You are required to answer three questions from the five listed below. The work must be your own - no collaboration with other members of the class is allowed. However, you may use whatever reading material you wish from that covered in the course, remembering to reference your answers accordingly. The total length of your examination paper should not exceed 12 double spaced type written pages (approx 4 pages per question). Your examination paper is due to be returned on Dec 14 by 4 pm, and should be handed in to the SIS office. Note that late submissions will be severely penalized.
 

1. Whatever the final shape and scope of Europe's cooperative security regime, many of its central elements are unlikely to translate easily to other regional contexts. Europe's postwar experience was built on the death and destruction of a century of total war and thus is unique. The transition in postwar western Europe to multiple, interlocking structures that have moved states and peoples away from systems of national compellance and toward converging expectations about security and about "normal" multinational solutions is also striking'.

To what extent does the European regional security system offer a viable model for other regions? Discuss with reference to one other major region that you believe to be either most or least suited to such a model. .

2."Although some postconflict governments have argued that linking individuals with specific acts of violence would impede reconciliation, others have decided that it is vital to know the truth about abuses on both sides of the conflict to avoid repeating the past to promote national reconciliation."

If justice, truth and reconciliation are compatible goals in post-conflict societies what are the proper roles and functions of mechanisms such as the South African Truth Commission?  Should there be a trade off in order to avoid unnecessarily inflaming past national traumas or destabilising any established peace agreement?

3. The horrors of the wars in the former Yugoslavia raise an inevitable question: Was this avoidable? The question is particularly intriguing because for many months prior to the outbreak of fighting in June 1991, the European Community (EC) and the United States exerted themselves to prevent the growing crisis from erupting into war.

To what extent does the failure of preventive diplomacy to avert the violent breakup of Yugoslavia signify basic weaknesses in the way preventive diplomacy is conceptualized and practiced?  What would be needed to overcome such weaknesses if a similar conflict were to arise?

4. "Transformation [of a relationship] involves changing the underlying assumptions that each party in a conflict holds of the other... These include the beliefs that the other community's goal is to destroy you and that there is no one on the other side whom you can trust enough to enter into any meaningful agreements."

How effective are non-governmental organizations in transforming relationships between conflicting parties as a prerequisite for successful negotiations? Can this ever go beyond changing the perceptions of a few elites who risk being out of step and being marginalized when returning to face their respective constituencies? How might second track diplomacy overcome such limitations in pre-negotiation efforts?
 

5. "Intervention should be both limited and impartial, because weighing in on one side of a local struggle undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of outside involvement. This Olympian presumption resonates with respect for law and international cooperation. It has the ring of prudence, fairness, and restraint. It makes sense in old-fashioned UN peacekeeping operations, where the outsiders' role is not to make peace, but to bless and monitor a cease-fire that all parties have decided to accept. But it becomes a destructive misconception when carried over to the messier realm of "peace enforcement," where all belligerents have yet to decide that they have nothing more to gain.

Discuss Betts' critique of ëimpartial intervention' and the main problems that can be raised with such a critique. Should constraints on the multilateral use of military force be relaxed in order to intervene effectively in violent internal conflicts, or should present constraints be maintained and alternatives explored?