whose work is predicated on objec-
tive calculi: A Michelangelo, a Newton, or a Buddha perform
in the privacy of their studio or within the intimacy of a
narrow circle of a few disciples.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          Table 13                            │
│              Number, Compactness and Flexibility             │
│                                                              │
│   Numbers:                                                   │
│                                                              │
│    Monads    ↑                              Intellect:       │
│              │                               objectivity     │
│              │                              (consistency)    │
│              │                                               │
│    Dyads     │                      Ethos:                   │
│              │                    partisanship               │
│              │                    (commitment)               │
│              │                                               │
│    Triads    │            Society:                           │
│              │       material interests                      │
│              ↓         (competition)                         │
│                                                              │
│              ←────────────────────────────────────→          │
│                 Compactness              Flexibility         │
│                  (entropic)             (negentropic)        │
│                                                              │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

3.9

By the same token, an intricate dialectical relationship
exists between the strict hierarchical order which exists
between Society, the Mind and the Intellect, on the one
hand, and the dislocations which separate them and impede
free transitivity among them.

    In the last analysis, it is the difference between Tri-
ads, Dyads, and Monads which causes the dislocation between
Society, the Mind and the Intellect and facilitates their

relative autonomy. Thus identification and commitment dis-
rupt and supersede material interests which inhere in social
status. This is facilitated by the greater flexibility of
Dyads compared to Triads.

By the same token, the very objectivity of calculi allows
them to disrupt and to supersede the particularism of com-
mitments and values. This is facilitated by the universal
and formal character of the calculi as much as by the great-
er flexibility of the individual monad that handles the
calculi. The objective and formal character of the Intellect
implies and presupposes the detachment which liberates and
emancipates the artist, the scholar and the religionist from
the strains and stress of their social and moral environ-
ment.

Chapter 4

ORGANIZATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND COLLECTIVITIES

4.1

The discovery of the monadic character of the Intellect in contrast to the dyadic character of the Mind and the triadic character of social Order is impressively congruent with the different collective configurations which result from them. Contrary to current usage, a strict distinction should be made between organizations, communities, and collectivities, i.e.,

Organizations ≠ Communities ≠ Collectivities

4.2

To begin with organizations, it is not enough to equate them with regulation. While Durkheim accomplished a pioneering feat in identifying the social order with regulation and negative constraint, the discovery of the triadic character of the social order adds one more criterion: The constraint which is inherent in the social order is itself the result of coalitions, i.e., of purposive arrangements between competing material interests.

In other words, the struggle between divergent interests is likely to trigger combination, or coalition, as its most rational solution. The coalition of "Two Against One" (Theodor Caplow 1968) is not only aimed at eliminating the competition of the third -- it is also aimed at sharing the spoils and at establishing a general order which works to their advantage. In the last analysis, social order implies coalition as inevitably as constraint and power. Indeed the three terms are coterminous.

4.3

The situation is quite different with communities which, again following Durkheim, are predicated on "positive attraction" and consensus -- indeed, they are identical with Durkheim's notions of "mechanic solidarity" and "common conscience." However, in contrast to Durkheim's views, they are intrinsically dyadic. The "positive attraction" which Durkheim attributes to them is based on individual persuasion rather than collective constraint.

In sum, the attraction that constitutes communities is neither suprapersonal nor is it a constant. In clear contrast to the social order, the moral order varies continually, both from individual to individual and in degree of

intensity. To paraphrase Renan's famous dictum about public
opinion: Communities are the equivalent of continually
renewed plebiscites. While structures last, community varies
in intensity and is subject to continual renewal.

4.4
In contrast to organizations and communities, collectivities
are unstructured plurals without organizational constraints
or emotional bonds; they are neither infused with material
interests nor with ideal commitments. They are best illus-
trated by anonymous people who share knowledge about Plato,
travel in the same airplane, or collect stamps without
necessarily knowing one another.

   For example, besides and beyond common bonds of ethnicity
and history which unite the English, those among them who
know medicine or are soccer fans form special categories of
people who, together with foreigners of equal knowledge or
predilections, share some common code which facilitates
understanding among them without integrating them organiza-
tionally or ideologically. Invisible but pervasive objec-
tive networks thus facilitate communication which may or may
not eventuate in formal organizations or ideological commu-
nities.

4.5

In sum, objective culture systems constitute ideal codes
which are basically different from the social order and from
value systems. Unlike organizations and communities, codes
constitute ideal constructs which transcend space and time.
For example, chess is played wherever and whenever the rules
of chess are accepted, just as we may build Gothic cathe-
drals whenever we adopt the Gothic style. It is in this
sense that collectivities are unstructured aggregates of
anonymous people who have access to some code independent of
social status or personal sentiments.

4.6

Vernacular language, local dialects and esoteric technical
jargon work in the same way as, and aptly illustrate, educa-
tion and life-styles. Like telephone lines or radio and TV,
they work unobtrusively without explicit commands or emo-
tional attachment.

   At the same time, those not privy to the code resemble
foreign visitors who are physically present but who are shut
out of the social process. It is in this way that communica-
tion and lack of communication discreetly stabilize the

social and the moral order. Indian castes and medieval estates, modern clubs, lodges, fraternities, etc., all work in the same way. Just as state secrets shield bureaucracies from criticism, technological and ideological jargon promotes the superiority of the insiders over outsiders, as Simmel (1908/1950) and Alvin Gouldner (1979) have strikingly shown. Whoever has graduated from high school or college is privy to a network which is different from that of the other members of the same family, class or denomination.

4.7

New light thus falls on the notion of "integration," which combines at least three different connotations: 1) imposed rules, 2) shared values, and 3) impersonal networks, just as social reality represents an aggregate of organizations, communities and ideal codes. Looked at more closely, there exist no such things as "organic" societies any more than a "common conscience" or a "general will."

Table 14 Organizations, Communities, and Collectivities		
triadic Organizations	dyadic Communities	monadic Collectivities
suprapersonal	personal	impersonal

Rules	Consensus	Codes

4.8

The trichotomy of organizations, communities and collectivities matches remarkably not only with the fundamental domains of the social order, the moral order and the intellect; it also fits with Karl Bühler's (1934) <u>Theory of Language</u>. In each of the three domains, language serves, and in turn promotes, distinctive functions: appellative, expressive and cognitive. In terms of M. Kreckel's (1981) convergent theory, the first is action-oriented; the second, person-oriented, and the third, cognition-oriented.

(1) Social organization produces and in turn presupposes language for **appellative** (imperative) functions, most prominently commands and warnings. In every case, it is action-oriented and enhances the effectiveness of collective action.

(2) By contrast, **expressive** language serves to express (articulate, refine, conceal) feelings and sentiments which reflect personal preferences and values. It is expressive

language which enables the individual to shape his or her community and to constitute himself as an authentic person who at the same time depends on, and vies for the sympathies and approval of his community. Without expressive language there is neither personality nor community.

(3) Finally, **cognitive** language is descriptive and impersonal. It is predicated on propositions, i.e., on objective, value-neutral symbols and algorithms which allow for the construction of systems and theories. By the same token, cognitive language is the instrument which allows abstraction, generalization and formalization and thus overcomes the constraints of society and the strains of community. Whatever the dependence of the Intellect on the Social and the Moral Order, objective logic and analyticity are able to supersede coalition and constraint as well as consensus and attachment.

Table 15		
Appellative, Expressive and Cognitive Language		
SOCIETY	MIND	INTELLECT
prescriptive	personal	objective
Rules	Commitments	Calculi
Coalition	**Consensus**	**Consistency**

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│   & constraint      & attraction      & analyticity     │
│                                                          │
│  action-oriented  person-oriented cognition-oriented     │
│    appellative      expressive        cognitive          │
│     language         language          language          │
│                                                          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

4.9

The trichotomy which constitutes social reality is felici-
tously corroborated by Jürgen Habermas' (1981/84) Theory of
Communicative Action. Throughout his work Habermas makes a
fundamental distinction between "communicative" and "per-
formative" behavior, on the one hand, and between "communi-
cative" and "cognitive" behavior, on the other hand.

   In particular, Habermas interprets performative action as
purposive-rational and functional, and communicative action
as motivational. By the same token, performative behavior
contributes to the development of the productive forces,
while communicative action promotes the dynamic of social
movements. Consistently, performative behavior is informed
by compliance with rules and norms ("normative correctness"
or Richtigkeit, as Habermas puts it), whereas communicative
behavior is expressive of the subjective feelings of the
individual.

```
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|                         Table 16                            |
|      Performative, Communicative and Cognitive Behavior     |
|                                                             |
|       SOCIETY             MIND            INTELLECT          |
|                                                             |
|    performative      communicative       cognitive          |
|      behavior           behavior          behavior          |
|                                                             |
|      purposive         subjective         objective         |
|      functional       motivational      propositional       |
|                                                             |
|    Effectiveness      Authenticity       Consistency        |
|      Legality          Legitimacy          Validity         |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
```

It follows that performative behavior is marked by <u>Inter-</u>
<u>essenlage</u> (i.e., material interests, a term borrowed from
Max Weber), whereas communicative behavior is marked by
moral-practical consensus and aimed at authenticity rather
than legality. At the same time, cognitive behavior is
characterized as propositional and aimed at objective,
anonymous truth rather than correctness (legality) or truth-
fulness (authenticity).

Chapter 5

ZWECKRATIONALITÄT, WERTRATIONALITÄT, FORMRATIONALITÄT

5.1

For the uncircumspect reader, Max Weber's terse elaboration
on the "Fundamental Categories of Sociology" may appear as a
mere excursus on social psychology. It may well represent
the one writing in which Weber came closest to symbolic
interactionism and even phenomenological sociology. Signifi-
cantly, if this is action theory, it is certainly not a
treatise on the irrationality of action.

An ingrained opponent of holism and organicism, Weber
starts out from individual interaction to demonstrate the
rationality of social configurations of any kind, ranging
from occasional interaction to associations, organizations
and institutions. Whatever his emphasis on "verstehen" and
its phenomenological implications, Weber is as much a ratio-
nalist as Husserl and Dilthey. For him spontaneous action
eventuates in regular habits and codes, just as, conversely,
structure makes rational, calculated action possible.

5.2

Looked at more closely, it is the pursuit of rational goals (i.e., purposes, or Zwecke) which makes action calculable, not because it is logical in the formal sense, but because it is geared to the choice of means. Action becomes rational once it selects among means.

By the same token, Zweckrationalität is subject to the principle of least effort (cf. Zipf 1973), or Kraftökonomie (Mach 1934), i.e., either to achieve the same effect with less effort or to achieve a greater effect with the same effort. It is this intrinsically "materialistic" or more precisely, energetic implication (cf. Ostwald; Newbold Adams 1988) which is implied but is not spelt out clearly in Weber's notion of purposive rationality. Still, it is the hub of Weberian action theory: For Weber, verstehen is founded on calculating, pragmatic rationality rather than empathy.

5.3
At the same time, Zweckrationalität is not identical with instrumental or technical rationality. Just as purposive action implies both means and ends, purposive rationality implies the deliberate, "rational" choice of means and the spontaneous, "irrational" determination of goals. In terms of Habermas (1981), it combines instrumental and strategic

rationality. In the long run, means which are ineffective will be discarded, and goals which are too costly will be abandoned. Success and failure rather than formal consistency control purposive rationality.

In sum, purposive rationality is the Cartesian product of strategic and instrumental rationality. While each factor may vary independently, neither factor can decline to zero without cancelling purposive rationality as a whole.

```
        Purposive rationality  =   Ends x Means
        =  strategic x instrumental rationality
```

Most important, each of the two factors follows a different rationale: **Instrumental rationality aims at minimizing effort; by contrast, strategic rationality aims at maximizing effect. By the same token goals are intentional and ideal, i.e., creations <u>ex nihilo</u>; by contrast, means are contingent, pragmatic adaptations to reality.**

Purposive rationality is therefore far from monolithic. It is neither purely mechanic (as positivism assumes) nor

purely voluntaristic (as idealism assumes). Rather, it is open to contradictions and in constant search for a pragmatic balance between its two elements, and while it is not fully predictable it produces objective consequences which are amenable to precise computation and measurement.

5.4
One of Weber's most brilliant achievements, made only late in his life, has been the discovery of <u>Wertrationalität</u>. The latter must not be confused with strategic rationality any more than purposive action must be downgraded to instrumental action, as Habermas' (1981) interpretation suggests. Rather, **the dichotomy of instrumental and strategic action crosscuts with both purposive and value rationality.**

Like purposive rationality, value rationality is the Cartesian product of two elements which feed back on each other. Just as strategic and instrumental rationality combine to constitute purposive rationality, **ideal values** and **contingent sentiments and commitments** combine to constitute value rationality. The first are **persistent** and posited <u>per fiat</u>; the second are **contingent** and **in constant flux**:

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│      Value rationality   =    Values  x  Sentiments     │
│      =   persistent Ideals  x  fluctuant Commitments    │
│                                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

The new formula felicitously revises Pareto's notion of
instinctual residues. What infuses persistence into the flux
of waxing and waning sentiments are the values, to which
individuals respond with varying support or opposition and
which function like beacons that steer ships through unknown
seas. While each follows its own rationale, values and
sentiments feed back on each other: **Values depend as much on
continued commitments as the latter need the guidance of
unwavering values in order to be persistent.**

By the same token it is safe to equate the sum of the
values, i.e., the loyalties, ideals and moral principles a
person espouses, with his or her character structure. As
Sartre acutely put it, we are what we choose to be. While
sentiments and commitments fluctuate from paroxysm to indif-
ference, firmness of character implies sticking to one's
loyalties, ideals and moral principles.

5.5
Weber's notion of purposive and value rationality marks an

important shift from <u>Lebensphilosophie</u> and hermeneutics to analytical theory. It makes it possible to determine through trial and error, which (latent) purposes and values must be assumed in order to understand (overt) action. At the same time <u>verstehen</u> implies value rationality as much as purposive rationality. Weber is therefore a "Machiavellian" (Burnham 1938) only in the Nietzschean sense; any more than Kant, he is not the "archpositivist" as Horkheimer sees him.

Rather, what distinguishes Weber's notion of rationality is the assumption of social and moral norms which make **disciplined, methodical action and commitments** possible. The point is not that Weber is a voluntarist, as Parsons (1937) put it, but that action is no longer based on tradition or affection, but is controlled by goals and values which are pursued in persistent, disciplined effort. At the same time Weber (1968: 16) makes a clear distinction between the (external) social order and the (internal) moral order, which cut across the dichotomy of unreflected, free-wheeling reaction and "rational," disciplined action, as the following schema indicates:

Table 17
Max Weber's Four Types of Action

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                  the social Order:    the moral Order:       │
│    impulsive:         traditional          affectual         │
│    (unstructured)                                            │
│    methodical:        zweckrational      wertrational        │
│    (structured)                                              │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

What is novel is not that interests and affections drive
people to act. What distinguishes **rational** action in the
Weberian sense are the norms and values <u>a priori</u> which
infuse action with persistence and discipline.

5.7

In addition to purposive and value rationality, Max Weber
identified a third type of rationality: <u>Richtigkeitsrati-
onalität</u>, i.e., formal or logical rationality:

> Rationally evident, i.e., directly and unequivocally
> intellectually comprehensible in the highest degree are
> those meanings which are cast in the form of mathematics
> or logic. We understand quite unequivocally the meaning
> of 2 x 2 = 4, of the Pythagorean theorem, or of some
> logical syllogism.

Unfortunately, Weber used the term "formal" in an equivo-
cal sense which makes it look like instrumental rationality:

> Artifacts, e.g., machines, are comprehensible only
> because of the purpose they serve.

The preceding passage is quite equivocal: We do not under-
stand a bus or a telephone by understanding that they serve
transport and communication. Instead, the passage should
read: "To understand a machine is to understand how it func-
tions," i.e., to understand a steam engine, pottery, or a
plough is to understand, not the purpose they serve, but
their structure.

Invariably, it takes formal rationality, i.e., intuition
and logic, to construct artifacts.   The terms "tech-
nical," "functional" and "system rationality" must therefore
not be confused with instrumental rationality. Technology,
as artifacts in general, are subject to purposive
rationality only insofar as they are used (and may thus turn
out to be "eufunctional" or "dysfunctional). As far as their
structure is concerned, they are predicated on formal ratio-
nality, i.e., on intuition, logic and experiment. Actions
and sentiments do not build houses or construct steam en-
gines; the intellect, and that is, intelligent labor, does.

Indeed, the domain of the intellect is identical with
artifacts, formal rationality and objectivity. While it can
be used for all sorts of purposes, its hallmark is **objec-**

tivity, ideality and **affective neutrality** (<u>Wertfreiheit</u>). By the same token, **construction** and **playful experiment,** or in terms of Aristotle, <u>poiesis</u>, rather than purposive rationality or moral values is the force that drives the Intellect.

5.8
We thus end up with three types of rationality: purposive, normative, and formal rationality, each of which is constitutive of a specific domain of reality:

(1) **Purposive rationality** is predicated on material interests. It is constitutive of the Social Order.

(2) **Value rationality** is predicated on ideals and commitments. It is constitutive of the Moral Order.

(3) **Formal rationality** is predicated on impersonal calculi. It is constitutive of ideal constructs and of formal systems, or in terms of Durkheim, civilization.

Table 18 Weber's Three Types of Rationality		
<u>Zweck-rationalität</u> = purposive rationality	<u>Wert-rationalität</u> = value rationality	<u>Richtigkeits-rationalität</u> = formal rationality
material interests	subjective sentiments	objective calculi
Social Order	Moral Order	Formal Systems

5.9

The fit of Weber's types of rationality with the domains of analytical sociology is striking. It is all the more reassuring as Weber arrived at his trichotomy independently and only late in his life. A short glance at his types of political authority (Typen der Herrschaft), which date from 1913, is instructive. While Weber was obviously fascinated with "charismatic" authority as a substitute for the Hegel-Marxian notions of "social consciousness" and "ideological superstructure," his typology is plagued with a paradigm shift from an initial dichotomy of conservative "traditionalism" versus innovative "charisma" to a subsequent dichotomy of **substantive** (both traditional and charismatic) legitimacy versus **formal** legality. The original trichotomy thus gives way to a two-phased pattern of intermittent charismatic innovation and subsequent routinization.

Interestingly, the notions of purposive and of value rationality are both absent from Weber's typology. Indeed it

is a far cry from "traditional" authority to purposive rationality, as is the shift from "charismatic" authority to value rationality. What makes Weber's "Introduction" all the more remarkable (and accounts for his fascination with bureaucracy about which there is nothing fascinating), is the discovery of formal rationality in its most conspicuous form, viz. administrative, military and judicial bureaucracies. While serving **strategic** political goals, bureaucracies are based on **formal** rather than on **purposive** rationality. The importance of the three types of authority then lies exactly in the notion of legality as manifestation of **formal** rationality. It is the latter rather than class struggle which accounts for the rise of the early-modern state and for the ongoing differentiation and fragmentation of modern society.

Significantly, it is possible, in the light of Weber's most mature stage, to identify "traditional" authority with purposive rationality and "charismatic" authority, with value rationality, and thus to arrive at three types of authority which are in tune with the three types of rationality: authority **by the sword, by argument** (or in terms of Habermas, by discourse), and **by legality.**

It has been objected that legality in itself is merely
formal and is no substitute for legitimacy, but so is tradi-
tional authority: Authority by the grace of God is for the
most part authority by the sword. On the other hand, legali-
ty is not entirely suspended in midair: Once certain privi-
leges and principles are taken for granted, others may be
considered legitimate on grounds of logical consistency -- a
method that has served, and continues to serve, Anglo-Saxon
case-law with patent success.

In any case Weber's typology of forms of authority is
amenable to reinterpretation in the light of his types of
rationality which adds much to the credence of both:

Table 19 Weber's Three Types of Authority		
traditional	**charismatic**	**formal-legal**
authority by	authority by	authority by
force	**argument**	**consistency**
dominance/deference	support/opposition	trial/error
= purposive	= value	= formal
rationality	rationality	rationality
Social Order	Moral Order	Objective Systems
Legality	**Legitimacy**	**Validity**

Chapter 6

THE SELF: ACTOR, PARTISAN AND ARCHITECT

6.1

This far, our analyses have focused on the structure of
(social and cultural) reality and in this sense, on macroso-
ciology. What remains to be established is its relationship
to microsociology and in particular, the individual acts
which constitute social and cultural reality. George Herbert
Mead's analyses of the Self come to our mind as a possible
solution: At a first glance, his interpretation of the Self
as the Cartesian product of the "I" and the "me" seems to be
the right answer to our question:

$$SELF = I \times ME.$$

According to this equation, the "I" and the "ME" appear
as complementary concepts which should be unable to exist
independently of one another. However, according to Mead's
own description this is not the case: On the one hand, the
"I" denotes the infinitely active, but real Self which does
not depend on the "ME" as an indispensable complement. On

the other hand, the "ME" denotes past experiences, as it were, the frozen past of the "I."

It thus turns out that the Meadian Self is not identical with William James's (1890) "pure" Self, which turns into a physical, social or spiritual Self depending on the activities in which it is involved. Rather, the Meadian Self is the integral Self which combines the various Selfs and cumulates its past experiences no matter whether they are physical, social or spiritual.

6.2

Taking up the ideas of William James, we may well link his types of the Self with the distinctive qualities of analytical sociology and accordingly, equate his types of Self with Physis, Status, Values and Calculi (thus substituting the ethical Self for James' religious Self). We thus end up with four different Selfs each of which is constitutive of a specific domain:

(1) The physical Self constitutes Physis;
(2) The social Self constitutes Society;
(2) the ethical Self constitutes the Mind;
(4) the Intellect constructs formal Systems and Codes.

Accordingly, we end up with four distinct types of activities and Agents: The physical Self is involved in survival and is identical with the human **Body;** the social Self pursues material interests and is identical with the **Actor;** the ethical Self approves or disapproves and is identical with the **Judge,** or more poignantly, the **Partisan;** finally, the Intellect produces objective form and is identical with the **Architect.**

By the same token, the first Self is identical with **adaptation;** the second, with **praxis;** the third, with **ethics;** the fourth, with **construction** (rather than with cognition, which inheres in all four Selfs). The empirical Self, i.e., the concrete human Person, thus combines four different Selfs, each of which is marked by specific activities: **adaptation** to the environment, praxis, ethics, and construction. It should therefore come as no surprise to see various theorists end up with similar results.

```
                      Table 20
                The Four Analytical Selfs

  the physical Self  =  the Body:      adaptation
  the social Self    =  the Actor:     praxis
```

```
  the ethical Self   =   the Partisan:  ethics
  the Intellect      =   the Architect: construction
```

6.3

Except for a short passage in the later work of Descartes
(1647), where the famed Cogito ergo sum is replaced by three
different types of cogitation, viz. ideas, volitions, and
judgments, credit belongs to Wilhelm Dilthey for having
opened a new avenue to social theory by redefining the
traditional trichotomy of denken, fühlen and wollen as
denken, **werten** (i.e., value judgments) and purposive action,
thus initiating a trichotomy followed by Husserl (1913),
Scheler (1927) and Alfred Schütz (1932/67) as well as by Max
Weber (1920) and, as we shall see, Talcott Parsons:

```
                    Table 21
          Dilthey, Husserl, Scheler and Weber

  Wilhelm Dilthey:
      Wollen            Werten            Denken
  (purposive action) (valuation)   (representation)

  Husserl:
   formal praxis    formal axiology    formal logic

  Max Weber:
     purposive          value            formal
    rationality      rationality       rationality
```

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Max Scheler:                                            │
│     Zielordnung      Wertordnung      Wesensordnung      │
│      Purposes          Values         logical Truth      │
│                                                          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

6.4

Dilthey does not stop at a mere taxonomy. Most important,
the three basic activities manifest themselves in specific
"cultural objects," or objectifications. According to Dil-
they Social **institutions** and organization objectify purpo-
sive action; **culture systems** objectify ethical values; and
symbol systems such as logic, mathematics and the sciences
objectify thought.

    Dilthey goes even farther by pointing to the distinct ef-
fects of each of the three objectifications, thus anticipat-
ing latter-day functionalism:

    Purposive action and institutions achieve **socialization;**

    Valuation and cultural systems achieve **individuation;**

    Thought and symbol systems achieve **inculturation.**

    We may disagree with Dilthey on the latter account.
According to his own distinction between cultural systems
and symbol systems, we would expect that valuation results
both in (personal) individuation and (collective) incultura-

tion, whereas symbol systems promote the construction of (value-free) models, paradigms and formal systems. Nobody is inculturated by mathematics, nuclear physics or antibiotics. Rather, what drives both individuation and inculturation is the commitment to norms and values.

The same error haunts Sorokin's (1947) and Parsons' (1951) trichotomy of <u>Society, Culture and Personality</u>. Both authors fail to realize -- as the school of "Culture and Personality" (e.g., Boas and Kroeber) did -- that personality and culture represent but the individual and the collective aspect of the Mind, which is marked both by valuation and expression. while they fail to recognize objectivity as the hallmark of both formal Systems and of pattern maintenance, which are much broader than mere cognition.

```
                        Table 22
                   Dilthey and Parsons

 Dilthey:
       Volition        Valuation         Thought
  purposive action  value judgments   representation
    Institutions    Cultural Systems  Symbol Systems
    socialization     individuation   (inculturation)

 Parsons:
    cathexis          valuation         cognition
   adjustment         integration   pattern maintenance
    Motives            Values           Systems
    Society           Personality       Culture
```

6.5

Besides the unclarities which beset James' notions of the "social" and the "spiritual Self," even his notion of the "physical Self" is ambiguous. Besides the body it includes family and friends, clothes and the house, even horses and bank accounts. What James failed to see, is the specific character of artifacts and the activity which produces them, on the one hand, and the various activities artifacts serve once they have been produced: While they are the products of the intellect, they may serve praxis and ethics as well.

It is therefore important to realize that artifacts divide into three distinctive subsets depending on the activities they serve: material culture, fine arts, and formal systems, each of which constitutes, in terms of Piti-rim Sorokin (1947), a "Culture System."

(1) **"Material culture"** serves both physical survival and material (economic, social and political) interests. By the same token tools, facilities and weapons structure Society.

(2) **The fine arts** express and objectify moral sentiments. Using language as their paramount means of expression, the

fine arts impart structure to the ever fluctuant Mind.

   (3) **Formal systems** and ideal constructs are the free
creations of the Intellect whose validity is founded solely
in ideal constructs regardless of location and time.

Table 23
Three Types of Artifacts

material artifacts:	expression of values:	ideal constructs:
material Culture	**fine Arts**	**formal Systems**
tools, weapons facilities	literature epos, drama	mathematics logic
praxis	**ethos**	**logic**

6.6

A fascinating observation which goes back to Hegel is that
the "objectified mind," i.e., each of the three types of
"me"s, unfolds its own type of objective possibilities.
While the artifacts are indubitably creations of the "I,"
each type of "me" harbors its own rationale. The latter must
not be mistaken for teleology.

   In a way which surprisingly vindicates Hegel, the fact

that an indefinite number of individuals potentially share
(or diverge on) status, values and calculi implies the pos-
sibility of free variation, not only of ideas (as Husserl
ingeniously noted), but also of perceptions of status and
values. As Robert Merton's (1968) theory of "Reference
Groups" has shown, it is by observing or imagining alterna-
tives that individuals become critically aware of their
situation -- and by the same token, start practicing Ideen-
variation not only with regard to ideas, but also to status
and values.

The idea of "Ideenvariation" and of "reference groups"
illustrates the workings of the Intellect and its ubiquitous
presence in society. Starting with the awareness of disorder
and iniquities and the quest for improvement and culminating
in the call for radical change and a growing sense of histo-
ry, the Intellect exerts a pervasive influence on action as
well as on moral sentiments.

6.7
To be sure, Ideenvariation is a noetic process which does
not proceed independently of individuals who think. At the
same time, it triggers a teleology of a new kind which is
thoroughly pragmatic and free of metaphysics. People set out

to improve their environment, society, morals or the arts through continual trial and error as the most elementary form of thought experiment and thus to achieve "error elimination" and "objective knowledge" (Popper 1972).

In every case, starting with making bows and arrows, building huts or making pottery, trial and error is at once the simplest and most effective way to spur imagination and explore the whole gamut of objective possibilities which lie hidden behind the compact face of concrete reality. It is thanks to the intellect that mankind transcends the "iron casing" of reality and discovers the triple realm of beauty, truth, and certitude.

6.8
At the same time a significant difference exists between the manner and scope of trial and error practiced by the various Selfs. As Descartes (1647) acutely noted late in his life, thought, will, and judgment constitute different species of cogitation. It is because of the vitality of their interests and sentiments that the social and the moral Selfs stop short of exploring the whole gamut of objective possibilities. Rather than leaning on abstract principles the social Self (i.e., the Actor) limits its aims to the dialectic of

means and ends.

The same holds for the moral Self (i.e., the Partisan):
It too stops once its values and ideals come true. Just as
action is ruled by the dialectics of means and ends, the
ethos is ruled by the dialectics of sentiments and values.
The individual may modify his material interests or his
ethical ideals but he or she is normally in no mood to
transcend them.

It is only by bracketing material interests and personal
values that all objective possibilities come fully into our
reach. The intellect does just this: it practices radical
epoché and thus subjects reality to analytics. It is for
these reasons that social structure (stratification), the
personal ethos (values) and the intellect (analytics) are
intrinsically different. While they may be empirically
coterminous, they are neatly separated analytically.

6.9
The latter is unfortunately not the case with the classical
Sorokinian (1947) and Parsonian (1951) trichotomy of Soci-
ety, Culture and Personality, which are irretrievably
empirical and hence cut across all three analytical domains

with which they are not at all identical.

For example, Sorokin correctly enumerates norms, values and meanings as informing action, but he is far from equating norms (which are intrinsically social), meanings (which are intrinsically objective), and values (which are intrinsically personal) with "Society," "Culture" and "Personality," respectively, as strict analysis would require.

In the offshoot, Sorokin (and following him, Parsons) ends up with a dichotomy of Society and Culture which more or less reflects the Hegelian dichotomy of "social existence" and "social consciousness" (if not to say "material basis" and "ideological superstructure"), while the Personality cuts across both. Inevitably, it represents the Meadian "I" rather than an independent domain on a par with Society and Culture, as strict logical disjunction would demand.

The same holds for Parsons's (1956;1961;1966) four functions. He too falls victim to "misplaced concreteness." Each of his action systems as well as each of their subsystems is expressly meant to satisfy all four functions. Parsons is therefore far from identifying "goal attainment" with Soci-

ety, "integration" (i.e., value consensus) with the Person-
ality, or "pattern maintenance" with objective algorithms,
as logical consistency and parsimony would require. It is
exactly by satisfying this requirement that analytical
sociology differs from Parsons's functionalism and that
grand theory begins to make sense.

Chapter 7

FROM PLATO TO PARSONS

7.1

The analytical system as developed in the previous chapters
must stand a double test: for inner consistency and com-
pleteness, and a critical comparison with other theories in
the field. As to the latter, it must be able either to inte-
grate them or to refute them.

Surprisingly (and almost sensationally), one of the first
approaches to the subject has also been one of the most
enduring. In his opus magnum on The Republic Plato links the
three social orders which constitute society with three
distinctive faculties of the soul each of which is linked
with a distinct virtue:

(1) epithymia (i.e., material, utilitarian interests) is
distinctive of the free farmers and artisans;

(2) thymos (i.e., courage and commitment) is distinctive
of the warriors and the nobility;

(3) nous (i.e., abstract, objective thought) is distinc-
tive of the philosophers.

In his attempt to link ethics with social status, Plato virtually anticipated the sociology of knowledge. By the same token he anticipated three of the four constituent ranges of social reality: Material interests constitute **praxis**; courage and commitment constitute the **ethos**, and objective ideas, the **intellect**.

At the same time Plato represents an idealized picture of ancient society: he stays silent about the slaves which, in Marxian terms, provide the **labor power**, or more generally speaking the **energy input** that allowed ancient society to rise from tribal structure. It is with inclusion of the input of energy that the convergence with our own system is complete. At the same time, the inclusion of slaves and metics reveals the close affinity of Plato's view of society with India's caste system. Yet in spite of its archaic character, Plato's taxonomy is also amenable to modern interpretation in terms of Max Weber's trichotomy of purposive rationality, value rationality, and formal rationality:

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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │              Table 24                    │ │
│ │     Indian Castes and Plato's Republic   │ │
│ └──────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│   India:            Plato:            Max Weber:         │
│                                                         │
│  Brahmins   Philosophers: reason  formal rationality    │
│  Kshatriya   Warriors:  courage  value rationality      │
│  Vaisya      Citizens:  greed  purposive rationality    │
│  Sudra       (Slaves) (labor power)    (drudgery)       │
│                                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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7.2

In its earliest modern form Plato's trichotomy dates back to
Descartes' distinction of three kinds of cogitation (Des-
cartes 1647, quoted by Franz Brentano 1969, p.51):

> It is requisite that I should here divide my thoughts
> (all mental acts) into certain kinds... Of my thoughts
> some are, so to speak, images of the things, and to these
> alone is the title 'idea' properly applied... But other
> thoughts possess other forms as well... and of the
> thoughts of this kind some are called **volitions** or **affec-
> tions**, and others, **judgments**.

In other words, the traditional version: "I think, therefore
I am" needs to be complemented, in Descartes' own terms, by
"I act, therefore I am" and "I judge, therefore I am."

It is with this trichotomy that Descartes stands out as
anticipating phenomenology (as Husserl (1936) was keenly
aware). Still, Descartes' paradigm is blurred by the
confusion of volition and affection while the nature of

judgment remains unspecified.   It was Wilhelm Dilthey
(1883) who clarified the classical trichotomy by defining
willing as purposive rational action and by freeing affec-
tion, feeling, etc. of their emotional overtones by
identifying them with value judgment.

   Unfortunately, Dilthey's reputation as the founder of
irrational <u>Lebensphilosophie</u> has obfuscated his original
effort to lift the "human sciences" to the standards of
strict (though not deterministic) "positive" science. He
was therefore far from sacrificing rationality. On the con-
trary, he set out to elaborate the fundamental mechanism,
the <u>Grundstruktur</u> which informs human activity and history
alike. It is in this endeavor that he focussed on "cultural
objects" as objectifications of the mind.

   As we have seen, the latter fall into three principal
categories which remarkably converge with Plato's trichoto-
my: **institutions**, which objectify purposive action; **culture
systems**, which objectify values, and **symbol systems** (most
prominently logic, mathematics and the sciences), which
objectify thought and, to use Russell's terms, convert know-
ledge by acquaintance into knowledge by description. What
eluded Dilthey's attention is the fact objectification is

identical with the construction of artifacts and that Symbol
Systems are themselves only a subset of artifacts whose
function is neither socialization nor individuation or
inculturation but objectification.

   Given the fact that the notion of <u>verstehende Soziologie</u>
is borrowed from Dilthey, it seems plausible to assume that
two other key notions of Max Weber's sociology, viz. purpos-
ive rationality and value rationality, derive from Dilthey
as well. In spite of his rejection of sociology, Dilthey was
seminal for modern sociological theory.

7.3
The seminal importance of Dilthey for analytical theory does
not stop here. Husserl (1913/1931) and Schütz (1936) both
adopted his trichotomy. This is brought out with particular
clarity in Schütz's (1966/1978, p.264) description of "moti-
vational relevancy":

> The interest prevailing at the moment determines the ele-
> ments which the individual singles out of the surrounding
> objective world ... so as to define his situation... In
> other words, the interest determines which elements ...
> are relevant for the individual to define his situation
> **thinkingly, actingly, emotionally,** to find his way in it,
> and to come to terms with it (emphasis added).

   No less interesting, before switching to full-fledged

functionalism and its quaternary divisions, Talcott Parsons'
work on The Social System (1951) shows a remarkable parallel
to Dilthey's trichotomy of volition,valuation and represen-
tation. In Parsons'(1951: 57) terms, **cathectic, evaluative**
and **cognitive** primacy mark the Social System, the Personali-
ty System and the Culture System, respectively, the first of
which is **adjustive**, the second, **integrative**, and the third,
expressive.

   Jürgen Habermas' (1981/84) Theory of Communication, which
tries to integrate sociological theory with linguistics and
psychology, parallels Dilthey even more closely. As already
shown above, Habermas divides behavior into **performative**
(functional), **communicative** (motivational) and **cognitive**
(propositional) behavior. Whatever the variations in termi-
nology and whatever Habermas' adaptations of other theories,
the affinities of his trichotomy with Dilthey -- and Max
Weber -- are unmistakable:


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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                       Table 25                         │
│             Dilthey, Parsons and Habermas              │
│                                                        │
│   Dilthey:                                             │
│      volition        valuation        representation   │
│                                                        │
│   Parsons:                                             │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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```
   cathectic       evaluative        cognitive
   adjustive       integrative      (expressive)
 Social System  Personality System (Culture System)

 Habermas:
  interactive      expressive       propositional
  manipulative     consensual        cognitive
   strategic      communicative      symbolic
    action           action           action
```

In a similar fashion two of the prominent contemporary
sociological theorists develop trichotomies which more or
less resemble Dilthey. Thus Randall Collins' (1975;1981)
conflict theory distinguishes between **motivational, emotion-
al** and **cognitive** resources, identifying the first with prop-
erty and authority, the second, with friendship, and the
third, with technology.

By contrast, Anthony Giddens' (1984: 28,30f.) structura-
tion theory distinguishes three dimensions of social systems
(which combine face-to-face "social integration" with formal
"system integration"), viz. **domination**, **legitimation**, and
signification. As in the case of Collins, no direct rela-
tionship to Dilthey is apparent, rendering the convergence
all the more impressive.

7.4

What neither Dilthey nor the phenomenologists recognized is the crucial fact that cognition (and science) represents but a subset of a much wider field which, as we have seen, is characterized by objective calculi and artifacts, viz. the intellect. The analysis of the latter starts with the simplest human artifacts such as bows and arrows, hoes and axes, fishing nets, baskets and pottery and culminates in mathematics and logic. **It is not until artifacts are recognized as constitutive of the intellect that the importance of the latter for social theory is fully realized.**

It comes therefore as no surprise that a new epoch of social theory starts with Auguste Comte (1822) who predicated social evolution on civilization, defining the latter as the Cartesian product of science, arts, and industry. Besides the seminal importance of Comte's discovery for Marx's "materialist interpretation of history" there exists another variant which has fallen into almost total oblivion in spite of the fact that it informed the work of Robert MacIver and Robert K. Merton's (1936)early essays on "Culture and Civilization" and on "Puritanism, Pietism and Science:" Alfred Weber's (1920;1927;1951) cultural sociology which is predicated on the trichotomy of Gesellschaftspro-

zess, Kulturbewegung, and Zivilisationsprozess (i.e., social progress, cultural change, and technological progress).

Much to his credit Alfred Weber makes a sharp distinction between "Kultur" and "Zivilisation" which aptly parallels Alfred Schütz' (1932) dichotomy of subjective and objective meaning and our own distinction between (personal) values and (impersonal) calculi and which, not so incidentally, parallels Tönnies' famed dichotomy of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The same dichotomy informed Spengler's (1920) controversial The Decline of the West, whose Kulturmorphologie linked the decline of culture to the decline of religion and the concomitant rise of the city.

Alfred Weber felicitously dismissed Spengler's nostalgic cityphobia and recognized civilization as the third constituent of a trichotomy each of whose components follows its own rationale: Society tends to grow in organizational complexity (an idea well known from Herbert Spencer's sequence of simple, compound, doubly and trebly compound societies). By contrast, Culture aims at perfection at any time, as illustrated by Gothic, Renaissance and Baroque art, with every single artist aiming at perfection, barring any causal determinism. By contrast, Civilization (in the broader sense

in which Comte used the term) is marked by objectively mea-
surable technical or scientific progress.

Alfred Weber's thought (who was unimpressed by Neo-Kanti-
anism and sympathetic to an intellectual apertura a sinis-
tra) represents a remarkable step forward to overcome the
prevailing historicism of his time and to deal seriously
with the material (technological) basis of society. Seen
against an intellectual background which was dominated by
irrational historicism or positivist determinism, Alfred
Weber deserves pride of place for freeing the civilizational
process from its dual embrace by culture and economics with
Auguste Comte, Marx and Durkheim as early precursors.

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        Table 26                          │
│             Durkheim, Alfred Weber and MacIver           │
│                                                          │
│   Durkheim:                                              │
│     social order        moral order      civilization   │
│                                                          │
│   Alfred Weber:                                          │
│    Gesellschafts-         Kultur-        Zivilisations-  │
│        prozeß            bewegung            prozeß      │
│                                                          │
│   MacIver:                                               │
│     social order     cultural order   technical order   │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Interestingly, the theory of Alfred Weber has had its American counterpart, which too has fallen into oblivion: Robert MacIver's (1942/1964) work on Social Causation. In close parallel to Alfred Weber, MacIver (1964, p.273) defines the "realm of conscious being" as the aggregate of the social, the cultural and the technological order. Unfortunately MacIver's trichotomy was far too general to hold ground against the rising tide of Boas' and Kroeber's more poignant dichotomy of "culture and personality" and Sorokin's Social Mobility (1927) and his much more detailed trichotomy of Society, Culture and Personality (1947) which in turn influenced Parsons (1951;1966;1977).

To be sure, the label Kultursoziologie is misleadingly modest. In fact, Alfred Weber was one of the first to establish a strict disjunction between the three domains which compose "supraorganic" reality. Most important, since civilization is not limited to cognition, the intellect is no longer reduced to mere shadow boxing, but is recognized as a force which molds society. So long as this crucial element is missing sociological theory remains defective.

7.5

It is at this point that our most incisive criticism of contemporary theory sets in: its insensitivity to the elementary fact that the intellect is the agency which, from the most elementary beginnings, remodels nature and society and by creating artifacts redefines the environment upon which all social action, personal sentiments and intellectual activities are predicated.

In order to take this insight seriously, it is not enough to point to the importance of symbols for social interaction, or even to emphasize the importance of technology. However valuable the emphasis on "material culture" as, e.g., in Lewis Mumford's (1934) work on Technic and Civilization, it is only by linking technology to energy, as e.g., in Cottrell's (1955) work on Energy and Society or in Newbold Adams's (1975,1988) works on Energy and Structure and on The Eighth Day, that the workings of the intellect are fully grasped, viz. to produce artifacts in order to mobilize and save energy (and thus both to trigger and to obviate entropy). Whatever the deleterious consequences of overconsumption of energy, the effects of the intellect are intrinsically negentropic.

As Ostwald 1909) and Henri Poincaré (1905/1952) have

argued, energy underlies all understanding of human life. Energy represents the bottom line of cybernetic theory, and information caps it. Indeed, the two are complementary: In order to harness energy, the intellect creates artifacts and in doing so adds information.

In the last analysis, (as Peter Caws (1988) has perceptively argued) the intellect is the one and only agency able to create not only symbols, but structure. By the same token, it is the agency able to countervail entropy. **While interaction and commitment are both irreversibly entropic, the intellect is able to create form, and by the same token, to obviate (i.e., slow down rather than reverse) entropy.** While it does not reduce, but even spurs, the consumption of energy, it rationalizes its use. **It is in this sense that the Principle of Least Effort (Zipf 1949) underlies and controls both social action and moral judgment.**

7.6
New light thus falls on the thought of Marx: His notion of "instruments of production" stands as a metaphor, not only for technology, but for the creations of the intellect in general. Rather than squeezing the instruments of production into the ill-defined, much overdrawn notion of "modes of

production" and extolling the latter as the "discovery of a new continent" (Althusser 1968), the very notion of "mode of production" to be taken apart and redefined: The "instruments of production" must be limited to tools, machines, etc., and be complemented by means or instruments of investment such as buildings, facilities, etc., on the one hand, and by means or instruments of organization such as weapons, law and institutions, on the other hand.

Concomitantly, what holds for the instruments of production also holds for the "modes of production." They too must be clearly limited to the production process, i.e., to the occupational structure, to be complemented by corresponding "modes of appropriation," or "property relations" (both terms used by Marx in 1848 resp. in 1859) as well as by "modes of organization," or "relations of domination" (the latter two terms occur in the <u>Grundrisse</u> of 1857).

7.7
It is in the light of these considerations that Althusser's and Balibar's (1958/1970) tetratomy of economic, political, ideological and theoretical praxis loses much of its luster. While Althusser must be commended for drawing a fast line between ideology and theory, his ill-taken idea of "history

without a subject" prevents him from elucidating the dynamics of his own types of praxis.

Instead, the dichotomy of ideology and technology, and in more general terms, the dialectics of the mind and the intellect is felicitously elaborated by Alvin Gouldner's (1976) work on <u>The Dialectics of Ideology and Technology</u>. Here ideology is not only predicated on a meaningful reinterpretation of the situation by the individual, but also on convincing oneself by persuading others. A subtle, but pervasive dialectic thus moves the human conscience to continually redefine its sentiments and values in order to convince others.

On the other hand, technology exacerbates the objectification process which is the hallmark of the intellect. For example, with increasing perfection of the news media, news became ever more "de-contextualized," and hence incomprehensible and unappealing. Like a soup without salt "de-contextualized" news becomes decontextualized politics, and the more it becomes susceptible to manipulation, the more it loses power to convince.

Seen in a more general context, Gouldner's juxtaposition

of ideology and technology highlights the fundamental dif-
ference between the mind (which is subjective and "particul-
aristic") and the intellect (which is objective and "univer-
salistic"). Each follows its specific rationale which cannot
be transferred and which resists integration. All that can
be achieved is an unstable equilibrium.

7.8

The preceding discussion reveals some of the intrinsic
weaknesses in the theories of Talcott Parsons and of Althus-
ser. Reduced to its simplest form, Parsons' (1956, 1961,
1966) social system (which must not be confused with his
earlier work on The Social System (of 1951) which deals with
five pairs of "pattern variables") comprises four subsystems
which have an astounding resemblance with Althusser's four
types of "praxis" (as Nancy DiTomaso (1982) has aptly
shown). Whatever the derivation from preexisting needs and
functions (i.e., AGIL, the ever recurrent stereotype of
Parsonian functionalism), the mere sequence of economy,
polity, "societal community" (alias integration), and "fidu-
ciary" (alias pattern maintenance) strongly recalls Althus-
ser's tetratomy.

   At the same time, a new light falls on Parsons's under-

taking once we reinterpret his mystificatory and often turgid language into analytical terms. We have only to replace "societal community" with social consciousness, on the one hand, and Parsons's "fiduciary" and Althusser's "theoretical praxis" with the objective form produced by the intellect, to understand the true meaning of "pattern maintenance." The secret of the convergence of Parsons's and Althusser's theories lies in the common ontological background of which neither is aware.

Another resemblance of Parsonian with Marxian thought occurs occasionally. In his work on macrosociology (1966), Parsons stipulates an asymmetrical hierarchical order which is informed by increased information and "cybernetic control" in the upward direction, and by an increased energy input and independence (conditioning) in the downward direction (a pattern which implies the faculty of the intellect to harness energy). Unfortunately, Parsons never took the cybernetic order seriously. Instead, he continued to emphasize equilibrium, seemingly unaware that the latter is incompatible with asymmetrical hierarchies.

7.9
Still, the theory of Parsons is inherently ontological. Once

its errors are made transparent, it is easy to correct.
There is no reason to retreat to "theories of the middle
range" which are unable to go beyond empirical generaliza-
tions. Analytical theory provides the key to an impressive
convergence among the dominant theories, as the following
synopsis demonstrates:

```
                          Table 27
                  Society, Mind and Intellect

       SOCIETY           THE MIND          THE INTELLECT
       (praxis)           (ethos)             (logic)
    Plato:
      epithymia          thymos                 nous


    Dilthey:
     Institutions    Cultural Systems     Symbol Systems


    Husserl:
   formal practice    formal axiology      formal logic


    Max Weber:
        Zweck-             Wert-            Richtigkeits-
     rationalität      rationalität        rationalität


    Durkheim:
    social order        moral order         civilization


    Alfred Weber:
   Gesellschafts-         Kultur-          Zivilisations-
       prozeß             bewegung             prozeß


    MacIver:
   social order        cultural order      technological
                                               order
    Parsons:
      cathectic          evaluative         cognitive
      adjustive          integrative        expressive
   Social System    Personality System    Culture System


    Althusser:
     political          ideological         theoretical
       praxis              praxis             praxis


    Habermas:
   performative        communicative        cognitive
   (functional)        (motivational)     (propositional)
     behavior            behavior            behavior


    Collins:
   motivational         emotional           cognitive
    resources           resources           resources
```

<u>Giddens</u>:
  domination   legitimation   signification

PART II

THE SOCIAL ORDER

Chapter 8

WORK, WEALTH AND POWER

8.1

As human society evolves from animal society, it develops
new mechanisms and functions which are no longer sociobiolo-
gical. Kinship, age and territory take second place and are
superseded by specific forms of interaction which can be
summed up under a common denominator: social status and its
corollary, social stratification. As Sorokin concluded in
his ground-breaking work on Social Mobility (1927: 12), "any
organized social group is a stratified social body."

   At the same time, there is more to social stratification
than merely higher or lower, superior or inferior position.
To create analytical theory, concrete reality has to be
replaced by abstract concepts, models and ideal constructs.
For example, in chemistry water is reconstructed as H_2O, and
salt, as NaCl, while in geography the earth is constructed
as a sphere with 360 meridians and 90 latitudes North and
South. A sharp distinction must therefore be made between
description and analytics. The first produces **contingent**

factual truth (F-truth); the latter creates ideal constructs which purport to produce **apodictic logical truth (L-truth).**

8.2

While he has prominent precursors such as Rousseau and Comte and the widely read French liberal historians from Thierry to Michelet, Sorokin's classic on <u>Social Mobility</u> (1927) and his <u>magnum opus</u> on <u>Society, Culture and Personality</u> (1947) mark a giant step toward analytics; indeed, Sorokin referred explicitly to Descartes' foundation of analytical geometry as the model to be followed by sociology. It may therefore be of interest to know that the Russian original, <u>The System of Sociology</u> (of 1920), was divided into two parts, viz. <u>Social Analytics</u> and <u>Social Dynamics</u>, a division which re-calls as much as it revises Comte's division of his sociology into <u>Social Statics</u> (vol.2, 1852) and <u>Social Dynamics</u> (vol.3, 1853). As Sorokin (1920: XII) noted in the preface, his work was meant to reverse Comte's tendency to overemphasize dynamics at the expense of analytics[4].

In this context it is no surprise that Sorokin aimed at raising sociology to the status of a strict science. He also emphasized one of the ground rules which no theorist neglects with impunity:

> Any classification must be logical with a definite and
> consistent <u>fundamentum divisionis</u>. For the same reason
> the classification must not mix the types of simple or
> elementary social groups with their complex types made
> up of the combination of two or more of the simple
> types (Sorokin 1947: 159).

It is on grounds of these principles that Sorokin (1947:
171-78) distinguishes between "unibonded" and "multibonded"
(originally, in 1920: elementary and cumulative) groups.
Referring to the work of René Worms (1908), another leading
positivist, Sorokin (1947: 172) expounds his program (using
the same metaphor as Durkheim, though in the reverse, ana-
lytical sense):

> Just as the analysis of concrete chemical substances
> consists ultimately in finding the molecules and ele-
> ments of which they are composed, so the analysis of
> group structures in human populations consists in the
> reduction of its complexity to multibonded and unibon-
> ded structures.

It is at this point that we must depart from Sorokin on
grounds of his own criteria. While we concur with his
distinction of three types of social mobility (viz. occupa-
tional, economic and political) and with his interpretation
of social class as three-dimensional (Sorokin 1947: 276-95),
we do not agree that there is any such thing as "unibonded"
groups (cf. Mueller 1967 and 1969). Rather, as Sorokin

(1927: 18, fn.2) himself states, all real groups are "multi-bonded," i.e., multidimensional (and even more precisely: three-dimensional):

> The best definition of social class is that of the totality of people who hold a similar position in regard to occupational, economic and political status.

We could not agree more. However, occupational, economic and political **status** is not the same as occupational, economic and political **groups.** The first are abstract, or in Sorokin's terms, "unibonded;" the latter, concrete and "multibonded."

As Sorokin (1927: 3-19) elaborates in a special chapter on "Social Space, Social Distance and Social Position," his method is informed by Descartes' ingenious conception of analytical geometry: Just as

> by establishing ... abscissas and ordinates ... we can locate the spatial position of all physical phenomena, ... we may say that social space (is created) in order to locate social phenomena.

Accordingly Sorokin (1947: 256-275) defines castes, social orders and classes as Cartesian products of occupational, economic, and political bonds[1].

---

[1]Obviously Sorokin's trichotomy goes back to Rousseau's (1755)

8.3

A closer look at Sorokin's three dimensions of mobility

(1927) and of elementary social bonds (1947) substantiates

our reservations about "unibonded" groups: The latter are a

misnomer for simple, elementary mapping functions (rather

than "bonds") which, like the three dimensions of space, are

the key to analytical sociology. Just as height, width and

length are cognitive instruments to come to grips with

extended bodies, Sorokin's "unibonded groups" denote dimen-

sions of social status which allow one to analyze and

reconstruct social reality as an ideal construct[2].

   Accordingly, Sorokin (1927) identifies occupational,

economic, and political status as the three elementary

dimensions of social mobility and by the same token, of

social status and social structure. And while there may be

no such thing as unibonded economic, political or occupa-

tional groups -- all of which will turn out to be "multibon-

ded" -- Sorokin may still have a point that social status --

---

second Discourse on Inequality. It is also at the heart of Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations and of Marx's Preface of 1859.

   [2]It is in this sense that Sorokin may be considered one of the
founders of analytical sociology, his later leanings toward
"integralism" notwithstanding.

and that is, social structure -- is the Cartesian product of occupational, economic and political status, i.e.,

$$\text{Social Status} = \text{occ.econ.pol Status.}$$

In other words, just as all physical objects are three-dimensional in space, social status, too, is three-dimensional. To be true, this thesis must withstand a dual test of falsification: On the one hand, real, concrete social interaction is not reducible to only two or one dimension. On the other hand, any additional dimension of status must turn out to be either redundant or a compound with non-structural, e.g., cultural, moral, religious, biological, etc. variables. The truth that underlies Sorokin's dichotomy of "unibonded" and "multibonded" groups thus dawns on us: the first denote analytical, abstract parameters; the second denote clusters of real, interacting individuals such as groups, associations and societies, all of which combine occupation, distribution of wealth, and power.

8.4
In addition, each of the three dimensions is marked by specific **indicators** which define people's **social status** according to whether they are high or low on **skills**, **proper-**

ty, or **rank**. The first indicator maps **Work;** the second maps **Wealth**, and the third, **Power**.

   A short glance on geometry is instructive. Any physical objects is either big or small, long or short, broad or narrow, and thus subject to measurement. Whatever the size and shape of a given physical object, the Cartesian product of Length x Height x Width represents the analytical framework which raises physics to the status of a strict science.

   The same holds for analytical sociology. Without preempting empirical research it provides the analytical framework which rules sociological theory and raises it to the rank of a strict science. Like geometry it starts out from observation and practical tasks which is increasingly replaced by ideal constructs that are instruments needed to map reality.

8.5

Sorokin deserves credit for initiating analytical sociology. His work on <u>Social Mobility</u> (1927), which marks a milestone in analytical theory, is summed up in the following table:

Table 28
Sorokin's Parameters of Stratification

```
bosses vs. subordinates:   occupationally stratified;
wealthy vs. poor:          economically stratified;
ruler vs. ruled:           politically stratified.
```

Unfortunately, Sorokin's work is not free of serious
flaws. His dichotomy of bosses vs. subordinates, however
important, is redundant with his dichotomy of rulers vs.
ruled. Both dichotomies map the same dimension, viz. rank,
no matter whether it pertains to politics (rulers vs.
ruled), to occupational status (bosses vs. subordinates), or
to "status honor" (upper class vs. common people). In any
case power is not limited to politics.

At the same time, **rank** is limited to individuals, as is
status (both being individual indicators rather than generic
parameters). By contrast, **organization** is the parameter
which applies to groups, associations, societies etc. to map
the **power structure** of these entities. A clear distinction
thus exists between indicators and parameters: the first are
concrete; the second, **analytical**.

A closer look at the logical structure of parameters is
illuminating. Invariably, they are defined by opposite

extremes, or polar opposites which, like hot and cold, big and small etc. define each other by negation: hot equals non-cold, and cold equals non-hot, such that the more A the less B, and <u>vice versa</u>.

In the same way, the polar opposites dominance and deference, giving orders and taking orders (Collins), superordination and subordination (Simmel) etc. define each other and at the same time provide the scale which measures power and defines rank. It thus elucidates that **rank** is the indicator of power, just as **skills** and **property** are the indicators of occupation and wealth.

8.6

The preceding analyses provide the key to **occupational status** and its corollary, **occupational structure**. As Sorokin (1927: 101f.) rightly observed, the occupational scale reaches from unskilled labor at the bottom to highly skilled professionals at the top -- no matter whether the skills are political, economic, technical, or for that matter, military, pedagogical, artistic or religious. In every case **skills,** i.e., individual aptitudes and competence, are the indicator that determines **occupational status** and its corollary, **occupational structure**, including, as Sorokin

correctly noted, leisure, housework and childbirth as well as unemployment, sickness and crime[3].

It thus elucidates that the occupational structure is broader than the economy, as the notion of occupation is more general than that of labor, production, or civil society. In any case **occupational structure** is solely defined by skills to the exclusion of property and rank. It is therefore roughly equivalent to the division of labor, but neither to the Parsonian Economy nor to Marxian "modes of production."

By the same token, a clarifying light falls on the notion of **economic status**. As Sorokin rightly noted, it is circumscribed by rich vs. poor as its specific parameter. Accordingly, economic status is not identical with occupational status any more than it is with skills and the division of labor. Rather, it is identical with the **distribution of wealth** and **property**, as indeed Sorokin distinguishes between economic and occupational status.mobility.

In any case a clear distinction must be made between the

---

[3]It is in this sense that the occupational structure equals the time budget of a given society, as Sorokin has argued.

occupational and the socioeconomic structure: the first maps Work, the second, Wealth and thus defines the class structure. At the same time property triggers its own type of differentiation. Just as power divides people into those who give orders and those who take orders, and skills divide people into those who give advice and who take advice, property divides people into those who lend and those who borrow. In other words, property is the indicator of **socioeconomic status** and its corollary, the **distribution of wealth**, or **Class Structure**.

8.7

This far, we have focused on each dimension separately in order to determine their distinctive indicators and parameters. At the same time the three parameters constitute a Cartesian product whose factors may vary independently but none of which can decline to zero:

Social Status = skills.property.rank,

and accordingly,

Social Structure = occupation.distribution.organization.

Both formulas raise an intriguing question. If social reality is invariably three-dimensional, any real, observ-

able social phenomenon such as "modes of production," Economy and Society, Polity, etc., and in particular social status and social mobility, must combine all three parameters. If everything social is three-dimensional, no criteria seem to be left to differentiate, e.g., between Economy, Civil Society and the State.

Fortunately, there exists a solution to the quandary: **All social phenomena, and likewise, Sorokin's three types of mobility, each combines all three parameters, but in different strength dependent on which indicator -- skill, property or rank -- predominates.** For example, while occupational status and mobility combine skills with property and rank, occupational status is determined by skills, whatever the pay raises and the increase in authority that accompany occupational mobility, just as lesser skills entail less income and less authority.

In a similar fashion wealth may predominate over skills and rank and determine socioeconomic status without being impervious to them. As the notion of "status consistency" and "status inconsistency" (Lenski 1960) indicates, increased wealth tends to entail increased life-chances, including education and political influence.

The dominance of one parameter over the two others is even more transparent with rank, and in particular with political Power, which is hardly imaginable without superior skills and never fails to entail wealth.

The following set-theoretical formula reveals the analytical composition of Sorokin's three types of mobility:

occupational Mobility = **skills**.property.rank
economic Mobility = skills.**property**.rank

political Mobility = skills.property.**rank**.

8.8

We have seen, this far, the merits and pitfalls of Sorokin's analytical approach and in particular the ambiguities of his notion of "unibonded" and "multibonded" groups. Replacing his unibonded groups by unequivocal parameters, we were able to produce strictly unidimensional parameters and structures. At the same time, skills, property and rank are the guide-posts which produce social status and social structure as clearly defined sets. In every case, **status and structure are ideal constructs which provide the key to analytical sociology.**

Using the same indicators as mapping functions, we end up
with individual status or social structure depending on whe-
ther we choose individual INTERACTION or SOCIETY as the
domain (marked by upper case) to be mapped:

```
    indicator:  real DOMAIN:      abstract Mappings:
    _____

    skills    : INTERACTION -->  Occup. Status = Know-how
    property  : INTERACTION -->  Economic Status = Clout
    rank      : INTERACTION -->  Power Status = Authority

    skills    :  SOCIETY  -->  Occupational Structure
    property  :  SOCIETY  -->  Economic, or Class Structure
    rank      :  SOCIETY  -->  Power Structure
```

Up to this point, we have dealt with one dimension of
social status and social structure at a time. Let us now
combine the three dimensions to form a Cartesian product,
whose different composition produces three different forms,
or types of society:

```
        indicators:        DOMAIN:     Mappings:
    _____

   skills.property.rank : SOCIETY --> Communal Society
   skills.property.rank : SOCIETY --> Civil Society
   skills.property.rank : SOCIETY --> Political Society
```

(1) Prevalence of **skills** over property and rank maps
Elementary, or Communal Society, viz. self-sustaining
households and workshops in C.H. Cooley's (1910) sense of

"primary groups" or F. Tönnies's (1887) Gemeinschaft.

(2) Prevalence of **property** over skills and rank maps **Civil Society** (in terms of Adam Smith) in which the distribution of wealth controls the division of labor and is unimpaired by state power.

(3) Prevalence of **rank** over skills and property maps **Political Society**, or **State Power**, which is strictly limited to the delegation of power from the sovereign downwards to the common soldier, civil servant and policeman. Together, they constitute the executive and as such are identical with the **political class** in the sense of Mosca and, incidentally, with **the New Class** in the sense of Djilas (1957) which, in contradistinction to the power elite reaches down to the lowest echelons of society.

We thus end up with three **alternative types of society**, viz. "Natural" Communal Society, Civil Society, and Political Society (reading in the vertical), and three **complementary analytical structures**, viz. organization (org), or the power structure; the distribution of wealth (dis), or the economic structure; and the division of labor, or the occupational structure (occ) (reading in the horizontal), such that each (multibonded) type combines the same three (unibonded) functions, but with different **dominance** (marked by

bold face):

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        Table 29                          │
│              The Three Main Types of Society             │
│                                                          │
│   org:        rank            rank            rank       │
│   dis:      property        property        property     │
│   occ:       skills          skills          skills      │
│                                                          │
│        COMMUNAL SOCIETY  CIVIL SOCIETY  POLITICAL SOCIETY │
│                                                          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

8.9

The tripartition (both in the vertical and in the horizontal) opens new perspectives to sociological theory:

(1) Social stratification is the heart and core of sociological theory. It is identical with social structure.

(2) The picture remains confused so long as no distinction is made between concrete (observable) types of societies, on the one hand, and abstract (theoretical) ideal structure, on the other hand.

(3) Analytical sociology is not limited to mere taxonomy. Rather, each type of society displays a different dynamic dependent on which indicator predominates.

What remains to be done is to cross over the three empirical indicators A, B, C, with the three analytic parameters a, b, c, and to examine the Mappings they produce. We thus arrive at a cogent blueprint of society:

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗│
│║                        Table 30                           ║│
│║                 The Two Axes of Society                   ║│
│║                                                           ║│
│║              A=WORK   B=WEALTH   C=POWER                  ║│
│║                                                           ║│
│║   c=organization:    Ac   v   Bc   v   Cc   =   c(AvBvC) ║│
│║   b=distribution:    Ab   v   Bb   v   Cb   =   b(AvBvC) ║│
│║   a=occupation:      Aa   v   Ba   v   Ca   =   a(AvBvC) ║│
│║                                                           ║│
│║              COMMUNAL     CIVIL      POLITICAL           ║│
│║              SOCIETY      SOCIETY     SOCIETY            ║│
│║           = A(a.b.c)  = B(a.b.c)  = C(a.b.c)            ║│
│╚═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝│
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Chapter 9

INEQUALITY AND HETEROGENEITY

9.1

Peter Blau's (1977) work on <u>Inequality and Heterogeneity</u> promises to shed more light on the interplay of the two axes

of analytical theory. Blau distinguishes two kinds of struc-
tural parameters: "Graduated" parameters map social status,
or rank-order; by contrast, "nominal" parameters map what
122lau calls "functional diversification" such as the divi-
sion of labor, religious denominations or political parties.
Moreover, "graduated" parameters are inherently continuous,
capturing an infinity of transitions, e.g., from young to
old, rich to poor, etc.; by contrast, nominal parameters are
inherently bounded, but know of no rank-order. For example,
a clear and fixed boundary separates Frenchmen and Germans,
Protestants and Catholics, bakers and butchers without
implying a rank order.

By the same token only "graduated" parameters are parame-
ters in the strict sense, i.e., they are defined by two
polar opposites (extremes) which span a continuum of in-
creasing, respectively decreasing proximity to one of the
opposites which provides the rationale for measuring.
Obviously this is not the case with Blau's nominal parame-
ters, which reduce to simple classification. To take Blau by
his own words (1977:7): What his dichotomy addresses are not
two types of parameters but

> two kinds of social position ... membership in a group
> and status.

9.2

Granted that there are two different <u>principia divisio-</u>
<u>nis</u>, we must disagree with Blau's contention (1977: 8) that
age is a status. While all parameters are indeed graduated,
they are not identical with rank-order. Rather, the latter
is limited to, and indeed distinctive of, social status.
Once this is realized Blau's (1977: 8) miscellany of gradu-
ated parameters lends itself to classification under the
rubrics of analytical theory (where Blau's notion of age is
more or less equivalent to experience and seniority):

Table 31		
Peter Blau's Graduated Parameters		
(skills)	(property)	(rank)
Education	Wealth	Power
Age (Seniority)	Income	administrative
(Experience)	Socioeconomic	Authority
Intelligence	origin	Prestige

A closer look on these parameters is instructive:

(1) While Blau (p.45) enumerates wealth and power (along

with income and education) as main indicators of the rank-order, he consider economics and politics (along with the division of labor) nominal parameters.

(2) Blau does not recognize skills as a graduated parameter. Instead, he enumerates education, age and intelligence, and later on in the book, expertise, experience and seniority as graduated parameters. He thus attributes to education what rightfully belongs to occupation, and that is, skills.

(3) While prestige is indeed a graduated parameter that deals with rank-order, it is not a structural but an attitudinal parameter. While it is a potent indicator of **perceived** social status (as for instance in Richard Centers's (1949) or in North and Hatt's (1963) scales of occupational prestige), it is not an independent objective parameter.

9.3
Whatever its ambiguities, Blau's dichotomy goes to the roots of analytical theory. To illustrate his case, let us apply it to Rousseau's <u>Discourse on the Origins and Causes of Social Inequality</u>. To make their survival easier, humans develop **skills** which spawn specialization and increased division of labor, i.e., heterogeneity, on the one hand, and increas-

ed inequality, i.e., **stratification**, on the other hand.

   Blau thus deserves credit for identifying **inequality** and **heterogeneity** as cross-cutting axes of sociological theory. Unfortunately Blau ends up with an endless variety of group affiliations. Let us therefore look whether we can reduce this variety to a few principal sectors such as the well-known division of the economy into an **extractive,** a **manufac-turing** and a **service sector.** We would thus end up with the following aggregate:

      Industry = Extraction v Manufacture v Services.

   Relevant as this trichotomy is for economics, it implies wage labor and industrial society. We have therefore to look for a more comprehensive aggregate which encompasses prima-ry, communal groups as well as sovereign power. We then end up with a trichotomy of **self-employed, independent labor; wage labor,** and thirdly, **"executive labor,"** or the public sector whose function is the execution of State Power:

  Occupations = Free Labor v Wage Labor v Civil Servants.

   Unlike the divisions of industry, this trichotomy cap-

tures the whole gamut of social activities from housework
and child-bearing to hospitals, spy agencies and prison
camps, dividing the occupational structure into a communal,
an industrial and an executive sector.

9.4

As productivity increases, property accumulates and triggers
economic **inequality**, viz. a **hierarchy** of rich and poor, on
the one hand, and an **aggregate** of different types of wealth,
on the other hand. Regarding the latter, Adam Smith's famed
trichotomy of revenue comes to our mind: Land, stock and
work produce **rent, profit** and **wages** as the principal sources
of revenue, and landlords, owners of stock and laborers as
the fundamental social classes -- an idea taken up by Marx,
whose third volume of <u>Capital</u> (1981:1025) breaks off with
the following statement:

> The owners of mere labor-power, the owners of capital
> and the landowners, whose respective sources of income
> are wages, profit and ground rent ... form the three
> great classes of modern society.

Marx transformed Adam Smith's trichotomy into sweeping
political prophecy, combining it with Comte's law of the
three stages and proclaiming the sequence of feudalism,
capitalism and socialism as the law that rules history:

```
                          Table 32
                     From Adam Smith to Marx

   Adam Smith:
             Land              Stock              Labor
             rents             profits            wages
           landlords      owners of stock       laborers
   Marx:
         aristocracy        bourgeoisie        proletariat
          Feudalism          Capitalism         Socialism
```

9.5

The prophetic aspect of Marx's theory has since been dis-
carded while its analytical aspect continues to attract our
attention: Property constitutes a massive material asset
which along with skills (expertise) and rank (organization)
lies at the center of exploitation and class structure (cf.
Roemer 1983 and Wright 1985). Marx (1981: 1026) asked, "What
makes a class?" and answered, "The identity of revenue and
revenue sources." It is the **quality**, i.e., the source of
income rather than its **quantity** which determines social
status. It thus follows that **neither income nor production,
nor prestige or life-style, but property, skills and rank
determine social structure.**

   Accumulation of a surplus thus denotes the way in which

the prime producer creates property and by the same token, gets into a position to take advantage of those who have none. Obviously, as both John Roemer (1982) and Erik Olin Wright (1985) have shown, **exploitation precedes capitalism and wage labor**, as a glance at the reforms of Solon and Kleisthenes or at the prophets of ancient Israel illustrates. In any case **capital represents a new type of property which is no longer based on mere cumulation, but on rational calculation to produce profits that exceed the investment.** Property <u>per se</u>, or for that matter, money and precious metals, do not create value. It is **investment** which transforms wealth into **capital** as a specific form of property, and **profit**, into a specific form of revenue.

In turn, investment must be distinguished from **redistribution** as the third source of revenue which derives neither from labor nor from property, but from power and in its most primitive, barbarous form, from brute force. While in its more advanced, civilized form redistribution reduces to customs and taxes and lies in the hands of the sovereign, its more robust forms reduce to conquest and plunder and lie in the power of the sword. It is the latter which distinguishes rent from profit, as in the case of the plantation owners. Adam Smith's classification of revenue thus undergoes

a radical revision: **Accumulation of surplus labor, invest-ment and redistribution replace wages, profits and rent as the three main sources of revenue and wealth**[5]:

Wealth = Cumulation v Investment v Redistribution

9.6

The identification of free labor and redistribution as independent sources of wealth leads to a revision of Adam Smith's trichotomy of revenue and class. Compared with self-employed labor, Adam Smith's notion of wages becomes ambigu-ous: the intimate link of wages with capital forbids to separate the one from the other[4]. On the one hand, wages and profits derive from the same source, viz. capital; on the other hand, the subsumption of wage labor under capital does not obliterate self-employed labor as the primal source of wealth.

Adam Smith's failure to distinguish self-employed labor from wage labor[5] leaves two questions unanswered: Why people

---

[4]Consistently, Marx distinguishes three types of capital: "variable," "constant" and "fixed," viz. investment in labor, in raw materials, and in machinery.

[5]Where Adam Smith addresses self-employed labor, as in his discussion of the French Physiocrats, he speaks of "merchants, artificers, and manufacturers," to which he adds at times propri-etors and cultivators (1937: 631).

choose to work at all, and how to explain rent. The answer to both questions is instructive: **What distinguishes self-employed labor from wage labor is its capacity to reap the bounty of nature in excess of the labor power invested to extract it. Like capital at a more advanced stage, work is the primordeal investment to reap the bounty of nature** long before the rise of capitalism.

By contrast, **rent** is the price for access to nature's amenities once the latter have been monopolized. In Adam Smith's (1937: 53) breakdown of the revenue of the "gentle-man who farms a part of his own estate" the latter reaps

(a) some imaginary **wages** which, as it were, he pays to himself but which really represent his investment of labor;

(b) **profit** from investment in his gear and in amelioration of the land;

(c) **rent** from owning the land, or to be more precise, from **renting** the land, in which case rent becomes indistinguishable from interest from stock. Quite consistently, Adam Smith observes (1937: 53) that the North American and West-indian planters, who considered their plantations an investment, spoke of their income as "profit."

9.7

Obviously, there is something mysterious about rent[6]. Looked at more closely, rent derives from the benefits reaped not from owning but from working the land in excess of the investment of labor power[7]. **In every case, work combines labor (as primal investment) and surplus value (as primal profit in excess of the investment), or else work would not be worth the effort.** While it is true that no surplus can be reaped without labor and that labor is the measure of exchange value, it is no less true that **labor is not the only source of wealth.** As Sir William Petty (1667) acutely put it,

> Labor is the father of material wealth, and the earth, its mother[8].

It is the failure to recognize natural resources as an independent source of value which mars Adam Smith's notion of rent and Ricardo's and Marx's theory of value. This becomes stridently clear in Adam Smith's (1937, Book IV, ch. IX) discussion of "the agricultural system," i.e., the

---

[6]As Adam Smith (1937:49) pointedly put it, "landlords...love to reap where they never sowed."

[7]As Adam Smith (1937: 147) put it, "Land generally produces more food than will maintain the labor necessary to bring it to market."

[8]Quoted by Marx in Capital I (1977: 134).

French Physiocrats. While he praises Quesnay as a "very ingenious and profound author" (1937:637) and while he admits (1937:642) that "this system, with all its imperfections, is perhaps the nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been published on the subject of political economy," Smith fails to recognize land (or more precisely: the earth) as the primal source of absolute surplus value. Instead, his main intent is to vindicate the landlord as a productive source of wealth. He thus argues (1937:631) that "the expense laid out in employing farmers and country laborers and in ameliorating the land produces a new value, the rent of the landlord. It is therefore a productive expense." One is therefore not surprised that he did not find it worth while to examine at great length this very ingenious system" (1937:621) that was in his own words "the closest approximation to the truth as yet published on the subject."

The Marxian reduction of absolute surplus value to extended exploitation is no less slanted. Ironically, what distinguishes the three sources of revenue -- the bounty of the earth, work, and the ingenuity of investment -- is exactly reducible to Marxist terminology: The **extractive** sector produces **absolute surplus value** (with extended work hours and child labor as its most reprehensible forms but not its

main source) by extracting raw materials and energy from nature. By contrast, **manufacture** produces **relative surplus value** by more effective organization and by substituting fixed capital for variable capital. Finally, **services** derive profit from the **excess of use-value over exchange value**. In any case, **rent** as a third source of revenue derives neither from labor (as Ricardo and Marx would have it), nor from investment (as Adam Smith would have it), but from the bounty of the earth (as the wrongly spurned Malthus[9] has argued).

9.8

Along with the division of labor and the distribution of wealth **power** represents the third parameter of social stratification. While Max Weber's (1946: 180) definition of power as "the ability to impose one's will on others even against their resistance" holds for power in general, this definition must not delude us to equate power with brute force, and the state, with oppression. **The ultimate source and test of power is the ability to direct and organize, i.e, leadership.** By the same token, what makes subordination acceptable is the benefit that society reaps from competent leadership.

---

[9]One is reminded of Keynes's remark that economics would have fared much better if it had listened to Malthus rather than Ricardo.

In addition to <u>ad hoc</u> leadership, which is based solely on the individual, there exist two more indirect, round-about sources of power: **voluntary contract** and **sovereignty.** We thus end up with three alternative forms of power:

Power = Leadership v Contract v Sovereignty.

(1) **Personal leadership** is inherently spontaneous and unpredictable, limited in time and scope, and predicated on ever-renewed **performance.**

(2) **Power by contract** implies two tacit conditions which distinguish it from personal leadership and from sovereign power, viz. **coalition to benefit the insiders at the expense of the outsiders, and the proviso <u>rebus sic stantibus</u>.** While it outlasts individual leadership, contractual power lasts only as long as the balance of powers on which it is based. As such it relatively stable.

(3) **Sovereign power** is based on power monopoly including the ability to redistribute wealth, to legislate and to create its own executive apparatus. As such, it is predi-cated on stability even at the risk of stagnation, and while contract relies on **particular interests** and involves compe-tition, sovereign power invokes the **common interest** and

practices paternalism to achieve iron-clad unity and unifor-
mity.

9.9

Just as they are ubiquitous in real life, inequality and
heterogeneity lie at the heart of analytical theory. Once
Blau's open-ended diversity of group affiliation is reduced
to its essentials, it produces a pattern of compelling
consistency:


```
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        Table 33                          │
│                Inequality and Heterogeneity              │
│                                                          │
│  organization:   Leadership  v Contract   v  Sovereignty │
│  distribution:   Raw Wealth  v  Capital   v  Public Funds│
│  occupation:     Free Labor v Wage Labor v Civil Servants│
│                                                          │
│                  COMMUNITY v CIVIL SOCIETY v STATE POWER  │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Table 33
Inequality and Heterogeneity

organization:	Leadership v Contract v **Sovereignty**
distribution:	Raw Wealth v **Capital** v Public Funds
occupation:	**Free Labor** v Wage Labor v Civil Servants
	COMMUNITY v CIVIL SOCIETY v STATE POWER

   A closer look at this table is instructive: Reading in
the horizontal produces trichotomous aggregates which divide
occupation, distribution and organization into alternative
sectors which exist one along the other without impinging on
one another. By contrast, reading in the vertical combines
occupation, distribution and organization into Cartesian

products which produce Communities (egalitarian society), Civil Society and State Power (political society) as the alternative types of society which compose virtually every society since the neolithic revolution[10].

Besides the division into types, the preceding table reveals another fundamental feature of analytical theory: The structural parameters imply not only distinctive struc- tures but also distinctive functions which manifest them- selves in observable "objective consequences." In other words, to each structural parameter there corresponds not only a determinate structure as an ideal construct, but also possible -- but not necessary -- "objective consequences" which are real but contingent. Robert Merton (1968) equates the latter with manifest functions which reveal the "latent" functions which, unbeknown to Merton, are obviously identi- cal with the structure (both are intrinsically ideal). The truth is quite different. To paraphrase a well known dictum of Marx, functions, like structures, and like history, "do nothing. They build no castles and they accumulate no sur- plus. Rather, it real, active individuals who do all that."

---

[10]As such, the trichotomy is anticipated in the political consciousness of ancient Greece, whose citizens considered themselves "civilized" in contrast to the barbarians, and free citizens in contrast to the despotic rule of the Persians.

By the same token, objective consequences are as necessarily "manifest" and contingent as structures are necessarily "latent" and bare of any necessary consequences (i.e., effects). We thus arrive at the following reinterpretation of structure and function in terms of analytical theory:

(1) The occupational structure is predicated on -- and thus "manifests" itself in -- **skills**, which are developed in order to enhance **productivity.**

(2) The economic structure is predicated on, and manifests itself in, **property**, which is developed in order to enhance **prosperity** and **security.**

(3) The power structure is predicated on, and manifests itself in, **rank**, i.e., superordination and subordination, and is developed in order to enhance **effectiveness.**

Given the contingency of its objective consequences, no parameter completely controls its structure, which varies with the manifestations the agents produce. While the three parameters -- occupation, distribution and organization -- form an unshakable Cartesian product which transcends time and space, **the actual, historically given Division of Labor, Distribution of Wealth and the Power Structure are free to**

develop discrepancies and contradictions, uneven development and overdetermination. In no case have structure or function ever determined social action.

Chapter 10
CUSTOM, CONTRACT AND COERCION

10.1

The varying relative strength of the three structural para-meters (skills, property and rank) provides the key to the different dynamics of the three types of society: Whatever the function of rank to enhance effectiveness, its dominance over property and skills is limited to State Power, just as the dominance of property over skills is limited to Civil Society, and the dominance of skills over input from nature is limited to Communal Society. **In sum, the three types of society are qualitatively different according to the parame-ter which dominates them and determines their dynamics.**

   It is thus obvious that a hierarchical, or more precise-ly, a foundational order exists among the three parameters and their structures such that skills are the foundation,

or necessary condition, for property, just as the latter is
the foundation of rank:


```
        skills <= property <= rank
    =  -skills => -property => -rank
    =   skills v -property v -rank.
```


The differential dynamics of the three types of society
follows from the preceding formula: Each type of society
develops a different dynamic dependent on which parameter
predominates: The division of labor is possible independent
of property and rank, which remain optional, as this is the
case with Communal Society. By contrast, property depends on
labor, but is independent of rank, i.e., the latter may or
may not supplement it, as this is the case with Civil Socie-
ty. Finally, to constitute State Power, rank must dominate
property and skills, but at the same time depends on them as
indispensable subsidiaries.

```
    Communal Society =  skills v -property v -rank;
    Civil Society    =  skills & property v -rank;
    State Power       =  skills & property & rank.
```


At the same time, the foundational order combines increa-
sing strictness with diminishing extension. Thus Communal

Society is the least constrained, seemingly egalitarian and almost ubiquitous type of society, constrained only by non-social, physical and ecological conditions. By contrast, Civil Society combines tight control of property over labor with voluntary contract as a supplement at the discretion of property. Finally, State Power is tightly knit and restricted to a narrowly circumscribed group of people whose function it is to execute sovereign power and whose material survival depends on the power to redistribute wealth.

10.2

According to the foundational formula, the division of labor cannot dominate property and rank, which are, as it were, out of its reach[6]. At the same time it does not depend on them and in this sense is free of domination by them. A loose, open-ended relationship thus exists between the occupational basis and its potential superstructures: Raw, accumulated wealth and ad hoc leadership are free to emerge in Communal Society so long as they do not control it.

```
Communal Society  =   skills v -property v -rank
                  =  -(-skills & property & rank
           =  N Division of Labor; P Wealth, P Leadership
```

The preceding formula captures the essence of "primi-

tive," elementary, minimally stratified **Communal society,**
which is determined by the division of labor, but unregulat-
ed by property and rank (and thus appears to be egalitarian)
without being unstructured. While property and rank may
reach considerable proportions, they remain supplements
which have no lasting impact on Communal Society to trans-
mute it into Civil Society or State Power. By the same token
Communal Society is based on kinship to regulate property
and power, much as folkways, custom and tradition define its
morals as the antecedent of social consciousness.

Assuming that the three types of society are universal,
it will come as no surprise to find traces of them almost
everywhere. Thus Communal Society has been the subject of a
vast literature on "primitive," preliterate folk societies
(Redfield), sacred societies (Becker) and communities (R.
Park) as well as on Folkways (Sumner), primary groups (C.H.
Cooley), and most resoundingly, on Gemeinschaft and Gesell-
schaft (Tönnies).

A closer look at the latter is instructive. To begin
with, Tönnies' dichotomy had two notable precursors, Sir
Henry Sumner Maine (1861), who is well known for contrasting
"status" and "contract," and John Stuart Mill (1848), who

juxtaposed "custom" and "competition." Both Maine and Mill had premodern, traditional society and the emergent commercial society in mind; by contrast, Tönnies was influenced by the growing bureaucracy which encroached on the traditional society of his home town. This personal experience was compounded by Tönnies' study of Hobbes, two of whose unpublished works he edited, and Gierke's Genossenschaftsrecht (1877), which acquainted him with the "organic" corporate law of the Middle Ages.

No less important, Tönnies' dichotomy also leans on Schopenhauer's (1818) dichotomy of blind, seemingly irrational **will**, and rational, conscious **thought**, or representation. As a consequence, Tönnies overreaches himself when he applies his dichotomy to gender (male vs. female), age (young vs. old) or character structure (warm vs. cold, and soft vs. hard). What lies at the bottom of Tönnies's dichotomy is, in the last analysis, the contrast of the "mechanic" rationalism of the Enlightenment and the "organic" historicism of Romanticism.

Durkheim's dichotomy of mechanic vs. organic solidarity stands Tönnies' dichotomy on its head without being plausible. It is medieval corporatism which was "organic" (the

product of "essential" will), and it is modernity which is "mechanic" (the product of "arbitrary" will). In his subsequent work on Suicide (1897) adroitly dropped the notion of "organic solidarity" altogether and replaced the old dichotomy with "altruistic" and "fatalistic" suicide in traditional society, and "anomic" and "egoistic" suicide in modern society, a dichotomy which clearly vindicates Tönnies: There is little that is organic about anomie and egoism.

Howard Becker seems to take up Durkheim's dichotomy. However, in his article on "Sacred and Secular Societies" he (1960:249) emphasizes that his notion of the "sacred" is not identical with the "spiritual," "religious," "holy," and like terms. For him (1960:252),

> A sacred society is one that elicits from or imparts to its members ... unwillingness and/or inability to respond to the culturally new... Otherwise put, a network of sociation that develops ... a high degree of resistance to change, particularly in their social order, is a sacred society.

Conversely, secular society is defined by "a high degree of readiness and capacity to change, particularly in their social order." Becker's dichotomy thus closely parallels Pareto's residues of persistence and combination while it

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agrees with Webster's (1942: 145) definition of the sacred as "that which one treasures as a thing apart, not to be violated or contaminated by being put to vulgar or low uses."

Becker thus captures an important feature of Communal Society: it is the breeding ground of the sacred which he extends to the totalitarian movements of the 20th century: For Becker (1950: 254f.) the theocracy of Calvin, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia[11] are the clearest examples of the "prescribed-sacred" which he contrasts with the "principled-secular" and the "normless-secular" (1950: 67) of modern (and postmodern) society.

Becker thus deserves credit for having identified the sacred as an intrinsic quality not only of folk-society, but also of agrarian societies (Lenski 1970) and their empires and high traditions, a feature which is missing in most other typologies. Becker also sheds light on the resurgence of fundamentalism in mass society. If according to Gardavsky (1968) God is Not Yet Dead, it is because Communal Society survives alongside Civil and Political Society.

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[11]For an application of this idea, note Becker's (1947) book on German Youth: Bond or Free.

10.3

Any discussion of Communal Society would be incomplete without Robert Redfield's (1947) contributions to Folk Society. Like Howard Becker a student of Robert E. Park, himself the author of a signal study on Human Communities, the City and Human Ecology (1952), Redfield combines first-hand studies in folk-societies[12] with theoretical sophistication, which led him to substitute Little Communities (1955) and Peasant Society and Culture (1956) for isolated Folk Society.

Responding to criticisms, and in particular to an article by Gideon Sjoberg (1952) on "Folk and Feudal Societies," Redfield revised the original dichotomy of folk-urban as an antinomy (in which the growth of one antonym implies the decline of the other) to a supplementary relationship in which economic and political bonds (notably, the market and government) do not displace Folk Society, but supplement it.

Indeed Tepoztlán, like Chan Kom had access to a market; it also had a mayor, a teacher and a priest who represented institutions beyond the purview of folk society. Yet while

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[12] (Tepoztlán (1930), Chan Kom (1934), The Folk Culture of Yucatán (1941), A Village the Chose Progress (1950).

Folk Society resisted transformation by the market, church and government, the latter were accepted -- as it were, coopted -- so long as they remained enclaves which represented no threat to Folk Society.

Redfield's switch in analytical paradigm has far-reaching implications. It allows one to account for the rise of literate society (Gordon Childe's (1936, 1942) urban revolution) out of folk society and thus to include, as Redfield (1956:20) suggests, the peasant societies of India, China, Japan and the Moslem world in spite of the fact that they were embedded in a different type of society.

Accordingly, Redfield (1956:39) distinguishes two cultural traditions in peasant society: the local oral "low" tradition, and the written, translocal "high" tradition, with the latter emerging from the former but not strong enough to displace it. Whatever the achievements of the "high" tradition, as illustrated by Hinduism (1956: 48), it easily combines with the "low tradition" of folk society so long as it respects the latter[13].

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[13]The same can be observed in Catholicism with its popular cults of the Saints, miracles, indulgences, etc., which the Reformation abolished in a radical break with folk society.

Obviously, the high tradition belongs to a different, more complex type of society. In contrast to preliterate, isolated societies, peasant societies participate and even revel in the high tradition without fully understanding its meaning. Conversely, the high tradition, and in particular religion and morals, draws its vitality from its symbiosis with the low tradition, and that is, with Communal Society. Wherever the latter fades, religion and morals wane.

Sjoberg thus has his point: peasant society is different from folk society. It is marginally literate and subsidiary to an urban "high tradition" whereas Folk Society in the strict sense is preliterate and as it were, autochthonous. Still Redfield has his point, too: While peasant society connects with some urban center, the latter is not strong enough to displace Communal Society.

A notable difference thus exists between Communities -- as well as Civil Societies and State Power -- as ideal types and comprehensive, "real" Societies. The latter combine all three alternative types, albeit in very different proportions and with one type predominating. The peasant society of Yucatán can thus coexist with Mexican State Power and the Catholic Church so long as the three do not encroach on each

other, with the peasant society, as it were, coopting the mayor, the teacher and the priest.

New light thus falls on the earliest forms of culture and its extant monuments: Knossos and Tyrins, Tikal and Uxmal, Teotihuacán and Monte Alban all testify to a composite society which extended far beyond isolate Communal societies in the vein of the Nuer or the Trobrianders without yet being empires or city states. Rather almost everything indicates that these were cultic centers without a permanent population, but with a theocracy and massive concentrations of people on cultic occasions such as the Olympic games, Passover, Yom Kippur, the New Year, etc., i.e., a form of comprehensive Communal Society with cultic and organizational centers which are the earliest manifestations of contractual power and by the same token, of Civil and Political Society.

H.L. Morgan's signal book on Ancient Societies (1877) thus gathers new momentum and also calls for qualification. At the beginning of comprehensive societies we identify sacred cults which loosely unite Folk societies. By contrast, contractual societies as illustrated by the Iroquois League -- who acted under external military pressure -- bear

a much more determinate, political character as this was also the case with Rome and with the German tribes which elected a king on a contractual basis. For instances of cultic communal confederacies we have to look at archaic Egypt, India, Ancient Israel, Greece, and the Mayas.

It is in this sense that so-called theocracies appear at the beginning of high culture, which must not be confused with city states and empires. At the same time, an interesting light falls on caste society. Far from being a particularity of ancient India, it testifies to the ingenuity of Folk society to evolve comprehensive society without abandoning its sacred, traditional character. It is not by accident that along with Pharaonic Egypt castes and estates represent the longest lasting form of society in history.

10.4
In distinct contrast to Folk Society, **Civil** or, as we shall see, **Contractual Society** is determined by property and contract. Accordingly, it develops its own dynamics. Once property becomes dominant, it amalgamates with wage labor to constitute the hard core that drives Civil Society. At the same time, the relationship of capital and labor is laden with tension: While capital is bent on maximizing profit,

labor is bent on maximizing wages. It is in this sense that capital and labor form a "unity of opposites" which relentlessly pushes for revision and, as Max Weber (1906) put it, "holding one's own." Civil Society thus combines skills (labor), property (capital) and rank (power) in its own way, as the following formula encapsulates:

```
Civil Society  =  labor & capital v -power
               =  -(-labor v -capital & power)
               =  N Wage Labor & Capital; P Contract.
```

While property and labor thus combine into a powerful, if contradictory amalgamate, power is limited to voluntary contract. In contrast to spontaneous leadership which is based on personal performance and charisma, contract is based on a **coalition** for the mutual advantage of the insiders to the disadvantage of outsiders. By the same token **contractual power is calculated, retractable and limited to insiders, i.e., it is inherently rational, insecure and egoistic.** No contract lasts longer than the interests on which it is based. As such, contract is at the heart Civil Society.

The contrast between Civil Society and Folk Society reverberates in a wide gamut of typologies which stretch from John Stuart Mill and Sumner Maine to Parsons:

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         Table 34                            │
│           Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft Revisited           │
│                                                             │
│  J.St. Mill:                                                │
│                      custom  :  competition                 │
│  Sumner Maine:                                              │
│                      status  :  contract                    │
│  Tönnies:                                                   │
│                 Gemeinschaft :  Gesellschaft                │
│  Durkheim:                                                  │
│                    mechanic  :  organic solidarity          │
│  Becker:                                                    │
│                      sacred  :  secular societies           │
│  Redfield:                                                  │
│                        folk  :  urban society               │
│  Parsons:                                                   │
│                   ascription :  achievement                 │
│                                                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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In hindsight, one admires the acumen of these authors[14],
and in particular of Tönnies' Schopenhauerian legacy, viz.
the dichotomy of the subconscious, blind will and conscious,
rational ideas, which anticipates Freud and which rever-
berates in the dichotomy of Communal and Civil Society. The
latter look almost like Jungian "archetypes" which are
indelible, whatever the turn of history.

10.5

The preceding formula captures the essence of Civil Society,

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[14]For an informative survey see Charles Loomis' and McKinney's
(1960) "Introduction" to Tönnies's Community and Society.

as an ideal type, whatever its complexities in real, comprehensive society, for which we have still to find an appropriate name: urban, bourgeois, capitalist, commercial or most fittingly, Contractual Society. As with Traditional, Sacred society, reality reaches beyond Civil Society. Like Folk society, Civil Society is able to combine with communal and political enclaves so long as these do not dominate it. Civil Society may thus evolve into a City State, as in antiquity, or grow into a free City, as in Renaissance Italy, or found a "bourgeois" republic like Switzerland and the United States while comprising large enclaves of Folk society -- the Urkantone and the American backwoods and the frontier -- as well as enclaves of State Power so long as its contractual character remains unimpaired.

By the same token, as Max Weber's comprehensive study of The City makes clear, the mere incidence of cities is not necessarily an indicator of a civil, market oriented society. As Sjoberg (1960) has shown for The Preindustrial City, the latter may play quite an important role in agrarian empires without rising to dominance as in the case of the Oriental city. In other words, the City is a complex historical entity which is not necessarily dominated by Civil Society, as demonstrated by the open Oriental city. By

contrast, the occidental city owed its independence either to the powerful clans that founded the ancient city state, or to the contractual setting of feudal society which protected its free cities from State power.

In any case Civil Society is intrinsically rational and secular, determined by **the market** even where the latter is tampered with by monopolies and guilds. Yet, even as enclaves in empires, cities play a signal role in extracting and consuming national wealth. As Sjoberg (1960) has pointed out, the preindustrial city is the seat not only of merchants and artisans, but of the political, professional and cultural elites even where much of the wealth originates from landed property and even where the city is dominated by State Power. As Max Weber has made clear, there are three main types of cities: Patrician (based on clans), mercantile (based on wealth) and imperial (based on power).

In any case Civil society denotes a type of behavior which is marked by competition (achievement), contract and secularism as distinct from communality, custom and sacred trust, even where Civil Society is embedded in sovereign society, as e.g., in early modern Europe. As such, Civil society manifests itself in a spirit of rationality which

replaces the sacred and promotes Enlightenment, accompanied
by individualism and, as Max Weber (1946:155) put it, the
Entzauberung der Welt. Man now attains salvation in this-
worldly activity rather than by magic and ritual and serves
God by making this world a more perfect, better place to
live. Achievement and personal piety replace sacraments and
tradition and become manifestations of faith. It is in this
sense that Protestantism functions as the religious expres-
sion of Civil Society.

At the same time the shift from fixed, hallowed custom to
open-ended competition and from "an honest pay for an honest
day's work" to unrelenting performance, shatters the securi-
ty of traditional society and changes it to the benefit of
the successful and to the detriment of those left behind. As
Gertrud Himmelfarb has pointedly observed, the poor house
becomes a public institution. Civil Society has little to
offer to the underprivileged, who are nostalgic of the good
old times of Communal (corporate) society and look for State
Power and politics as the alternative to Civil Society.

10.6
Communal and Civil Society are complemented by a third type,
State Power. The latter is marked by the dominance of rank

over property and labor, which are relegated to subsidiary status. Invariably, State Power redistributes wealth and creates a public sector of civil servants and officers which differs notably from Communal and Civil Society:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{State Power} \ &= \ \text{rank \& property \& labor force} \\
&= \ -(-\text{rank v } -\text{property v } -\text{labor force}) \\
&= \ \text{N Sovereign Power \& Redistribution \& Officials.}
\end{aligned}
$$

As the analytical formula indicates, State Power is limited to a tightly knit hierarchical system which is predicated on unconditional power of the sovereign and on strict rules which determine rank and competence. State Power is thus marked by self-sufficiency and strict discipline which separate it from Communal and Civil Society and make it a minority which is prone to develop its own esprit de corps and to protect itself by secrecy.

We may therefore consider patrimonialism, including all the early Systems of Empire (Eisenstadt 1963) and the pre-industrial "agrarian societies" (Lenski 1970) early forms of State Power. Insofar as they developed bureaucracies and standing armies they do not depend on communal or Civil society and are representative of an alternative type of society which is marked by domination, i.e. in terms of Max

Weber, Herrschaft rather than tradition or contract.

At the same time, from its beginnings sovereign power has
tended to develop a sort of early "ideological state appara-
tus" in the sense of Althusser (1968) which links it with
supernatural and divine powers. From Ancient Egypt to the
Spanish Inquisition and the Holy Alliance the priesthood has
therefore been an integral part of the Sovereign, producing
a "high" tradition which complements and reformulates the
"low" traditions of folk society without eliminating it. In
terms of Howard Becker (1960) the "prescribed-sacred" com-
plements the "folk-sacred," while both are much less compat-
ible with the "principled-secular," which fittingly comple-
ments contractual society.

State Power does not stop at that. Since its beginnings
it has tended to expand by providing vital services to
society, with the water works in Ancient Egypt and China as
the most eminent example[15]. By the same token, State Power
tends to expand and thus to develop a broad gamut of profes-
sional, cultic and administrative elites which constitute
the earliest form of cultural elites while they remain en-

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[15]Leaning on Max Weber, Wittfogel's work on Oriental Despotism
(1970) has coined the term "hydraulic societies" without being
fully convincing.

shrined in the patterns of patrimonial rule and the "pre-scribed-sacred."

10.7

Intrinsic differences thus divide the three types of society which are mutually irreducible. **There exists no such thing as a uniform, universal social structure, but an aggregate of three alternatives which may vary independently,** i.e.,

Society = Community v Association v Domination,

or in different terms,

Mode of Integration = Custom v Contract v Coercion.

In every case Communal Society, Contractual Society and State Power are differently structured dependent on which type of cohesion predominates. At the same time, custom, contract and coercion are free to combine so long as the dominant type relegates its supplements to subsidiary status. We thus end up with three possible combinations which are much closer to empirical reality:

```
Communal Society     =  Custom v -Contract v -Coercion;
Contractual Society  =  Contract v -Custom v -Coercion;
State Power          =  Coercion v -Custom v -Contract.
```

We thus end up with three types of comprehensive society: Communal society, which supplements community with contractual and coercive elements; Contractual society, which supplements civil society with communal and coercive elements; and State Power, or in terms of Max Weber, Herrschaft.

Communal societies, or ethnic Communities, are predicated on direct interaction, custom and kinship -- which redefines Community in the strictly structural sense of primary relations rather than common values and solidarity[16]. These unreflected, spontaneous, face-to-face primary relations may be supplemented by emergent, primitive forms of contract or coercion such as tribal alliances and cultic communities, respectively chiefdoms and castes, without attaining an enduring contractual or institutional form and hence without transcending Communal Society.

By contrast, **Contractual Society** is predicated on negotiated, voluntary agreements between partners to delimit their power and interests. Deliberate (rational) contract thus arises from and reshapes traditional society without fully replacing it and at the same time resists subjection to

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[16]It thus elucidates that Tönnies' notion of Gemeinschaft is highly ambiguous: It equates Community with solidarity and thus conflates social status with affections and values.

sovereign power, as the assassination of Ceasar dramatically illustrates. **Contractual Society** may thus continue to rely on custom, as in the case of the Patrician City, notably ancient Rome[17]. It is only after the contract includes the people and the patriarchal bonds are weakened that the City State veers towards tyranny and oligarchy. The latter evolve as the result of unrelenting factional struggle for power. As Max Weber acutely remarked, the latter was less a class struggle than a struggle between social orders.

Finally, **State Power** emerged in various combinations with custom and contract, notably in the form of the vastly traditional patrimonial state and in the form of the elective, Feudal monarchy and the Ständestaat[18] to culminate in the Absolutist State with bureaucracy, legalism and paternalism as its main characteristics[19].

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[17]For an exhaustive elaboration, see Max Weber's chapter on The City (1958 and 1968: ch.XVI).

[18]See, again, Max Weber's (1968) exhaustive Soziologie der Herrschaft, especially chs. XII and XIII which draw the important distinction between patrimonialism in the Orient and feudalism in the Occident.

[19]Following the same rationale, Johannes Winckelmann has added a concluding section to Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft which presents Weber's ideas on the modern bureaucratic and democratic state as Weber's Staatssoziologie (cf. Appendix II in Weber 1968:1381-1469).

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        Table 35                          │
│                Historical Forms of Society               │
│                                                          │
│                Kinship &      Coalition &     Coercion & │
│                Custom:        Contract:       Control:   │
│   Communal                                               │
│   Society:      Ethnic        Synoikismos     Chiefdoms, │
│                 Communities   Cultic Centers    Castes   │
│   Contractual                                            │
│   Society:      Patrician     Social Contract Oligarchy and│
│                   Cities      Senate & People   Tyranny  │
│   State                                                  │
│   Power:      Patrimonialism   Feudalism     Absolutism  │
│               Erbmonarchie     Ständestaat    Bureaucracy │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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10.8

The present table provides a stringent system of forms of

society whose validity is supported by some famous ancestry,

starting with Montesquieu's reflections on The Grandor and

Decadence of Rome (1732) and the famous trichotomy of "vir-

tue" (custom), "honor" (competition) and "fear" (coercion)

which connect The Spirit of the Laws (1748) with distinct

forms of government, and culminating in Hegel's triad of

(altruistic) Family, (egoistic) Civil Society, and (coer-

cive) State, which excels by the acumen with which the

qualitative differences in social behavior are grasped[20].

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[20]As Georg Lukács (1954) and Shlomo Avineri (1972) have shown, Hegel is one of the great precursors of sociology avant la lettre. This holds for his theory of the "objective mind" as well as for his theory of "objectified mind" which, incidentally, anticipates Gidden's notion of resources as well as Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital.

Sorokin's three forms of social relations (1947: 99-118) closely follow -- and explicitly refer to -- Hegel, though on quite different grounds. Sorokin distinguishes "familistic," "contractual," and "coercive" social relationships to found his theory of Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937-41): "Ideational," "idealistic" and "sensate" supersystems represent successive stages of an imaginary cyclical movement which claims to replace Comte's three stages of evolution. In doing so Sorokin inadvertently switches from the horizontal (analytical) axis of our table to its vertical (historical) axis without noting the difference between them and thus invalidates his theory of cultural dynamics.[21]

10.9

The trichotomy of custom, contract and coercion has another eminent precursor, however divergent and disjointed the terminology: Max Weber. In his introductory chapter to Economy and Society (1968:1-25) on the "Basic Categories of Sociology" Weber approvingly refers to Tönnies. However, his

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[21]The case is quite different with Anthony Giddens' (1979, 1984) "stratificational model of personality" whose hierarchy of the unconscious, practical consciousness and discursive consciousness is remarkably in line with the trichotomy of traditional, contractual and coercive societies.

interpretation of Vergemeinschaftung and Vergesellschaftung
no longer emphasizes the affectual overtones of solidarity
and altruism, but interprets Tönnies' "essential will" as
traditional behavior and custom, while "associative rela-
tions" (Guenther Roth's translation of Vergesellschaftung)
accords with competition (struggle), freedom of contract and
rational choice.

It is in an unrelated context that Weber distinguishes
between Consensual and Imposed Order, and subsequently,
between Voluntary and Compulsory Association (1968:50), and
that is, between arbitrary contract (Verein) and coercive
institutions (Anstalt) as illustrated in his famed juxta-
position of sects and churches (Weber 1946:320). It is on
this occasion that Weber articulated the difference between
contract and coercion, Vergesellschaftung and Herrschaft as
distinctly as nowhere else, viz. discipline imposed from
above regardless of person and status in the latter case,
and "the necessity of holding one's own in the circle of
one's associates" and its ability to breed habits, in the
first case.

Significantly, the same idea reverberates in Weber's
Sociology of Law (1968, ch.VIII), where individual Rights

and universal Law are juxtaposed with one another and with customary law. What first appears as a tentative heading of a paragraph on "Law, Convention and Custom" with an indeterminate borderline between them (Part II, ch. I) thus culminates in an elaborate theory with a special section on the creation of right from the struggle of contending parties.

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Table 36
From Hegel to Max Weber

Hegel:
        Family              Civil Society          The State
Sorokin:
     familistic              contractual            coercive
     relations               relations              relations
Max Weber:
  Vergemeinschaftung    Vergesellschaftung       Herrschaft
       Custom                Rights                 Laws
```

At the same time, Weber was aware of the levelling effects of formal legality and the deafening effect of bureaucracy, whose stifling effects he wanted to check by political struggle.

Most important, as the previous analyses have shown, our theory is no longer based on description and induction nor

on axioms and deduction, and in this sense is "postpositiv-
ist." Following Frege, it is based on set theory to define
the substantive arguments, and on algebraic logic, to define
its syntactic functions. In astounding accord with Hegel,
compact, opaque reality is made transparent by showing how
to construct it conceptually.

Chapter 11

MEASURING SOCIAL INEQUALITY

11.1

The acid test of theory is its applicability to reality. It
is for this reason that scaling and measurement must be
shown to fit in with analytical theory and in particular
with the three dimensions of stratification. The first step
then is to identify the common denominators which allow for
the correct measurement of work, wealth, and power.

   A short glance at the value theory of labor will be help-
ful. Whatever the infinite variety and the subjective idio-
syncrasies of use value, it is the reduction to exchange
value, i.e., the normally necessary labor time to produce a
given product, which allows establishment of a common
denominator to measure and compare the infinite variety of
goods. In the same way work, wealth and power (i.e., skills,
property and rank) become amenable to objective measurement:

   (1) Skills may be quantified in terms of time (years)
normally needed to attain the indicated level of perfection.
For example, let us assume three students graduate after

four years of college, the first with an A, the second, with a B, and the third, with a C grade average. Then the first student has a better reputation, or more "prestige," then the second, and the latter has a better reputation than the third.

By the same token, let us assume three students all graduating with a B grade average, but taking, respectively, three, four or five years. In this case, considering the diverse time span it took to graduate, the performance of the first student would compare to an A, and that of the third, to a C.

(2) <u>Property</u> and income are mutually convertible: Either property may be measured in the amount of yearly income it normally yields, or income may be discounted as the yield of an assumed capital. For example, if ownership of $ 1,000,000 is assumed to be equivalent to a yield of $ 50,000, then a yearly income of $50,000 is equivalent to a $1,000,000 property.

(3) <u>Rank</u> is quantifiable in terms of the number of people affected by the decisions of the power holder. Conversely, power is circumscribed by freedom, or independence from

authority. In sum, freedom and power both reflect the
ability to give orders and not to have to take orders.

11.2
To be sure, scaling starts with discerning opposites such as
hot and cold, old and young, etc., and ends up with a
hundred centigrades or with so many vintages and age groups.
The same holds for the scaling of society. It starts with
the distinction of a lower and an upper segment of a given
society, e.g., rulers and ruled, elites and masses, rich and
poor, literate and illiterate, etc., as the most elementary
and ubiquitous division of society.

However, at closer inspection the elementary dichotomy
will have to yield to the division into three levels as the
analytically and historically more convincing one. As
Collins (1975, p.63) aptly puts it:

> The situations in which authority is acted out are the
> key experiences of occupational life... On this basis,
> three main classes can be distinguished: those who take
> orders from few or none, but give orders to many; those
> who must defer to some people, but can command others;
> and those who are order-takers only. The readily under-

stood continuum from upper class through middle class to working class corresponds to this dimension.

Applied to social history and evolutionary theory Collins's formulation works as an eye-opener. Wherever we observe the split of the "primitive" tribal society into (warrior) nobility and free citizens, as in ancient Greece, Rome, among the ancient Germans or among the Aztecs and Incas at the arrival of the Spaniards, the price for this advance in organization is paid by those who have no influence: the conquered and those who are not included in the class of the free. This can be exemplified by the Indian caste of the sudras -- the conquered dark skinned population which functions as the agriculturists.

In sum, wherever tribal society evolves into "archaic" society in terms of Bellah (1964) and Parsons (1966;1971), a new underclass of dependents (such as clients, metics, helots, servants, serfs and slaves) emerges -- the "silent majority" of premodern society -- and by virtue of living under the same roof with their masters, becomes as effec- tively "inculturated" and "integrated" as it remains con- signed to silence. In the last analysis, the creation of a lower class is the condition for the "free citizens" to

accept the emergent upper class.

11.3

To be sure, the number of levels of measurement is a matter
of mere expediency. For example, as Collins (1975, p. 63)
suggests, we may divide the middle class into upper and
lower middle class and distinguish between working class and
lower class, thus ending up with five ranks. Or, as with
English society, we may consider hereditary nobility as an
upper upper class in distinction to executives, the rich and
the political and military elites as a lower upper class,
and thus end up with a scale of six levels.

   On the whole, the division into six levels combines sim-
plicity and clarity by simply splitting each of the three
elementary levels (i.e., U, M, and L) into an upper and
lower level. We thus climb from a lower lower class (LL) to
upper lower (UL), lower middle (LM), upper middle (UM),
lower upper (LU) and finally to upper upper (UU) class.

11.4

Strange as this terminology may sound at first, the notions
of lower middle class and upper middle class have certainly
caught on because of their universal usefulness. The sug-

gested scale is applicable even in cases where revolutions
have done away with an hereditary upper class -- as in the
U.S.A., France or Russia -- or where a tribal society has
not yet developed a lower class. In such cases, the missing
classes figure as an empty set without invalidating the
scale as such. In every case, the analytical trichotomy
suggested by Collins undergirds the six-levelled scale as
the following tables demonstrate:

```
                         Table 37
               Unified Models of Stratification I.


          The Military:        Business Corporations:

   UU        Generals               Executives
   LU        Colonels         Technical Intelligentsia

   UM        Captains         Junior Line Supervisors
   LM       Sergeants            Clerical Workers

   UL        Corporals        First-Line Supervisors
   LL        Privates          Shop & Bench Workers
```

```
                         Table 38
             Unified Models of Stratification: II.


        The Christian Church:     The University:
```

```
UU        Popes, Patriarchs     President & Provost
LU     Cardinals,Archbishops      Deans & Chairs

UM           Bishops                Professors
LM   Priests,Pastors,Ministers    Instructors

UL      Elders, Presbyters         Graduates
LL           Laymen             Undergraduates
```

11.5

The universality of the stratificational scale is not
limited to modern societies. It applies to ancient Rome and
to feudal estates and Indian castes as well as to tribal
societies, as the following table demonstrates:

```
                    Table 39
      Stratification in ancient, feudal and tribal
                    societies

 ancient Rome:     feudal estates:    tribal society:

  (Emperor)           Princes          --------
   Senators           Nobility         chieftains

  Equestrians         Burghers          elders
 free Citizens      Craftmasters       warriors

 socii, metics       peasantry        dependents
    slaves            servants         ------
```

What the preceding table brings out with particular clarity is the division of premodern society into three seg- ments which constitute almost three different nations within the same society. The seemingly extreme case of Indian caste, viz. warrior nobility (kshatriya), free citizens (vaisya), and peasantry (sudras) easily translates into English feudal society: lords, commons, and disenfrenchised peasantry.

Caste does not have to wait for religious sanctions to emerge and to rule supreme. Rather, it is endemic in premo- dern "traditional" society. Looked at more closely, medi- eval "estates" or Staende are exactly such caste-like formations, as Max Weber (1946) elaborated in his much quoted, but little understood chapter on "Klassen, Stände, Parteien." Rather than an additional dimension of stratifi- cation, "status groups" represent the pre-modern equivalent of social class (as the House of Lords and the House of Commons patently demonstrate). In contrast to Indian caste occidental nobility and citizens were not religiously sanctioned (while royalty and the Catholic clergy were). Rather, their "status" was based on life-style, privilege and "status honor." In any case, "status" is not a dimension

of stratification.

11.6

This far, we have used concrete, necessarily multidimensional entities to demonstrate the rationale of scaling. We have only to identify Collins's occupational dimension with power and to add skills and property to arrive at the three-dimensional pattern of social stratification:

Table 40
A three-dimensional Scale of Stratification

	Class:	Skills:	Property:	Rank:
(U)	upper	learned	wealthy	rulers
(M)	middle	skilled	middle class	citizens
(L)	lower	unskilled	poor	dependents

The preceding schema readily lends itself to further division into six levels:

Table 41
A Six-level Scale of Stratification

	Education (years of study)	Income (in 1959 $)	Rank (control)
UU	Experts	over $25,000	Generals

```
LU   University      $15,000 - 25,000      Colonels
UM   College         $10,000 - 15,000      Captains
LM   High School      $6,000 - 10,000      Sergeants
UL   Grammar School   $3,000 -  6,000      Corporals
LL   Illiterates       below $3,000        Privates
```

The preceding table well illustrates the problems of
empirical measurement as well as of analytical thought. For
one, since everything real is three-dimensional, no concrete
indicator can represent any single dimension in full purity.
For example, years of study are indicators of education
rather than of skills; income reflects occupation as well as
wealth and power; military rank reflects power as well as
education, skills and income.

At the same time, the very fact of overlap ensures a
relative (contingent, not analytical) degree of consonance
or consistency among the three dimensions which, if reduced
to abstract purity with no overlap, would show much less
affinity. For intrinsic reasons, empirically verifiable
status is multidimensional.

The problem of the affinity or compatibility of the three
dimensions is compounded by the fact that, within each

dimension, rank is a relative rather than an absolute variable: It is predicated on proportion and hence subject to change. There exists no abstract, universal definition for the concrete meaning of rich and poor, free or dependent, educated or uneducated, which can differ considerably from society to society and from epoch to epoch.

For example, in terms of income and education (but not in terms of property and power) considerable sectors of the working class have risen into the lower middle class, much as part of the upper middle class enjoy an income which equals that of the lower upper class. Accordingly, American society has become "affluent," with corresponding changes in life-style, without fundamentally changing the over-all class structure. While the absolute level of income and education has risen, and the over-all quality of American society has undoubtedly changed, the relative distribution of wealth may have changed little. After all, what counts for scaling, are relative proportions rather than absolute quantities.

11.7
On the individual level, the multidimensionality of status is corroborated by the discovery of incongruent status, or

status inconsistency, i.e., different status in different
dimensions. For example, barring contingencies such as
inheritance, gambling or corruption, the individual usually
rises first in skills and education to rise subsequently in
income and power, i.e., the initial status inconsistency
between high skills (knowledge) and low income (property)
and rank (power) is overcome and eventuates in status
consistency.

11.8
Quite routinely, a tendency towards status consistency
(Goffman 1957) or, as Lenski (1954;1956) first called it,
"status crystallization" seems to prevail such that the lag
in one dimension tends to be made up to draw even with the
other two dimensions. The more dramatic and illustrative
cases are those in which a person leads on one dimension and
lags behind on the two other dimensions, resulting in three
typical constellations:

   (1) A person highly advanced in <u>skills</u> lacks property
and power. Unless he advances on at least one more dimen-
sion, he is most likely to be frustrated. The revolution-
ary, the prophet and the heretic are most likely to evolve
from this combination.

(2) A person of considerable **property** is poor in skills and power. He too is likely to lose out unless he advances in at least one other dimension, as is the case of a self--made men whose wealth is not matched with power and formal education. In the long run even the greatest wealth is unlikely to last unless it is aligned with power. Besides that the second most effective protection of wealth is education.

(3) The most dramatic rise in status is the rise in **power**. However, to hold one's own in power requires both education and economic potential. Even where brute force succeeds to hold an individual or a group in power, the following generation will bolster their status by education, property and marriage. While education <u>per se</u> does not compensate for wealth and power, the latter tend to coopt education with impressive regularity in order to establish status consistency and to consolidate their superiority. By the same token, education becomes a status symbol and an instrument to consolidate power. Quite indubitably, education is not limited to skills.

11.9

In the last analysis, **status inconsistency** functions as a mechanism to keep the individual alert, and society, dynam-

ic. Where it is quelled, society ceases to be dynamic. On the other hand, upper classes tend to perpetuate their superiority by establishing privileges in education, wealth and power. To the extent that they succeed, a society becomes increasingly closed, caste-like and "ascriptive." Conversely, to the extent that the middle and lower classes are strong enough to fend off privileges, a society is open, "republican" and "democratic."

A closer look at both types of society is illuminating: The first type of society tends to become stable, ultrastable, and finally stagnant (though not necessarily "integrated"). By contrast, the second type tends towards dynamics, friction and conflict (though not necessarily anomie, as Comte and Durkheim believed).

The opposite holds true. As Max Weber (1906/1946) perspicaciously observed in his essay on "The American Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," it is the unrelenting constraint to **hold one's own** which explains the internal dynamics of social stratification independent of consensus and "mechanic solidarity."

Chapter 12

PRESTIGE, POWER AND PRIVILEGE

12.1

Although it is a widespread practice to equate **class struc-
ture** and **social class** with income, education, and occupa-
tion, it is quite clear that any concrete (i.e., any empiri-
cally verifiable) indicator of class, however persuasive, is
necessarily three-dimensional, i.e., the combined product of
skills, property and rank. By the same token, if social
stratification is strictly three-dimensional, there are no
other dimensions of stratification in addition to skills,
property, and power.

12.2

This holds in particular for **sex**, **age** and **kinship** (ethnicity
and race). While each of these groups is marked by biologi-
cal and biographical characteristics, neither age nor sex or
ethnicity add anything to the social status of a person that
is not measurable by skills, property, or power.

    In every case, the differences (iniquities, injustices,

resp. advantages or privileges) of any of these groups are
measurable in exact terms only by computing the aggregate
status of their individual members. To take a well known
example from Gerhard Lenski's (1966: 80) work on Power and
Privilege, the status of Mexican mestizos as compared to
white Creoles and indigenous Indians is defined by the
aggregate skills, property and power of their members.

The same holds for gender and age groups as well as for
minorities. Their grievances could not even be spelled out
if it were not for the differentials in skills (education),
wealth (income) and power (occupation).

12.3
A closer look at property and income is no less illumi-
nating. Obviously, the value of a property (e.g., a house, a
farm , a factory) is determined by the revenue it is expect-
ed to produce. By the same token, the value of a property
that is insecure drops to zero. In the long run, the value
of any property depends on the security only power can
ensure, either individually or socially.

Looked at more closely, the same holds for the distinc-
tion between income from rents, profit and wages. They too

are intimately linked with power. Let us assume that a
landlord, a shopkeeper and a highly skilled wage earner have
the same amount of income. Then it is obvious that the
income from rent is the most secure, and that from wages,
the most precarious one. It is property that determines who
has the longer breath. Consistently, "status groups" are
groups of property owners whatever their life-style and
their concept of "honor."

   The importance of the property variable does not stop
here. Income may be consumed or invested. In that way,
social differentiation sets in by dividing people into those
who enjoy immediate gratification and into those who (in
terms of Max Weber) defer gratification. In every case, the
outcome is the differentiation of property and social status
and concomitantly, two different attitudes towards life
which account for the weighty difference between tradition-
alism and "the spirit of capitalism," or more precisely,
between the indulgent and the provident.

12.4
A closer look on power is no less illuminating. We must drop
the preconception that power is identical with coercion, or
even worse, with alienation and inertia, as some radicals

seem to believe. Rather, quite independent of coercive institutions the "will to power" permeates all human action -- a "powerless dialogue" is a dialogue in a no-man's land. Given the fact that power, defined as the capacity to give orders, is the polar opposite to dependence, there is no flight from power that does not forfeit freedom.

As such, independence turns out to be one of the hidden variables that determine occupational prestige: In contrast to reputation, which reflects personal performance no matter what the prestige of the job, those jobs rank highest in prestige which are not only free of drudgery and which are well paid, but most of all, which afford independence.

Invariably, occupational prestige implies freedom from having to take orders, and hence power. By the same token, prestige is not a primary variable on a par with skills, property or rank as, Gerhard Lenski (1966) and Jonathan Turner (1984) assume. Invariably, it reflects rank.

12.5
The changing and equivocal use of such terms as **prestige**, **honor** and **power** continues to cause considerable confusion about social stratification. While they are indeed closely

linked with status these terms reflect subjective, orienta-
tional rather than objective, situational variables, with
which they must not be confused.

(1) In the broadest sense, **prestige** is coterminous with
status as well as class. It reflects the esteem a person
enjoys thanks to the good standing of his family or his
personal achievement. For all practical purposes, it com-
bines skills, property or power, each of which may become
the source of prestige. In particular the prestige which a
doctor, a scholar, a politician or an artist enjoys is
commensurate to his reputation or competence.

(2) By contrast **honor** applies to (premodern, traditional)
status groups whose 'status honor' (Max Weber 1946) reflects
power and privilege. While it is intrinsic to feudal and
caste societies, it is not an independent stratificational
variable any more than class. While both differ indeed in
that the first is "ascriptive," while the second is based on
"achievement," both are equally three-dimensional.

(3) To compound the confusion, the term **power** is often
used in the sense of occupational prestige or wealth.
However, to say that somebody is a powerful scholar or owns

a powerful fortune is not identical with crediting him with
actual power to make decisions which affect others. It is
only in the latter sense, i.e., in the sense of control and
superordination, that the term "power" is used properly.

12.6
Max Weber's (1946) well known equation of **status group**
(Stand) with 'status honor' and life-style is no less
equivocal. In any case, Stand represents a premodern equiva-
lent of class which is primarily based on privilege (i.e.,
power and law) rather than on 'status honor' and life-style
(as Weber would have it). Whatever their importance, which
nobody denies, the latter are both secondary.

   Moreover, where privilege is reinforced by ethnic strati-
fication and religious doctrine, we speak of caste. In every
case, however, castes, social orders (estates), and classes
are all equally three-dimensional. What makes them different
is their way of legitimation (viz. kinship, privilege or
achievement). It is evident from the preceding analyses that
social structure is equivalent to social status as well as
social stratification. It is also equivalent to social
codes, parameters, rules of the game and, in terms of
Durkheim, to external constraint and regulation.

Stratification affects life even farther: Skills, proper-
ty and rank determine not only a person's "material inter-
ests," but even his or her life chances in an almost fatal,
tragical sense. With a specific configuration of skills,
property and rank a persons ability to appropriate is set,
his or her dice are cast.

12.7
In any case, **life chances** must be clearly distinguished from
life styles. The latter function like a protective halo or a
shell which shields and to some extent also hampers its
carrier. Thus, table manners and dressing habits, the way
one's budget is tilted, e.g., towards expensive dining and
wining, socializing, travelling, child rearing or charitable
activities decisively determines the scope of potential
social contacts. Commensality is the entrance ticket to
connubium and close association.

By the same token, life styles are far from being merely
expressive of a persons's status and values. Like prestige
and "status honor" they are powerful instruments of social
selection and control which constitute "cultural capital" in
Bourdieu's sense. Together with kinship and privilege life

style is the single most potent determinant of caste.

12.8

Since the dimensions of stratification are relatively autonomous, they are not necessarily evenly strong. Each of the three dimensions may variously predominate. Accordingly, three extreme types of society (and of personal character) are possible:

(1) Radically egalitarian, anarcho-syndicalist or **communist societies** with a communal or fraternal structure in which property and power are minimized or outright dismissed. The prototypes of this group are religious orders and utopian communes in which civil society and the state are reduced to primary (Communal) society.

(2) **Plutocratic societies**, which are mainly property and wealth oriented. They spurn the prime producer and his primitive property as much the sovereign state while they extol the market as the panacea for all social problems.

(3) **Dictatorships**, and most notably, **militaristic** and **fascist** societies, which are based on brute power, Machiavellianism and social Darwinism and opposed to civil rights,

freedom of assembly and a free press.

12.9

Seen in comparative perspective, these three types represent an ascending order of obnoxiousness and coercion and of decreasing rights and freedom. Each in its own way conveys a vivid idea how society looks like if reduced to skills, to property or to power.


```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────┐│
││                    Table 42                        ││
││              Eccentric Types of Society            ││
││                                                    ││
││  coercion │                            fascism     ││
││           │              plutocracy                ││
││  freedom  │ anarchism                              ││
││           └──────────────────────────────────      ││
││              pacifism              militarism       ││
│└───────────────────────────────────────────────────┘│
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Chapter 13

THE STRUCTURATION OF SOCIETY

13.1

As will be argued below, society is structured by the use of
artifacts. It is an undisputed, if trivial fact that society
is surrounded by two environments: Nature and Culture. As we
shall see, the notion of Culture requires further discussi-
on. For clarity's sake, let us equate Culture with <u>Artifacts</u>
and define the latter as comprising all objects which are
man-made (or animal-made, including ant heaps, bee hives,
birds nests etc).

   In any case, artifacts represent objects whose use serves
to enhance our command over the physical, social and cultur-
al environment. Accordingly, artifacts fall into three
fundamentally different classes:
   Material Culture such as tools, weapons, facilities,
etc., in short, technology.
   Expressive Culture such as song, dance, ritual, poetry,
epos, drama, and novels insofar as they express personal

sentiments and values.

   "Pure," i.e., purposeless, **Formal Systems** such as art styles, paradigms, logic and mathematics.

13.2

In short, artifacts, and by the same token, culture, vary dependent on the domain of reality they serve: Technology serves, and is intrinsic to **Society**. Expressive Culture -- i.e., culture in the ordinary sense -- serves and is intrinsic to the **Personality** and to Social Consciousness. Formal Systems are purely ideal Constructs which are intrinsic to the **Intellect**. At the same time, each type of artifacts involves its own distinctive "exchange medium," viz. Skills, Language and Logic.

Table 43 The Three Main Types of Artifacts		
Material Culture	**Expressive Culture**	**Formal Systems**
structures	structures	structure
Society	**the Personality**	**the Intellect**
technology property institutions	song, poetry epos, drama literature	art styles paradigms symbols
Skills	**Language**	**Logic**

Once produced, **Material Culture** represents and works like a man-made substitute for Nature. In other words, Material Culture duplicates Nature. Like the latter it constrains and, as Anthony Giddens (1979,1984) emphasizes, enables man to control Nature. Thus a well substitutes for a source or a brook; a spear, for a longer arm, etc. In the same vein, a canal substitutes for a river; an irrigation system, for rainfall; fire, for a warmer climate, just <u>as if</u> man had created rivers or rainfall, or had changed the climate. In any case, Material Culture recreates Nature and functions to enhance man's control over it.

Just as Material Culture duplicates Nature, **Expressive Culture** duplicates Society. In this way, Hamlet, Nathan the Wise and Tartuffe are equivalent to admission tickets to the social, political and moral worlds of Shakespeare, Lessing and Molière, much as David Copperfield, the Rougon Macquarts or the Magic Mountain introduce us to English, French or German society. In every case Expressive Culture is instrumental in setting moral standards and in diffusing values. By the same token, it is as much socially conditioned as it is socially relevant.

By contrast, **Formal Systems** are free of material interest
and subjective sentiments, their sole and distinctive prin-
ciple being objectivity and "following a rule." In any case
Formal Systems are ideal constructs based on impersonal
calculi. Like games they are detached from reality and its
anxieties. Just as a good game is run for the game's sake,
good art is created for art's sake, science, for science's
sake, and religion, for religion's sake.

In any case the essence of Formal Systems is <u>Ideenvaria-</u>
<u>tion</u>, i.e., the free variation of all variables involved "as
if" things were speaking for themselves -- an idea which we
borrow from Husserl (1913/1936) and which epitomizes analy-
tics as much as it anticipates post-modern "de-centering"
and "de-constructing." It is in this sense that Gothic
cathedrals and Bachian fugues are no less prototypes of
Formal Systems than analytical geometry or calculus.

13.3
Significantly, just as Society, Personality and Intellect
produce distinctive types of artifacts, each of the three
subsystems of Society is marked by a specific type of arti-
fact, of which Marxian "instruments of production" are the
most prominent example. In order to save energy and hence

guided by the principle of least effort, man invents tools
and weapons, appliances and machinery, huts and houses,
pottery and cloths, wheels and boats, etc., which enable man
to control Nature and trigger the division of labor.

An intricate mechanism thus rules production which cannot
simply be reduced to labor: the invention and use of tools
and facilities promotes skills, much as the growing special-
ization of skills promotes the improvement and invention of
tools and facilities as "instruments of production."

Significantly, what holds for means of production holds
for artifacts in general. As Hegel acutely observed, arti-
facts constitute "objectified" or "externalized" mind. It is
this objectification which enables man to develop, practice
and control thought. It is by being externalized, or "mate-
rialized," that labor becomes subject to trial and error and
by the same token, to upgrading without implying any "hidden
hand" or teleology.

Obviously, the development of the Intellect is inconceiv-
able without the invention of artifacts. There can be no
doubt that skills represent the most elementary, as Bourdieu
prefers to call it, "habitual" layer of the Intellect. As

Friedrich Engels (1880) put it, human intellectual develop-
ment starts with the development of the hand and the inven-
tion and use of tools.

13.4
While the importance of technology for society is generally
recognized (though with the exception of Auguste Comte
barely integrated into sociological theory), even fewer
attempts have been made to look for a similar rationale for
the creation and distribution of wealth. Ironically, while
capital stands at the center of Marx's work, his denuncia-
tion of profit as unearned surplus-value has almost com-
pletely obfuscated the function of investment and property[7].

The point is that capital as a sort of surplus property
constitutes the objective means, or more precisely, the
instrument of investment whose adapt use determines the
growth and the lack of growth of wealth in society. **Just as
the interaction of skills and tools constitutes the mecha-
nism which drives production, the cumulation of capital and
its investment constitute the mechanism which drives the
creation of wealth.** It is in the light of this insight that
the function of utilities and facilities becomes transpar-
ent: Tents and houses, canals, bridges and roads all consti-

tute material assets whose benefits exceed the investment.

In sum, capital represents surplus value which functions as an **instrument of investment** to produce Wealth just as the **instruments of production** serve to reproduce Society. In an unrelenting process of trial and error the cumulation of capital pushes investment just as investment pushes the cumulation of capital. While it is true that capital <u>per se</u> is not productive, it is its combination with investment which functions as the magic wand which produces wealth.

13.5
Just as investment is more general and reaches farther than skills, organization transcends investment. Laws and institutions objectify and regulate power and as such constitute "instruments of organization" which enable rulers to rule and to control production and investment. Thanks to laws and institutions power is able to shape production and wealth even though it continues to depend on them. By the same token power determines the form of society.

Because laws and institutions promote, rationalize and generalize power, they are not "generalized media of exchange," but instruments of organization. As such, as George

C. Homans (1961) has pointed out, they are investments made
in order to enhance political effectiveness rather than
satisfy some imaginary "functional need."

```
+---------------------------------------------------------+
|                        Table 44                         |
|             Means of Production, Investment             |
|                    and Organization                     |
|                                                         |
|      Work:              Wealth:            Power:        |
|                                                         |
|  Tools & Weapons       Property            Laws          |
|     Technology          Capital         Institutions     |
|                                                         |
|     means of           means of          means of        |
|    production         investment       organization      |
|                                                         |
|   Reproduction          Wealth          Effectiveness    |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
```

13.6

We thus arrive at a trichotomy of social processes, viz.
reproduction, investment and organization, which are consti-
tutive of the three subsystems of Society, viz. Work, Wealth
and Power. Accordingly, to set Marxism straight, the instru-
ments of production are to be supplemented by instruments of
investment and organization, just as the Marxian "modes of
production" are to be redefined as division of labor to be
supplemented by the distribution of wealth and domination.

Clearly, Society is not reducible to production, nor will property and power ever wither away.

A clear and unequivocal picture thus emerges: Social interaction represents a Cartesian product of reproduction, investment and organization, none of which can decline to zero without annulling action. At the same time, each function invents specific instruments to produce specific artifacts which are no longer bound to complementarity.

In this way the functions amalgamate with artifacts to constitute **subsystems** of society which are at the same time **interdependent** due to the functions they share, and **contingent** due to the artifacts they produce, which vary independently of each other and thus account for uneven development, contradictions and overdetermination. There is no such thing as a monolithic Society.

In other words, while production, investment and organization are closely intertwined, their outcome is unpredictable. Artifacts thus play a fundamental role in the social process: They integrate dynamic, spontaneous action into structured subsystems whose output is contingent on the use that is made of the instruments. It is the latter that both

constrain and enable action and in this sense produce
"structural effects."

   A strict distinction must therefore be made between the
functions and their respective **subsystems**, viz. the Division
of Labor, the Distribution of Wealth, and Subordination and
Superordination, i.e., Hierarchy, or in terms of Max Weber,
Herrschaft, each of which is marked by a specific structure.
In terms of logic, the functions form an indivisible Carte-
sian product; the subsystems, a loose aggregate, i.e.,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Action} &= \text{occ \& dis \& org} \\
\text{Subsystems} &= \text{Div.Labor v Distrib.Wealth v Hierarchy} \\
\text{Social Structure} &= \text{occup Str v econ Str v power Str}
\end{aligned}
$$

13.7
The preceding analyses shed new light on structuralism.
There is nothing about action (activity, agency) that
implies structure. Rather, social action constitutes un-
structured, dynamic fields which are in constant flux.
Action per se has no structure nor subsystems. Rather, it is
the product of the temporal effort made by each of its
agents, with the pecking order as its rationale.

By contrast, the subsystems of society combine dynamic action with the use of instruments and the production of artifacts. It is the latter that "objectify" and "external-ize" the otherwise evasive functions and differentiate Society into subsystems dependent on the instruments they use (viz. tools, capital or law) and the type of artifacts they produce (viz. goods, property or institutions).

```
                          Table 45
                Functions, Instruments and Systems

          skills            investment           leadership
          tools              capital                law

          goods             property           institutions
    Division of Labor    Distrib of Wealth       Hierarchy
    occup. Structure     economic Structure    power Structure
```

In any case structure is a derivative that presupposes real, concrete action and processes from which it abstracts. **Structure is an epistemological rather than an ontological category. It is not a part of reality; rather it is a device to map it.** It is by abstracting from complex reality that we map reproduction into **occupational structure**; accumulation of wealth and investment, into **economic structure**, and

leadership and organization, into **power structure**.

    As adversaries of structuralism have long argued, there
is no such thing as social structure as a real material
factor that produces effects. To paraphrase Engels again,
structure, like history, does nothing. It possesses no
immense wealth and it fights no battles, nor does it produce
effects or "objective consequences." Rather it is the **use of
instruments** and its impact on Society that
produces the apparent **structural effects**: Tools promote, or
in terms of Anthony Giddens (1984), enable the production of
goods, just as capital enables the creation of **property**, and
laws enable the creation of **institutions and social order**.

13.8
The combination of (fluid) action and (static) artifacts
provides the key to the analysis of society. On the one
hand, interaction is predicated on unrelenting effort to
"hold one's own," and is hence **entropic.** On the other hand,
the creation and use of instruments is based on the princi-
ple of least effort. It is hence **"negentropic"** in the sense
that it diminishes entropy without being able to revert it.
As Leslie White (1959) and in his succession, Fred Cottrell
(1970) and more recently Kenneth Bailey (1992, 1994) have

shown, it is the dialectics of entropy and negentropy, and
that is, the extraction and rational use of energy that
underlies the social process.

Interestingly, the duality of entropy and negentropy has
found its theoretical expression in Marx's (1867) distinc-
tion between "absolute" and "relative" surplus value. While
he limits "absolute" surplus value to the extraction of
labor power (i.e., of human energy), the concept holds for
the extraction of energy in general, including not only
water mills, wind mills and sail boats, but any type of raw
materials extracted for human use[22].

By contrast, the production of "relative" surplus value
is geared to the use of instruments (not only of production,
as we now see, but also of investment and organization):
either to attain the same results with less effort, or to
achieve better results with the same effort. Quite obvious-
ly, "rationalization" underlies Society and each of its
subsystems and is thus inherent in socialization.

Still the Marxian dichotomy highlights the fundamental

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[22]In Marxian terms, absolute surplus value thus includes not
only human labor power, but all forces of production as well.

difference between unstructured dynamic fields, on the one hand, and "rational" structured systems, on the other hand. For the reasons we have shown, systems promote "secondary" socialization grounded in purposive rationality. By contrast, "primary" socialization is inherently spontaneous, uninhibited by rules, values and ideal constructs, grounded on the simple rationale of the pecking order and of "holding one's own." It is in this sense that society is dual. Whatever the rationales of its subsystems, its primary form of interaction points to the unbound, blind Schopenhauerian "Will" that underlies all its representations.

13.9
The dualism of entropic action and negentropic systems also sheds light on functionalism and its ontological foundations. **Homo faber** rises from animals by producing artifacts, combining skills and tools, capital and investment, leadership and organization, trying to upgrade reproduction, wealth and leadership. The question why people should try to do all this is easily answered in terms of negentropic theory: Social evolution is driven by the principle of least effort.

   The division of labor thus emerges from the thrust to

improve the production of goods, just as people start producing a surplus in order to create property, and organization and institutions are invented in order to strengthen society by making leadership more effective. In an ascending order of upgrading, reproduction emerges from mere hunting and gathering, just as capital accumulation emerges from successful reproduction, and institutions emerge from societies whose property is at stake.

Chapter 14

RULING CLASSES AND POWER ELITES

14.1

Two theories have been in the foreground of political sociology: the Marxian notion of class struggle, and the Paretian notion of circulating elites. Both will have to be put to the test by analytical theory which will in turn have to demonstrate its ability to shed light on a seemingly endless discussion.

At first glance, everything seems to favor the theory of elites. Considering the multidimensionality of stratifica-

tion, it would seem that it is only in very approximate terms that we can use the term "upper class" or "ruling class." Those at the top of society who are considered the elite may excel in many different ways, e.g., in knowledge, creativity, effectiveness, etc. Likewise top position may be based on performance (skills) as well as on wealth or power.

It seems therefore a good strategy to dissect upper classes into specific elites and to speak tentatively of professionals and intellectuals as <u>occupational</u> elites, of the "superrich" or "old money" as the <u>economic</u> elite and of those in power as <u>governing</u> elites rather than of a compact ruling class. (As we shall see, none of the three labels fits: occupational elites conflate performance with power; economic elites are far from being elite; governing elites and, for that matter, political elites fail to realize that power inheres in decision making rather than in government).

For reasons which are inherent in the very notion of stratification, the distinctive qualities of each dimension tend to be brought out more clearly in their top echelons where the role of performance, wealth and power is most conspicuous. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the use of the term "elite" implies no value judgment. As Pareto hastened to emphasize, elites, defined as those

holding the top echelons of society, may be far from being "the best." By the same token, the use of the term "elites" implies no resignation to a seemingly iron "law of oligar-chy" (Robert Michels) or to manipulated masses (Mills; Domhoff).

14.2

At first glance, Pareto's (1900;1902;1915) theory of the circulation of elites seems to dispense with Marx's and Mosca's notion of the ruling class. Except for tribal confederacies and feudal societies in which power is inher-ited and legated like property -- and from which the notion of a ruling class was originally derived -- the notion of ruling classes seems to have to give way to "governing class" (Mosca; Domhoff), "political class" (Aron 1960), "governing elite" (Pareto), "integrative" and "sublimative elites" (Mannheim 1946;1950), "strategic elites" (Suzanne Keller 1958) or, most poignantly, "the power elites" (Mills 1956).

However, this judgment may have been rash. While Pareto is right in emphasizing that class struggle ultimately reduces to power struggle -- an argument he shares with Marx as well as Mosca and Max Weber -- his theory comes danger-

ously close to psychological reductionism. What Pareto attributes to the residue of persistence is what requires explanation in the first place. Granted that elites circulate (for immanent reasons), their persistence remains unexplained.

It would seem, therefore, that the notion of a ruling class cannot be entirely dispensed with: Even if the notion of a ruling class could be reduced to "governing elites" or a "political class," the latter are not identical with "old," "established" upper classes as the equivalent of a social elite. In terms of Raymond Aron (1960/1966, p.204), the "social elite" is not identical with the "political class." By the same token, neither Baltzell's (1958;1964) "Philadelphia Gentlemen" or his "Protestant Establishment" nor Mills's (1956) "higher circles" or his "Metropolitan 400" nor, for that matter, the court of St. James, represent a "power elite," and only vaguely an "aristocracy" in the classical sense. They do, however, represent the social elite.

14.3
A closer look at Marx's concept of the ruling class will be illuminating. To be sure, Marx's definition of the ruling

class as those who dominate the means of production and therefore wield a pervasive influence smacks of economic reductionism and is indeed not tenable -- as Alvin Gouldner (1980) has acutely remarked, Louis Bonaparte then should never have ascended to power.

However, Marx's notion of a ruling class gains considerable weight once it is seen in its original context. Leaning on Adam Smith, Marx defines classes not in terms of power, but in terms of revenue. The Marxian notion of "ruling class" is therefore to be understood as a social rather than as a political class; it is certainly not identical with Mosca's notion of the "ruling class" as a governing class. In terms of Gramsci, la classe dominante is not identical with la classe dirigente.

Accordingly, in Marxian terms the bourgeoisie represents the ruling class (even under Napoleon III and under Bismarck) which is, however, not identical with either Pareto's "governing elite" or with Mosca's "ruling class." By contrast, the 200 social-democratic deputies in the French Legislative Assembly of 1849, and even Antonio Gramsci as an Italian senator, were members of the "power elite" or "governing class" without being part of the "ruling class"

in the Marxian sense.

Obviously, the lack of distinction between these two key notions is one of the reasons for the confusion that all too often haunts political theory and sociology. What Pareto addresses as the "governing elite," and what C. Wright Mills (1956) calls "the power elite" is not identical with the ruling class: Rather than an elite in the strict sense, the latter is a "status group" in a sense which only Max Weber (1946;1968) has clearly brought out.

14.4
While it is obvious that "ruling classes" are not identical with power elites, we still have to find out what distinguishes the latter from the professional elites. For one, the notion of "power elite" addresses those at the top of power pyramids, and that is, of organizations, not only in government and in politics, but wherever society is organized. The notion of "governing elites" and "political elites" thus turns out to be far too narrow. On the other hand, the notion of "elite" points in a distinctly different direction. It refers to outstanding personal performance whatever the field and regardless of power and wealth.

Wherever elite is predicated on achievement, it is synonymous with excellence. We speak admiringly of <u>virtuosi, maestros, geniuses</u>, etc. At the same time, <u>The Celebration of Heroes</u> (William Goode 1978) is not limited to artists and intellectuals; it also holds for politics, business, and the military. A Pitt and a Cavour, a Carnegie and a Ford, or a Napoleon Bonaparte and a Lord Nelson are elite, not because of their political, economic or military rank, but because of their performance. It is in this respect, as Raymond Aron (1960/66) has acutely observed, that all performing elites are "more or less professionals."

The same holds for Suzanne Keller's (1958) "strategic elites": While she subtly distinguishes four main types of elites, viz. external "adaptive" and "goal attaining" elites (only the second of which are "strategic" in the strict sense) and internal "integrating" and "pattern maintaining" elites (which address St.-Simon's and Marx's "ideologues" and Mannheim's "sublimative" elites), they are all predicated on performance and are hence professional elites.

Therefore, when Mills (1956) speaks of political, military and corporative elites, he like so many others conflates two different criteria: exceptional performance

and top position. The two are not identical: The first is personal, the second, impersonal. Looked at more closely, Mills's (1956) notion of "the power elite" is even more ambiguous.

According to his own definition, his power elite denotes power holders at the top of organizations who derive their power from an assumed "ruling class" of the "corporate rich" who, strictly speaking, are not an elite in the general sense, nor are they identical with political, military and even business "chief executives." Clearly, the latter are represented as the "executive committee" of the corporate rich as the American ruling class. The Paretian terminology to the contrary, Mills's conception of American society thus turns out to be basically Marxian: In the last analysis, even the "power Elite" is the executive of the "corporate rich" as the ruling class whose status character is adumbrated over and again but is ultimately misconstrued as leadership where there is none.

14.5
At the same time, while it is obvious that elites are predicated on performance and must not be confused with power holders, the latter must not be confused with the

social elite either. One of the fundamental facts about elites is that performance is not transferable: Skills must be learned from scratch with every new generation. By contrast, property is readily transferable. Like money it is insensitive to the manner in which it is acquired. It is all the more sensitive to the way it is used.

By the same token, property spawns special strategies for its protection and conservation: exclusivity to keep contenders out, strict codes of honor to avoid fraud and scandal, and cooptation of political, economic, military, etc. power.

It is in this way that a tightly knit and firmly exclusive, but not necessarily integrated, let alone organized social elite, or upper class as a "status group" (cf.Max Weber 1946) or "establishment" (cf. Baltzell 1964) develops which holds its own through strict etiquette, exquisite education, carefully calculated connubium and selective commensality even where formal privilege no longer exists.

It is in this sense that the educational reform led by Wilhelm von Humboldt has been constitutive of the modern German upper class much as the system of "public schools"

continues to constitute the English upper class, and much as the Ecole Normale and the Académie Française define the standards of the French social elite.

14.6
New light thus falls on upper classes and elites alike: Both do exist, but rather than excluding one another they relate to different dimensions. What still remains to be analyzed is power properly speaking.

A short glance at C. Wright Mills and Robert Michels will be clarifying: Rather than outstanding personal achievement, Mills's Power Elite comprises those who wield power by virtue of occupying top positions and on whose decisions the fate of their subordinates and ultimately the fate of society depends. (It is in this sense that the decision makers are the truly "strategic" elites).

As Robert Michels (1915/1962, p.78) put it, using a quote from Louis XIV, in the last analysis, power depends on the capacity to make fast and competent decisions. Rather than skills and status, the essence of power is fast and unerring judgment and direction, or as Louis XIV. put it, resolution. It is in this sense that power does not derive from force;

rather, it directs it.

By the same token, power is inherently precarious.
Exactly because it inheres in decision, power is subject to
be renewed and sanctioned with every new decision: It is the
position that persists; the individual is expendable.
However powerful his or her position, he or she is subject
to the unrelenting test of fast and competent decisions, not
for himself or herself, but for the organization (family,
firm, state, etc.) at whose top he or she stands. In dis-
tinct contrast to skills and property, power is volatile,
ungrateful, challenging and implacable.

14.7
Like property and achievement, power imposes particular
strategies. Just as class relies on wealth and exclusivity,
and just as elites rely on unrelenting learning and cre-
ativity, power relies on coordination and coalition. The
latter may be formalized in treaties and alliances; it still
remains predicated on rebus sic stantibus. No coalition
lasts longer than the power of each single partner.

Most important, coalitions are aimed at securing advan-
tages over other, third parties: Coalitions are voluntaris-

tic minorities whose <u>raison d'etre</u> is to benefit the insiders at the expense of the outsiders. This holds for the sheer exercise of power (i.e., domination) as much as for material advantages (i.e., privileges) and information (i.e., secrecy).

What Mosca (1939, p.53) observes about individuals holds no less for groups and institutions: Coalition is the key to collective power:

> The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority. At the same time, the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority.

What founds power, then, are neither professional skills nor social status -- although both are indispensable in order to succeed in society -- but resolution and coalition: The "power elite" and the "governing class" are neither an elite nor a class, but a number of people in top positions whose power inheres in the organizations they head and whose authority depends on their ability to achieve superiority.

14.8
In sum, society develops three distinct types of top eche-

lons which follow quite different rationales:

(1) **Skills** are not transferable, and each generation must start from scratch.

(2) **Property** is amenable to, and indeed invites, transference through legacies and inheritance.

(3) **Power** is subject to the relentless test of success and to ever changing coalitions.

Although only achieving elites are elites in the strict sense, common parlance uses this term indiscriminately for the top echelons of all three subsystems:

1) **Professional elites** excel by their skills. They vie for excellence whose ultimate resort is creativity.

2) By contrast, upper classes, or **social elites** (which are neither "economic elites" nor "ruling classes") vie for status and tend towards exclusivity, particular codes of honor and glamorous life-style.

3) **Power elites** are strategic elites which are defined by decision making. They are not limited to government and the military but comprise all sorts of managers.


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Table 46
Three Types of Elites
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│      professional        social        strategic      │
│         elites           elites          elites       │
│                                                       │
│      performance         status        leadership     │
│       creativity       life style     coordination    │
│       excellence       exclusivity    superiority     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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The disparity between the three dimensions of strat-
ification which the comparative analysis of the elites has
again borne out is the reason for the dislocation which
obviates any firm integration among the three dimensions. In
the last analysis, the three principles of performance,
status, and coalition rule each other out and can be brought
only to some transitory, tenuous equilibrium.

14.9

New light thus falls on the ongoing discussion between (lib-
eral) theories of pluralism, (classical) theories of ruling
classes, and (radical) elite theories. As Martin Marger
(1987) has shown, there is a point to each theory. What his
analysis does not fully bring out is the disparity between
the three analytical dimensions which separates elites,
upper classes and decision makers. For the most part, real-
ity is foreshortened by missing one of the three dimensions
and conflating what should be kept separate.

Thus the propertied and educated constitute Digby Balt-zell's (1964 and 1958) Establishment and Philadelphia Gentlemen which comprise the "higher circles" of society. Unfortunately no distinction is made between power and achievement. On the other hand, C.W. Mills (1956) addresses those functional elites which wield power, but makes no distinction between performance and position. Even worse, Mills's "power elite" is indistinguishable from the upper class which is conceived as the "ruling class."

On the whole, while most of the theories suffer from foreshortening the three dimensions of social structure, they are at least unequivocal about the dislocating effect of power. While each dimension is indeed autonomous and resists reduction, this does not rule out the hierarchical order which rules the relationship between elites, upper classes and power. Rather than reflecting some given econom-ic reality, every society is predicated on the distribution of power. Incessantly and implacably power redefines the social and the occupational structure and reshapes society. In no case is the power structure a mere epiphenomenon of the property structure, any more than the latter is a mere epiphenomenon of the "mode of production." It is power which

determines the shape of society.

Chapter 15

FROM ROUSSEAU TO LENSKI

15.1

The trichotomous pattern of social stratification goes back
to Rousseau's pathbreaking essay on the Origins and Causes
of Inequality among Men (of 1755). As an ideal construct
which does not reflect the actual course of history, Rous-
seau's essay constructs the rise of inequality from an
imaginary "natural" state of equality. Successively (1)
skills develop and articulate in the division of labor; (2)
with increased productivity, property develops and articu-
lates in social class; (3) finally, in order to protect
property, law develops and articulates in government and the
state.

It is therefore possible to argue that the foundations
for a valid theory of society have existed since 1755, with
St.-Simon (1822) and Marx (1859) standing in this tradition.
Unfortunately the resounding success of The Social Contract
(of 1762) eclipsed Rousseau's earlier essay. While he is
identified with contract theory and the idea of the "general
will," the roots of his radical theory lie in the earlier

essay. If Marxism has French roots, it is not French social-
ism, nor French materialism, but Rousseau.

15.2

Two generations after Rousseau his conception found its
classical formulation in Auguste Comte's (1822/1877) early
essay on a "Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for
Reorganizing Society." Admittedly, the idea of making
politics a positive science belonged largely to St.-Simon
and the essay was indeed first published as the third part
of St.-Simon's Catechism of the Industrialists (of 1822). To
make politics a positive science, politics must be explained
by (but not reduced to) the social forces that underlie it,
just as the latter must in turn be explained by the "state
of civilization," i.e., the sciences, arts, and industry:

> Civilization properly so called consists on one hand in
> the development of the human mind, on the other in the
> result of this, namely the increasing power of man over
> nature. In other words, the component elements of
> civilization are science, the fine arts, and indus-
> try...
>
> The state of civilization necessarily determines that
> of the social organization, whether spiritual or tempo-
> ral.... It is still more evident that the prolonged
> existence of any political system is inconceivable
> unless it confers supreme power on the predominant
> social forces, the nature of which is invariably pre-
> scribed by the state of civilization. Reason points to
> this conclusion, and experience confirms it (Auguste
> Comte 1877: 554).

Civilization, the civil and the political order thus form an integrated hierarchical system the higher levels of which presuppose the lower ones for their explanation. Conversely the higher level is considered the "exponent" of the lower one:

> The best thinkers....already admit that the political order is and can only be the expression of civil order; in other words, that the preponderating social forces, of necessity, at last become the directing ones. Only one step more is needed to recognize the subordination of the political system to the state of civilization. For if it is clear that the political order is the exponent of the civil order, it is at least equally apparent that the civil order itself is merely the exponent of the state of civilization (Comte 1877: 555).

Most remarkably, Comte was well aware of the feedback effect of the higher levels (i.e., in Marxian terms, of the "super-structure"): Once they have come into existence, they develop a momentum of their own and begin to reshape the "basis":

> Doubtless social organization, in its turn, inevitably reacts on civilization in ways more or less marked. But this influence, which, notwithstanding its great impor-tance, is only secondary, cannot overturn the natural order of dependence... For experience always shows that if the social organization be constituted in a sense at variance with the coexisting civilization, the latter in the end always gets the upper hand... (Comte 1877: 555).

One is struck by the elegance and precision of Comte's

formulation which goes far beyond Rousseau and even Marx.

15.3

An unmistakable if complex relation exists between Marx and the work of St.-Simon which is complicated by the influence of Hegel and of Ricardo. The ideas of St.-Simon reached Marx both through the intermediary of the French historians -- notably Buchez and Pierre Leroux -- through the St.-Simonian movement and through Lorenz von Stein's (1842) sensational book on Communism and Socialism in France.

Seen in this context, Marx's (1859) famed "Preface" to the Critique of Political Economy reverberates the Comtean trichotomy even though Marx starts out from the Hegelian (and Rousseauan) trichotomy of political economy, civil society and the state:

> My investigations led to the result that legal rela-
> tions, as well as forms of state...have their roots in
> the material conditions of life which Hegel.....
> combines under the name of "civil society"; that,
> however, the anatomy of civil society is to be sought
> in political economy.

By contrast, the St.-Simonian trichotomy underlies Marx's subsequent distinction between an economic, a social and a political structure:

> The mode of production...determines the general charac-
> ter of the social, political and intellectual life
> processes....

This far, and in contrast to his subsequent identifica-
tion of the "relations of production" with the property
structure, Marx is in accord with the classical trichotomy.
In the Manifesto he still distinguishes "relations of
production" (Produktionsverhältnisse), from "property rela-
tions" (Besitzverhältnisse). This usage is duplicated by the
distinction between "modes of production" and "modes of
appropriation." This dichotomy is complemented by Marx's
interpretation of the state as "form of organization" and
his interpretation of Herrschaftsverhältnisse, as relations
of domination between oppressors and oppressed. Signifi-
cantly, while the preceding quotes are culled from diverse
texts, they all reverberate the classical trichotomy.

15.4
Unfortunately, a confusing break occurs in Marx's thought
which seems to have gone unnoticed: The property relations
are equated with the relations of production, while the
forces of production replace the latter. Consequently, the
forces of production, which were originally coterminous with
the relations of production, now enter into conflict with

the latter:

> At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production ... come into conflict with the existing relations of production or -- <u>what is but a legal expression of the same thing</u> -- <u>with the property relations</u>... (emphasis added). From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters...

It should be clear from Marx's own arguments that it is the property relations which turn from "forms of development" into fetters. However, no such conflict should be conceivable between forces of production and relations of production in the normal sense. To paraphrase Marx: Rather than coming into conflict with itself, the "mode of production" comes into conflict with the "mode of appropriation," or the property relations, and even more so, with the "mode of domination," or the power structure. Quite definitely, to equate property and power with "relations of production" is an improper use of language which has for too long confused Marxist thought.

15.5

Comte's formula had a considerable influence on the Anglo-- Saxon world, most notably on John Stuart Mill -- who was personally acquainted with Comte and who wrote a special

monograph on <u>Auguste Comte and Positivism</u> --and through him, on Herbert Spencer, whose work merged Comtean positivism with British utilitarianism. In the second part of his <u>Principles of Sociology</u> (1876, chs.7-9) Spencer distinguished an internal "sustaining" system, an external "regulating" and a mediating "distributive" system, with reproduction, distribution and organization as their functional rationales.

As Jonathan Turner (1987) emphasizes it is Spencer rather than Durkheim who must be credited with presenting the first structural-functional theory of society. Most remarkably, Spencer's trichotomy is free of the teleological conception of parts satisfying imaginary needs of the whole. Rather, the three subsystems of society are determined by specific functions which are remarkably consonant with analytical theory, viz. reproduction, distribution and organization.

15.6

It is with Pitirim Sorokin's (1927) classical work on <u>Social Mobility</u> that a new accent was added to the classical trichotomy. Sorokin set out to supplement the idea of geometrical (physical) space with the idea of social space. Just as Descartes initiated analytical geometry by introduc-

ing the notion of coordinates, Sorokin sets out to create

analytical sociology by elaborating coordinates to capture

social mobility and through it, social stratification.

Sorokin discerns occupational, economic, and political

stratification as the three dimensions of social space which

capture social mobility with the same precision as Descar-

tes' analytical geometry captures physical space. By the

same token, just as any physical object is tridimensional,

> any organized social group is always a stratified
> social body... Unstratified society...is a myth which
> has never been realized in the history of mankind
> (Sorokin 1964, pp.12f.).

Sorokin's argument is substantiated by vast statistical and

historical evidence. It is the adequacy of the conceptual

labels he uses which stirs doubts.

> If the economic status of the members of a society is
> unequal, if among them there are both wealthy and poor,
> the society is economically stratified...
>
> If the social ranks within a group are hierarchically
> superposed with respect to their authority and pres-
> tige, their honors and titles, if there are rulers and
> ruled, then...the group is politically stratified...
>
> If the members of a society are differentiated into
> various occupational groups, and some of the occupa-
> tions are regarded as more honorable than others, if
> the members of an occupational group are divided into
> bosses of different authority and into members who are
> subordinated to the bosses, the group is occupationally

stratified...

The point is that each of the qualifiers, viz. the epithets "economic," "political," and "occupational" is itself three-dimensional. Occupational groups reflect skills as well as wealth and authority (as Sorokin explicitly states), just as political groups reflect skills and wealth as well as power, and just as "economic" groups reflect skills and power as well as wealth.

Yet while the conceptual labels may be imprecise (especially the term "economic"), Sorokin is to be credited with defining each dimension by its distinctive quality, viz. skills, property and authority and, no less important, with defining the scales which map the position of every individual who is either skilled or unskilled, wealthy or poor, powerful (ruler) or powerless (ruled). With Sorokin's work, the original trichotomy stands as solidly as ever.

15.7
A glance at the work of Max Weber is no less instructive. Weber basically follows the separation of civil society and the state by bracketing power from class, but he is clear and precise in his distinction of "property class" and

"occupational class" as the components of "social class":

> "Class situation"....derives from the relative control over goods and skills.... "Class" means all persons in the same class situation. a) A "property class" (<u>Be-sitzklasse</u>) is primarily determined by property differences. b) An "occupational class" (<u>Erwerbsklasse</u>) is primarily determined by the marketability of goods and services. c) A "social class" makes up the totality of those class situations within which individual and generational mobility is easy and typical.

However, the power component is omnipresent in Weber's thought. Upper and lower classes are equally defined by "positive," and respectively, "negative privilege," i.e., by law and ultimately, power:

> Positively privileged property classes rely on the monopolization of capital formation out of savings, i.e., of the utilization of wealth in the form of loan capital, and its resulting control over executive positions in business. (Weber 1978, p.303)

> The primary significance of a positively privileged occupational class lies in a) the monopolization of enterprise management for the sake of its members and their business interests; b) the support of these interests through influence on the economic policy... (Weber 1978, p.304)

Obviously, even market oriented "social classes" imply power, both in the form of legal privileges and in the form of decision-making. The impact of power is brought out even more strongly in Weber's discussion of "status groups," i.e., <u>Stände</u>. Whatever the importance of life styles and

charisma, it is not difficult to see that

> Status groups...come into being...through monopolistic
> appropriation of political and hierocratic powers....
> Every appropriation of political powers and the corre-
> sponding economic opportunities tends to result in the
> rise of status groups (i.e., Stände) and vice versa.

15.8

In Gerhard Lenski's (1966) comprehensive study on Power and
Privilege the trichotomous pattern reemerges again, though
with less rigor and in a different context. Lenski's work is
predicated on power, privilege and prestige. At the same
time, according to Lenski, "privilege is largely a function
of power" just as "prestige is largely....a function of
power and privilege" (Lenski 1966, p.45). It is in this
sense that Lenski's work is almost unidimensional. Indeed
Lenski (1966, p.75) thinks that

> We might best define a class as an aggregation of
> persons in a society who stand in a similar position
> with respect to some form of power, privilege and
> prestige... If our analysis has any validity at all,
> power classes must be our chief concern.

At the same time, Lenski maintains that "power rests on
various foundations" and that "we are forced to think in
terms of a series of class hierarchies or class systems"
each of which represents "a hierarchy of classes ranked in

terms of some single criterion" such as occupation, proper-
ty, education, race, age and sex. Thus "in a fictitious
Latin American society...there are four important sources of
power: political activity, wealth, work, and ethnicity"
(Lenski 1966, p.80).

   It is only in this context that the three classical
dimensions show up, combined with ethnicity as a fourth
dimension which, like age and sex, is not social, but
biological. While Lenski's work corroborates Sorokin's
thesis, it lags in analytical rigor.

15.10
Another contemporary work, Barrington Moore's (1978) book on
Injustice. The Social Bases of Disobedience and Revolt falls
remarkably in line with the classical trichotomy. While his
work focuses on injustice as the driving force of revolt, he
assumes an "implicit social contract" as the criterion for
what is deemed just or unjust. Significantly, any such
contract comprises three dimensions:

> People living in any society must solve the problems of
> authority, the division of labor, and the distribution
> of goods and services. They do this.... by working out
> rough-and-ready principles of social inequality and
> teaching each other... to accept these principles.

15.11

In his book on Societal Stratification, Jonathan Turner
(1984, p.59) defines societal stratification as "unequal
distribution of resources." He correctly contends that

> stratification is only a name that sociologists give to
> a number of related processes for which we need to
> develop separate theoretical principles. We cannot
> ....have a theory of the stratificational system (Turn-
> er 1984, p.58).

In a manner which strongly reminds one of Lenski (1966),
Turner (1984, p.59) identifies three types of unequal
distribution which he considers most generic, viz. material
wealth, power, and prestige, which he weights in the follow-
ing way:

                 Wealth > Power > Prestige.

   While he acknowledges his indebtedness to Lenski, Turner
(1984, p.124) concedes that prestige has both attitudinal
and behavioral dimensions and that it is "more illusive
(sic) than power and wealth"; he even admits that "we
presently do not understand precisely what prestige is." In
short, Turner does not equate prestige with occupational
prestige, notably with a person's performance, which would
at once restore the classical trichotomy and spare Turner

the confusion with attitudinal dimensions.

15.12

Finally, the work of Erik Olin Wright on Classes (1985) and
its follow-up, The Debate on Classes (1989) deserves our
special attention. As an avowed Marxist, Wright, like his
mentor, John Roemer, insists on reducing social stratifica-
tion to exploitation, even though he dismisses the labor
theory of value. Instead, he focusses on game theory: "The
workers who work less are able to do so because the less-
endowed producers have to work more." It is on grounds of
this principle that Wright identifies not only feudal and
capitalist exploitation but also socialist exploitation.

Be this as it may, Wright ends up with a stratificational
theory that is as analytically accurate as it is original:
What causes the differentiation in social status to coagula-
te and to last are the **assets at their disposition** -- and
that is, not only the instruments of production, but also
the skills and the position (rank) people occupy in a given
organization. In any case, skills, property and rank deter-
mine social status and social structure independent of Marx'
value theory and, as we may add, independent of whether we
equate inequality with exploitation.

The beauty of Wright's theory is that in spite of wrong
presuppositions its results are as analytically accurate as
they are functionally sound. At the same time, Wright is in
full tune with Marx. As Gerald A. Cohen (1978) has argued in
his work on Karl Marx' Theory of History, Capital harbors a
specific type of functionalism which is not teleological but
practical: The right or wrong use of skills, property and/or
power (rank) is likely to entail positive or negative ("dys-
functional") "objective consequences" regardless of imagi-
nary "needs" (as Parsons would have it) and regardless
whether these consequences are intended (as Robert Merton
(1968) put it, "manifest") or "latent."

15.13
In sum, the evidence is overwhelming that the three dimen-
sions of stratification are universal, as the following
synopsis epitomizes:

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         Table 47                            │
│                   From Rousseau to Lenski                   │
│                                                             │
│      (Work)                (Wealth)            (Power)      │
│  Rousseau (1755)                                            │
│   skills vs unskilled   Poor vs rich   Powerful vs weak     │
│                                                             │
│  Auguste Comte (1822)                                       │
│     Civilization        Social forces   Political System    │
│   science & industry    = civic order   = political order   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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```
Marx (1848/59)
      "mode of              "mode of             "mode of
     production"          appropriation"       organization"
    relations of            property           relations of
     production             relations           domination

Herbert Spencer (1876)
     Sustaining           Distributive          Regulating
    inner system     intermediary system       outer system

Max Weber (1920)
   Erwerbsklassen        Besitzklassen          Herrschaft
   = occupational         = property           = dominance
      classes               classes        = political power

Sorokin (1927)
    Occupational           Economic             Political
       bonds                 bonds                bonds

Lenski (1966)
  Occupational class    Property class      Political class
     (weight=3)           (weight=5)          (weight=10)

Barrington Moore (1978)
     Division             Distribution of       Authority
    of Labor              goods & services      security

Erik Olin Wright (1985)
      skills                property             position
   (credentials)       (economic assets)     (organization)
```

PART III

THE MIND AND SOCIETY

Chapter 16

THE SOCIAL ORDER AND THE MORAL ORDER

16.1

As Marx was well aware, social reality falls into two funda-
mentally different domains which, following Hegel, he
called social existence and social consciousness. To be more
precise let us follow Durkheim (1893) and distinguish be-
tween social order and moral order as the two integral com-
ponents of social reality.

Social order is marked by status, roles and rules or, in
terms of Durkheim, regulation and negative constraint. It is
hence equivalent to social stratification and to the pursuit
of material interests. By contrast the moral order (or mind)
is marked by subjective sentiments, preferences, partisan-
ship, biases, commitments and values or, in terms of Durk-
heim, integration and positive attraction. It is hence equi-
alent to the personal ethos and the character structure, the
sum of which constitute social consciousness, or in terms of
Durkheim, conscience collective. The latter is not the same

as <u>conscience commune</u>, i.e., it does not imply full consen-
sus. It is in this sense that the myth of a superpersonal
"general will," "objective spirit" etc. evaporates.

```
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
|                        Table 41                           |
|                 Society and Personality                   |
|                                                           |
|         SOCIETY                    PERSONALITY            |
|                                                           |
|     Social Structure          Social Consciousness       |
|   social Stratification           personal Ethos         |
|       Roles & Rules          Preferences & Commitments    |
|                                                           |
|       Social Order                 Moral Order            |
|       social Status              moral Sentiments         |
|     negative constraint         positive attraction       |
|       likeness repels            likeness attracts        |
|        competition                  integration           |
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
```

In sum, just as stratification is the hallmark of the social
order, subjective sentiments and values are the hallmark of
the personality and the moral order.

16.2
Both domains have long been known, though under different
names. Marx equated social existence with "the real basis,"
and social consciousness, with the "ideological superstruc-
ture." Durkheim distinguished "regulation" from "integra-

tion," while Pareto distinguished "interests" from "senti-
ments." In terms of Max Weber, the social order is tanta-
mount to material interests, and the moral order, to ideal
interests, which are in turn equivalent to purposive ratio-
nality (Zweckrationalität) and value rationality (Wertratio-
nalität). In terms of Parsons, the first is external and
equals situation, while the second is internal and equals
orientation. Finally, in terms of Habermas, the social order
is characterized by strategic action and role-identity,
while the moral order is characterized by communicative,
normative action and ego-identity.

```
                         Table 42
             Social Order and Moral Order: a Synopsis

           Social Order:              Moral Order:

Marx:
        Social Existence        Social Consciousness
          = economic               = ideological
             Basis                  Superstructure
Durkheim:
         social order                moral order
      negative constraint        positive attraction
        = Regulation                = Integration
Pareto:
          Interests                   Sentiments
Max Weber:
       Zweckrationalität          Wertrationalität
     = material interests       = ideal interests
Parsons:
          external                    internal
          situation                  orientation
Habermas:
```

```
        strategic,              communicative,
     purposive action          normative action
       = Role-Identity           = Ego-Identity
```

16.3

Empirically, both domains are equally constitutive of social reality and hence equally indispensable. Analytically, however, the relationship between the two domains is asymmetrical: Subjective sentiments and the moral order emerge from, and presuppose, social order, but not vice versa. The individual who develops preferences and biases, espouses or opposes values, does so from a definite position (status) in society. Without the latter, individuals would be unable to judge and to develop persistent preferences and values. Conversely, people may ride a bus or a train and converse with their neighbors without sharing values and commitments.

16.4
However, while subjective sentiments presuppose social status, they are neither caused nor determined by it. Rather, social status and subjective sentiments relate like (external) environment and (internal) cybernetic system. The point is that beyond all social constraint people develop distinctive values and commitments which in spite of their

spontaneous and personal character are aimed at controlling
society while people continue to depend on society.

By the same token sentiments, commitments and values
constitute an emergent quality over against social status to
which they are not reducible but on which they continue to
depend. It is in this sense that Marx characterizes social
consciousness as a superstructure which depends on, and to
this extent reflects, its social basis, while he is insensi-
tive to the intrinsic function of social consciousness: to
control and to superform the social order.

16.5
It follows from these observations that autonomy and control
are not identical with independence. Just as society con-
trols and superforms nature without ceasing to depend on it,
the emergent personality never ceases to depend on, and thus
to reflect, the social order. The reason for this interplay
of autonomy and dependence is that **there exists an asymmet-
rical hierarchical order of ascending autonomy, complexity
and specificity and of decreasing simplicity, robustness and
independence between society and personality.**[8]

Accordingly, the social order and the moral order, social

existence and social consciousness relate like matter and form and like potential and actualization (in terms of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas), like basis and superstructure (in terms of Marx), and like environment and cybernetic system (in terms of Norbert Wiener). Just as society presupposes and potentially controls nature, personality presupposes and potentially controls society. To paraphrase Thomas Aquinas, <u>Arbitrium societatem non tollit sed perficit</u>.

16.6

While subjective sentiments are inconceivable without social status, an individual without strong convictions and values is conceivable. He or she would be a mere cog in the wheels of society or, to put it differently, would represent a being who is completely socialized. Conversely, a solipsistic ego which is completely divorced from society is inconceivable. Even the most radical forms of world-flight, such as hermits or the monks on Mount Athos, depend not only on some social environment to sustain them but also on fellow beings with whom to talk and articulate sentiments even if the latter are completely otherworldly.

The point is therefore not only that consciousness is founded on society, but that consciousness itself is founded

in a subconscious "deep structure" of diffuse ingroup feel-
ing (Graham Sumner 1902) or the collective "We" as the
"primary ideal" in the sense of Charles H. Cooley (1910).
Indeed, it is the We as the collective uncounscious which
underlies all social interaction and constitutes the primary
moral (not: social) bond. As Durkheim (1893) incisively put
it, **in the moral order likeness attracts**, while **in the soci-
al order likeness repels**. It is in this sense that along
with primary groups primary ideals represent in Cooley's
terms (1910) "the nursery of human nature." At the same time
the We underlies the moral order and connects it with the
social order. It is the subconscious, collective We that
holds people together whatever their subsequent personal
choices.

16.7
It is from the subconscious We -- in addition to the libidi-
nal Id -- that the personality emerges as a self-regulating
system that is founded on, and at the same time aims at con-
trolling, the We. Looked at more closely, the personal Ego
always presupposes the impersonal We, i.e.,

$$WE <= EGO. = \ -WE => -EGO. = \ EGO -> WE.$$

In sum, personal values and commitments are emergent
qualities which transform the members of diffuse subcon-
scious collectives into personalities. Whatever their depen-
dence on the collective unconscious and its idols, individu-
als are driven by an irrepressible quest for autonomy to
emancipate themselves from the constraints of society. At
the same time the human personality is driven by its own
type of rationality: value rationality. The latter is quite
different from purposive, or strategic rationality which
drives the social order:

16.8
Moreover, two opposite mechanisms combine to produce the
personal ethos: (1) benevolence and acquiescence, on the one
hand, and (2) opposition, anger, and hostility, on the other
hand. The first define a person's positive **bonds**; the sec-
ond, his or her **resolve** to act and to fight.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                      Table 43                        │
│           Positive Bonds and Negative Resolve        │
│                                                      │
│        Integration            Fragmentation          │
│        Sympathies               Opposition           │
│         Loyalties                 Anger              │
│         Solidarity               Hostility           │
│                                                      │
│     = positive Bonds        = negative Resolve       │
│        Benevolence              Criticism            │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Acquiescence	Militancy
Continuity	**Rupture**

It is in this way that the individual constructs a network of moral coordinates which determine his or her character, much as the coordinates of social status determine his or her position in society. Just as people build society in order to emancipate themselves from nature, they are driven to build their personality in order to emancipate themselves from the constraints of society.

16.9

The juxtaposition of the social order and the moral order would not be complete without a glance at the specific types of artifacts which they produce. Thus society calls for and produces material culture, reaching from tools and weapons to facilities and utilities, laws and institutions. Without the development of these artifacts, society could not have risen to dominance over nature, property would be limited to primitive hoarding, and power, to <u>ad hoc</u> leadership.

Likewise, without culture, and most prominently, without language, the personality would not be able to express

itself and mankind could not have emerged from the animal
level. Just as tools and weapons objectify skills and pro-
vide the instruments for society's dominance over nature,
cultural artifacts are instruments not only of communication
but for the dominance of values over interests.

A clear difference thus exists between cultural artifacts
and language. In terms of Hegel, language "objectifies" or
"materializes" meaning regardless of content; as such it is
a "means of communication." By contrast, cultural artifacts
express ("objectify") personal values and sentiments, reach-
ing from simple songs and nursery rhymes to epics and drama,
novels, oratory and historiography. In every case they are
the material carriers of values which serve to define the
personality and his or her culture.


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+--------------------------------------------------------+
|                      Table 44                          |
|           Material Culture and Expressive Culture      |
|                                                        |
|                                                        |
|         Material Culture:        Expressive Culture:   |
|        Tools, weapons, money      Songs, dance, rhymes |
|       utilities and facilities    poetry, epics, drama |
|        laws and institutions       novels and oratory  |
|                                                        |
|           dominance of               dominance of      |
|         Society over Nature     Moral Order over Society|
|                                                        |
+--------------------------------------------------------+
```

Chapter 17

THE MORAL ORDER AND ITS SUBSYSTEMS

17.1

Like social stratification, subjective consciousness is far
from homogeneous. Its most elementary and spontaneous dimen-
sion is the identification with and partisanship for or
against individual persons and groups. It reaches from
Durkheim's (1893) notion of "mechanic solidarity" and W.
Graham Sumner's (1902) "in-group-feeling" to G.H. Mead's
(1936) "significant other." **Personal loyalties, allegiances**
and **solidarity** are the most prominent manifestations of this
class of identifications.

17.2

In every case, the surrounding social world no longer re-
mains what it is **in itself**. Seen through the lenses of
personal preferences and biases, it becomes a world **for
ourselves**, i.e., a subjectively defined world which is
constitutive of subjective consciousness and of the personal
character. Most important, their subjeective origin in nno
way diminishes their objective validity. To quote W.I.Thomas

(1928: 572), "If people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."

Genetically and systematically, the most elementary step in the formation of the personal character is the selective division of the social environment into friend and foe. With this step, the world is no longer perceived as it is but as the person defines it. For obvious reasons every "definition of the situation" starts with identification with "significant others" (G.H. Mead).

17.3
Next to solidarity, ideology is the strongest determinant in defining the situation. Rather than reflecting objective reality, ideology reconstructs reality according to its meaningfulness for the person. Rather than objective knowledge, it constitutes subjective, or "existential" truth (in the sense of Karl Jaspers). It represents the second dimension in the subjective appropriation of reality.

This assumption is easily amenable to test: Where ideologies compete for adherents and partisans, those ideologies will prevail in the long run which have the greater power to convince, i.e., which appear subjectively more meaningful.

The ultimate test of ideology is neither its utility nor its objective truth but its power to persuade.

17.4

The third great power in man's mental life is his <u>sense of justice</u>, or his moral judgment. It judges actions and decisions according to whether they are felt to be right or wrong, just or unjust, equitable or iniquitous. In making moral judgments, the individual builds a moral universe which is no longer grounded in diffuse sentiments, but in articulate principles. Together with personal loyalties and ideology, it constitutes the third dimension of the moral order and of the subjective appropriation of the world.

17.5

Subjective consciousness thus falls into three subsystems each of which is characterized by specific parameters:

(1) **personal bonds** produce loyalties, allegiances, and solidarities;

(2) **ideal projects** produce ideologies, world views, beliefs, philosophies, etc.;

(3) **moral principles** underlie the sense of justice, morality, legitimacy, and most prominently, militancy.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                      Table 45                       │
│        The Subsystems of Subjective Consciousness    │
│                                                     │
│       Solidarity        Ideology        Morality     │
│                                                     │
│       personal           ideal           moral       │
│        bonds:           projects:      principles:    │
│                                                     │
│      Allegiances         Ideals      Sense of Justice │
│      & Loyalties        & Beliefs    & Moral Judgment │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

It is in these three ways that the individual "defines the situation" and appropriates the world. At the same time, he or she constitutes himself or herself as an autonomous person which is no longer the captive of the subconscious We. Rather, as Sartre has shown, the human person is the sum of his or her past and present choices. It is in this sense that the human person chooses him- or herself.

17.6

Far from being irrational, each of the three subsystems of subjective consciousness follows a distinctive rationale which articulates in specific mental acts and functions:

(1) The specific activity which produces loyalty and solidarity is **identification** of the individual with "signif-icant others" as well as collectivities such as the family, the school, the church or the nation. Its specific function

is the sense of **belonging.**

(2) The activity which produces ideology and world views is **rationalization** as first discovered by the French moralists of the 17th century, e.g., LaRochefoucauld and Chamford, the early precursors of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud and of existentialism. The common denominator which unites these thinkers is the irrepressible, subliminal (seemingly irrational) quest for "subjective meaning." As Victor Frankl's practice of <u>Logotherapy</u> impressively demonstrates, its specific payoff is **meaningfulness.**

(3) The activity which produces morality is **moral judgment,** or **the sense of justice,** which determines the approval or disapproval of everyone's actions by society. As such it constitutes one's personal conscience. It works like a human gyroscope without which the individual, like a ship, would lose his or her sense of balance. Its specific payoff is **self-esteem** and **legitimacy,** i.e., the feeling that the world is in order.

Table 46 The Functions of Subjective Consciousness		
Solidarity:	Ideology:	Morality:

identification **Belonging**	rationalization **Meaning**	legitimation **Justice**
Ingroup Feeling (Graham Sumner)	Subjective Truth (Karl Jaspers)	The Golden Rule (Aristotle)

In every case, the functions of each subsystem, viz. identification, rationalization and legitimation, are intrinsically personal, and so are their payoffs. Rather than on systemic needs, they are predicated on in-group feeling, subjective truth, and the golden rule, each of which may benefit or hurt, integrate or fragment society.

17.7

The reaction to the lack of payoffs is no less instructive: In each subsystem the lack of payoffs spawns a specific kind of moral discomfort and ideological and moral anomie:

(1) The lack of belonging spawns feelings of betrayal, forsakenness and alienation.

(2) The lack of meaning spawns drift, meaninglessness, and ideological anomie.

(3) The lack of justice spawns cynicism, nihilism, defeatism, and moral anomie.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                      Table 47                       │
│       The Functions and Malfunctions of Subjective   │
│                   Consciousness                      │
│                                                      │
│      Solidarity:        Ideology:        Morality:   │
│                                                      │
│      **Belonging**        **Meaning**         **Justice**  │
│     vs.forsakenness    vs.drift and      vs.cynicism  │
│      and **alienation**   **shiftlessness**   and **nihilism** │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Significantly, each of these malfunctions has the poten-
tial to destroy the human personality. Alienation, drift,
and nihilism have a debilitating effect. Together with lack
of "moral density" and "lack of purpose in life" (Durkheim
1933) they are potential causes of (meaningless) egoistic
and anomic suicide whereas their supposed opposites, altru-
istic and fatalistic suicide, are little convincing.

17.8

In sum, subjective consciousness falls into three subsystems
each of which follows its own rationale and is not reducible
to any other. What Marx variously termed "social conscious-
ness" and "ideological superstructure" thus constitutes a
three-dimensional Cartesian product none of whose factors
can decline to zero. The same holds for the theories of the
Mind, Wissenssoziologie, Kultursoziologie, social psychology

etc. They all remain incomplete as long as they fail to identify solidarity, ideology and morality as their components.

By the same token, as the monopoly of ideology breaks off, so do the time-honored theories of ethics, justice, morals etc. which have captivated the European mind since Aristotle and Cicero. While ethics pertains to subjective consciousness as a whole, morals pertains only to one of its subsystems, viz. to moral judgment and the sense of justice.

By the same token, the sociology of law, (Rechtssoziologie), is fundamentally dual: As far as it deals with laws, it deals with objectified power; as far as it deals with rights, it deals with morals -- a division as old as Hobbes. The close link of ethics and politics thus becomes transparent: To attract people, appealing to their interests is not enough. No society will last unless it is based on justice.

17.9

The fact that subjective consciousness falls into three different subsystems provides considerable leeway for the individual person to give preference to one subsystem at the expense of the other sybsystems. The individual "I" may therefore be interpreted as a dynamic field whose components

are inseparable and barely distinguishable from one another while they are free to change in strength and direction.

By the same token, personal commitments may vary in strength in each subsystem.   In this way, a lack of commitment in one subsystem may be compensated by involvement in other subsystems. Accordingly, three different character types stand out (cf. Eduard Spranger's forms of life): The collectivist who leans on solidarity; the ideologue who is in continual search of a more perfect world; and the critical moralist who never tires to debunk the iniquities of the world.

At the same time, these three character types remind us that the intensity of involvement is inflatable or deflatable depending on internal inclination and external conditions. Far from being immutable, the "I" is in continual flux. It knows of no fixed rules except freely chosen loyalties, ideals and principles which express and objectify its quest for belonging, meaning and justice.

Chapter 18

18.1

"Collective life is not born from individual life, but it
is, on the contrary, the second which is born from the
first" Durkheim (1893) states categorically. While this
statement is indisputable as far as the social order (social
structure) is concerned, Durkheim does not found collective
life in the social order. Rather, he stipulates "pre-contra-
ctual solidarity" as the primordeal "social fact" when, on
Durkheim's own premises, solidarity should be limited to,
and even define, the moral order, and accordingly be consid-
ered a moral rather than a social fact.

18.2

It is therefore not surprising that Durkheim's emphasis on
pre-contractual solidarity involves him in a row of contra-
dictions. For one, recanting the integrative power of asso-
ciation, and notably of the division of labor -- which was
the center-piece of his doctoral dissertation -- involves
him in a contrived theory of "physical density" as the
driving force of progress (which, with a glance on overpopu-
lated India, he subsequently retracted). Looked at more
closely, physical density is identical with social density,

just as "pre-contractual solidarity is nothing more than a synonym for "mechanic solidarity."

By the same token, while physical density is synonymous with social density, **moral density** is, strictly speaking, not a "social fact." While it is couched in society, it is, in Durkheim's own terms, a fact <u>sui generis</u> which coincides with the moral order. Just as "mechanic solidarity" presupposes "segmented societies" and their physical (social) density, pre-contractual society is identical with C.H. Cooley's (1910) "primary groups" and, incidentally, with Marx's (1867) notion of "primitive cooperation." To postulate that sentiments, beliefs and values precede society is to indulge either in Romantic organicism or in the very psychologism which Durkheim so strenuously opposes.

18.3
The two axes of regulation/integration and collectivism/ individualism are supplemented by a third axis in Durkheim's later thought: the "sacred" and the "profane." As an ingrained positivist who dismisses the supranatural and the transcendental, when he juxtaposes the sacred and the profane, the extraordinary and the ordinary, Durkheim really contrasts strong, seemingly "sacred" convictions and commit-

ments with "normal" utilitarian behavior: Looked at more
closely, the "sacred" stands for strong, unconditional
commitments and principles which elevate the Ego above
itself, while the "profane" stands for "normal," everyday
utilitarian behavior.

18.4
Besides the ambiguities about his central notion of "social
fact" another fundamental error pervades Durkheim's thought:
the conflation of the ontological axis with the evolutionary
axis. While the first axis separates two domains (regulation
and integration, external social order and internal moral
order), the second axis juxtaposes simplicity to complexity,
or in terms of Herbert Spencer, "indefinite coherent homo-
geneity" with "definite incoherent heterogeneity."

   Oddly, but not surprisingly, the Marxian (ontological)
paradigm of social existence and social consciousness, which
underlies the dichotomy of the social   and the moral
order, yields to Tönnies's (evolutionary) paradigm of Ge-
meinschaft and Gesellschaft, and "pre-contractual solidari-
ty" is made into a social fact which is not only dependent
on, but inheres in the social order. As a corollary, the
notions of "organic" solidarity and "segmented" society

disappear. As a consequence, as J. Alexander (1989) has shown, Durkheim is no longer liable to the suspicion of championing the "materialist interpretation of history."

18.5
At the same time, it is undeniable that sentiments and beliefs energize society. However, there is no such thing as a suprapersonal subject. Invariably the energy that vitalizes society comes from individual persons. Rather than stipulating a suprapersonal "integrative" force, it is real living individuals who support or oppose "social facts," and in doing so promote integration, not of society, but of those sharing the same values and beliefs.

In any case, rather than satisfying some imaginary social need, social integration is an objective consequence of intended or unintended individual sentiments. People agree or disagree on grounds of attraction or repulsion but not on grounds of external constraint. At the same time, whatever their personal origin, sentiments respond to social environments.   It is in this **indirect** sense that sentiments, beliefs, etc., are social. Rather than "social facts," they constitute "moral facts" which resist reduction to society.

18.6

By the same token, the moral person is a "looking glass self" in the sense of Charles H. Cooley (1902) as well as an actor whose action is divided between a private and a public stage, as Goffman has shown. In both cases people live on the approval and disapproval of their fellow beings. Just as food and drink energize the body, "honor" and esteem are the fuel that energizes moral judgment. It is in this sense that along with prestige and reputation honor and self-esteem control the personal ethos as efficiently as negative con-straint controls action. In other words, society constitutes the external environment upon which the moral Self depends, but to which it cannot be reduced. As John Stuart Mill (1961: 104f.) incisively put it:

> To say that men's ... beliefs do not determine their conduct is like saying that the ship is directed by the steam and not by the steersman. The steam indeed is the motive power; the steersman, left to himself, could not advance the vessel a single inch. Yet it is the steersman's will and the steersman's knowledge which decide in which direction it shall move...

18.7

As already mentioned, Durkheim dropped his original dichoto-my of social and moral order and concomitantly, of mechanic and organic solidarity. The latter pair deserves a closer

look. To begin with, "mechanic solidarity" is rightly equated with solidarity pure and simple. As such it represents a **subsystem** of social consciousness **in its own right** which must not be taken for a substitute for social consciousness or for ideology, although Durkheim comes at times perilously close to it.

The notion of "organic solidarity" is even more instructive. According to Durkheim's own conclusions it aims at **distributive justice**: As the division of labor develops and society evolves from segmented to organized society, "mechanic" solidarity (which in terms of Parsons is inherently **particularistic**) tends to decline and to be superseded by a new type of solidarity which the reader would assume to be inherently **universalistic**. Indeed, as Durkheim (1893: 387) concludes,

> The work of the most advanced society is a work of justice... Just as ancient peoples needed a common faith, so we need justice.

A new perspective on Durkheim's work opens. A diffuse, almost instinctual sentiment of belonging and communality gives way to rational moral judgment which no longer discerns friend from foe, but right from wrong and which in contrast to mechanic solidarity is no longer "possible only

under equality."

   Significantly, Durkheim did not pursue the idea of equating organic solidarity with distributive justice. <u>The Division of Labor in Society</u> would then have ended on quite a different tenor: Rather than falling in line with anarcho-syndicalism and corporatism and instead of lamenting about the loss of order, he would have had to switch to the iniquities of French society. Rather, he dropped the notion of "organic solidarity" altogether and centered on "common conscience" and the sacred. Religion and ritual replace ideology, just as duty and patriotism replace justice.

18.8

Oddly enough, Durkheim fails to recognize the sense of justice as the driving force of morals and -- along with patriotism and ideology -- a powerful social agent. As Rousseau (1762) resoundingly put it in <u>The Social Contract</u>: In order to endure, **might must become right**. By the same token, as Barrington Moore (1989) has beautifully shown, the awareness of injustice is the strongest of all revolutionary agents. For a person or a society to be moral, injustice must not be tolerated. As a long tradition from Plato to Kant has emphasized, **justice is the ultimate, categorical imperative for**

society.

At the same time, it is not injustice <u>per se</u>, but the **awareness** of injustice which drives people to act, a "social fact" which has important implications: As no one was more aware than Lenin, to arouse awareness, ideology is indispensable.

18.9
What one misses most in Durkheim's conception of social consciousness is the notion of ideology. Due to his excessive equation of society with common conscience his sociology of knowledge has remained rudimentary. One looks in vain for terms like material interests, prejudice, or legitimacy, let alone "class consciousness" or "ideological superstructure." Just as he believes in pre-contractual solidarity, he accepts "common conscience" as a given which makes religion, common consciousness and society almost indistinguishable.

It is in the disguise of belief, religion and the sacred that ideology and world-view enter the Durkheimian system and replace solidarity. A case can therefore be made that, albeit dispersed over several periods, the three dimensions of ethics are implicit in Durkheim's thought: "Mechanic

solidarity" as original in-group feeling and "primary ide-

al;" "organic solidarity" as distributive justice; and

"belief" as a substitute for "meaning" and ideology.

```
Table 48
Solidarity, Belief and Justice in Durkheim


 mechanic          sentiments         organic
solidarity         & beliefs         solidarity

= personal         = purpose     = distributive
 attachment         in life          justice
```

Chapter 19

FROM DURKHEIM TO DILTHEY

19.1

As our previous analyses have shown, the moral order com-

prises three subsystems which, like those of the social

order, are closely interrelated but follow their own sepa-
rate rationale. However, while the multiple dimensionality
of the social order is widely recognized (even though it is
often foreshortened to two dimensions such as economy and
polity), the moral order is far from even a semblane of
consensus.

Solidarity, ideology and morality remain isolated fields
of interest fragmented among anthropologists, sociologists,
psychologists and philosophers who use widely divergent
language and who are mostly unaware of each other's work.
With two exceptions (notably Dilthey and Habermas) nobody
seems to be aware that there exist three basic subsystems
which are mutually irreducible and none of which is fully
understood out of context with its complements. As a corol-
lary the field as a whole is approached under the most dif-
ferent denominators such as "mind" or "spirit," social con-
sciousness, ideological superstructure, or culture.

19.2
Thus **solidarity** and **ingroup feeling** have been discussed by
authhors as different as Durkheim (1893, 1906 and 1913),
Graham Sumner (1906), Simmel (1908/1955), Robert Merton
(1949; 1972), Karl Deutsch (1953) and Lewis Coser (1956)

without much knowledge of one another's work and without awareness of the intimate connection with ideology and morals.

The same holds for **ideology**, whose scope and substance vary widely, ranging from false consciousness to ethics and world-view and combining thinkers as different as Francis Bacon and Marx (1846,1852), Lukács (1923), Gramsci (1973), Scheler (1926), and Mannheim (1936), with even the Kantian Marxists drawing no strict line between ideology and morals.

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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         Table 49                         │
│              The Fragmented Science of Ethics            │
│                                                          │
│    Solidarity:          Ideology:          Morality:     │
│                                                          │
│     Durkheim              Marx                Kant        │
│   Graham Sumner      Vilfredo Pareto      John Barnsley   │
│   Robert Merton      Karl Mannheim       Barrington Moore │
│   Karl Deutsch       Herbert Marcuse      Jean Piaget     │
│   Lewis Coser        Alvin Gouldner      Maria Ossowska   │
│                                                          │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Finally, **ethics** is widely treated as a philosophical discipline. While its bearings on society have been recognized since antiquity, its foundation in society is of a much more recent date. With Herder and Hegel and the his-

torical school as early precursors, ethics still waits to be discovered as a branch of social science. Set back by the resurgence of natural law and the belief in objective values (Nicolai Hartmann, Max Scheler), its close links with ideology and solidarity continue to be widely ignored.

19.3

As already discussed, Durkheim's notion of solidarity represents one of his great contributions to sociological theory. Yet while solidarity constitutes the foundation of social consciousness, including ideology and morality, it does not found society.   Looked at more closely, Durkheim's notion of solidarity transcends the specific limits of personal allegiances and loyalties, in-group and out-group feeling and thus becomes indistinguishable from ideology and morality.

19.4

It is only in the subsequent work of various authors that the concept of solidarity has been more stringently defined. In his work on _Folkways_, Graham Sumner (1906) introduced the notion of **"ingroup-feeling"** as one of the most elementary motives determining social interaction.   Unfortunately Sumner's work focussed predominantly on primitive folk-soci-

eties, leaving it to Robert Merton's (1949) theories of reference groups to expand the notion of in-group feeling to modern society, albeit only on a micro level.

By contrast, Karl Deutsch's (1953) work on <u>Nationalism and Communication</u> has demonstrated the power of nationalism. Starting with Joan of Arc and Hussitism and culminating in the two world wars nationalism has swayed the 19th and 20th century and made history.

19.5

On the whole, the notion of solidarity tends to suggest coherence and integration. By contrast, Georg Simmel's essays (1908/1955) on <u>Conflict</u> and <u>The Web of Group Affili-ation</u> and following him, Lewis Coser's (1956) work on <u>The Function of Conflict</u> have brought out the close relationship between external threat and internal integration. On the one hand, conflict polarizes divergent interests, world-views and morals; on the other hand, it spurs internal consensus in each of the opposing camps.

19.6

In a collection of articles on <u>Communication and the Evolu-tion of Society</u>, Juergen Habermas (1979: 98) came remarkably

close to a three-dimensional theory of Ethics. In his search
for a theory of "communicative," i.e., value determined
behavior, which he felicitously equated with ego-identity,
Habermas identified three subfields, viz. "world-views",
"moral representations," and "identity formation."

Admittedly, Habermas gave little more than an informative
sketch. Still his analysis is in remarkable tune with our
own. With the one exception of Dilthey's (1890/1958) lec-
tures on Ethics, Habermas is one of the few theorists to
recognize the multidimensionality of ethics and its intrin-
sic connection with ideology and morality. (One regrets that
he has not pursued this idea further in his (1981/1984)
subsequent Theory of Communicative Action.)

19.7

(1) In tune with Lukács and Mannheim Habermas redefines
ideology in a positive sense as Weltbild (world-image) which
must be clearly distinguished from science: While the latter
is objective (cognitive) and value-neutral, world-images are
value-infused and therefore make "communicative" action (in
the specific sense Habermas attributes to ethics) possible.
It is exactly because of this ethical character that world-
images are capable of creating the attachment which consti-

tutes "integration" in the sense of Durkheim as well as "communication" in the sense of Habermas.

(2) Habermas' theory of "moral representations" leans strongly on Kohlberg and Piaget. Rather than on functions and consequences, Habermas focuses on evolutionary stages. He mentions the problematic relationship between collective (phylogenetic) and personal (ontogenetic) approaches to morality without claiming to solve it. As a consequence, his discussion of "moral representations" remains on a very general level. It remains to Barrington Moore's magisterial analysis of <u>Injustice</u> (1978) to demonstrate the tremendous potential of the sense of justice, and that is, of morality in general, to "put iron in the soul."

(3) As far as Habermas' notion of **identity formation** is limited to collective identity it closely resembles "mechanic solidarity." Habermas shows how it has changed with the evolution of society, an idea that is in close tune with Durkheim. The parallel is less felicitous when it comes to ego-identity. The latter transcends the distinctive range of solidarity and personal loyalties which define the ingroup--feeling. Habermas seems to be unaware that his notion of ego-identity combines personal loyalties with ideological

projections and moral principles, i.e., it refers to the
human personality in general. In sum, Habermas' notion of
identification (and concomitantly: commitment) is the dis-
tinctive function of communicative action in general.

19.8

The lack of multidimensional theories of ethics is the more
astounding as there exists a uniquely clearsighted solution
which correctly identified the three fundamental dimensions
which constitute ethics as much as the individual human
character: Wilhelm Dilthey's eminent, though little recog-
nized System der Ethik. Based on lectures held at the Uni-
versity of Berlin in the 1890s, it is remarkable for its
perspicacity and in particular for its identification of
three types of ethical acts (1958: 106-112):

   (1) rectitude as a categorical imperative;

   (2) sympathy as spontaneous reciprocal sentiments;

   (3) ideals as the precondition for perfection.

   Dilthey thus comes remarkably close to drawing a line
between sense of justice, spontaneous feelings of solidari-
ty, and ideals as substitutes for Marxian ideology and false
consciousness. Most remarkable, each of the three dimensions
is founded in distinct acts of normative intentionality.

No less remarkable, Dilthey (1958, p.112) founds ethics on society without construing it as a social fact. He identifies three types of sanctions which control moral action:

(1) Infraction of rectitude causes exclusion from the group.

(2) Lack of solidarity destroys personal warmth.

(3) Abandonment of ideals excludes the individual from the fellowship of kindred spirits.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                                               │
│                         Table 50                              │
│                   From Durkheim to Dilthey                    │
│                                                               │
│                                                               │
│        Solidarity:        Ideology:        Morality:          │
│         loyalties          projects        principles         │
│                                                               │
│   Durkheim:                                                   │
│   ────────                                                    │
│        mechanic          Sentiments          organic          │
│       Solidarity:        & Beliefs:        Solidarity:        │
│      attachment to        purpose          distributive       │
│      social groups        in life            justice          │
│                                                               │
│   Habermas:                                                   │
│   ────────                                                    │
│        identity         world-images          moral           │
│       formation         (world views)     representations     │
│                                                               │
│   Dilthey:                                                    │
│   ──────                                                      │
│       Wohlwollen       Vollkommenheit     Rechtschaffenheit   │
│       (Sympathy)        (Perfection)         (Justice)        │
│                                                               │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

19.9

Besides identifying the three subsystems of ethics, Dilthey makes another fundamental observation: While the three sub-systems complement each other, each of them is capable of dominating to the point of displacing its neighbors:

> While we tend to identify one of these three creative choices (i.e., either justice, or sympathy, or ideal perfection) as the sole foundation of our moral world, the truth is that all three forms of synthesis comple-ment each other and found our moral life.

In the light of this analysis it becomes clear why it has taken so long to discover the three-dimensional structure of the moral order: Solidarity, ideology and morality easily lend themselves to overextension and thus to be taken for the domain as a whole. Not until a clear disjunction is made between them does the structure of the moral order, and that is, of ethics, become fully transparent. As Dilthey (1958, p.108) expertly put it:

> The contradictions of all past ethics can be solved only if the concept of an absolute morals as a compact unitary entity is critically revised.
>
> There exists no such thing as a unitary morals. Rath-er, there exists a wide variety of deep-seated differ-ences between moral commitments. There exists no unitary principle from which the rules of justice, close personal loyalties and inspiring ideals could be uniformly deduced. Any such ethics is nothing but an enormous fiction.

With this trichotomy, Dilthey has opened new avenues to the understanding of ethics. It is no longer identical with morals, which is limited to the sense of Justice, but comprises Solidarity and Ideology as independent disciplines on a par with Morals. What Durkheim, for lack of a better term, called the moral order is thus no longer limited to morals, just as on the other hand, ideology becomes a legitimate constituent not only of social consciousness, but also of the individual character structure. In sum, "collective" consciousness is synonymous with Durkheim's notion of moral order and with Marx's social consciousness, but not, as is widespread usage, with "common" consciousness and the Parsonian myth of "integration."

Chapter 20

PERSONAL ETHOS AND COMMON CONSCIOUSNESS

20.1
The notions of "common" or "collective" consciousness, as they are commonly used interchangeably, are largely the product of Romanticism, amalgamated with political conserva-

tism. To the individualism, voluntarism, rationalism and criticism of the Enlightenment, Romanticism countered with organicism, holism, irrationalism and collectivism, as epitomized in the notions of "Volksgeist" (Herder), "objective mind" (Hegel), "conscience commune" (Fustel de Coulanges), "solidarity" (Durkheim), "integration" (Parsons), etc.

Suggestive as they are, these notions suffer from a common defect, viz. the confusion of suprapersonal, enforceable rules, on the one hand, with personal, unenforceable sentiments, commitments and values, on the other hand. (In Durkheim 's (1893) terms, the first are based on negative constraint, the second, on positive attraction). As a consequence, a virtually perfect consensus is imputed to social consciousness, which becomes synonymous with integration, as this is the case in Talcott Parsons' (1966) functionalism.

20.2
The point is that individuals of the same group respond to the same social background, but arrive at different "definitions of the situation" (W.I. Thomas) and respond differently. In Marxian terms, while social consciousness is indeed founded in (and that is, conditioned by) the same social basis, it is not determined by it. Contrary to orthodox Marxism, the same basis may produce a variety of "ideologi-

cal superstructures" according to the analytical formula

$$BA <= SS. = -BA => -SS. = BA \lor -SS. = -(-BA \& SS)$$
$$= P\ BA \& (-SS \lor SS_1 \lor SS_2 \lor ...SS_i); -P\ -BA\&SS.$$

It is in this sense that individual behavior is not fully predictable. By contrast, collective behavior becomes the more predictable the greater the number of individuals: In the long run, the **probability** is that people will respond in a manner that fits best with their interests without necessarily developing a **common** consciousness. By the same token it is possible, as Lukács (1923) has suggested, to **impute** determinate responses to determinate groups (categories, classes, etc.) of people: As Marx illustrated in his pamphlet on The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, big land owners will veer towards monarchism, much as the bourgeoisie veers towards liberalism, the petit bourgeoisie leans towards democratism, and the workers, toward socialism.

20.3
It thus becomes clear that social consciousness falls into two quite different categories: **collective** consciousness and **common** consciousness. As we have seen, the first corresponds to **heterogeneous** social consciousness as a statistical plur-

al. By contrast, the second corresponds to **particular** beliefs whose adherents form **homogeneous** communities. In every case collective consciousness is a loose aggregate of individual consciences. Unalloyed monolithic unity, or "integration" is therefore as alien to **collective** consciousness as it is the hallmark of **common** consciousness.

By the same token collective consciousness is in continual flux, yet just because it is open to continual adjustment, it lacks the compact power to resist and to fight. The latter is the predicament of Talcott Parsons' functionalism. It is exactly because of its adaptability that it lacks the resolve that puts, in Barrington Moore's trenchant terms, "iron in the mouth" of action.

In sum, it is not enough, as this is the case with symbolic interactionism and behaviorism, to base action solely on exchange or the quest for approval and acceptance. In the last analysis, firmness of character, persistence and moral stamina as well as creativity and innovation exceed mere exchange and reciprocity.

20.4
By contrast, people who constitute normative (ideological,

moral, religious, etc.) communities share more than common beliefs, values, etc., as do, e.g., liberals, conservatives, etc. in everyday politics. In distinct contrast to **collective** consciousness, which is plastic and in constant flux, normative communities are centered around a **common cause** as the hard core of **common** consciousness which takes pride in not being congruous with ordinary society. Ideally, the people committed to a common cause or a common creed such as Marxists, Muslims, Catholics, etc., form diffuse, unstructured communities, as this has been the perception of the Christian Church as a community of Saints.

However, no community has a chance to endure without a modicum of organization such as the local parish, mosque or synagogue, which in turn create offices and hierarchies. Most important, in order to endure communities must develop rituals that allow them to meet on a regular basis; they also must formulate codes which define the common creed, as the seven Ecumenic Councils of the early Christian Church illustrate. Together with buildings and dresses, rituals and codes constitute what Durkheim has called "collective representations," which serve as the "means of integration" which "enculturate" the individual believers and lend structure to the otherwise unstructured communities.

20.5

The Marxian distinction between "class in itself" (<u>Klasse an</u>
<u>sich</u>) and "class for itself" (<u>Klasse für sich</u>) aptly illu-
minates the importance of common causes and "common consci-
ence:" While "classes in themselves" are little more than
statistical plurals (Sorokin 1947), they become actual clas-
ses only to the degree that people become committed to a
common cause. Looked at more closely, class consciousness in
the emphatic sense does therefore not simply reflect society
as it exists, but as people react to it.

By the same token it implies active participation in
molding social consciousness and ultimately, to play a
hegemonic role in society. In other words, supporting a
common cause implies ambition, resoluteness and a sense of
mission. It is for this reason, that "<u>conscience commune</u>" is
different from ordinary consciousness. It is consciousness
loaded with charisma and as such political consciousness <u>par</u>
<u>excellence</u>.   The same holds for the "age of ideologies."
The latter is the age of commitment that far exceeds mere
conflict of interests. By the same token, the "End of Ideol-
ogy" does not imply the end of conflict, nor does it imply
the end of ordinary socal consciousness, including normal

politics as well as normal loyalties and morality. In every case it is the commitment to a sacred cause that makes the difference between collective and common consciousness.

20.6

AS we have emphasized over and again, social consciousness differs fundamentally from social structure. Accordingly, it is measured by the **intensity** of subjective commitment rather than by objective status: People either support or oppose certain values and ideas or are undecided. Accordingly, social consciousness develops a dynamic of its own: Rather than pyramids of higher and lower status, **ideological communities resemble unstructured thermodynamic fields which rediate in concentric circles of decreasing intensity with a charismatic leader and a hard core of disciples at the center, an inner circle of model believers, a wider circle of ordinary believers, and an outward fringe of sympathizers and occasional supporters.**

It is this configuration -- not: structure -- around an active center which accounts for the internal dynamics of conscience commune: In order to attract believers, and on penalty of losing their support, the center must respond to their fears and hopes and constantly reinvigorate their

energies. By the same token, the leaders are under a compulsion to expound, explain and update the common creed and enact rituals, without which the community would fall apart a wisdom as old as the cults and rituals of primitive tribes and archaic religion. Like the latter, common causes live on their "collective representations."

20.7

From quite a different vantage point and with quite a different terminology Max Weber has arrived at remarkably similar conclusions. As Jeffrey Alexander (1983) has noted, Weber uses the notion of "charisma" widely as a substitute for ideology (a term Weber ostensibly avoided). For all practical purposes Weber's notion of "charismatic authority" is tantamount to ideological and moral hegemony. In any way, charismatic leadership is political leadership.

This view is corroborated by a juxtaposition of "charisma" with "genius." Nobody would speak of Newton and Bach, or of Einstein and Freud as "charismatic" rather than geniuses. Obviously charisma touches a chord which genius does not, viz. vision to provide leadership. **Rather than being limited to religion, charisma is a political category of prime importance. It is to the Mind what elites are to Society.**

20.8

To be sure, Weber's notion of charisma was originally de-
rived from his image of the prophets. Yet while the link
with religion is never explicitly dismissed, Weber gave a
purely secular definition of charisma as an extraordinary,
but not extramundane gift which transcends the routine of
everyday life and which is crucial in breaking the spell of
tradition. What fascinates Weber is not the religious, but
the antitraditional, revolutionary role of charisma.

Interestingly, the notion of charisma remarkably paral-
lels the notion of conscience commune: Just as the latter
overlaps with social consciousness without being identical
with it, charisma implies Wertrationalität without being
identical with it: the first is extraordinary, the second,
ordinary and ubiquitous.   In sum, social consciousness
is coextensive, and hence equivalent with Wertrationalität
and collective consciousness and in the last analysis, with
Marx's notion of "ideological superstructure" and Durkheim's
notion of the "moral order," although both terms turn out to
be inaccurate. Worst of all, Durkheim uses the terms "col-
lective" and "common" conscience interchangeably. It comes
therefore as no surprise that neither Durkheim nor his close

follower, Talcott Parsons, have ever developed a clear notion of ideology and its destructive potential[9].

20.9
As the comparison with Durkheim indicates, Weber's notion of charisma as the extraordinary that explodes tradition implies something which is missing in ordinary social psychology: the will to destroy. The latter has often been seen as an aberration of millenarianism and fanaticism, as Norman Cohn (1970) has impressively shown. Yet whatever the crudities of millenarianism, it is the hallmark of the prophet that he does not bring concord, but the sword.

Here Max Weber has made another invaluable contribution by discovering the dichotomy of mysticism and asceticism which divides religion into two opposite moieties and which also sheds light on consciousness in general. Just as it is possible to create music in the major or the minor key, people may prefer religion the "soft" (mystical) way or the "hard" (ascetic) way, and just as each branch produces its own type of protagonist, viz. the teacher and the prophet, solidarity, ideology and morality, too, come both the soft (compromising, adaptive) and the hard (uncompromising, militant) way.

As Weber got increasingly aware, it is the latter which moves mountains even if it is no longer tinged with religion. It is the ascetic who is ready to fight and to tackle the world while the mystic indulges and acquiesces. And while the two attitudes are basically founded in opposite types of character -- e.g., in terms of C.G. Jung, in "extroverted" and "introverted" character -- the frequency and strength of occurrence is as much a function of times of crisis or prosperity.

Chapter 21

FREUD AND THE MORAL ORDER

21.1

In our analysis of the Social Order the Division of Labor,
Civil Society and Political Power, and concomitantly, repro-
duction, distribution and organization, have stood the test
of unlimited applicability to social reality. Moreover,

  crossing over the first with the second (cf. Tables 30 and
33, pp. 119 and 132) provided an astounding insight into the
analytical structure of social reality The trichotomy of
Solidarity, Ideology and Morality must now stand a similar
inquiry for a second, intersecting axis.

  A global look of the Moral Order reveals gaps, weaknesses
and inconsistencies almost everywhere. With the notable
exception of Dilthey and Habermas they fail to recognize
even the trichotomy that rules the Moral Order. Another
frequent weakness is the failure to recognize the division
into a private and a public sphere, not as two separate
domains such as ethics and Ideologiekritik, but as comple-
menting one another. Accordingly, Freud's (1923) ingenious

distinction between Ego and Superego is missing in most theories dealing with the Moral Order.

21.2

Still Freud's importance for sociological theory has not gone unnoticed (cf. Parsons 1964; Collins and Makowsky 1972; Bocock 1983). As Parson has noted (1964: 18), a close relationship exists between Durkheim's theory of religion and Freud's (1923) trichotomy of the Id, the Ego and the Superego. There is something about mechanic solidarity, viz. its diffuse and seemingly irrational character, which is ubiquitous and which is not limited to "segmented" societies. Nor is it identical with Freud's notion of the (libidinal) Id.

At this juncture, Sartre comes to our mind with his clear perception that the Ego arises from the collective We by deliberate choice rather than following instincts. Sartre's existentialism thus represents one of the best interpretations of the Freudian Ego: In its struggle with nothingness the Ego arises from the We in an act of autopoiesis by choosing itself, or more precisely, by determining its personal loyalties, ideological perspectives and moral principles. In no way does the We, or for that matter, the "collective unconscious," determine the Ego.

That the latter is impossible is substantiated by a
closer look at the "collective" We: The latter is nothing
more than a loose aggregate of spontaneous sentiments which
emerge as as easily as they vanish. Just because they are
uninhibited and random they form an unstructured, erratic
collective much in the vein of a cloud of gases whose mole-
cules are unconstrained by rules[10]. We thus rightly speak of
a collective We as the locus of dispersed sentiments without
implying any unitary bond except the interaction among indi-
viduals.

21.3
At the same time, the Ego rises to dominance over the We --
using, as Piaget and Lacan have shown, language as its
instrument -- not only to communicate, but also to revise
its primitive sentiments to make them accord with its loyal-
ties, perspectives and judgments, and in doing so, to en-
hance itself -- an idea as old as the French Moralists: In
terms of La Rochefoucauld's Maximes (1678), amour propre
drives the Moral Order. At the same time, as La Rouchefou-
cauld was remarkably aware, the dominance of the conscious
Ego over the unconscious We is limited. Wherever the two
clash, the Ego will ultimately yield to the We. As La Ro-

chefoucauld put it in Maxime 102, <u>La raison est toujours la dupe du cœur.</u>

The Ego is thus involved in a continual process of revision of its prior sentiments and judgments. Its horizon is inherently self-seeking, or as Max Weber (1968) would put it, "value-rational," preoccupied with its authenticity, and in this regard the embodiment of G.H. Cooley's (1910) "looking-glass Self." By the same token, it is identical with Sartre's notion of <u>existence</u>: superseding its own uncontrolled sentiments and struggling with other Egos for recognition and respect. In an odd contradiction, the more the Ego is involved with other Egos, the more it is busy defining itself.

21.4
It takes an additional effort for the Ego to outgrow itself. The Superego is not, as it sometimes appears in Freud and particularly in Talcott Parsons' concept of integration, an external force in the vein of Hobbes' <u>Leviathan</u> that impinges on the individual. Rather, it is founded on the internal growth of the Self. **It is by espousing a sacred cause for which people are ready to make sacrifices regardless of immediate payoffs and rewards that the Ego turns into the**

Superego.

By the same token the Superego is an entity <u>sui generis</u>
alongside the Ego and the We. Just as the Ego grows out of
the We, the Superego grows out of the Ego in order to en-
hance the Self by serving a public cause which transcends
narrow personal interests.

At the same time, there exists no regulatory mechanism
that tunes the Ego with the Superego: The one may not fit or
even oppose the other, and while the Superego aims at domi-
nating and superforming the Ego, in the last analysis, the
Superego will have to yield to the Ego just as -- in the
other case of value dissonance -- the Ego will yield to the
spontaneous sentiments. Whatever the shining ambitions of
the Superego, reality will tune them down to the Ego[23].

21.5

In any case, the commitment to a sacred cause has its place
in a systematic configuration which divides the Self into

---

[23]The relationship between the We, the Ego and the Superego
thus remarkably parallels the notion of Friedrich Engels that "in
the last analysis" the legal and the ideological Superstructure
will reduce to economic interests -- regardless, we add, of the
ambition of the politicians to shape the economic structure.
Ironically, if this were not the case, there would be no class
strugg- le. Comte's <u>savants</u> and <u>industials</u> would simply run the
show.

three constituent parts: 1) the spontaneous I, which is merged in a diffuse collective We, 2) the energetic, literally "self-seeking" personal Ego which disciplines its sentiments and libidines, and 3) the dedicated Superego which subjects the Ego to some public cause and makes suprapersonal conscious integration possible. **The first constitutes the collective Unconscious; the second constitutes the conscious, "rational," Personality; and the third, the idealistic, "charismatic" Self.** It is the latter which determines moral and ideological leadership.

We have thus identified the second axis of the Moral Order mainly by leaning on Freud's pathbreaking trichotomy which, unbeknownst to Freud, fittingly intersects with Solidarity, Ideology and Morality. The point is that the two axes cut across each other such that each substantive parameter -- friend vs. foe; good vs. bad; right vs. wrong, loyalties, ideals and principles -- intersects with, and produces its specific version of the I, the Ego and the Superego.

21.6

Solidarity thus turns out as the combination of elementary, diffuse, unreflected **ingroup-feeling**; consciously chosen

personal loyalties, allegiances and solidarity which consti-
tute the Ego as an autonomous person; and thirdly, **supra-
personal bonds** which commit the Ego to some ethnic, politi-
cal, or cultural community and thus integrate the individual
into society.

Solidarity is therefore not a monolith that irresistibly
integrates society. While it is based on indeterminate
sentiments such as in-group feeling in the sense of Graham
Sumner's <u>Folkways</u> (1906:12), personal Loyalties represent
free choices which reach beyond in-group feeling and con-
stitute personal relations which may well be at variance
with the sentiments of the collective Unconscious.

The same holds for the commitment to a community which
may well be at variance with one's personal loyalties and
one's in-group feelings. Elsatians, Bretons and Basques may
thus be committed French patriots, just as, conversely,
French internationalists and anarchists may reject French
nationalism or that liberal Jews may reject Zionism. In
every case, while Solidarity integrates individuals, it may
fragment society as as well integrate it.

21.7

The same type of analysis holds for **Ideology.** It too combines spontaneous sentiments with the rational choices of the Ego and the suprapersonal commitments of the Superego, though in different ways. Rather than on kinship and in-group feeling, Ideology is based, not on cognition, but on evaluation and most notably, on **making sense** of one's situation and puts one's past and one's future into **perspective.** It thus serves as an indispensable instrument of orientation which prejudges, and thus facilitates, one's decisions. It is therefore erroneous to attribute a cognitive function to ideology. By trying to make sense of his or her own life the Ego asserts its autonomy and qualifies ideology as an indispensable Existentiale.

Finally, the individual transcends his or her private sphere by espousing the common good of an ethnic, cultural or racial group, social class or gender and by projecting ideals and utopias that depict a better future and debunk the iniquities of the past. It is in this sense that each perspective develops its own ideals and utopias and writes its own version of history. At the same time it elucidates that far from producing false consciousness, ideology is tantamount to value-judgment and that it serves one pervasive and irrepressible function: rationalization.

21.8

The case is again similar with **Morality.** The latter is
founded in spontaneous sentiments of approval and rejection
 which coagulate into deliberate choices between right and
wrong, good and evil which legitimize one's action and which
culminate in the commitment to justice. Kant's **categorical
imperative** thus finds its place in the moral order: It tran-
scends both the I and the Ego and thus embodies the power of
the Superego to superform the Ego and to recast society.

   By the same token, justice is capable to discipline the
Ego in its attempts to justify everything it does and thus
to curb moral idiosyncrasy. It also determines what is
morally inadmissible and thus imposes an effective norms
on socializing. We have only to realize how closely morality
is intertwined with rules of sexual behavior to understand
Freud's identification of the Superego with oppressive exual
sexual morals and with the primordeal cause for neuroses.

21.9

A clear and consistent picture thus arises of the structure
of the Moral Order, or as we may also call it, Social Con-
sciousness, as the following table epitomizes:

Indicators:	**Bonds**	**Ideals**	**Principles**
parameters:	friend:foe	good:bad	right:wrong

Table 51
The Architectonics of
the Moral Order

sacred causes:	**Sacred Community**	**Sacred Utopia**	**Sacred Justice**
public **Super-Ego**	Implicit Nationalism	Social Criticism	Moral Rigorism
personal choices:	personal Loyalties	personal Perspective	personal Judgment
private **Ego**	**Identifica-tion**	**Rationaliza-tion**	**Legitima-tion**

spontaneous sentiments: **I**	Ingroup/ Outgroup	Closeness/ Distance	Support/ Opposition
collective **Unconscious**	**Kinship**	**Comradeship**	**Elitism**
SUBSYSTEMS:	**SOLIDARITY** Belonging	**IDEOLOGY** Meaning	**MORALITY** Justice

Chapter 22

The Varieties of Social Consciousness

(In progress)

22.1

Reading the preceding table more closely provides many more insights. To begin with, the **I, i.e., the collective Unconscious**, the **conscious, self-determined Ego**, and the **selfless**

Superego form a conceptual hierarchy in the vein of a step pyramid such that the higher level presupposes the lower one. As the model of basis and superstructure illustrates, the relationship is asymmetric: while the superstructure depends on a basis, the latter may exist without the former. In sum,

$$I <= Ego <= Superego.$$

22.2
However, the mind is not limited to this static model. The point is that the superstructure that emerges from the basis may merely supplement its basis without further consequences, as the static model suggests. However, once it has emerged, the Mind may as well gather strength and feed back on the Unconscious. In sum, **there are two types of superstructure: emergent and dominant, transient and persistent.**

22.3
In this way the Ego may emerge from the collective Unconscious and engage in transitory, tentative loyalties, perspectives and judgments until it sticks to them and starts repressing some of its original sentiments, as Freud got increasingly aware. Indeed he distinguished two possible

kinds of spontaneous sentiments -- unrepressed, preconscious sentiments, and repressed, unconscious ones.

22.4

By the ame token, unbeknownst to Freud, **there are two kinds of Ego and of Superego: lenient, tentative, as it were, "soft" emergent ones, and dominant, repressive ones.** The first emerge as easily as they vanish; the second persist and dominate; by the same token, they potentially cause trouble, e.g., "value dissonance, neuroses, etc.," but they also put, in terms of Barrington Moore, "iron in the mouth" of the actor.

We are thus able to explain the difference between "soft" and "hard" personal character -- a difference which lies at the bottom of C.G. Jung's distinction between an "introvert-ed" and "extroverted" deep structure of the Ego. In every case the difference depends on the firmness of commitment and on the will of the Ego to discipline its sentiments (without, as Freud noted, being able to blot them out): Tamen etsi expellas furca, revertent.

22.5

By the same token, the Superego falls into an emergent, ac-

commodating, "soft" variety and a dominant, militant, "hard" variety: peaceful patriotism and militant nationalism; liberal social criticism and hateful radicalism; pondered "<u>Verantwortungsethik</u>" and uncompromising "<u>Gesinnungsethik</u>" and their combination such as terrorism in the sequence of Bakunin and Nechaev.

22.6
New light thus falls on the "True Believer," whose picture Eric Hoffer has drawn to impressively. He is not limited to the religious fanatic. Rather, he is the person whose Superego is unconditionally pledged to his sacred cause. He may therefore as well be a nationalist as a radical as a fundamentalist who believes in unmitigated revenge for the wrongs he believes his cause has suffered. As Hoffer as well as Reich and others have observed, the true believer suffers from a narrow, impaired Ego that has become the captive of his "Ego-ideal." By the same token, captivity to the one sacred cause impairs openness to its complements. When running amoc, nationalism, ideology and justice are blinded to each other.

22.7.
Fortunately, what holds for the true believer and the disci-

plinarian, does not hold the creative, "free mind," whose
imagination is uninhibited by a contorted Ego or a tyranni-
cal Superego. In this, the normal case, the three domains of
the Moral Order do not exclude but complement each other to
 constitute three varieties of Social Consciousness.

On the first case Solidarity prevails over, but does not
exclude Ideology and/or Justice provided they do not rise to
dominance. In other words, dominant Solidarity allows for
supplementary, experimental, non-cathectic Ideology and
Morality, as the following formula indicates:

$$SOL \ <= \ (IDL \ v \ MOR)$$
$$= \ SOL \ v \ -IDL \ v \ -MOR.$$

In this case Solidarity is no longer the abstract ideal
type we had to construct for analytical reason. Freely
integrating ideology and morality it constitutes what is
normally called **historical consciousness**: Rooted in its
group (whether this is a nation, a region, a political party
or a church, it produces a loving, hermeneutics which tran-
scends and at the same time nourishes Solidarity.

22.8

In a similar fashion, dominant Ideology allows for, and is usually accompanied by free-floating, experimental Solidarity and/or Morality, as the following formula indicates:

$$IDL \Leftarrow (SOL \ v \ MOR)$$

$$IDL \ v \ -SOL \ v \ - \ MOR.$$

As in the case of historical consciousness, Ideology that integrates Solidarity and Morality, transcends its own limits and constitutes something much richer: **political consciousness.**

22.9
The same holds for Justice that transcends its own limits and integrates Solidarity and Ideology to constitute **moral consciousness**:

$$MOR \Leftarrow (SOL \ v \ IDL)$$

$$MOR \ v \ -SOL \ v \ -IDL.$$

It is in this fashion that we get a new sense of social Consciousness and its complexities which paint a new picture of what Durkheim for lack of a better term called the Moral Order.

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1.   [1]What is wrong about classical ontology is its realism, not its rationalism. As Alois Dempf (1955) has argued, the intellectual ascent of the Occident starts with Scholasticism even before the Renaissance, the Reformation and Enlightenment.

2.   [2]We thus do not hesitate to reintroduce the term "transcendental," although in a strictly constructivist sense in which ideal constructs transcend the here and now. By the same token, we dismiss Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments a priori and replace it by Frege's distinction between unsaturated (algebraic) and saturated (applied) functions.

3.   [3]A strict distinction must therefore be made between entailment, or "necessary consequence" (A=>B), and foundation, or "necessary condition" (A<=B): the first implies determinism, the second, indeterminacy.

4.   [4] Moreover, Sorokin avowed his debt to Eugene De Roberty, a leading expositor of the work of Auguste Comte and a collaborator of Littré. It thus becomes obvious that Sorokin's work owes its

analytical thrust to French positivism, and notably to Auguste Comte, his disavowals to the contrary.

5. [5]Ironically, the entire fifth book of the Wealth of Nations deals with "the Revenues of the Sovereign." However, Adam Smith (1937: 53) considers taxes as ultimately derived from one or other of the three original sources.
6. [6]It does, however, dominate its physical (ecological) basis on which it depends as its indispensable subsidiary.
7. [7]Even a thinker as averse to socialism as Herbert Spencer, who did seminal work in functional theory and who identified production with "sustaining," and domination, with "regulating" society, was very vague about "distribution" as the source of wealth.
8. [8]It is noteworthy that the same relationship informs Auguste Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy (1830-42) as well as Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy (1876).
9. [9]The same may be said about J. Habermas'(1984) Theory of Communicative Action, which is broadly in unison with Durkheim and Parsons and avoids the militancy of Leninist rhetoric.
0. [10]For an excellent clarification, cf. Karl Popper's (1972:191-205) article "Of Clouds and Clocks.