Bluefin Tuna (BLUEFIN Case)
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CASE NUMBER: 316
CASE MNEMONIC: BLUEFIN
CASE NAME: Bluefin Tuna Quota
A. IDENTIFICATION
1. The Issue
Is the Bluefin Tuna facing extinction due to overharvesting of the
species? One of the main suspects in overfishing for Bluefin Tuna
is Japan. They have paid up to $24,000 for a 600 pound Bluefin
Tuna. Political pressure has prevented quick action to be taken to
protect this fish. Finally, at the ICCAT meeting in Madrid, Spain
in November 1993, restrictions and quotas were finally placed on
the fishing of Bluefin Tuna. The quotas will take effect in June,
1994.
2. Description
The bluefin tuna has been coined the "ultimate political fish."
The controversy surrounding the well being of the Bluefin tuna has
lasted over two decades and has yet to be completely resolved. It
is the traditional clash of environmentalists and commercial
interests. The problem with the plight of the Bluefin Tuna is the
disparity in the information being presented. It ranges from one
group claiming the fish might be entirely extinct before the end of
the decade the allegations that the Bluefin Tuna is not in any
jeopardy at all.
The Bluefin Tuna market had reached $32 million in sales to Japan
by the mid-1970's. But a brutal shock came to the market in 1981
when scientists from The International Commission for the
Conservation of the Atlantic Tunas came out with a recommendation
that the Bluefin Tuna catch be reduced to as 'near to zero as
possible.' Those in the Bluefin Tuna industry considered this the
'Pearl Harbor' for the industry and in response created the East
Coast Tuna Association. Through lobbying and support in congress,
the tuna industry managed to convince the 21 member international
commission, ICCAT, not to call for a ban. Instead, they
recommended a 55% reduction in the Bluefin catch in the waters of
the Western Atlantic. The three largest fishers of Bluefin tuna
are the United States, Canada and Japan. They each agreed to go
along with the recommendation.
In 1990, the Bluefin Tuna's 'boat was rocked' again when the
National Marine Fisheries Service recommended reducing the Bluefin
Tuna catch by another 50%. Bluefin Tuna lobbyists wasted no time
in convincing the New England congressional delegation to add a
proviso to the Atlantic Tuna Convention forbidding the U.S. from
establishing Bluefin harvest quotas above or below what ICCAT had
already established. What this proviso did, in effect, was to
ttake away Congress's ability to set policy on the Bluefin Tuna.
It was no longer a domestic issue but was solely an international
policy decision. The legislation was enacted in 1990 and was
sponsored by Senate Majority leader George Mitchell, Senator John
Kerry and Representative Gerry Studds. In the meantime, the United
States call for a 50% reduction in Bluefin Tuna was not well
received at the international commission and ICCAT ended up
adopting a Bluefin Tuna recovery plan that included only a 10%
quota reduction.
In March of 1992, Sweden shook the industry's status again when it
called for a total ban on international trade of West Atlantic
Bluefin Tuna. The Swedish representatives claimed the species is
on the verge of extinction and they want the Bluefin Tuna to be
included in Appendix I of the Convention which trade of a species
is banned completely. Sweden didn't stop there but also wanted
the East Atlantic Bluefin Tuna included in Appendix II of the
Convention, which would allow fishing but under certain
restrictions.
Unfortunately, the proposals only had the support of Israel and
Switzerland at the time it was presented. Because of intense
pressure, lobbying and protests, Sweden withdrew the proposal.
Japan, Canada, the United States and Morocco jointly moved a draft
resolution asking the International Commission for the Conservation
of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna to have voluntary restraints and not a
mandatory ban. The draft resolution said the countries agreed to
a 50% harvest reduction from the 1991 level at the ICCAT meeting
to be held in May. Japan also pledged to cut in half the number
of West Atlantic Bluefin it harvests each year.
Since then, Japan has taken its commitment to limit its harvesting
of Bluefin Tuna very seriously. In fact, Japan announced around
the same time as the CITES meeting that they would start
experimental raising of young Bluefin Tuna in order to ensure its
harvest of the fish. Japan accounts for 60% of the world's harvest
of the tuna and in order to maintain those levels, artificial
breeding seems to be the only solution. An agency affiliated body
called "Marino Forum 21" will conduct the four year project. The
project's method of harvesting the fish will use two types of net
preserves, one that is 50 meters and the other that is 20 meters in
diameter - these nets will be fixed to the seabed at a depth of 30
meters. The fish are very delicate and although private
institutions have been experimenting with Bluefin Tuna farming, as
many as 40% of the Bluefin Tuna have died through being crushed
against the preserve nets. A major goal of the Marino Project is
work on measures to protect the tuna from being crushed. One
method they are trying is the use an air curtain and laser beam as
a cushion.
Despite possibilities of raising Bluefin Tuna in the future,
concerns remain in the present with regards to this fishes
survivability. The main fear is around the depletion of the
breeding age fish -those over 8 years of age. Carl Safrina,
director of the Marine Conservation for the National Audobon
Society is quoted as saying, "We fear that the decline in breeders
may result in a collapse in effective reproduction." On the
industry side of the issue, Richard Ruais, executive director of
the East Coast Tuna Association claims, "I'm not saying there is
not problem, but I am saying that we have stopped the decline, and
the best projections show the spawning stock is going to increase
in 1995." But speaking for the Bluefin Tuna, Roager McManus, who
is the president of the Center for Marine Conservation based in
Washington D.C. states, "By overharvesting the fish today we are
borrowing from the future to let some people make a lot of money
today."
On November 8-12, 1993, the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) held its Thirteenth Regular
Meeting in Madrid, Spain. One significant outcome from this
meeting was the establishment of new quotas for Bluefin Tuna. The
total catch for the region for 1994 will be reduced by
approximately 15% to 1,995 metric tons (of which the United States
fisherman will receive 1,235.32 tons). This is less than 50% of
the 1991 level and for the two years in question, the Japanese
share of the Western Atlantic catch of Bluefin tuna will be reduced
to 12.5% from 26.5%. The Japanese agreed also to reduce their
catch in the mid-atlantic from approximately 1,400 tons in 1991 and
1,000 tons in 1992 to 650 metric tons for each of 1994 and 1995.
ICCAT agreed that imports of fresh Bluefin tuna should be
accompanied by a statistical document as of June 1, 1994.
Procedures were clarified for the use of that document as well as
for procedures associated with validation by a government official
of the Bluefin tuna statistical document. The USG called
attention to the failure to comply with ICCAT recommendations in
the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. The USG raised the
question of whether ICCAT should endorse multilateral trade
measures to encourage compliance with ICCAT measures, but there was
little willingness to discuss this at that time.
Participation at the ICCAT meeting included the following
contracting parties: Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire,
France, Gabon, Japan, Korea, Morocco, Portugal, Russia, Sao tome e
Principe, South Africa, Spain, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Observers were present from: Bermuda, Ireland, Mauritania, Mexico,
Seycheles, Sweden, Convention for the International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the European
Economic Community (EEC), North Atlantic Salmon Commission (NASCO),
and Taiwan.
BLUEFIN TUNA
The current working hypothesis for the assessment of Bluefin tuna
is that there are two stocks on the Atlantic, with the exchange of
individuals considered too limited to affect the results of
management on each side of the Atlantic. The Standing Committee on
Research and Statistics (SCRS) noted that the eastern Atlantic
stock has been considerably more productive than the Western
Atlantic stock during 1980-1991. During this period, the estimated
average recruitment to the eastern stocks has been at least 20
times bigger than the recruitment to the western stock.
Bluefin Tuna Management was the key issue of the meeting. There
were three areas of concern: a) the quota for the Western Atlantic
b) catches in the central Atlantic and c) compliance in the eastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean with current ICCAT recommendations.
There were many questions about validity of the assumptions upon
which the assessment of the SCRS was based. Of particular concern
to ICCAT nations, including the United States, was whether the
current working hypothesis that there are two stocks in the North
Atlantic is valid. For the U.S., this is a crucial question given
the drastic cuts and consequent economic loss necessitated by the
SCRS conclusion that the maximum amount that can be harvested
without further depleting the stock in the western Atlantic is
between 100-1300 metric tons. The United States announced that it
intended to conduct an independent scientific peer review of the
scientific basis for managing Bluefin tuna. It also drew attention
to its plans to seek the resources necessary for increased research
on key questions about the biology, distribution, and status of the
stocks. There was great interest on the part of other ICCAT
nations in participating in the review.
QUOTA:
The United States proposed a 15 year quota program in order to
continue the achievement of the goals of maintaining improvements
in the western Atlantic Bluefin tuna stock and allowing ICCAT to
develop an enhanced multi-year recovery program for the stock. The
quota schedule proposed by the U.S. delegation began at 1,995
metric tons for year 1994 and moved to 1200 metric tons for the
year 1995 and then to a rebuilding program below 1200 metric tons
for the next 13 years. The U.S. delegation argued that this
approach allowed a one-year phase-in of major quota reductions to
give fisherman a chance to prepare for the economic consequences
and to give time to review the science. Based on the scientific
advice, the proposed quota would move rapidly to allow sustained
rebuilding. It was the intention of the U.S. that the scientific
monitoring quotas be reviewed annually and adjusted on the basis of
the SCRS analysis to ensure rebuilding of the stock by the year
2008. Additionally, the USG proposed that the Contracting parties
may grant tolerances to the capture of Bluefin tuna to limit the
take of these fish to no more than 8.8% by weight of the total
Bluefin catch on a national basis provided that they institute
measures such that there would not e economic gain to the fisherman
from such fish. This proposal would have raised the proportion of
U.S. quota available for capture by recreation fisherman by .8% to
allow for more regulatory flexibility.
Canada opposed a long-term commitment to quotas. It also opposed
raising the proportion of small fish that the U.S. would be allowed
to take, on the grounds that such action would slow the recovery of
the stock. There followed several difficult rounds of negotiations
which resulted in a quota for western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna of 1995
metric tons and a quota in 1995 of 1200 metric tons unless the SCRS
scientific information indicates that this drastic cut would not be
needed.
Under the quota adopted, the total catch for the region for 1994
will be reduced by about 15% to 1,995 metric tons (of which the
U.S. fisherman may receive 1,235.2 tons) and the quota will be
reduced to 1,200 tons in 1995 (of which the U.S. fisherman may
receive 743.2 tons). This two-year reduction is greater than 50%
from 1991 levels. For the two years in question, the Japanese will
forego their share of the western Atlantic catch of Bluefin tuna,
although it will retain a two year quota of 400 metric tons for
scientific monitoring purposes.
Japan agreed, for the interim, to limit the biennial catch for 1994
and 1995 to a total of 1300 metric tons in the area north of 40
degrees North and between 45 degrees west and 35 degrees west.
This is down from about 2400 metric tons total in 1991 and 1992.
The maximum catch for 1994 will be 715 metric tons. Also ICCAT
agreed that the other Contracting Parties would not commence new
Bluefin fisheries in this area. In addition, the concerned
Contracting parties agreed to conduct a thorough scientific review,
prior to the 1995 SCRS meeting, of the impacts of harvests in this
area on the west Atlantic stocks.
In the Infractions Committee, the U.S. was successful in getting
attention to the high level of catch of Bluefin relative to 1974
ICCAT recommendations on limiting fishing mortality and minimum
sizes. The Infractions Committee specifically recommended, and
this was accepted by the Commission, that the 15% tolerance, which
exists for the entire Convention area, for Bluefin less than 6.4 kg
should be enforced and that consideration be given to the
definition of "recent levels" for Bluefin tuna in the eastern and
Mediterranean.
There was considerable concern within ICCAT about the possibility
that Bluefin tuna might be listed on an Appendix of the Convention
on International trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The
Commission passed two resolutions concerning CITES. The first,
drafted by the delegations of Canada, Japan, the US and the
observer from the European Community; (1) requests that CITES
consult fully with ICCAT concerning listing proposals for species
within the competence of ICCAT and for the current review of
listing criteria; (2) reaffirms ICCAT's intention to provide CITES
with a report on the status of Bluefin tuna populations; and (3)
expresses its wish that ICCAT's views be taken fully into account.
3. Related Cases
Keyword Clusters
(1): Trade Product = TUNA
(2): Bio-geography = OCEAN
(3): Environmental Problem = Species Loss Sea [SPLS]
4. Draft Author: Takashi Morioka (May, 1993)
B. LEGAL Cluster
5. Discourse and Status: AGReement and COMPlete
Yellowfin Tuna: At the ICCAT meeting, the United States drew
attention to the SCRS conclusion that the stock of Yellowfin Tuna
appears to be fully exploited and may be overexploited. ICCAT
agreed to limit effective fishing effort on Atlantic yellowfin tuna
to levels observed in 1992. This was the only new management
recommendation in 1993 for tuna other than the northern Bluefin
recommendation.
Albacore Tuna: ICCAT did not impose new regulatory measures for
albacore and none are currently in place. There was concern by
Spain on the expansion of driftnet fishing in recent years.
Southern Bluefin Tuna: Australia, Japan, and New Zealand met in
October, 1993 to assess this stock. The spawning stock biomass
appears to be declining steadily according to one analysis, while
spawning stock biomass was shown to be declining slowly or
stabilized using historical biological assumptions. These three
countries are working to reconcile these differences and to set
appropriate quotas. The United States noted that there was a
potential overlap in responsibilities between the new Convention on
Southern Bluefin Tuna and ICCAT. It called for close coordination
to avoid conflicts.
Albacore(south): Annual catches of Taiwanese and Japanese
longliners have exceeded estimated MSY since 1985. There are
currently no management measures in effect for southern albacore
and none were proposed in 1993. Should future results indicate a
continued catch above MSY, consideration should be given to
appropriate measures to limit fishing mortality to sustainable
levels.
6. Forum and Scope: ICCAT and MULTIlateral
7. Decision Breadth: 17
8. Legal Standing: TREATY
C. GEOGRAPHIC Cluster
9. Geographic Locations
a. Geographic Domain : ATLANtic
b. Geographic Site : Western Atlantic [WATL]
c. Geographic Impact : MANY
10. Sub-National Factors: NO
11. Type of Habitat: OCEAN
D. TRADE Cluster
12. Type of Measure: QUOTA
13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: INDirect
14. Relation of Measure to Environmental Impact
a. Directly Related : YES TUNA
b. Indirectly Related : NO
c. Not Related : NO
d. Process Related : YES Species Loss Sea [SPLS]
15. Trade Product Identification: TUNA
16. Economic Data
The Bluefin Tuna can weigh up to 1,000 pounds and can travel up
50-miles-per-hour. It is one of the world's most valuable fish and
is worth $10,000 - $30,000 a piece to Japanese brokers who fly the
fish overnight to Japan. There it is quickly transported to
restaurants where customers pay up to $75 for two thin slices of
Bluefin sushi.
The Bluefin Tuna market is now worth $32 million to U.S.
exporters. The fish can live up to thirty years but its numbers
have been reduced by 90% in the past two decades. In 1971,
Bluefin Tuna sold for about 10› a pound, today it
routinely fetches about $20 to $30 a pound in Japan. According
to a 1990 analysis compiled by scientists from ICCAT, the number of
western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna has declined to just 10% of its 1970
level. Conservationists are concerned about the breeding age of
the fish -those over 8 years - are the most severely depleted.
In 1990, ICCAT's Standing Committee on Research Statistics
indicated that the number of giant Bluefin Tuna in the Western
Atlantic have declined from 319,000 in 1970 to 30,000 in 1990.
The report also stated that the number of medium-age fish, between
6-7 years of age was approximately 50% of the level it was at in
1970 and the number of young fish of 5 years or less was only 25%
of its earlier level.
In 1989, Japan imported 9,628 tons of Bluefin Tuna, which accounted
for 60% of worldwide catch of fish. Japan is the world's largest
consumer of both the west Atlantic Bluefin Tuna and the East
Atlantic Bluefin tuna with a consumption estimated at 400,000 tons
a year. The tuna industry is worth an estimated $630 million a
year (82 billion Yen).
For Bluefin Tuna, (West Atlantic), the total catch has averaged
2,394 metric tons since the introduction of the monitoring quota in
1982. This is less than half the average level of the 1970's. The
total catch in 1992 was lower, reflecting the reduced monitoring
quota for this year. Recruitment to the stock has been lower than
in the early 1970's and there is no evidence of a strong year-class
in recent years. The SCRS estimated that recent biomass levels of
western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna have declined drastically over the
past two decades and are now between 6% and 12% of the level that
can produce the maximum sustainable yield. It concluded that a
reduction in the quota of more than 50% from 1991 levels is
necessary just to keep the stock from being depleted further, as
current replacement yield (the amount that can be taken from the
population without further decline in the stock size) is estimated
at between 1,000 and 1,300 metric tons per year.
The Commission requested the SCRS to provide options for rebuilding
the stock in a reasonable period. The SCRS advised that even if
there were no catch at all, by 2002 the spawning stock biomass
would still be well below the level associated with maximum
sustainable yield (MSY). That biomass level which would provide
MSY is estimated to be between 56,000 and 94,000 metric tons. The
SCRS estimated that there was about 1 chance in 10 that the
spawning stock could recover to a level which might produce MSY by
the year 2010, if there were no catch of Bluefin from the stock
1994-2009. The ICCAT meeting
concluded that,
"The bluefin tuna program represents a balanced approach of quota
cuts necessary to meet the scientific reports of the status of the
stocks but with a one-year phase-in to allow our fishermen to
prepare for the economic consequences. By coupling the American
quota cuts with disproportionately larger quota cuts assumed by the
Japanese, we have allowed our fishermen to catch about the same
amount of fish in 1994 as they caught in 1993, while at the same
time reducing the overall catch in the west in 1994. . . Sacrifices
under this plan are shared by the American, Canadian and Japanese
fishermen, although it is noted that in the next two years the
Japanese fishermen will be placed under more onerous constraints
than the other two countries."
17. Impact of Measure on Trade Competitiveness: HIGH
18. Industry Sector: FOOD
19. Exporter and Importer: MANY and JAPAN
E. ENVIRONMENT Cluster
20. Environmental Problem Type: Species Loss Sea [SPLS]
21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species
Name: Tuna
Type: Animal/Fish/Bony
Diversity: NA
22. Impact and Effect: HIGH and PRODuct
23. Urgency and Lifetime: MEDIUM and about 30 years
24. Substitutes: LIKE products
VI. OTHER Factors
25. Culture: NO
26. Trans-Border: YES
27. Rights: NO
28. Relevant Literature
Abramson, Rudy. "Sushi Lovers Could Eat Bluefin Tuna Into
Extinction; Conservationists Fear Japan's Craving For the Species
May Be Its Undoing. In 20 Years, Its Numbers Have Declined 90%."
The Los Angeles Times. October 24, 1991. Part A; Pg. 5; Column 1;
National Desk.
"Bluefin Tuna Fanciers Will Battle Environmentalists." The Montreal
Gazette. February 29, 1992. pg. K8/Break, Science: Earth Matters,
Enviroline.
"Canada Criticized At International Treaty to Protect Endangered
Wildlife." Canada Newswire. March 18, 1992, Domestic News.
"CITES: No Danger Of Extinction For Bluefin Tuna." European Report.
March 6, 1992. No. 1750
"Colossal Cold Shower Devised As Way to Farm Tuna Fish; New
Techniques Will Solve Old Problems." The Nikkei Weekly. March 28,
1992.
"Defeat of Tuna Ban Results in Tokyo Cut-Rate Fish Sale." Japan
Economic News Wire. April 26, 1993.
"Four Nations Propose 50% Cut on Tuna Quota." King Communications
Group Inc. March 11, 1992. No. 242, Vol. 2, ISSN: 0885-7946.
"General Developments: Also in the News." International Trade
Reporter. March 25, 1992.
Itoh, Yoshiaki. "Japan Resisting Bid to Ban Tuna Fishing: Sweden
Proposal Being Debated At Kyoto Conference." The Nikkei Weekly.
March 14, 1993. Politics & Society, pg. 2.
Itoh, Yoshiaki. "West Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Catch to be Restricted
In Compromise." The Nikkei Weekly. March 21, 1992. Politics and
Society, p. 2.
"Japan Fisherman Protest Proposed Trade Ban on Tuna." Chicago
Tribune. March 3, 1992. pg. 4, NEWS, Zone: M.
"Japan Moves to Avert International Tuna Ban." Reuters Library
Report. March 9, 1992.
"Japan to Propose International Monitoring of Tuna Resources."
Kyodo News International Inc, July 27, 1992.
"Japan to Start Experimental Raising of Bluefin." Kyodo News
International. March 16, 1992.
Kelly, Sean. "Sweden Seeks Ban on Trade of Bluefin Tuna."
Washington Post. Spring, 1993.
McArthur, Ian. "CITES Conferees Greeted By Protesters On Opening
Day." Japan Economic Newswire. March 2, 1992.
Rushford, Greg. "The Big Battle over the Big Catch" Legal Times.
September 21, 1992.
Turnball, Barbara. "Why Wildlife Graze Easier This Week." The
Toronto Star. March 21, 1992. Saturday Edition, Insight, p. D6.
Weisman, Steven R. "Bluefin Tuna and African Elephants Win Some
Help At a Global Meeting" The New York Times. Section A, pg. 8,
Column 1, Foreign Desk.
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