PROJECT DESCRIPTION: POLITICAL AUTONOMY
AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM FOR THE EAST TIMOR CONFLICT
INTRODUCTION
This proposal argues that a means of breaking out of the present impasse
in negotiations concerning the East Timor Conflict is to create a detailed
power sharing or autonomy plan. Such a plan can serve as a focus for a
comprehensive change to existing socio-economic and political conditions
in East Timor, while helping Indonesia better its international image and
perhaps even contribute towards needed democratic reforms. 'The Washington
Nine Point Formula: Principles of Self Government for East Timor,' a document
produced at an East Timor & Conflict Resolution workshop held at the
American University in Washington from July 24-26, 1997, and funded by
the US Institute of Peace, affirmed that the creation of an autonomy plan
is a conflict resolution mechanism that can break the impasse in current
negotiations.
It is proposed that an important step in making progress in negotiations
over East Timor's political status is to organize a further workshop where
participants from East Timor and Indonesia could meet and discuss autonomy
solutions to 'internal' conflicts in an informal and academic setting.
The proposed workshop would build upon the July 1997 workshop by being
more inclusive in terms of having Indonesian participants. The proposed
workshop would also explore problems and issues identified in the early
workshop as requiring further expert attention.
It is envisaged that academic 'experts' on the concept of autonomy,
conflict resolution processes, East Timor conflict, and Indonesian politics;
as well as diplomatic representatives who can lend their insights over
their countries positions or UN efforts in current negotiations, can facilitate
discussions whereby the East Timorese participants can develop a detailed
autonomy framework for resolving the East Timor conflict. The significance
of such a framework lies in its potential to become a focus of informal
discussion between the Indonesian government and the wider East Timorese
community. Furthermore, such a framework may significantly impact on formal
diplomatic efforts to bring about a resolution of the conflict.
WORKSHOP AIMS
The workshop aims to achieve the following goals:
There have been many attempts to negotiate a solution to the East Timor
conflict since the deaths of protesters at Santa Cruz cemetery in 1991.
Arguably the most significant emerged in 1992 when CNRM, an East Timorese
political organization, presented a peace plan to the European Parliament
and the UN. The CNRM peace plan provided the conceptual framework for a
comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The plan envisaged resolving
the conflict within a time frame of 7 to 12 years, where there would be
an initial two year period where Indonesian military forces are withdrawn
while a UN presence is simultaneously established, before a second period
of five years (extendable by a further five years) where autonomy is established
and a Territorial Assembly is elected. The plan culminated in a UN supervised
referendum that finally determined East Timor's political status. Despite
the efforts of the CNRM plan to accommodate Indonesian needs, the Indonesian
government has shown little interest in the plan, especially its principal
ideas: a referendum that determines final political status; UN involvement
in implementing the plan; and withdrawal of the Indonesian military. Nonetheless,
the CNRM plan is an important conceptual breakthrough insofar as it recognized
that the key issue of final political status needed to be deferred to a
later date, thus permitting wider discussion of the scope and durability
of political autonomy either as an interim measure or as a more permanent
power sharing arrangement.
The CNRM peace plan was followed by an Indonesian initiative that sponsored
a set of intra-Timorese reconciliation talks between 'pro-integrationists'
led by Indonesia's roving ambassador for East Timor and former UDT President,
Lopez de Cruz, and a number of externally based East Timorese led by former
President of Fretilin, Abilio Arauju in London in December 1993, followed
by talks in Geneva in January 1995. This Indonesian 'initiative' was condemned
by externally based East Timorese groups and received little support from
internally based East Timorese. The 1996 Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop
Carlos Belo, for instance, did not attend either set of talks and claimed
to know little about the first talks in London. The 'reconciliation' talks
were superseded by a more formal set of talks emerging out of the Portugal-Indonesian
dialogue as a result of an UN Secretary-General's initiative that set the
basis of the 'All-Inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue.'
The 'All-Inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue' was held under the auspices
of the UN Secretary-General in June 1995, again in March 1996, while a
third round is planned for October 1997. While these talks are significant
insofar as they involve the principal East Timorese figures representing
most viewpoints in the East Timorese community, these have not made progress
in the development of a joint East Timorese position on substantive political
issues. The lack of progress in this area can be attributed to a joint
ministerial decision by Portugal and Indonesia in January 1995 which sanctioned
the talks provided that these would not address the issue of East Timor's
political status. Due to the absence of substantive political discussion
in these talks, there is little prospect of a suitable plan to emerge from
this framework.
There has been little progress in the Ministerial meetings held between
Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices since 1983. In an effort to reinvigorate
these meetings, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed a respected Pakistani
career diplomat as his special envoy to East Timor. Annan requested that
more frequent meetings be held at the Ambassadorial level rather than at
the Ministerial level. There is little evidence thus far that this UN strategy
will yield progress over substantive differences. The same can be said
of the direct talks between externally based East Timorese organizations
led by Jose Ramos Horta, Jaoa Carascalao, and Indonesia's Foreign Minister,
Ali Alatas. In all, talks being conducted under the auspices of the UN
have been unable to put forth a political plan to settle the conflict.
Informal talks of internally based East Timorese in 1994 involving Bishop
Belo, Governor Abilio Soares, Joao Saldanha and other East Timorese (the
jailed guerilla leader, Xanana Gusmao, was reportedly consulted) argued
that granting autonomy to East Timor was a possible solution to the conflict.
These talks also included prominent figures of the Indonesian military,
including President Suharto's son-in-law, Brigadier-General Subianto Prabowo
(currently commander of Kopassus, an elite part of the Indonesian military),
and General Adang Ruchiatna. At the heart of these talks was a plan proposed
by Bishop Belo that proposed 'special status' for East Timor that would
begin with autonomy in the cultural and religious spheres, and then extend
to the economic and political spheres. The Indonesian military figures
involved in the talks, however, did not offer anything more than greater
autonomy in the cultural and religious spheres as outlined by General Ruchianto's
own proposal concerning special status for East Timor. These informal talks
on 'autonomy' have not progressed any further, due to President Suharto's
declaration in late 1994 and again in May 1996 that 'special status' (i.e.,
autonomy) would not be considered for East Timor.
Although the above developments seem to discard the granting of autonomy
to East Timor as a possible plan to settle the conflict, a recent workshop,
held in July 24-26, 1997 at American University in Washington, DC, gave
momentum to the idea that a coherent framework based on the concept of
political autonomy can break the impasse in current negotiations. This
workshop brought together a group of East Timorese intellectuals, activists,
and community leaders, who were believed to be the most likely initiators
of such an autonomy framework due to their earlier efforts in developing
or advocating such a framework.
The workshop aimed to assist the participants in gaining a firmer appreciation
of the concept of political autonomy, and consequently developing a coherent
autonomy plan that incorporates the various ideas and views raised on earlier
occasions by members of this group. The workshop also aspired to assist
the participants in gaining a firmer appreciation of their role and relevance
to the ongoing dynamics of the conflict.
Academics familiar with the concept of political autonomy, conflict
resolution, and the East Timor Conflict; in addition to members of the
diplomatic community who have experience of political autonomy as a conflict
resolution mechanism were brought together to facilitate discussions whereby
the East Timorese participants could develop a coherent framework for resolving
the conflict.
The workshop was successful in producing a confidential document, titled
"The Washington Nine Point Formula: Principles of Self-Government for East
Timor," that could serve as coherent framework for the above purpose. Due
to the insistence of the East Timorese participants, this document is being
confidentially circulated to influential policy-makers and parties involved
in the conflict for detailed comment and reaction.
Reactions & Comments received thus far in response to Washington Workshop
Indonesian reaction to the
workshop has been reported by those who participated to be favorable. To
begin with, some participants had to be approved at the most senior level
of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, ie., Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, to
participate in the Washington workshop. This was in particular the case
with two participants who are respectively elected representatives to the
Indonesian National Parliament, and to the East Timorese Provincial Assembly.
Upon their return they had to report to Foreign Ministry officials on the
workshop, and on the document that was produced. Thus participants discussed
the Nine Point Autonomy Plan with Senior Indonesian officials. Reaction
to the plan was reported to be positive and participants have been given
informal approval to participate in future workshops involving the ideas
and principles contained in theWashington
Nine Point Formula.
Reaction
by UN officials has also been favorable. Francesc Vendrell, Director of
the East Asia & Pacific Division of the UN's Department of Political
Affairs (Tel: 212 963 5122), who is responsible for organizing the All
Inclusive Intra-Timorese Dialogue; while also assisting the Secretary-General
in the Portuguese-Indonesian dialogue participated in the workshop as an
observer. He argued in the workshop that an autonomy formula that was sufficiently
nuanced, flexible and coherent would be very helpful in the first track
efforts that have been reinvigorated under the leadership of Kofi Annan.
Vendrell's reaction to the workshop upon his return to New York was that
the process was very helpful and should be continued.
Reaction
by the US State Department has been encouraging. Frank Bucholtz from the
Indonesian Desk of the State Department (Tel: 202 647 3276) participated
in the workshop as an observer, and discussed US policy on the East Timor
conflict. He expressed his personal view that an autonomy model similar
to that enjoyed by Peurto Rico might be a model that could settle the East
Timor conflict. At a subsequent meeting with Susan Sutton from the Human
Rights Division of the State Department (Tel: 202 647 1716) it was pointed
out that any settlement package or formula that has broad grass roots support
among East Timorese intellectuals, NGO's and the Catholic Church is likely
to generate firm support from the State Department.
Reaction
from East Timorese Catholic Church has been favorable. Bishop Belo's approval
is critical if an autonomy model developed in the workshops can generate
sufficient support for a settlement of the conflict. It has already been
confirmed that he approves of further workshops, and will send his most
senior Diocesan church official, Fr Domingo Sequeira, to future workshops.
Comments received as a result
of circulating the Washington Document will serve as the foundation for
the proposed workshop which will be held in March 1998 at the main campus
of the American University in Washington, DC. The workshop participants
requested another workshop which would be more inclusive by having a number
of Indonesian participants with strong ties to Indonesian policy makers.
METHODOLOGY
"The Washington Nine Point
Formula: Principles of Self-Government for East Timor" can serve as a basis
for either reaching a comprehensive solution to the conflict, or the more
limited goal of changing existing socio-economic and political conditions
in East Timor. Either way this document represents a means of stimulating
discussion on the parameters of a power sharing arrangement that could
resolve the conflict. This document, therefore, should not be seen as a
final plan, but as stepping-stone for a more encompassing framework that
grants political autonomy to East Timor, while satisfying the security
and identity needs of Indonesia. Consequently, the proposed workshop aims
at creating an informal and academic setting where Indonesian political
and community leaders can meet with their East Timorese counterparts and
participate in the informal development of a plan that could be seriously
considered by the present Indonesian government. The East Timorese delegation
will be made up of the group that participated in the 'July workshop,'
and produced "The Washington Nine Point Formula: Principles of Self-Government
for East Timor." The Indonesian delegation will be made up by individuals
who are willing to seriously investigate and support how political autonomy
granted to East Timor might resolve the conflict.
In addition, there will be
a number of 'experts' who will give presentations on a number of models
that illustrate power sharing solutions to ethnic conflicts, e.g., Puerto
Rico; Southern Mindanao in the Philippines; Hong Kong and the Basque region
of Spain. Furthermore, a number of problems associated with power sharing
arrangements will be addressed by experts, e.g., how power sharing works
in authoritarian political regimes; creation of independent bodies that
can arbitrate disputes between the central government and a local authority
with extensive political autonomy; and how power can be allocated to office
bearers in a way that allows for minimal friction between different political
factions.
The workshop format will
involve three different types of sessions, all of which were used in the
first Washington workshop. The first type of session involves formal presentations
by experts on specific aspects of political autonomy or conflict resolution
who then respond to specific questions by participants. These sessions
will be chaired in much the same manner as a typical academic seminar designed
to foster discussion and information sharing.
The second type of session
involves round table discussions which are informal and address the relevance
of the concepts and models that have been introduced for the East Timor
conflict. This type of session was found to be very useful insofar as it
allowed diplomatic 'observers' to participate in a way which maintained
confidentiality. Importantly, it will be here that many of the comments
and reaction to the circulation of the Washington Nine Point Formula will
be discussed. These sessions will be chaired in a more facilitative manner
than the first type since there will be an emphasis on problem solving
rather than information sharing.
The third type of session
involves two separate caucuses involving solely the East Timorese and Indonesian
participants respectively. In these caucuses East Timorese and Indonesian
participants could privately and confidentially discuss issues and draft
documents. It is envisaged that East Timorese participants will wish to
develop a detailed power sharing document based on the Washington Nine
Point Formula and on the issues discussed at the workshop.
Time & Location
The workshop is tentatively
scheduled to be held over a three day period in March 1998. The proposed
location for the workshop is in Washington, DC. This would enable the utilization
of the scholarly, administrative, and diplomatic resources in the DC area,
and to also provide a geographic location that is likely to enhance the
status of any agreement or document that emerges. The venue will be the
main campus of the American University which has a number of meeting rooms
that provide a secure, private and informal environment that meets the
needs of the workshop participants for confidentiality. The workshop will
be closed to the public and to the media. There will be no advance publicity
of the workshop, and participants are required not to make the content
of the workshop public. It is envisaged that once agreement is found among
the participants over a suitable autonomy plan, they could then begin the
task of liaising with other parties within the East Timorese community;
the Indonesian and Portuguese governments; and members of international
community.
Participants
The total number of participants and observers is anticipated to be between 20-25 and include the following:
East Timorese Participants (all confirmed):
Helder da Costa, Doctoral candidate at Adelaide University, Australia.
Francisco da Costa Guterres, Master's degree candidate at Griffiths University, Australia.
Marcelino Ximenes Magno, Journalist, Forum Keadilan, Indonesia.
Amindon Maia, Vice-Rector, University of East Timor.
Joao Mariano Saldanha, Political Economist formerly at Harvard University, USA.
Florentino Sarmento, NGO Activist and Member of the Local Parliament, East Timor, Indonesia.
Father Domingo Sequeira, Chancellor Dili Diocese, East Timor, Indonesia.
Salvador Soares, Chief-Editor
Suara
Timor Timur Newspaper and Member of the Indonesian National Parliament
In addition, there will be five Indonesians invited to participate, and six experts will also be invited.
Diplomatic officials and
represents from Portugal; UN & US will also be invited.
Workshop Organisers
Dr Michael Salla, Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, School of International Service, American University
Dr Kjell-Aake Nordquist, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University