

American University's School of International Service

The Clear and Present UN Peacekeeping Resource Crunch

Justification and Prospects for Increased U.S. Involvement

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Introduction

In the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, then-President George W. Bush succinctly articulated the paradigm shift that occurred in U.S. foreign and national security policy in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon in the following way: “The events of September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.”¹ Yet Afghanistan is only one of several so-called weak or fragile states around the world. Countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Sudan and others also suffer from “poverty, weak institutions, and corruption” that can have and has, in fact, had destabilizing regional and global spillover effects.²

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States, primarily with British and Canadian support, launched *Operation Enduring Freedom* in October 2001 to overthrow the Taliban regime that provided safe haven to Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan. However, as operations there (and Iraq) have shifted to fostering democratic institutions and governance, it has become abundantly clear that achieving sustainable war-to-peace transitions are exceedingly costly in terms of blood, time, and treasure. Thus, it is unlikely that the United States could or would unilaterally undertake similar operations in other weak or fragile states in the near future even if deemed it in its national interests to do so. The aforementioned statement underscores the increasing importance of

¹ President of the United States of America, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, George W. Bush (Washington, DC, September 2002), 4.

² Ibid.

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions as a viable U.S. and global tool to address threats to international peace and security.

As of February 2010, the UN has approximately 100,546 troops, police, and military observers serving in 15 peacekeeping missions around the world.³ In fact, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) deploys more military personnel than any state or organization besides the United States.⁴ And despite all of the perceived and real limitations of UN peacekeeping, high-ranking U.S. policy officials in recent Democratic and Republican administrations unambiguously recognize the value of UN peacekeeping missions.

For example, current U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, in a July 2009 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs called *New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations*, asserted that the Obama administration knows “that U.N. peacekeeping addresses pressing international needs, and serves our national interests.”⁵ Furthermore, although the Bush administration was from benignly neglectful to unequivocally hostile toward the UN in its first term, it too came to appreciate the added value of UN peacekeeping in addressing issues of global instability. Kristen Silverberg, an Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs under the Bush administration, said the following at an April 2008 hearing before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight: “I would also like to emphasize that the [Bush] Administration considers

³ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contributions to United Nations Operations: 2005-2010,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/> (accessed March 14, 2010).

⁴ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/factsheet.pdf> (accessed March 14, 2010).

⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 6.

United Nations peacekeeping to be in the direct national security interests of the United States.”⁶ Silverberg’s successor at the Bureau of International Organization Affairs Brian Hook also expressed admiration for UN peacekeeping by emphasizing that “even when facing significant challenges, it is clear that UN peacekeeping operations not only contribute to the prevention or mitigation of conflict and the resulting protection of civilians, but also provide good value for the U.S. in sharing the burden to respond to peacekeeping needs and requirements around the globe.”⁷

Yet even as recent U.S. administrations nominally support UN peacekeeping, the global tool is facing the impending dual crisis of increasingly complex mandates but a dearth of resources to carry out those mandates, a trend which may imperil UN peacekeeping’s viability as a tool to address threats to international peace and security. According to a December 2008 Government Accountability Report, a future UN peacekeeping operation is likely to take the following form:

A potential new operation would likely be large and complex, take place in sub-Saharan Africa, and have nine mandated tasks (such as restoring government institutions). This potential new operation would likely require member states to contribute 21,000 troops and military observers, including those in engineering and aviation units, and 1,500 police to carry out the mandate. The

⁶ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, & Oversight, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Underfunded International Mandate – The Role of the United States*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, 5.

⁷ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy, & Human Rights, *UN Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities – Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs Brian Hook*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, 1.

*UN would likely need to deploy 4,000 to 5,000 civilians. The operation's logistics needs also would be large and complex.*⁸

However, current UN resource constraints make the feasibility of effectively deploying new missions highly challenging. For example, ongoing UN peacekeeping missions face a 20% gap between troops and military observers authorized to carry out operations and those actually deployed. For police and civilian workers, the gap between authorized and deployed personnel is even larger at 34%.⁹ Given this resource shortfall that afflicts UN peacekeeping, the notion that one nation (read: the U.S.), however strong economically and militarily, cannot feasibly and adequately address problems emanating from every weak and fragile state, that the UN, especially since the end of the Cold War, has been the world's primary conduit for addressing countries emerging from conflict, and that the peacebuilding expertise that stem from UN peacekeeping may become increasingly vital to the United States in the midst of its Global War on Terrorism, it seems especially appropriate to ask the following questions: *Should the United States increase its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations? If so, how?*

The following paper will examine the questions just posed by first outlining how recent policy analysts and scholars have answered them, followed by a section examining whether UN peacekeeping, beyond the rhetoric of politicians, is actually a viable tool to address threats to international peace and security that merits increased U.S. involvement. This section specifically examines the relative costs and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping as well as details the relative benefits and limitations of UN peacekeeping compared to more unilateral interventions.

⁸ Government Accountability Office (GAO), *United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Further Limit Further Large Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress* (Washington, DC, 2008).

⁹ GAO, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Further Limit Further Large Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress*, Summary.

Evidence provided in this section leads to the conclusion that UN peacekeeping is indeed a global device deserving of increased U.S. support and participation.

Then, the paper shifts toward outlining the three main ways that the U.S. participates in UN peacekeeping besides its veto-wielding voting role as a one of five permanent members the UN Security Council: 1) financial contributions; 2) military involvement; and 3) training and equipping programs. For each substantive area of U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping, the paper will detail the U.S.'s historical involvement (mainly post-Cold War) with UN peacekeeping, analyze current developments, and finally offer recommendations for enhanced U.S. participation given the historical and current constraints and opportunities. The paper will conclude by offering potential further areas of study in terms of U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping.

Policy/Literature Review

A review of the opinions of recent policy analysts and scholars reveals that those who favor increased U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping are divided into those who focus primarily on U.S. military contributions and those who offer more comprehensive ways that the U.S. can enhance its involvement. On the other hand, those who oppose increasing the U.S.'s role in UN peacekeeping range from concerns the perceived weakness of UN peacekeeping to carry out its mandates to those who believe that UN peacekeeping must reform before the question of changes to U.S. involvement can even be addressed.

U.S. Boots on the Ground

Morton Abramowitz and Thomas Pickering, two former prominent U.S. ambassadors to a total of eight countries and to the United Nations (for Pickering), believe that the United States should directly contribute military personnel to UN peacekeeping. In their September/October 2008 article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled “Making Intervention Work: Improving the UN’s Ability to Act,” Abramowitz and Pickering assert that non-coercive efforts and economic sanctions have proven unable to alter the behavior of governments who repress their own people and that regional organizations (like the African Union) that provide support to UN peacekeeping have yielded minimum tangible benefits in addressing conflict thus far.¹⁰ Thus, UN peacekeeping remains one of the few viable options, but Abramowitz and Pickering argue that its capabilities need improvement in order to effectively take on the increasingly complex conflict environments of the 21st century. The authors recommend that the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, the U.S. included, each provide “5,000 fully trained troops on an ongoing basis for peacekeeping missions authorized by the Security Council.”¹¹

Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at Brookings, seems to echo the sentiments of Abramowitz and Pickering in terms of U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping but he also advocates institutionalizing U.S. military participation in UN peacekeeping within the U.S. Army. O’Hanlon believes that the U.S. should consider the deployment of “modest numbers” of American troops to strengthen faltering UN peacekeeping missions, such as the current one in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In order to implement U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping, O’Hanlon suggests that the Army create a peace operations division with

¹⁰ Morton Abramowitz and Thomas Pickering, “Making Intervention Work: Improving the UN’s Ability to Act,” *Foreign Affairs* 87 (September/October 2008): 101 & 103.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 104.

individuals enlisted specifically for the purposes of participating in peacekeeping missions. He would ask volunteers to enlist for two years and provide them with 12 weeks of boot camp and 12 weeks of specialized peacekeeping training before becoming deployable. Ultimately, O'Hanlon envisions a peacekeeping division of 15,000 troops with 3,000 to 4,000 participating in UN peacekeeping operations at any given time.¹²

While Abramowitz, Pickering, and O'Hanlon primarily discuss prospects for increased U.S. military involvement to UN peacekeeping missions, other policy analysts and scholars present a broader array of areas where the U.S. can enhance its participation within UN peace operations.

Comprehensive Approaches to Increasing U.S. Participation

Johanna Mendelson Forman, a senior associate with the *Americas Program* and former co-director of the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project* at the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), views a solid U.S.-UN partnership as “essential for effective peacebuilding and peacekeeping.”¹³ Forman suggests that Abramowitz and Pickering's aforementioned proposal may be appropriate in today's context, especially if it was given a test trial in a particular UN mission or region. However, she also urges the Obama administration to explicitly make full funding of U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping “nonnegotiable” while asserting that long-standing U.S. arrears to UN peacekeeping have caused more animosity

¹² Michael O'Hanlon, “U.S. Boots on Congo Ground: A New Kind of Force Could Provide Security,” *Washington Post*, August 14, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/13/AR2009081302900.html> (accessed March 14, 2010).

¹³ Johanna Mendelson Forman, *Investing in a New Multilateralism: A Smart Power Approach to the United Nations* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies: Smart Power Initiative, 2009), 10.

among UN member-states than any other U.S. government policy.¹⁴

Erin Weir, a Peacekeeping Advocate for Refugees International, sets forth a three-pronged approach to increase U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in her July 2009 report entitled *Greater Expectations: UN Peacekeeping & Civilian Protection*. First, Weir largely agrees with Forman that the Obama administration should make full and timely funding of UN peacekeeping missions a core priority of U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. Second, she believes that the U.S. should take the lead in ensuring that all peacekeeping training is standardized to fit UN modules and training methods. Finally, Weir advocates more U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, but unlike Abramowitz, Pickering, or O'Hanlon, she emphasizes the participation of particular U.S. military personnel, such as engineers, heavy transport, and medical units, that can contribute to the effective deployment of UN peacekeeping mission.¹⁵

William Durch, a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations Program proposes myriad ways for the U.S. to increase its involvement in UN peacekeeping. Financially, Durch calls on the Obama administration to ensure that the State Department and the Office of Management and Budget do not under-budget for UN peacekeeping operations, as he alleges they have been prone to do in the past.¹⁶ In addition, he recommends that the U.S. continue to train foreign peacekeepers through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) past the set date of 2010, with the caveat that recipient countries demonstrate the willingness "to discipline troops who violate their own military codes of justice

¹⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵ Erin Weir, *Greater Expectations: UN Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection* (Washington, DC: Refugees International, 2009), ii.

¹⁶ William Durch, *Peace and Stability Operations: Challenges and Opportunities for the Next U.S. Administration* (Washington, DC: Better World Campaign & Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008), 9.

or UN standards of conduct while serving in UN operations.”¹⁷ Operationally, Durch proposes that the U.S. should supply temporary military support, in collaboration with its NATO allies, for UN operations that experience extreme violence from spoilers or terrorists as well as increase the number of political advisers and civilian substantive experts who specialize in issues such as human rights and de-mining.¹⁸ Finally, Durch suggests that the U.S. should create an interagency process as well as a “centers of excellence” that focus on UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁹

Nancy Soderberg, an author and a former official within the Clinton administration at the National Security Council and at the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN, details comprehensive proposals to bolster the Department of Defense’s involvement in UN peacekeeping in a September 2007 National Defense University Report entitled *U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping: Areas for Additional DOD Assistance*. Some of Soderberg’s most notable recommendations are as follows:

- Create and lead a “Core Group of Support to Peace Operations” that would include the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the major Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), and key regional organizations. This Core Group would, in Soderberg’s view, more effectively coordinate assistance and training as well as press for reform at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO);
- Selectively increase U.S. participation in the UN command structure, both at UN headquarters in New York and in the field for UN peacekeeping missions;

¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

¹⁸ Durch, 10-11.

¹⁹ Ibid., 11.

- Explore ways to include each other (DOD and the UN) in ongoing activities such as training exercises and lessons learned efforts;
- Press for the formal inclusion of UN peacekeeping missions in the agendas of high-level summit meetings like the G-8; and
- Hold annual or semi-annual senior-level U.S. strategic dialogues on the UN peacekeeping needs and how they can be effectively addressed by the United States and its allies.²⁰

Increased U.S. Involvement in UN Peacekeeping – Not Ever to Not Yet

Although the majority of policy analysts and scholars concerned with UN peacekeeping at least nominally support the notion that the U.S. should increase its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, there is a cadre of scholars, officials, and analysts who reject this notion for various reasons, ranging from the perceived inability of UN peacekeeping to carry out its mandates to notions that reform must precede enhanced U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping.

Not Ever – UN Peacekeeping as an Incompetent Tool

Dana Rohrabacher, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives (R-California), questions the efficacy of multilateral efforts to address issues of international peace and security and instead proposes a more unilateral effort. At a July 2007 House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight hearing on UN peacekeeping,

²⁰ Nancy Soderberg, *U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping: Areas of Additional DOD Assistance* (Washington, DC: National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security, 2007), viii.

Rohrbacher proclaimed the following in response to Democrat Bill Delahunt's support for UN peacekeeping:

We have a fundamentally different philosophy when it comes to multilateral approaches to solving problems in the world. I do not see the United Nations as being the positive force that you have observed. For example, when I see UN peacekeepers, generally I see that there are large numbers of troops that are ill-equipped and ill-trained, as compared to our own military; people from Third World countries sending troops to various other countries, who then have their nationals participate. Their effect on the mission and their actual ability to achieve the goals are so small compared to what American troops, who are well-equipped and well-trained, can do.²¹

From this statement, Congressman Rohrbacher does not seem inclined to support U.S. efforts at improving UN peacekeepers' capacity through equipping and training; rather, he believes that American troops are intrinsically better suited to handle the complex tasks of operating in weak and fragile states.

Not Yet – Reform Before Increased Participation

Steven Groves, former senior counsel to the U.S. Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations and current Barnard and Barbara Lomas Fellow at the Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, in a roundabout way concedes that the U.S. benefits from UN peacekeeping with his admission that the "United States has benefited from the placement of U.N. forces in locations where the world may have otherwise called for U.S. military intervention, which has in turn allowed U.S. forces to deploy elsewhere in the world

²¹ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, *U.N. Peacekeeping Forces: A Force Multiplier for the U.S.?*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007, 3.

where our vital national interests are actually at stake.”²² However, Groves rejects the U.S. shouldering any increased involvement in UN peacekeeping until the United Nations does more to address what he characterizes as the “persistence of sexual exploitation perpetrated by UN peacekeepers.”²³

Brett D. Schaefer, who is also a fellow at the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, also suggests that fundamental reforms to UN peacekeeping must be implemented before addressing issues of U.S. involvement. Although Schaefer mentions allegations of sexual misconduct against UN peacekeeping as an area in need of reform, he particularly focuses his analysis on instances of mismanagement, corruption, and fraud within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. For example, Schaefer cites a 2007 UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit of \$1.4 billion in peacekeeping contracts that uncovered “significant corruption schemes” involving \$619 million, roughly 44 percent of the total value of the contracts.²⁴ Furthermore, Schaefer seeks reform of what he sees as the counterproductive renewal of older UN peacekeeping missions and excessive expansion of new ones.

Is UN Peacekeeping a Viable Tool to Address Threats to International Peace and Security?

As mentioned in the introduction, officials from both the George W. Bush and the Barack Obama administrations expressed sentiments that UN peacekeeping has practical value for the United States. However, are the officials’ affirmative beliefs about UN peacekeeping well-founded or misguided when examining the pertinent evidence? Indeed, this question must be examined thoroughly because if current and future policymakers are to ascertain ways that the

²² House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.N. Peacekeeping Forces: A Force Multiplier for the U.S.?*, 8.

²³ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.N. Peacekeeping Forces: A Force Multiplier for the U.S.?*, 9.

²⁴ Brett D. Schaefer, *United Nations Peacekeeping: The U.S. Must Press for Reform* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2008), 7.

United States can increase its involvement in UN peacekeeping, they must first effectively show members of Congress and the American people that UN peacekeeping as currently constituted has value in general and to the United States in particular.

The following section seeks to distill the relative value of UN peacekeeping in its mission of addressing global instability. First, it will detail the relative financial costs of UN peacekeeping, particularly in comparison to a similar hypothetical and actual U.S.-led peace operations ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then, the discussion will turn to assessing the success rate of UN peacekeeping missions, which will yield some perhaps surprising results. Finally, the section will end by examining the relative benefits and continuing limitations of UN peacekeeping as a tool to address issues of international peace and security, while coming to the conclusion that on the whole, UN peacekeeping is an international mechanism of considerable value to the United States.

Financial Costs of UN Peacekeeping: A Bargain for the U.S.

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, the UN peacekeeping budget is expected to rise to about \$7.8 billion USD, with the U.S. contributing about \$2.2 billion.²⁵ This indeed marks a sharp increase for the UN peacekeeping budget since the end of the Cold War, when the total UN peacekeeping budget averaged around \$711.3 million from 1989-1991 in constant 2004 U.S. dollars.²⁶ Furthermore, the estimated \$2.2 billion that Congress has appropriated for U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping in FY 2009 is more than the entire UN peacekeeping budget as recently as

²⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations*, 7.

²⁶ Michael Renner, "Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures: 1947-2005," Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/pk_tables/currentreal.pdf (accessed May 5, 2010).

2000.²⁷ Yet despite the seemingly exponential rising costs of UN peacekeeping, it remains a relative bargain for the United States.

Comparative Cost of an UN-led versus U.S.-led peace operation

In an oft-quoted (in Congressional hearings) June 2007 Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled *Peacekeeping: Observations on Cost, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, Joseph Christoff, Director of the International Affairs and Trade division of the GAO, compared the cost of a UN peacekeeping operation versus the cost of a similar hypothetical U.S.-led peace operations. Christoff astutely chose the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a case study because, as he terms it, “both the United States and the UN have conducted operations in that country, thus providing comparative information on their two approaches.”²⁸

It is worth detailing how the GAO gathered its data to conduct the cost comparison of the UN Mission Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the hypothetical U.S. mission there because it underscores the thoroughness and legitimacy of the study. First, the GAO gathered budget and personnel data on the first 14 months of MINUSTAH. Then, it “developed a scenario for a U.S. operation in Haiti that used the same deployment schedule as the UN, with the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel and aircraft over the same period,” which the U.S. military Joint Chiefs of Staff validated as reasonable.²⁹ Finally, GAO used the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Contingency Operation Support Tool to estimate the military costs of a U.S.-led peace operation in Haiti, which is a mechanism used by DOD to generate estimates for all

²⁷ Michael Renner, “Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures in Current vs. Real Terms: 1947-2005,” Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/pk_tables/currentreal.pdf (accessed May 5, 2010).

²⁸ Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, Prepared by Joseph Christoff (Washington, DC, 2007), 1.

²⁹ Ibid.

U.S. contingency operations as well as to justify supplemental appropriations requests to Congress.³⁰

When the GAO tabulated the collected data, it found that the first 14 months (from May 2004 to June 2005) of MINUSTAH cost a total of \$448 million, which included transportation and logistical expenses. The U.S. financial contribution to MINUSTAH during the 14-month time period was about \$116 million. However, in the hypothetical U.S.-led peace operation in Haiti, using the same military, civilian, and police personnel numbers and logistical and transportation support levels as MINUSTAH, the GAO estimated the cost would be around \$876 million, more than twice as much as the UN-led peacekeeping operation.³¹ The organization found that costs for civilian police, military pay and support, and facilities account for most of the wide disparity between the two missions. Most prominently, UN budgeted \$25 million to deploy 872 police officers to MINUSTAH while it would cost the U.S. an estimated \$217 million to deploy the same number of U.S. civilian police officers to Haiti.³² The financial bargain that UN peacekeeping presents is also apparent when comparing its budget to actual U.S.-led peace operations (called stability operations in U.S. parlance) in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Monthly Expenditures in Afghanistan & Iraq Compared to UN Peacekeeping

As of the July 2009 Department of Defense obligations report, which details its monthly expenditures in overseas contingency operations, the U.S. military is spending an average of \$3.6 billion per month in Afghanistan for FY 2009, which is \$1.4 billion more than what the U.S. will

³⁰ GAO, *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, 2.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

³² GAO, *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, 8.

contribute for the entire FY 2009 for UN peacekeeping.³³ The numbers from U.S. military operations in Iraq are even more pronounced. Even after the “surge” in Iraq, which increased monthly U.S. military expenditures to an average of \$14.3 billion per month in FY 2008, DOD is still spending about \$7.3 billion per month in FY 2009.³⁴ That figure is only slightly less than the entire proposed FY 2009 UN peacekeeping budget of \$7.8 billion.

One can reasonably argue that peacekeeping or stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are more strategically important to the United States than Haiti or the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, but the financial disparities between U.S. and UN peace operations are glaring given that they are nominally carrying out the similar mandates of transitioning a post-conflict state onto a sustainable and democratic path. Finally, as U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice points out, the total cost of UN peacekeeping for FY 2009, even at one of the highest figures ever at \$7.8 billion, still just represents less than one percent of global military spending, which is extremely cost effective when considering that there are currently 15 UN peacekeeping missions around the globe.³⁵

As financially efficient as UN peacekeeping seems, especially when compared to hypothetical and actual comparable U.S. operations, as Christoff concedes in his GAO report, “cost is not the only factor in deciding whether the United States of the UN should lead a peace operations.”³⁶ Indeed, the relative low cost of UN peacekeeping is incomplete without a rigorous analysis of how effective the mechanism is in assisting post-conflict states toward an enduring peace. A close examination of the evidence shows that UN peacekeeping is much more effective

³³ Congressional Research Service (CRS), *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11*, Prepared by Amy Belasco (Washington, DC, 2009), 20.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges For International Peacekeeping Operations*, 7.

³⁶ GAO, *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, 11.

than one may believe from an over-emphasis of the failures of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia in the mid-1990s.

UN Peacekeeping as a Successful Global Tool

At the most recent Congressional hearing on UN peacekeeping in July 2009, Ambassador Rice forcefully articulated how successful UN peacekeeping missions are in achieving their mandates by saying the following:

U.N. peacekeeping delivers real results in conflict zones. U.N. peacekeepers can provide the political and practical reassurances that warring parties often need to agree to and implement an effective ceasefire. Their deployment can help limit or stop the escalation of armed conflict, and stave off wider war... Many countries are more peaceful and stable today due to U.N. peacekeeping. In recent years, UN peacekeepers helped divert an explosion of ethnic violence in Burundi; extend the fledgling government's authority in Sierra Leone; keep order in Liberia; and take back Cite Soleil from the lawless gangs in Haiti. All of these countries, I should note, now enjoy democratically elected governments.³⁷

Administration rhetoric aside, myriad independent scholars who have studied UN peacekeeping operations recently buttress Ambassador Rice's claims about the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping with overwhelming evidence.

James Dobbins, Director of the International Security & Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, conducted extensive case studies on eight UN peacekeeping missions (Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone) from 1960 to 2005 and concluded that among the eight

³⁷ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations*, 6.

cases studied, seven countries remain peaceful and six became democratic.³⁸ This compares favorably to U.S.-led peace operations, which has a success rate of four of eight peace operations studied by Dobbins, although admittedly the verdict is still out on Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁹ Dobbins attributes the higher success rate of UN peacekeeping to case selection differences between the U.S. and the UN and the more robust nation-building projects that the U.S. took on (he includes Germany and Japan in his case study of U.S.-led peace operations). However, for Dobbins, the biggest factor in higher success rate for the UN is that it “has done a better job of learning from its mistakes than has the US over the past 15 years.”⁴⁰

Lise Morjé Howard, former founding Director of the Conflict Resolution program at Georgetown University and author of *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* came to a similar conclusion when studying ten post-Cold War UN peacekeeping operations that were highly complex in nature and completed as of 2005. Howard found that, of the ten cases she chose, six were “largely successful,” which she asserts is “surprising, even for most peacekeeping experts, since most of the objects of analytic study and media attention are the four major cases of failure” in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Angola for the UN.⁴¹

Virginia Page Fortna of Columbia University offers even more robust evidence that UN peacekeeping has been successful at helping states achieve sustainable peace. Fortna combines a quantitative analysis of a data set encompassing ceasefires from all civil wars (she counts 60 total) from 1989 to 2000 with a qualitative analysis of three in-depth case studies of conflicts to

³⁸ James Dobbins, *The US and UN Ways of Nation-Building* (Washington, DC: United Nations Associations of the United States of America, 2005), 3.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴¹ Lise Morje Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5. The successful cases for Howard were, like Dobbins, Namibia,, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia,, & East Timor.

ascertain whether post-conflict countries that experience peacekeeping have an appreciably better chance at maintaining peace and security than post-conflict countries where the UN (or regional bodies) decided not to intervene. Through her statistical analysis, Fortna comes to the conclusion that peacekeepers will significantly improve the chances that peace will hold.⁴² In fact, she asserts that conservative estimates indicate that peacekeeping reduces the risk of a war recurring by more than half while “less conservative, but probably more accurate estimates show that peacekeeping cuts the risk of renewed by 75 to 85 percent.”⁴³ Furthermore, Fortna explains that UN peacekeepers have reduced the likelihood of recidivism back to war for post-conflict countries by:

- Changing the incentives for war and peace for the belligerents;
- Reducing belligerents’ uncertainty about each other’s intentions by providing credible information;
- Preventing and controlling accidents and skirmishes that might otherwise re-escalate the conflict; and
- Preventing either side from permanently excluding others from the political and/or peace process.

Besides the benefits that Fortna lists above, UN peacekeeping offers other notable qualities that enable it to be a singular and viable tool for addressing post-conflict situations.

Additional Benefits of UN Peacekeeping for Global Peace & Security

⁴² V. Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 8.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 9.

Most prominently, the international character of UN peacekeeping missions provides it with unparalleled legitimacy when intervening in post-conflict countries. Ambassador Rice echoed this sentiment well when she said in July 2009 that “sometimes warring parties will not let other outside actors in except for the UN. Governments, rebels, warlords, and other antagonists often don’t want foreign forces in their country, but the UN’s universal character and its unique legitimacy can make it a little easier for some governments and opposition elements to decide to let constructive outside actors in.”⁴⁴ This notion played itself out in 2006 when State and Defense Department officials were considering a U.S. or NATO-led peace operation in Lebanon following the country’s hostilities in Israel. In the end, the U.S. decided to support the expansion of the existing UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon because the other options “would be perceived by some factions in Lebanon and neighboring countries as a threat and potentially a hostile force.

Furthermore, the United Nations seems uniquely equipped to handle the multidimensional tasks that modern post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction require such as reforming rule of law institutions and reintegrating refugees and former combatants. For example, the organization contains a large quantity (5,700 as of May 2007) of civil servants who are experienced in peacekeeping as well as possess valuable native language and translation skills.⁴⁵ But most importantly, the UN has the expertise to pull together military, political, police, humanitarian, human rights, and development activities under the leadership of a single individual who heads any given UN peacekeeping mission.⁴⁶

Finally, most U.S. policymakers and scholars, even those reluctant to embrace the UN as

⁴⁴ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges in International Peacekeeping Operations*, 7.

⁴⁵ GAO, *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, 14.

⁴⁶ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges in International Peacekeeping Operations*, 7.

an organization, concede that if UN peacekeeping did not exist, the U.S., as one of the most potent military forces in the world, would face more international pressure to intervene directly in various global conflicts. For instance, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan regarding MINUSTAH in Haiti that if “there were not 6,000 Brazilians in Haiti, there would be 6,000 American Marines.”⁴⁷ Indeed, the United States, as of February 2010, only contributes 86 troops, military advisers, and police to seven UN peacekeeping operations worldwide, an issue that will be discussed more at length below.⁴⁸

The paragraphs in the above sub-section extensively detailed the ancillary benefits of UN peacekeeping that contribute to its overall effectiveness as a tool to address issues of international peace and security, but it is also important to note some of its seemingly chronic limitations before definitively determining whether and how the U.S. should expand its participation in the global mechanism.

Enduring Limitations of UN Peacekeeping

Most importantly perhaps is the notion that UN peacekeeping missions cannot be deployed to every conflict environment and achieve substantive results. For example, James Dobbins recommends that for missions requiring forced entry or necessitating 20,000-plus troops, the U.S., NATO, or the European Union (EU) may be better suited because most UN peacekeeping missions are too undermanned and underfunded to achieve success in these more robust undertakings.⁴⁹ Indeed, Howard also argues that situational factors such as consent of the belligerents are one of the decisive factors determining the success of the ten UN peacekeeping

⁴⁷ Mark Leon Goldberg, “The Coming Peacekeeping Crunch,” American Prospect Online, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_coming_peacekeeping_crunch (accessed March 31, 2010).

⁴⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Monthly Summary of Contributor of Military and Police Personnel*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/> (accessed March 31, 2010).

⁴⁹ Dobbins, 6.

operations she examined.⁵⁰

Furthermore, the UN has limited command and control over its peacekeeping forces because historically, each troop contingent from the various countries remains under the command of its national authority. Thus, the UN force commander in any given mission cannot reasonably be assured that individuals or troop contingents will follow his or her orders, a conundrum that is significantly absent under a U.S. or even a NATO-led peacekeeping force. UN limitations on command and control of troops also manifest itself in disciplining “UN peacekeepers involved in criminal, sexual, or other misconduct.”⁵¹ Although troop-contributing countries are responsible for investigating and, if necessary, prosecuting their own troops for misconduct during UN peacekeeping missions, when the UN documented that it had received upward of 1,200 allegations of criminal and sexual misconduct by its peacekeepers in 2003 and 2004 alone, UN peacekeeping came under increasing scrutiny by members of Congress, both Democratic and Republican alike.⁵²

Finally, UN peacekeeping missions suffer from uneven levels of troop and equipment quality. Dobbins believes that this trend has been exacerbated as “many rich Western nations have followed U.S. practice and become less willing to commit their armed forces to UN operations.”⁵³ What or whoever is the culprit, UN headquarters have documented cases where some troops providing by contributing countries have arrived without rifles, helmets, and other necessary equipment. In addition, DOD officials also recalled to the GAO that the “United States

⁵⁰ Howard, 10.

⁵¹ GAO, *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, 15.

⁵² GAO, *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, 15 and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges of International Peacekeeping Operations*, 3 & 31-32. In the latest Congressional hearing on UN peacekeeping in July 2009, Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) and Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) alluded specifically to and asked about UN efforts to combat sexual and criminal misconduct among its peacekeepers.

⁵³ Dobbins, 6.

provided some equipment, provisions, and military supplies to UN troops that were deployed with insufficient equipment,” particularly in Haiti.⁵⁴

But despite the very real and continuous limitations of UN peacekeeping, the preponderance of evidence, as detailed above, suggests UN peacekeeping forces have nevertheless been successful in assisting post-conflict countries on a path to sustainable peace in a plurality if not a majority of instances where they been deployed. Moreover, the UN peacekeeping mechanism seems to offer unique characteristics, such as international legitimacy and well-established expertise, which allows it to operate in countries where the United States and/or other organizations would have difficulty doing so. For all these reasons and more, one must conclude that UN peacekeeping is considerably effective in addressing threats to international peace and security. Thus, in the face of declining resources and the increasing complexity in UN peacekeeping missions, the United States must find practical and feasible ways to increase its involvement to help ensure that the UN remains a viable tool that the United States can depend on to deploy to volatile post-conflict situations. The next section of the paper will examine the primary ways that the U.S. has involved itself in UN peacekeeping – financially, militarily and training and equipping more recently – in hopes of gleanng ways that the U.S. can enhance its participation.

U.S. Funding of UN Peacekeeping

Since all of the United States’ financial contributions to UN peacekeeping stem from Congressional appropriations to the State Department’s Contributions to International

⁵⁴GAO, *Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and UN Operations*, 15.

Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) accounts, Congress has played a major role and continues to figure prominently in this realm of U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping. According to a November 2008 Congressional Research Service report, Congress has primarily used appropriations bills to express its views of and to enhance its oversight of the executive branch's actions and uses of UN peacekeeping operations. Congressional actions in this regard have ranged from "diminishing to increasing U.S. assessed contributions and linking release of U.S. contributions to reports on actions taken to improve U.N. peacekeeping reform or other actions, not related to peacekeeping, by the United Nations."⁵⁵ The following sub-sections detail: 1) the ebbs and flows of the U.S.'s financial contributions to the UN peacekeeping since the Cold War, with an emphasis on the role of Congress; 2) recent development in U.S. funding of UN peacekeeping under the Obama administration; and 3) two recommendations on how the U.S. can enhance its participation in UN peacekeeping from a financial standpoint.

Where We Were – U.S. Funding of UN Peacekeeping

The United Nations' support for and authorization of the highly successful U.S.-led Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in August 1990 generated Congressional goodwill for itself and thus generous funding for UN peacekeeping at the tail end of the George H.W. Bush's administration. For example, in 1991, Congress authorized and appropriated \$133 million to fund existing UN peacekeeping missions, to reduce the amount of arrearages the U.S. had gathered, as well as to account for the rapidly increasing number of UN peacekeeping operations that it expected to occur in 1992.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Congressional Research Service, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, Prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne (Washington, DC, 2008), 31.

⁵⁶ CRS, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, 32.

Congressional support for UN peacekeeping continued and perhaps increased for Fiscal Year (FY)1992, as it actually appropriated more (\$462 million) to UN peacekeeping than the Bush administration requested (\$201 million).⁵⁷ Indeed, some members of Congress seemed quite optimistic about the future prospects of UN peacekeeping. For example, in 1992, the late Senator Paul Simon (D-Illinois) attempted to permanently stabilize U.S. funding to UN peacekeeping by introducing a bill to move peacekeeping finance to the defense budget function, which is a larger and considered a more reliable source.⁵⁸ Simon and other proponents of the bill cited the extent to which UN peacekeeping advanced U.S. national security interests in the post-Cold War period. Eventually, Section 1342 of the FY 1992 Defense Authorization Act, mandated that the Secretary of Defense obligate up to \$300 million to, among other things, fund UN peacekeeping if the CIPA account proved insufficient. Thus, as the Clinton administration entered office in January 1993, U.S. financial contributions seemed to be on a firm footing, which gave it further impetus to make UN peacekeeping a cornerstone of its foreign policy.

Early in 1993, the Clinton administration coined the term ‘assertive multilateralism’, which signaled an embrace of UN peacekeeping, and approved new UN operations in “Georgia, Uganda-Rwanda, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia during its first year” alone.⁵⁹ Furthermore, President Clinton launched an internal review of U.S. peacekeeping policy in February 1993 through Presidential Review Directive 13 (PDD-13), a policy review process that many expected to embrace a proactive and supportive stance toward UN peacekeeping, which would in turn

⁵⁷ Ibid., 31.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Victoria Holt and Michael MacKinnon, “The Origins and Evolution of U.S. Policy toward Peace Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 15 (February 2008): 20.

presumably stabilize and perhaps increase U.S. funding to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide.⁶⁰

However, as President Clinton's decision to support the expansion of UN operations in Somalia proved disastrous, especially from a public relations standpoint, following the death of 18 U.S. soldiers during the now-infamous 'Black Hawk Down' incident in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, as well as highly the publicized failures and setbacks of UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Haiti and the Balkans, Congress's previous financial generosity toward UN peacekeeping dried up rather quickly. Congress also chafed at the fact that total UN peacekeeping expenditures had sharply increased from around \$490 million in 1991 to \$3.342 billion in 1994.⁶¹ Even the Clinton administration's efforts to rein in the expansion of UN peacekeeping through the May 1994 release of Presidential Decision Directive 25, which scholar Michael MacKinnon compared to the highly restrictive Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, could not stave off a new-found Congressional displeasure toward UN peacekeeping.⁶²

Thus, when the Clinton administration requested an unprecedented but necessary \$619.7 million in FY1993 for the CIPA account as UN peacekeeping continued to expand, Congress not only refused to appropriate the full amount (it only appropriated \$401.6 million) but also mandated a series of oversight requirements, which included the following:

- Recommending that the Clinton administration thoroughly review the current process of committing to peacekeeping operations;

⁶⁰ Holt and MacKinnon, 20.

⁶¹ Renner, *Peacekeeping Expenditures: 1947-2005*.

⁶² Edward M. Spiers, "US Peace Operations: The Transition Continues," in *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities, and the Challenges of Military Intervention*, ed. Rachel Utley (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 18.

- Urging that the Clinton administration notify the United Nations that the United States will not accept an assessment greater than 25% (which the Clinton administration supported through PDD-25) for any new or expanded peacekeeping commitments after the date of enactment of the FY 1994 State Department Appropriations Act (the UN assessment for U.S. contributions in Calendar Year (CY) 1994 was 31.735%);
- Expecting the State Department in its FY1995 budget submission to include an annual three-year projection of U.S. peacekeeping costs and submit a detailed plan identifying U.S. actions needed to correct policy and structural deficiencies in U.S. involvement with UN peacekeeping activities;
- Requesting that the Secretary of State to notify both appropriations committees 15 days in advance, where practicable, of a vote by the U.N. Security Council to establish any new or expanded peacekeeping operation; and
- Requiring the notification to the appropriations committees to include the total estimated cost, the U.S. share, the mission and objectives, duration and estimated termination date, and the source of funding for the U.S. share.⁶³

When the Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives in January 1995 and as issues of U.S. support for UN peacekeeping moved from primarily foreign policy circles to the public arena as Republicans such as Pat Buchanan and Senator Bob Dole (R-Kansas) geared up for the 1996 Presidential Election, the “domestic debate on peacekeeping became increasingly politicized and polarized” with U.S. funding for UN peacekeeping taking center stage.⁶⁴

⁶³ CRS, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, 33.

⁶⁴ Holt and MacKinnon, 21.

For the rest of the Clinton administration, U.S. funding to UN peacekeeping was defined by Congress maintaining a 25% cap on its total payments to UN peacekeeping, which resulted in the accumulation of about \$1.114 billion in U.S. debt to the UN by December 2000.⁶⁵

Republican Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and then-Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) figured prominently in keeping U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping at 25%, as they negotiated with the State Department from 1997-1999 in talks that culminated in the Helms-Biden Act of 1999, which among other things mandated that the U.S. Ambassador to the UN actively negotiate and win a reduction in U.S. contributions to the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets in exchange for Congress gradually releasing U.S. arrearages.⁶⁶

As the George W. Bush administration entered office in January 2001, Congress had begun to loosen its commitment to the 25% assessment cap on U.S. financial contributions to UN peacekeeping that it maintained throughout the latter half of the Clinton administration. This resulted from a December 2000 agreement struck between outgoing U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke and the UN General Assembly to reduce the U.S. assessment to the UN regular budget to 22%, which would, in effect, progressively decrease the U.S. assessment for peacekeeping contributions to 25%. In fact, at a January 2001 Congressional hearing, Holbrooke predicted that “the U.S. rate will continue to progressively decline, and we expect that it will reach 25% by 2006 or 2007.”⁶⁷ These new developments, as well as a more multilateral posture within the U.S. government after the terrorist attacks after September 11, 2001, prompted Congress to increase the UN peacekeeping assessment cap to 28.15% CY 2001 and to grant the

⁶⁵ Global Policy Forum, *Debt of 15 Largest Payers to Peacekeeping Budget: 2000*. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/the-un-peacekeeping-operations-budget/27438.html> (accessed March 27, 2010).

⁶⁶ Ian Christopher McCaleb, “Helms: U.S. will make massive dues payments to U.N., January 9, 2001,” CNN All Politics Online <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/01/09/un.debt/> (accessed March 31, 2010).

⁶⁷ CRS, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, 11-12.

Bush administration \$844.139 million UN peacekeeping, which exceeded the administration's request of \$739 million.⁶⁸

After this first year in office, the Global War on Terrorism progressively guided U.S. foreign policy more, and a "culture of [fiscal] restraint" began to characterize the Bush administration's posture toward UN peacekeeping. Even as Congressional resistance to UN peacekeeping softened, the State Department under Bush after 2001 routinely sent budget requests for UN peacekeeping to Congress that "held to the minimum costs for current and future operations, even in times of anticipated growth [in UN peacekeeping mission]."⁶⁹

Meanwhile, Congress was becoming preoccupied again with the goal of permanently reducing the U.S. assessment to UN peacekeeping to 25%. Although Congress had assessed its contributions to UN peacekeeping at a range of 27.1 to 27.9% from CY 2002 through 2004, which actually exceeded the contributions assessed by the UN, when Section 401 (inserted by Senator Biden) of the FY 2006-2007 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act tried to set a permanent ceiling of 27.1% on U.S. peacekeeping to UN peacekeeping, then-Senate Foreign Relations chairman Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) proposed an amendment that successfully removed Section 401 from the bill. Senator Lugar maintained that passing a permanent ceiling of 27.1% at that time would reduce U.S. leverage in negotiating toward the ultimate U.S. goal of 25% as an assessment rate for its U.N. peacekeeping contributions.⁷⁰ When several amendments Senator Biden introduced proposing a ceiling for U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping at 27.1% for

⁶⁸ Ibid, 35-36.

⁶⁹ Holt and MacKinnon, 29.

⁷⁰ CRS, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, 12.

CY 2005 and 2006 failed to garner enough votes, the cap reverted back to 25% as it had been in 2000, which caused a further accumulation in U.S. debt to UN peacekeeping.⁷¹

When the Democrats became the majority in both branches of Congress in the 2006 mid-term elections, the Congress became noticeably more amenable to funding UN peacekeeping missions. For example, when President Bush requested FY 2007 supplemental funding for both the CIPA and PKO accounts in February 2007, with \$200 million for CIPA to fund “unforeseen” UN peacekeeping expenses, and \$228 million for PKO in order to lend support to peacekeeping efforts in Darfur, Somalia and Chad, the newly Democratic Congress eventually followed through with \$288 million for CIPA account and \$230 million for the PKO account.⁷²

Furthermore, Congress started to lash out at the perceived fiscal restraint toward UN peacekeeping that the State Department had developed earlier during the Bush administration. For instance, when the State Department submitted the administration’s budget request of \$1.107 billion for the CIPA account, the House Appropriations Committee reacted in following way in its recommendations report to the rest of Congress:

The Administration has not adequately planned for funding International Peacekeeping activities. Committee analysis has concluded that the Administration’s budget request in fiscal year 2008 for CIPA is a cut of 3 percent below the fiscal year 2007 level and that all missions except UNMIS are taking a reduction in the President’s request. The Committee continues to inquire as to the rationale used by the Secretary of State when requesting \$28,275,000 below the fiscal year 2007 level in the CIPA account. The Committee is concerned that peacekeeping missions could be adversely affected if the requested fiscal year 2008 funding level is enacted. The Committee

⁷¹ CRS, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, 13.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 8.

*notes that in the last year the Administration has voted for: a seven-fold expansion of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Lebanon; the expansion of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Darfur; reauthorization of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Haiti; and a renewed peacekeeping mission in East Timor.*⁷³

The Senate Appropriations Committee expressed similar sentiments in reaction to the Bush administration's FY 2008 request by characterizing it as "unrealistic considering the significant contribution to peace and stability provided by U.N. peacekeeping activities, without the participation of U.S. troops ... The Committee does not support the administration's practice of under-funding peacekeeping activities and relying on limited supplemental funds."⁷⁴ Congress thus agreed to \$1.7 billion for the FY 2008 CIPA, almost \$600 million above what the Bush administration originally requested.⁷⁵

Thus, as the Obama administration prepared to enter office in January 2009, it faced an 111th Congress that seemed highly amenable to stabilizing U.S. funding to UN peacekeeping, especially given that Democrats gained seven seats in the Senate and 21 seats in the House of Representatives on election night in November 2008.⁷⁶ However, even with heightened Congressional support of U.S. funding to UN peacekeeping since, the U.S. still owed as little as

⁷³ CRS, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, 6.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid. However, it must be noted that in October 2007, the Bush administration requested a supplemental appropriation of \$723 million, designated as "emergency requirements" for the start-up, infrastructure, and operating costs of the new United Nations-African Union joint operation in Darfur (UNAMID), so the final Congressional appropriation more or less equaled the Bush administration's total request for FY 2008.

⁷⁶ USA Today, *2008 Election Coverage*, <http://content.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/results-all.aspx> (March 31, 2010).

\$860 million and as much as \$1.3 billion in current and prior debt to UN peacekeeping at the end of the Bush administration in December 2008.⁷⁷

Where We Are – U.S. Funding to UN Peacekeeping

In the first year of his presidency, President Obama and Congress took substantive steps to stabilize funding to UN peacekeeping. In April 2009, the administration requested to Congress \$836.9 million for UN peacekeeping in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriations bill in order to “sustain current UN peacekeeping operations, fund an expanded mission in the DRC, and a new mission in Chad and Central African Republic.”⁷⁸ Most notably, however, the request sought to address the arrearages that had accumulated since the 1999 passage of the Helms-Biden Act.

By June 18, 2009, both the House of Representative and the Senate passed the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriations bill with \$906 million for the CIPA account, which former Senator and current President of the United Nations Foundation Timothy Wirth lauded in the following way: “Great nations pay their bills, and today’s action will ensure that the United States has honored in full its commitments to the United Nations.”⁷⁹ However, it is not clear whether the

⁷⁷ Global Policy Forum, *Debt of 15 Largest Payers to the Peacekeeping Budget: 2008*, 2 and Better World Campaign, *U.S. Funding for the UN: An Overview* <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/issues/funding/us-funding-for-the-un-an-overview.html> (accessed March 28, 2010).

⁷⁸ Department of State: International Organizations and Conferences, *Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities: FY 2009 Supplemental Request* http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/budget_amendments/supplemental_04_09_09.pdf (accessed March 28, 2010), 80.

⁷⁹ Better World Campaign, “Congress Answers the Call on UN Funding: June 18, 2009,” <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/news-room/press-releases/congress-answers-the-call-on-un-funding.html> (accessed March 28, 2010).

\$906 million will actually eliminate U.S. arrearages to UN peacekeeping since 1999 or since 2005, when Congress reinstated the 25% cap on U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping.⁸⁰

In December, 2009, both houses of Congress passed and President Obama signed the FY 2010 Omnibus Spending Bill, which contained the FY 2010 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations (SFOPS). Within SFOPS, the CIPA account received \$2.215 billion, which was \$135 million less than the administration requested but nevertheless enough for “full [U.S] funding of the United Nations and United Nations peacekeeping missions.”⁸¹

Where We Should Go – U.S. Funding of UN Peacekeeping

Since the funding of UN peacekeeping missions is the primary means of U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping, subsequent administrations and Congresses must ensure that the U.S.’s financial contributions are stable and consistent, which is a fiscal policy commensurate with the added value that UN peacekeeping has provided to U.S. national and security interests worldwide. Stabilizing American financial contributions to UN peacekeeping is also good diplomacy to U.S. allies and major Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to UN peacekeeping missions such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Kenya. As mentioned earlier, Johanna Mendelson Forman asserts in a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on a ‘smart power’ approach to the United Nations, “The continued arrears in payments of the United States’ UN dues have created more ill-will among other member states than any other

⁸⁰ How exactly the \$906 million will address current and prior U.S. debt to UN peacekeeping is disputed by the Better World Campaign and an article the organization posted from USA Today, which can be found at the following link: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-06-17-undues_N.htm.

⁸¹ Better World Campaign, “Statement by Better World Campaign Executive Director Peter Yao,” <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/news-room/press-releases/better-world-campaign-lauds-passage-sfops.html> (accessed March 28, 2010).

policy of the U.S. government.”⁸² Indeed, it is understandable that arrears to the UN would raise the ire of countries such as Bangladesh and Kenya, which were still owed \$77 million and \$55 million respectively for past and current UN peacekeeping efforts as of June 2007.⁸³

Admittedly though, there are legitimate limits to how financially generous Congress will be toward UN peacekeeping. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that Congress will support an increase above the U.S.’s currently assessed rate for UN peacekeeping. Ranging from around 26-27% percent of total UN peacekeeping, the U.S. financially supports UN peacekeeping far more than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council (Britain comes in second with 7.8% in 2009) and in fact is the only country in the world besides Japan at 16.6% to contribute over 10% per year to total UN peacekeeping.⁸⁴ Furthermore, Congress currently does and in the past has appropriated more money to UN peacekeeping than is assessed. In fact, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account is designed expressly for that purpose, and in the FY 2010 SFOPS, Congress appropriated \$322 million beyond what is assessed by the UN for, among other things, logistical support to some UN peacekeeping missions and training and equipping programs, which will be discussed below.⁸⁵

With all of the aforementioned in mind, subsequent administrations would do well to pursue the following in regards to the U.S.’s financial contributions to UN peacekeeping:

- 1) **Negotiate with Congress to permanently lift the 25% cap of U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping.** Since every UN peacekeeping missions has to be approved by the

⁸² Forman, 6.

⁸³ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.N. Peacekeeping Forces: A Force Multiplier for the U.S.?*, 50.

⁸⁴ United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-fourth Session, Agenda Item 145, *Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236 – Addendum*, 2009.

⁸⁵ Committee on Appropriations, *Summary: FY 2010 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations*, (Washington, DC, 2009), 4.

United States by virtue of it being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the ebbs and flows of the U.S. assessment to UN peacekeeping for peacekeeping is intimately tied to the actions of the United States. Therefore, it should not unduly financially hamper the UN peacekeeping operations that it in fact votes in favor of in the first place. Since 2001, when Richard Holbrooke successfully negotiated a reduction in U.S. contributions to the UN's regular budget (a deal unique only to the U.S.), U.S. assessments to the UN peacekeeping budget has indeed progressively declined to a low of 25.9% in CY 2009.⁸⁶ And although the U.S. assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping are scheduled to increase to 27.2% in 2010 and 27.1% in 2011-2012, these amounts are not yet close to the over 30% assessment rate that so infuriated members of Congress in the mid-1990s.⁸⁷ Thus, given the undeniably beneficial aspects of UN peacekeeping for the U.S detailed above, particularly financially, it seems logical for the United States to permanently remove the 25% cap while maintaining the discretion to restart negotiations with the UN if and when assessed contributions to peacekeeping risks becoming incommensurate with U.S. national security interests; and

- 2) **Pay UN dues not only in full but also on time.** Beginning in the 1980s under the Ronald W. Reagan administration, the United States began deferring payments to some international organizations, including the United Nations, with the “adoption of a budgetary mechanism (known as the Stockman provision) to garner one-time budgetary savings by deferring dues payments by nine months—into the next fiscal year.”⁸⁸ Since the 1980s, the UN, along with almost every other international organization, has been put

⁸⁶ CRS, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, 11.

⁸⁷ Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, 2.

⁸⁸ Better World Campaign, *U.S. Debt to the UN*, <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/assets/pdf/briefing-book/us-debt-to-the-un.pdf> (accessed March 31, 2010), 2.

under permanent deferral status, meaning in essence that even as the UN issues peacekeeping assessment on January 1, the U.S. does not pay it until after October 1.⁸⁹ This entrenched practice (the U.S. is not alone in it) has dire consequences especially for UN peacekeeping. For example, at the end of the 2007 UN peacekeeping budget year, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted missions with a 40% budget shortfall.⁹⁰ With a mechanism as important as UN peacekeeping in addressing threats to international peace and security, William Durch of the Henry Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations Program makes a highly apt observation in saying the following: "This sleight-of-hand approach means that money shortages drive day-to-day U.S. dealings with the UN on matters of peace and security instead of U.S. interests. Even UN mission launched with urgent U.S. backing may not receive U.S. funds for months unless they can hitch a ride on a timely supplemental in Congress."⁹¹ Thus, the Obama administration must immediately work with Congress to resynchronize U.S. payments to the United Nations assessment cycle, even if nothing can feasibly change in the short run.

U.S. Military Involvement in UN Peacekeeping

After the post-World War II occupations of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Austria, the United States did not become directly involved in the extensive "reconstruction of governments, infrastructure, and economies after quelling the chaos of internecine conflicts" for several decades because of its all-encompassing competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold

⁸⁹ Better World Campaign, *U.S. Debt to UN*, 2.

⁹⁰ Durch, 2.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

War.⁹² Furthermore, the UN's ability to carry out its mandate to address threats to international peace and security was severely curtailed except where there was considerable risk of superpower confrontation, such as the Suez Canal crisis in November 1956, which led the United Nations to deploy the first official UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).⁹³ However, at the end of the Cold War, the UN sought to seize upon the momentous global paradigm shift in order to increase its relevance as an international actor, and, as mentioned earlier, the UN's support for the 1991 U.S.-led Operation Desert Storm generated such goodwill within the United States that the George H.W. Bush administration began a U.S. trend of "support[ing] a host of new peacekeeping missions under UN leadership," to which U.S. military personnel either directly participated or played a substantial supporting role.⁹⁴

Of all the ways that the U.S. involves itself in UN peacekeeping, the direct contribution of U.S. military personnel has probably been fraught with the most controversy within the United States government. At the height of U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s, the phenomenon generated considerable consternation from the U.S. Army, which argued that focusing too much on peacekeeping would divert resources from combat functions, as well as members of Congress, who expressed concerns over command and control issues as well as the notion that "peacekeeping duties had overtaxed the shrinking U.S. military force and were detrimental to military 'readiness.'"⁹⁵ And indeed, the prospect of U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping remains controversial today, even though the United States only contributes 86 military, observer and police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions as of

⁹² Congressional Research Service, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, (Washington, DC, 2007), 1.

⁹³ Spiers, 3.

⁹⁴ Holt and MacKinnon, 20.

⁹⁵ CRS, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, Summary.

the end February 2010.⁹⁶

The following sub-sections will: 1) detail U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War, with a particular emphasis on the early 1990s and how difficult UN missions in Somalia and Haiti have shaped the U.S.'s disinclination to contribute military personnel ever since; 2) discuss continuity and potential change in the Obama administration in regards to U.S. military participation in UN peacekeeping; and 3) present two ways in which the U.S. can potentially increase U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping without raising the concerns of members of Congress.

Where We Were: U.S. Military Involvement in UN Peacekeeping

The first notable contribution of U.S. military personnel to a UN peacekeeping mission was the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Balkans, which deployed to Croatia in February 1992 and to Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 1992. Overall, the U.S. military dispatched only 1,000 troops to the 38,000-strong UNPROFOR, which had the mandate to “quell the conflict that accompanied the 1991 break-up of Yugoslavia.”⁹⁷ The United States instead played a much more prominent role in the NATO air operations that airdropped humanitarian relief, established no-fly zones, and provided air support for UNPROFOR troops under attack.⁹⁸ Although the U.S. military played only a marginal role on the ground for UNPROFOR, by December 1992, it would begin a mission that would become its most substantial involvement in UN peacekeeping to date, with an outcome that has influenced U.S. military involvement ever since.

⁹⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Monthly Summary of Contributions of Military and Police Personnel*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/> (accessed April 1, 2010).

⁹⁷ CRS, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, 4.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

After small-scale U.S. air- and sea-lifts from August to December 1992 failed to substantively alleviate a humanitarian crisis unfolding in Somalia, President George H.W. Bush ordered U.S. forces to enter the country under a U.S.-controlled but UN-authorized contingent termed the United Task Force (UNITAF). U.S. forces, by January 1993, numbered 25,426 out of a total of 38,301 troops.⁹⁹ Although UNITAF's main mandate was to provide protection for relief workers and food convoys, U.S. military personnel also facilitated the development of a Somali police force.¹⁰⁰

After achieving relative success in achieving its immediate mandate of facilitating the distribution of humanitarian relief to the Somali people, UNITAF, in May 1993, turned over operations to the United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) force, which numbered 28,000 military personnel and 2,800 civilians and had a robust mandate to “build new local, regional, and national political and administrative institutions.”¹⁰¹ The U.S. military contributed about 3,000 troops to UNOSOM II, which primarily provided logistical support to the mission. However, the U.S. also maintained 17,700 troops in the country, including a 1,150-soldier Quick Reaction Force, under U.S. command that supported UNOSOM II military personnel.¹⁰²

As numerous accounts examine at length, when UNOSOM II and U.S. commanded troops, at the urging of the new Clinton administration, began to search for and fight local militia groups, the situation on the ground in Somalia became increasingly precarious. U.S. involvement in UNOSOM II then abruptly ended in October 1993 after 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed, with the bodies of dead American soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, in an

⁹⁹ Spiers, 17.

¹⁰⁰ CRS, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, 3.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

incident, as mentioned earlier, infamously now known as “Black Hawk Down.”¹⁰³

Around the same time that the U.S. were redeploying from Somalia, the Clinton administration ordered U.S. troops into Haiti as the lead-country in a 21,000-strong Multinational Force (MFN) in order to restore to power ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown by the Haitian military in 1991. The MFN’s mandate was to lay the foundation for peace while the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) operation prepared to deploy. However, as UNMIH’s deployment experienced numerous delays, the U.S-led MFN, which was envisioned as an operation of short duration, found itself reluctantly, because of the general lawlessness in Haiti, “assisting with the reconstruction and improvement of rule of law institutions and facilities (i.e., the police, court system, and prisons), as well as in disarming and demobilizing Haitian soldiers.”¹⁰⁴ When UNMIH finally arrived in March 1994, the U.S. contributed 2,400 troops to the 6,000-man force.¹⁰⁵

Largely as a result of the peacekeeping disaster in Somalia and the peacebuilding difficulties in Haiti, the Clinton administration, issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), which prominently stated that the U.S. “cannot be the world’s policemen.”¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, PDD-25 set out eight criteria for the U.S. government to consider before even supporting a UN peacekeeping mission, six more stringent ones before U.S. troops could be involved, and three additional factors if there was a strong possibility of combat.¹⁰⁷ PDD-25 fed into military and Congressional laments that peacekeeping was an inefficient and inappropriate use of U.S. soldiers and had a considerable impact on U.S. military contributions to UN peacekeeping. By

¹⁰³ Spiers, 17.

¹⁰⁴ CRS, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, 3.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Spiers, 18.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

April 1996, with the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) coming to an end, the number of U.S. military personnel serving in U.N. peacekeeping operations had fallen to 712.¹⁰⁸ Although the Clinton administration would continue to support NATO operations in the Balkans, contributing 6,900 troops at its peak to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia after the signing of the Dayton accords from 1996-2004, for example, there were no more than 901 U.S. military or police personnel assigned to UN peacekeeping missions for the duration of President Clinton's duration in office.¹⁰⁹

When the George W. Bush administration entered office January 2001, most expected minimum U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping given his critique of President Clinton during 2000 presidential campaign that under Clinton the U.S. military's training and morale "suffer[ed] from nation-building' missions that had little, if any, connection to national interests."¹¹⁰ In addition, the Bush as a presidential candidate even favored phasing down the number of U.S. troops deployed in the Balkans under NATO. However, since only 880 Americans were serving in eight UN peacekeeping missions, most of whom (836) were police advisers hired by DynCorp International, a private security contractor, the Bush administration largely ignored the issue of U.S. military involvement in UN peacekeeping missions altogether upon entering office¹¹¹

The events of September 11, 2001 precipitated a noticeable, if not seamless, increase in support for UN peacekeeping by Congress and the Bush administration. For example, members of Congress objected strenuously to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's attempt to close

¹⁰⁸ CRS, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, 17.

¹⁰⁹ Global Policy Forum, *Peacekeeping Tables and Charts*, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/peacekeeping/peacekeeping-data.html> (accessed April 1, 2010).

¹¹⁰ Holt and MacKinnon, 25.

¹¹¹ Robert M. Perito, "Police in Peace and Stability Operations: Evolving US Policy and Practice," *International Peacekeeping* 15 (February 2008): 58.

the Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), a center created in the 1990s "to develop military doctrine, provide leadership training, and convene civilian and military participants to consider lessons learned in the field" as well as to serve as a U.S. military liaison to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.¹¹² Moreover, Kim Holmes, an Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, said the following about UN peacekeeping in October 2003: "The bottom line is that we recognize that neither the United States, with all its wealth and military power, nor the United Nations with its universal membership can solve the world's problems alone ... Working within the UN system helps us better leverage our political, financial, and military capabilities, so as to be ready to respond to any new challenges that arise."

Nevertheless, this rhetorical support for UN peacekeeping did not translate into a renewal of U.S. military participation that had been witnessed in the early 1990s; instead, the number of U.S. personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping mission reached an all-time post-Cold War low of 91 – 77 of which were non-military police officers – at the end of the Bush presidency in December 2008.¹¹³

Where We Are: U.S. Military Involvement in UN peacekeeping

The Obama administration thus far has not differed much from its predecessor in terms of utilizing U.S. military personnel in UN peacekeeping missions. In President Obama's first year in office, the U.S.'s total contribution to UN peacekeeping operations ranged from a high of 96

¹¹² Holt and MacKinnon, 27.

¹¹³ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/> (accessed April 1, 2010).

in April 2009 to a low of 75 in December 2009, with no more than 20 actual U.S. military personnel serving with the UN at any time in the past year.¹¹⁴

However, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, at the July 2009 House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on peacekeeping, signaled the Obama administration's interests in at least exploring the prospect of contributing U.S. personnel to UN peacekeeping by saying, "Other countries willingness to provide troops and police is likely to increase if they see that key Security Council members, including the United States, not only value their sacrifice, but respect their concerns. The United States, for our part, is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police and other civilian personnel, including more women I should note, to U.N. peacekeeping operations."¹¹⁵ Furthermore, Ambassador Rice reiterated the point when Representative Bill Delahunt (D-Massachusetts) asked whether American military officers could conceivably participate in a quick response UN mission, "particularly in a crisis that does not require substantial amounts of military personnel."¹¹⁶

Where We Should Go: U.S. Military Involvement in UN Peacekeeping

As detailed above, the U.S. military involvement's in UN peacekeeping has never been extensive except for the brief period of 1993-1994. Extremely limited U.S. military participation in UN peacekeeping has thus become entrenched norms to members of Congress especially. In fact, even the most ardent Congressional proponents of UN peacekeeping as a mechanism to address threats to international peace and security preface their support for it on the fact UN peacekeeping can be effective without U.S. military involvement. For example, Representative

¹¹⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/> (accessed April 1, 2010).

¹¹⁵ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations*, 9.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

Delahunt mentions the following to Ambassador Rice in his opening statement at the July 2009 Congressional hearing in support of UN peacekeeping: “More importantly, as you well know, peacekeeping, and I think your words were it has saved the United States not only treasure but blood. Again, the gentle lady indicated that there is over 100,000 people or personnel in terms of peacekeeping worldwide; [only] 93 of those are American personnel.”¹¹⁷ Thus, it would seem that Congress would be extremely hesitant to approve of U.S. military participation in UN peacekeeping at anywhere near the amount of the mid-1990s.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military has in recent years, largely out of the perceived post-war operational failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, come to embrace the need to improve its capabilities to undertake peace operations. In November 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld issued Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, called *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)*, which decreed that stability operations would be a core mission of the U.S. military and established guidelines and periodic progress report requirements to ensure that all the services were improving their capability and capacity in this area.¹¹⁸ In addition, the May 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap envisioned a direct relationship with the UN to address instability in weak or fragile states by stating, “The Department [of Defense] must be prepared to grow a new team of leaders and operators ... operating alongside or within UN organizations ... to further U.S. and partner interests.”¹¹⁹ Thus, it seems that the U.S. military may be becoming more receptive to a more substantive partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UN peacekeeping.

¹¹⁷ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations*, 5.

¹¹⁸ William Flavin, “US Doctrine for Peace Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 15 (February 2008): 42.

¹¹⁹ Soderberg, 7.

Taking the aforementioned proclivities of Congress and the U.S. military into account, the Obama and subsequent administrations should consider the following to enhance the U.S. military's participation in UN peacekeeping:

- 1) **Explore various ways to selectively increase the Department of Defense's involvement in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).** Nancy Soderberg, a former government official under the Clinton administration, conducted extensive interviews with both DOD and officials at UNDPKO headquarters in New York for a National Defense University report in 2007 and found both parties receptive to having DOD personnel serving in "positions of real authority in headquarters and in the field" at UNDPKO¹²⁰ Specifically, more DOD civilian and military personnel can serve as military planners in New York while filling more "strategic headquarter positions, administrative positions... and observation roles" in the field.¹²¹ The U.S. military can also explore ways to include UNDPKO officials and troops in U.S. training exercises and lessons learned efforts, and DOD can deploy military officers and civilian personnel to UNDPKO and regional peacekeeping training centers, so that both sides can gain expertise and build trust.¹²² The activities listed above may be especially appealing to administrations because it increases the U.S. military's involvement in UN peacekeeping and expands its capacity to undertake future peacekeeping/stability operations without raising the ire of a still skeptical Congress; and
- 2) **Increase U.S. military participation in the initial deployment of UN peacekeeping missions.** As mentioned in the introduction, along with the financial and personnel

¹²⁰ Soderberg, vi.

¹²¹ Ibid, viii.

¹²² Ibid.

shortfalls that UN peacekeeping is currently facing, it is also dealing with chronically delayed deployments to the field. As Ambassador Rice asserts, “There was a time in the 1990s, even as there was a fair demand on peacekeepers, that the rate of full deployment was substantially swifter than it is today.”¹²³ There seems to be room for increased U.S. military participation in this area given its advanced capabilities and prior experience in assisting the deployment of other non-UN peacekeeping missions. For example, in July 2005, an U.S. Air Force advance team and C-17 cargo aircraft loaded support equipment from Germany to Kigali, Rwanda, where U.S. troops then set up a logistics station to transport approximately 1,200 Rwandan soldiers to Darfur during the beginning stages of an expansion of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).¹²⁴ Indeed, Peacekeeping Advocate Erin Weir at Refugees International forcefully argues that countries with advanced militaries like the U.S. “need to show a commitment to UN peacekeeping by committing more personnel and advanced support, such as engineers, heavy transport, and medical units. The availability of these resources is crucial to the deployment of new missions, and the early commitment of enabling units helps peacekeeping operations get off the ground quickly. This would set the foundation for more effective operations.”¹²⁵ Obviously, this recommendation will become more operational as the U.S. military draws down from Afghanistan and Iraq; however, the policy should be considered because it aids UN peacekeeping in a very tangible way and it is less likely to draw extreme Congressional outrage because most of the U.S. military’s tasks in this realm would not involve being directly on the ground in UN peacekeeping missions.

¹²³ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges in International Peacekeeping Operations*, 39.

¹²⁴ Global Security, “U.S. Military to Assist with Darfur Deployment,”

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/07/mil-050718-usia01.htm> (accessed March 31, 2010).

¹²⁵ Weir, 9.

U.S. Training and Equipping Programs

Training and equipping programs for would-be UN and regional peacekeepers are a relatively recent way that the United States has involved itself in UN peacekeeping, especially when compared to funding and military participation. Training and equipping activities and programs started off and have remained primarily focused on building peacekeeping capacity on the African continent, which, according to African scholars A. Sarjoh Bah and Kwesi Aning, originated due to the difficulties of UN peacekeeping in the mid-1990s: “Ever since the failed mission in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda, U.S. policy has been centered on developing the capacities of African countries to undertake peace operations in guise of ‘African solutions to African problems’ – a notion that some view as a convenient alibi for U.S. inaction.”¹²⁶ A June 2009 Congressional Research Service report entitled *The Global Peace Operations Initiatives: Background and Issues from Congress*, while also tracing the emergence of training and equipping peacekeeping programs to UN peace operations in Africa in the 1990s, offers a slightly different assessment than Bah and Aning by emphasizing the “perception that developed nations would not be able to sustain the [peacekeeping] burden indefinitely, as well as the perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure needed troop commitments there...”¹²⁷

Whatever the reason, U.S. training and equipping programs for eventual UN peacekeepers have emerged as one of the primary means of U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and their reach, through a State Department program called the Global

¹²⁶ A. Sarjoh Bah and Kwesi Aning, “US Peace Operations Policy in Africa: From ACRI to AFRICOM,” *International Peacekeeping* 15 (February 2008): 120.

¹²⁷ Congressional Research Service (CRS), *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, (Washington, DC, 2009), 4.

Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), has extended to about 62 countries on five continents.¹²⁸

Furthermore, GPOI currently enjoys substantial bi-partisan support from recent Republican and Democratic administrations as well as from members of Congress on both sides of the aisle. For example, both House Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairman Howard Berman (D-California) and ranking Republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Florida) cite GPOI as evidence that the United States has had a “strong record of support for peacekeeping.”¹²⁹

The following section intends to: 1) examine the U.S.’s involvement in training and equipping foreign troops and gendarmes (constabulary police forces) for future deployment to UN and regional peacekeeping missions since the mid-1990; 2) detail the Obama administration’s slightly new focus for U.S. peacekeeping training and equipping programs; and 3) recommendations to further extend U.S. training and equipping programs that could increase the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers.

Where We Were: U.S. Training and Equipping Programs

In the immediate aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the United States launched its first substantive training and equipping initiative in Africa called the African Crisis Response Force, which would quickly be renamed as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Operating on a bi-lateral basis, ACRI’s main objective was to “train African contingents for Chapter VI-style peacekeeping missions on the continent.”¹³⁰ The U.S. also provided non-lethal equipment to the troops it trained, including boots, communications packages, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), mine detectors, and uniforms.¹³¹ Several countries, including Côte

¹²⁸ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 17-19.

¹²⁹ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *New Challenges in International Peacekeeping Operations*, 4.

¹³⁰ Bah and Aning, 120.

¹³¹ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 6.

d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, and Uganda embraced ACRI.¹³² However, regional powers such as Nigeria and South Africa viewed ACRI with suspicion, with then-South African President Nelson Mandela viewing the program as “a knee-jerk reaction by the Clinton administration after its failure to intervene in Rwanda and an excuse to establish a foothold on the continent.”¹³³ A lack of support from regional African powers, coupled with the limited nature and scope of the program (with an average annual budget of only \$15 million per FY), resulted in the ACRI's failure to yield substantive progress in training and equipping African troops for peacekeeping operations, with the exception of the deployment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Observer Group to Liberia in 1997.¹³⁴ Thus, the George W. Bush administration replaced ACRI with the African Contingency Training Assistance (ACOTA) program in 2004.

Like ACRI, the ACOTA program was based on bilateral agreements between the U.S. and recipient African states; however, ACOTA training also provided “skills needed for African troops to perform peacekeeping tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit tactics” whereas ACRI's training, as mentioned above, focused on the more traditional peacekeeping skills under Chapter VI of the UN charter.¹³⁵ Moreover, while ACRI provided generalized training in peacekeeping skills, ACOTA tailored its training modules to address the varied needs of each recipient state.¹³⁶ ACOTA, despite its more robust mandate, failed to gain traction on the continent, in part because of low funding but primarily because the U.S., at various times, suspended ACOTA training to countries such as

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Bah and Aning, 120.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 121.

¹³⁵ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 5.

¹³⁶ Bah and Aning, 122.

Benin, Kenya, Mali, and South Africa because they refused to sign the Article 98 agreements, which is the waiver exempting U.S. nationals on their soil from prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC).¹³⁷

While the United States primarily carried out training and equipping programs in Africa from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s, it also offered classroom training for 31 foreign militaries around the world through the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC), which was financed through the Foreign Military Financing Program in the State Department. Operating from FY 1998 through FY 2004 with a total budget of \$31.5 million, EIPC's mandate was to design and implement a "comprehensive, country-specific peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance training and education program to enhance a nation's institutional structure to train and deploy peacekeepers."¹³⁸

In the midst of the ACOTA and EIPC programs, members of the Group of Eight (G-8) began to deal more squarely with increasing support to peace operations in Africa, which culminated in a June 2004 G-8 summit meeting in Sea Island, Georgia, where G8 leaders adopted the *Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations*, a program that focused specifically on building peacekeeping capacity in Africa.¹³⁹ The broad mandate given by the G8 gave the U.S. Department of Defense's Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflicts (SO/LIC), who was already working with the State Department to expand and improve the ACOTA program as well as to perhaps extend it to other parts of the world, the impetus to develop the plans that would eventually become the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 6.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 9.

Housed under the State Department Bureau of Political and Military Affairs' Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (PM/PPA), GPOI's main goals, as set by the Bush administration in 2004, were as follows:

- Train some 75,000 troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, in peacekeeping skills by 2010;
- Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme (constabulary) forces (with a goal of 7,000 total by 2010) to participate in peacekeeping operations;
- Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there; and
- Promote an exchange of information among G8 donors on peace operations training and equipping programs in Africa¹⁴⁰

Furthermore, President Bush envisioned GPOI as a five-year program with total annual funding reaching \$660 million from FY 2005 to FY 2009, which was indeed a substantial increase from to \$154 million the United States spent from 1994 to 2004 on the ACRI, ACOTA and EIPC programs combined.¹⁴¹

In GPOI's first funding year, FY 2005, the program trained about 12,080 African peacekeepers, including five Senegalese battalions that eventually deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia.¹⁴² More importantly, regional African powers such as Nigeria and South Africa participated in the pilot program,

¹⁴⁰ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 4.

¹⁴¹ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 1.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 7.

lending it much-needed credibility on the continent. Although building peacekeeping capacity in Africa would always remain the emphasis of GPOI, the State Department initiated GPOI programming outside of Africa, first expanding to Latin America, Europe, and Asia in June 2005 then to South Asia and the Pacific Islands in 2006 and 2007.

In October 2008, GPOI received a vote of confidence by the Bush administration when its National Security Council Deputies' Committee approved a five-year renewal of the program. Indeed, GPOI had notable accomplishments that legitimized the decision to extend it. Nina Serafino, a Specialist in International Security Affairs at the Congressional Research Service noted the following:

As of the end of January 2009 (the beginning of the Obama administration), GPOI funds have supported the training of 54,245 military troops as peacekeepers and of 3,350 military personnel to train others in peacekeeping skills. Of those trained, GPOI reports that as of January 30, 2009, some 46,115 troops from 21 countries were deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations and 1 election observer mission, and another 4,860 troops were in the process of being deployed. In addition, GPOI has supported the training of 1,932 police trainers from 29 countries at the Italian-run Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, Italy.¹⁴³

Where We Are: U.S. Training and Equipping Programs

When the Obama administration entered office in January 2009, it reaffirmed the Bush administration's decision to extend GPOI for another five years. Thus in May 2009, the administration requested \$96.8 million in the FY 2010 budget for the program, which is under the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations account (PKO). On June 10, 2009, the House of

¹⁴³ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 2.

Representatives duly signaled its support for GPOI by passing legislation that not only authorized the Secretary of State to carry out GPOI programming but also asked her to expand it even further.¹⁴⁴

The Obama administration also put its personal imprint on GPOI. Although the administration said that it would “continue to provide training, equipping, and sustainment of peacekeeping troops” in the next five years, it planned to shift GPOI’s emphasis to strengthen partner country capabilities to train their own peacekeeping troops by “developing [more] indigenous peacekeeping trainer cadres, peacekeeping training centers, and ... other programs, events, and activities to encourage self-sufficiency.”¹⁴⁵ Additionally, the administration wanted to use FY 2010 funds for GPOI to support an evaluation of the program and develop performance measurements, which stemmed from recommendations made by a June 26, 2008 Government Accountability Office report entitled *Peace Operations: A Report on the Global Peace Operations Initiative* to better assess the overall outcomes of the program.¹⁴⁶

In late July 2009, GPOI scored a major coup when the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs announced that the program exceeded its goal of training 75,000 foreign troops for deployment to peacekeeping missions worldwide. As of July 23, 2009, GPOI had “succeeded in training and equipping more than 81,000 new peacekeepers and has facilitated the deployment of nearly 50,000 peacekeepers to 20 United Nations (U.N.) and regional peace support operations to secure the peace and protect at-risk populations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti,

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 14.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ “Peacekeeping: A Report on the Global Peace Operations Initiative,” *The DISAM Journal* (December 2008): 141-144.

Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan.”¹⁴⁷ As mentioned earlier, overall, GPOI has provided training and non-lethal equipment militaries of 62 partner countries of Africa, Asia, Central/South Africa, Europe, and South Asia, as well as technical assistance to two regional peacekeeping headquarters in Africa and 23 other peace operations training centers worldwide.¹⁴⁸

Where We Should Go: U.S. Training and Equipping Programs

The Global Peace Operations Initiative, although the newest means of U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping, enjoys a consensus of support within U.S. policymaker circles because it builds the global capacity of UN peacekeeping while at the same time nominally absolves (at least to members of Congress) U.S. soldiers from participation in UN missions. The Obama and subsequent administrations should seize upon the widespread support of GPOI within the U.S. government to pursue the following to enhance its participation in the training and equipping program, besides continuing to work close with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to standardize GPOI training to match UN peacekeeping principles and guidelines as much as possible:

- 1) **Bolster GPOI’s constabulary police training.** Although GPOI reached its goal of training 75,000 peacekeeping troops by 2010 in July 2009, the Italian-led Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) has only graduated 2,000 trainers from 29 countries.¹⁴⁹ While this is a laudable accomplishment, when GPOI began in 2004, it had the goal of training “3,000 mid-to-high ranking personnel at Vicenza and an

¹⁴⁷ “United States Department of State Surpasses Target of 75,000 Trained Peacekeepers by 2010,” *The DISAM Journal* (November 2009): 84.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ “United States Department of State Surpasses Target of 75,000 Trained Peacekeepers by 2010,” *The DISAM Journal*, 84.

additional 4,000 in formed units in their home countries.”¹⁵⁰ And indeed, constabulary police forces seem increasingly important to the success of UN peacekeeping missions. As United States of Peace scholar Robert Perito asserts, “The arrival of foreign forces is nearly always accompanied by the breakdown of public order, looting of commercial districts, and the destruction of public buildings and property,” a situation that indigenous police forces often seem unable and military troops of any kind seem often unwilling or ill-equipped to handle effectively.¹⁵¹ Thus, the deployment of a robust constabulary police contingent to UN peacekeeping missions seems vitally important. Since GPOI already reached its goal in training military troops for future peacekeeping operations, the U.S. government should begin to provide long-promised additional staff instructors to CoESPU, identify more police personnel to train worldwide, and shift more of GPOI’s appropriations toward CoESPU to support increased admissions as well as program monitoring and evaluation; and

- 2) **Expand GPOI programming in South Asia.** As of February 2010, 75,699 troops, police, and military experts are deployed to the six sub-Saharan UN peacekeeping missions, totaling a little over 75% of all UN peacekeeping troops, police and experts operating globally.¹⁵² Thus, it is certainly plausible to focus GPOI on building African capacity for UN and regional peacekeeping. However, when looking at the rankings of top Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to UN peacekeeping missions as of February 2010, Bangladesh places first with 10,852, while Pakistan (10,733) and India (8,783) ranks second and third respectively – all from South Asia. Moreover, according to the

¹⁵⁰ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 10.

¹⁵¹ Perito, 51.

¹⁵² United Nations Peacekeeping, *Monthly Summary of Contributions of Military and Police Personnel*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/> (accessed April 1, 2010).

Global Policy Forum's records on troop and other personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping, which date back to 1996, the three countries in South Asia have been the three highest contributors to UN peacekeeping since the beginning of the GPOI program in 2004.¹⁵³ Yet as of January 31, 2009, GPOI has only trained 240 Bangladeshi troops, 85 Indian troops and no Pakistani troops since its inception.¹⁵⁴ The Obama and subsequent administrations must examine the probable political sensitivities here and use a combination of quiet diplomacy and/or incentives to convince the Bangladeshi, Indian, and Pakistani governments to include more of their troops in GPOI programming, as this will at least nominally improve the largest cadre of troops that deploy to UN peacekeeping missions.

Conclusion: Additional Areas to Examine

This paper is intended to restart a much-needed conversation within the United States as to what its role is and perhaps should be in the most often utilized mechanism for interacting with countries engaged in and/or emerging from conflict – the United Nations generally and United Nations peacekeeping in particular. As such, the paper does not necessarily (for brevity's sake) delve into every conceivable area in which the United States can enhance its participation in UN peacekeeping; rather, it attempts to outline the areas in which the U.S. has historically and is currently involved in an effort to recommend (rather conservative) ways that the Obama and subsequent administrations can balance the constraints imposed and opportunities granted by

¹⁵³ To access myriad tables and charts on various aspects of UN peacekeeping, access the following link: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/peacekeeping-0-89.html>.

¹⁵⁴ CRS, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, 18.

Congress, the U.S. military, and within the wider executive branch with the pressing need to make a substantive contribution to address the resource shortfalls of UN peacekeeping.

However, there are a few additional areas of U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping that may warrant further analysis as the U.S. government further develops its capacity to carry out post-conflict/stability/peacekeeping operations. For example, the Obama and subsequent administrations should think about how or how not the State Department's Office of the Coordinator of Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) and its Civilian Response Initiative (CSI) can fit into UN peacekeeping. According to a February 2010 Congressional Research Service report, the Bush administration created S/CRS to establish "new structures within the State Department and elsewhere that would allow civilian agencies to develop effective policies, processes, and personnel to build stable and democratic states," which would be able to deploy rapidly in a post-conflict environment.¹⁵⁵ Since UN peacekeeping missions, because of their growing complexity, currently deploy over 5,800 civilian international civilian personnel that are not police officers, the Obama and subsequent administrations may want to consider using S/CRS personnel in UN peacekeeping at least for training and lessons learned purposes when its Civilian Response Initiative becomes more operational (re: receives more Congressional funding and support).¹⁵⁶

Within the United Nations itself, since 2000, the United States has been a continuous member of UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, a body which

¹⁵⁵ Congressional Research Service (CRS), *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Stabilization and Reconstruction Capacities*, Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, (Washington, DC, 2010), 1.

¹⁵⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping, *Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/factsheet.pdf> (accessed April 1, 2010).

approves the budgets for every UN peacekeeping mission about to be undertaken or extended.¹⁵⁷ Since Susan McLurg, a veteran delegate from the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN, is now currently serving as chairwoman of this committee, the Obama administration particularly may want to have Ambassador Rice conduct a thorough review of the activities and politics of the committee in order to better align resources with mandates in UN peacekeeping missions.

In conclusion, the evidence shows and recent administrations agree that UN peacekeeping is a valuable tool in the elusive quest of maintaining international peace and security. However, as UN peacekeeping faces a personnel and financial shortfall, coupled with the demand for increasingly complex operations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, it is time for the U.S. to match its rhetoric with increased involvement. The policy recommendations outlined in this paper is a humble attempt at just that.

¹⁵⁷ GAO, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further Large Deployments and Should be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress*, 10.

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