US Government Innovations in Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution: Implications for the IPCR Program

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Executive Summary

Over the past number of years, the relationship between the conflict resolution (CR) field and United States government programs and policies in this area has been rapidly changing. This is in large part due to the development of new USG offices to help manage post-conflict transitions, reconstruction and stabilization, i.e., peacebuilding, as well as to implement conflict-sensitive approaches in USG diplomacy and development work. This study was initiated to document some of these changing realities so that the IPCR program can stay on the cutting edge of the CR field.

The purposes of this report are twofold: a) to track developments in the USG's international conflict resolution activities and b) to identify necessary job competencies and opportunities for IPCR graduates to improve how the IPCR program prepares graduates for related employment. The study focused on three government offices: the US Agency for International Development's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID/CMM) and Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI), and the US Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The research consisted of research consultations and interviews with twenty individuals, including four USAID employees and five State Department employees. The study began by conducting research consultations with knowledgeable members of the conflict resolution community, and using the snowball method then approached selected administrators within the government offices.

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) was established in 2003 within USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), and works to integrate conflict management into the implementation of USG development aid. The office provides support and resources, such as analytical tools, conflict resolution training, and policy recommendations, to existing USAID missions and other government agencies. CMM has developed a number of tool kits for different conflict situations and has played a central role in the development and implementation of conflict assessment frameworks for the USG and its agencies/departments. Much of the work mandated by this small office is contracted out to large consulting firms, although there is also a direct grants mechanism for reconciliation work.

The Office of Transitions Initiatives (OTI), also within USAID, was created in 1994 to provide short-term assistance in post-conflict situations or crises in order to support peaceful and democratic transitions. By promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting economies and helping democracy take hold, the intent is to lay the foundations for long term successful development. With a uniquely responsive funding structure, OTI is able to deploy more rapidly during critical windows of opportunity than other branches of USAID. After more than 15 years of operation, OTI has built an impressive track record of carrying out a variety of peacebuilding projects around the globe, with attention to both the substantive and human or relationship aspects of the work. As with CMM, OTI uses an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) mechanism to contract out most of its work.
The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created in 2004, and was tasked with managing USG interagency efforts at reconstruction and stabilization in countries at risk or emerging from violent conflict. S/CRS was directed to provide the platform for developing the necessary programs and strategies, and to coordinate this work among all USG agencies. Thus S/CRS coordinates government-wide efforts among several agencies to prevent conflict and to assist countries emerging from violent conflict to move toward democracy and peace. To implement the USG role in reconstruction and stabilization, the CRS has taken the lead in the planning and development of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), which consists of an active response corps housed at CRS, a reserve response core of USG employees on standby, and a larger civilian response core, now being actively developed, which is composed of a range of nongovernmental professionals. To fulfill its mandate, CRS has developed several offices each with specific tasks, but it has had difficulty achieving full operational status due to funding limitations, but these have recently been lifted for FY 2010. A major accomplishment of CRS in concert with CMM has been the development of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), which has been utilized in a number of conflict-torn countries.

Each of these innovative agencies has been vigorously engaged in supporting USG peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts around the globe. Despite funding and other limitations, these agencies are creating and spawning career opportunities for IPCR graduates who have developed the competencies required for active engagement in conflict prevention and resolution in terms of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Thus, throughout the research process, interviewees from various roles were asked to identify the kinds of competencies that would place IPCR graduates in a competitive position in relation to job opportunities now and in the future. First and foremost, graduates should possess general conflict literacy in terms of understanding the nature and expression of violent ethnopolitical conflict, but should also be able to solve practical problems by applying theory on the ground. Part of this involves the capacity to carry out conflict analysis and assessment activities, and to be able to manage conflict in organizational settings. Graduates should also acquire knowledge of reconstruction, stabilization, and development work (i.e., peacebuilding), and should understand how the USG operates in these areas. To complement these competencies, graduates are advised to leverage their location in Washington to develop awareness of current trends in analysis and policy as expressed by the major governmental and nongovernmental institutions. Finally, graduates are advised to acquire significant overseas experience, including the development of language capacity, and to learn to think outside the Western cultural framework. A perusal of the IPCR curriculum and its learning outcomes would indicate that the program is already strong in a number of these areas, and is consistently adding enhancements which will place our graduates in a very competitive position with those of other programs. Serious consideration of the programmatic implications brought forward by this report will further assist IPCR in this enterprise.
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Section I: Introduction

Over the past several years, the relationship between the conflict resolution (CR) field and US government programs and policies in this area has been rapidly changing. Proponents applaud the government's newfound adoption of conflict-sensitive approaches, which have been neglected for too long. Detractors caution against a loss of agency and neutrality in CR work. Regardless of one's opinion of these developments, they are a growing reality for the CR field.

This study was initiated to document these changing realities so that the IPCR program can stay on the cutting edge of the CR field. The purposes of this report are twofold: a) to track developments in the USG's international conflict resolution activities1 and b) to identify necessary job competencies and opportunities for IPCR graduates to inform how the IPCR program can prepare graduates for employment in this domain of the conflict resolution field.

The report will focus on three government offices: the US Agency for International Development's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID/CMM) and Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) and the US Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Section II will look at CMM, a small office which aims to change the way development aid is planned and implemented, making all of USAID's work more conflict-sensitive and effective in situations of conflict, especially post violence. Section III will examine OTI, which supports US foreign policy interests by helping local partners advance peace and democracy in countries in crisis. Section IV will review the work of S/CRS, which seeks to coordinate US government civilian capacity to respond to conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct post-conflict societies. Section IV will offer overall conclusions and recommendations to the IPCR program.

The research, conducted by Graig Klein and Sarah Beller under the guidance of Ronald Fisher, consisted of interviews/research consultations with 20 individuals, including four USAID employees and five State Department employees. The study began by conducting research consultations with knowledgeable members of the conflict resolution community, and using the snowball method eventually approached selected administrators within the government offices. Also, IPCR and other SIS alumni in these offices provided a helpful entry point and valuable advice to assist the research process.

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1 Much overlap exists among conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and development activities, and often the boundaries are fuzzy. For the purposes of this report, we will primarily focus on conflict resolution activities, defined as communication-based interactions with the purpose of increasing understanding among conflicting parties and/or achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. This could include mediation, negotiation, problem-solving workshops, dialogue, conflict resolution training, and some media work. Peacebuilding implies a broader set of activities and objectives, and is currently defined by the Alliance for Peacebuilding as “the set of initiatives by diverse actors in government and civil society applied to address the root causes of violence and protect civilians before, during, and after violent conflict.” (www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org)
Section II: USAID's Office of Conflict Management & Mitigation (CMM)

Brief Description & Overview

Conflict impacts development and development impacts conflict. Though the USG has been working in and around conflict since it began, until now it has not been working directly on conflict issues. Recognizing this need, former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios established the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in 2003. An office within USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), CMM works at the macro level to integrate conflict management into the implementation of development aid.

This small office provides support and resources to existing USAID missions and other government agencies (e.g. analytical tools, training, policy recommendations, etc.). Key tools used widely in the government have been developed by this office, particularly the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF). Of all the government offices dealing with conflict internationally, CMM is the office most focused on prevention (rather than stabilization and reconstruction, which occur during and after violent conflicts).

CMM states its vision and mission as follows:

DCHA/CMM envisions an agency that effectively prevents, mitigates and manages the causes and consequences of violent conflict, instability and extremism.

DCHA/CMM leads USAID's efforts to identify and analyze sources of conflict; supports early responses to address the causes and consequences of instability and violent conflict; and seeks to integrate conflict mitigation and management into USAID's analysis, strategies and programs.

To achieve this mission,

DCHA/CMM provides analytical and operational tools to USAID Overseas Missions, development officers and program partners to enable the Agency to better address the causes and consequences of conflict through its development assistance programming.

By integrating awareness of conflict, instability, and extremism into everything that USAID does, CMM aims to influence the institutional culture of the agency. Through research, outreach, training, and conflict assessment, CMM advocates for the prioritization of peacebuilding in development programming. In addition to the CAF, one of CMM's most visible

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contributions may be its “toolkits.” To date, CMM has published seven toolkits, covering a wide range of topics such as youth, land, water, livelihoods, gender, and community driven development. 

Founding Director of CMM Elisabeth Kvitashvili stressed that the office’s goal is changing the way USAID (or AID) officers think about conflict—particularly understanding the root causes. To do this, CMM is training AID officers on how to use the CAF and how to apply Mary Anderson's principles of “Do No Harm.” Additionally, Kvitashvili emphasized that through research and a speaker series, CMM is challenging conventional wisdom about how the US government (USG) handles sensitive areas such as religion and development, counterterrorism and insurgency.

This approach met with enthusiasm, according to Kvitashvili; for example, after a conflict training in Cairo, CMM received many requests to do training in various Middle Eastern countries represented at that gathering. “It's not a hard sell,” she said. Conflict and instability are everywhere, and it is not the same kind of conflict as before. Development is happening in a different environment.

Background & History

Before delving into CMM’s current status, it is helpful to set a political backdrop. Recounted by Jennifer Ulman, a conflict specialist at Management Systems International (MSI) a MS graduate of the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University, the following is some of the history of this office and its most widely used tool, the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF).

Prior to the creation of CMM’s Conflict Assessment Framework, USAID's Africa Bureau commissioned what they named the Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA). The creation of the CAF was pioneered by Sharon Morris under the leadership of CMM Director, Elizabeth Kvitashvili. The CAF has now been revised/updated (CAF 2.0) and is listed on CMM’s website.

Under the auspices of S/CRS and USAID/CMM, with other USG participation, the CAF was expanded into the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). According to Ulman, there were tensions between CMM and S/CRS due to the lack of clarity about how the interagency function, or coordination, would evolve. Eventually, CMM and S/CRS came to a mutual agreement as to the design and conduct of an ICAF. CMM considers the ICAF to be 90% CAF and 10% “interagency nuance,” according to Ulman.

Additionally, USAID's Office of Military Affairs (OMA) in conjunction with CMM has developed a tool called the Tactical Conflict Assessment & Planning Framework (TCAPF),

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adapted from the CAF. Jim Derleth (who used to work in CMM and moved to OMA) has taken
the lead on training military personnel and taking the TCAPF on the road. The purpose is to get
the military up to speed with conflict assessment tools. The TCAPF documents are not open to
the public, but it is known to be a practical tool for military personnel on the ground to conduct
quick assessments for short-term planning.

Conflict assessments have been carried out to varying degrees over the past decade. Under
Andrew Natsios, the USAID administrator from 2001-2005, there was strong support for
evaluation, and conflict assessments were made mandatory. However, during the second half of
the Bush administration, conflict assessments were not viewed as a necessary step in the
development programming cycle.9

Walker elaborated upon this history of conflict assessments. He emphasized that conducting a
full-fledged conflict assessment is a large engagement for CMM and for the country mission.
There has been a varying level of interest in participating in assessments over time. Even before
Natsios' term, USAID had a stipulation that when a mission was constructing a strategic plan,
they needed to do a conflict assessment. Consequently, the assessments were often viewed as a
bureaucratic requirement. The requirement was lifted in 2005, around the time USAID's and
State Department's planning functions were merged, and interest in conducting assessments
decreased. CMM continued to advocate for conflict assessments, in part because it was an
effective way for the nascent CMM to develop relationships with the missions. Once gaining
access to missions became easier for CMM, conflict assessments became a lower priority.
However, CMM has realized the pendulum may have swung too far away from assessments, and
they released a proposal for six new assessments.10

General Statistics of CMM

Under the leadership of Director Neil Levine, CMM is a relatively limited but important
operation, financed through the USAID budget. A small office with a modest budget, CMM's
main asset is its 12 employees. Because such a small staff is handling such a broad mandate,
Senior Conflict Advisor Dr. S. Tjip Walker acknowledged a general sense of being overworked,
a general feeling that with additional resources CMM could do more, and a perception that it
could really help the agency if it grew.11

According to Walker, CMM's budget in the 2008 fiscal year was $6.2 million in Development
Assistance funds for its core activities. In addition, CMM manages $25 million in grants for
reconciliation programs, under a Congressional earmark (see below for more information).12

As in any branch of the government, the budget is determined by a multi-step process. At the
beginning of the fiscal year, CMM makes a proposal which is considered by the Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. The proposal then goes to the Bureau of
Foreign Assistance, to USAID, and to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The

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9 Interview with Ulman.
10 Telephone interview with Dr. S. Tjip Walker, Senior Conflict Advisor, CMM, USAID. August 13, 2009.
11 Interview with Tjip Walker, Senior Conflict Advisor, CMM, USAID. Washington, DC, May 12, 2009.
12 Telephone interview with Walker.
The five functions are not all equally weighted with technical leadership and field support being the two biggest areas of CMM's work.

1) Technical Leadership (research, dissemination, etc.)

In this area, CMM is continuing to develop a body of knowledge on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. They distill and disseminate the knowledge to their primary audience: USAID officers in the field. Although USAID officers are usually not conflict experts, they may often find themselves in a conflict zone. Therefore, CMM provides these officers with knowledge and tools to help them deal with situations of conflict.

Toolkits

The main product of the technical leadership function is toolkits. CMM has produced a number of toolkits, which are posted on their website for public access. The seven toolkits published as of September 2009 are:

- Community-Based Development in Conflict-Affected Areas
- Forests and Conflict
- Land and Conflict
- Livelihoods and Conflict
- Minerals and Conflict
- Youth and Conflict
- Women and Conflict

Many of their current toolkits deal with conflict and natural resources. CMM is looking to branch out into other topics and “diversify output products,” said Walker. Two new toolkits are coming out soon: Peace Processes and Religion and Conflict. Another one, on Oil and Conflict, is “in the pipeline,” so to speak. A possible future toolkit topic is Elections and Conflict, since there is a lot of interest in this subject. Topics for toolkits are determined by combination of
demand from the field and priorities identified by staff or former staff. Dr. Walker noted that toolkits are very time-consuming to produce.

Research Agenda

In addition to toolkits, CMM maintains a four-part research agenda.

1) Understand conflict risk in the short, medium, and long terms
   - Short-term: CMM maintains an "alerts list" of countries for conflict early warning, and this covers a two-year horizon.
   - Long-term: CMM is thinking how their research can address longer term issues, like climate change, urbanization, etc.

2) Assess what development programs can do in volatile environments
   - e.g. Afghanistan, Pakistan
   - CMM conducts impact evaluations or teams up with universities, contractors, or NGOs to do evaluations.

3) Understand "State-Building"
   - CMM researches how to rebuild the fabric of relationships between government and people in post-conflict societies.
   - They are working with USAID's Office of Democracy & Governance office on this.

4) Develop analytical tools
   - This whole area has developed over the last year.
   - CMM is identifying Theories of Change and related indicators for conflict/peacebuilding work.
   - CMM is revising the Conflict Assessment Framework.
   - CMM is working on issues of diaspora communities, i.e., do they exacerbate or help resolve conflict?
   - In the future, CMM wants to look more at the issue of identity in conflict.

2) Field Support

Most USAID country missions do not have dedicated “conflict staff,” so CMM aims to support the missions in conflict sensitive programming. Since they do not have the capacity to support all US missions, CMM focuses on countries considered to be key, i.e., in conflict or at high risk.

The goal here is to improve the sensitivity of missions to conflict dynamics; depending on the country and issues, this could entail anything from simply letting the mission staff know that their country is on the alert list to assisting with strategic planning. CMM frequently assists with conflict assessment, program design, and evaluation. If CMM cannot carry out the assessment or evaluation themselves, they help the mission find consultants to conduct it.

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13 See note on terminology in Sources & Notes section. Personnel in the government and contractors often use the term “conflict” rather than “conflict resolution,” “conflict management,” etc.
3) Training

Based upon what materials are ready from the technical leadership agenda, CMM does trainings for USAID employees. They deliver the trainings where they are most needed, based upon which countries are prioritized for field support. Often missions will call CMM and ask to have a training. CMM's flagship course is Conflict 102: Intro to Conflict Assessment & Programming, a two-day course offered at USAID once or twice a year. CMM offers a number of other courses, some taught by contractors such as MSI. CMM is now rolling out a course on conflict programming and religion. On deck is an advanced course on assessment. One CMM employee serves as the training coordinator.14

There is talk of more demand for training in USAID generally, with the influx of Junior Officers now that the baby boomer generation is starting to retire.15

4) Interagency Coordination

CMM also serves the function of coordinating between USAID and other government agencies. When the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was formed, CMM became the connection between USAID and S/CRS. According to Dr. Walker, CMM believes it is no longer the right place to connect to all of S/CRS. In some areas, CMM is the appropriate connection, but in other areas, such as civilian response capacity, other offices such as USAID's new Office of Civilian Response are more appropriate.

5) Outreach

Finally, CMM reaches out to other communities of interest, such as other donor organizations (e.g. World Bank; OECD's INCAF research program), NGOs, and universities. This activity has been modest to date, but CMM would like to increase it.16

Process of the Work

While their staff directly carries out some of the work of the office, CMM also shares work with outside organizations. As has become quite common in the government, much of the work is actually done by outside organizations, and conflict management work is no exception. Recently, many of the “beltway bandits” (for-profit government contractors such as Chemonics and DAI) and NGOs (such as Mercy Corps, CRS, World Vision) have opened conflict units. The impetus was often Iraq—the money was there for reconstruction and stabilization work.

Conflict-related work may emerge from many different parts of the agency. Therefore, Kvitashvili pointed out, only some of the AID officers writing the scopes of work (documents detailing the project to be completed) have been trained by CMM, while others have not. In a consultant-type role, CMM has worked with many offices and missions to develop scopes of work. Typically, missions would approach CMM requesting their consultation.

14 Interview with Walker.
15 Interview with Ulman.
16 Interview with Walker.
USAID gives out work through three mechanisms: contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. Walker noted that it is almost impossible for CMM to work with an organization if there is not a contracting relationship with USAID. Although organizations can submit unsolicited proposals, they are not usually fruitful. The main difference among the three arrangements—contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements—is who decides on the scope and nature of the work:

1) Contracts: USAID defines the scope and nature of the work. CMM defines the work very clearly and narrowly and then seeks an implementing partner to carry it out. For example, they may even define exactly how many personnel at what professional level are needed, and for how many days; this way the budget is quite clear from the start.

2) Grants: The beneficiary organization defines the scope and nature of the work. The grantee has already planned or launched a program, and they would like USAID to fund it. Grants are often used for humanitarian assistance, since organizations engaged in humanitarian assistance are often interested in maintaining a sense of neutrality from government.

3) Cooperative Agreements: These agreements fall somewhere in between contracts and grants. They are essentially grants with provisions that give USAID greater involvement in the implementation. At present, CMM does not use cooperative agreements.

These different mechanisms are the subject of debates in the peacebuilding field. Some organizations may refuse to accept contracts but do take grants. Other organizations "don't seem to have qualms" about taking contracts, according to Dr. Walker, for example, World Vision and Mercy Corps. Various universities feel differently about what type of funding they will take.

Contracts

The principle way CMM's work is contracted out is their IQC mechanism (Indefinite Quantity Contract). "ICRP" (Instability, Crisis, and Recovery Programs) is CMM's own IQC. In the competitive process in 2005, five “consortia” became implementing partners under this IQC. The primary partners are Development Alternatives International (DAI), Academy for Educational Development (AED), Associates for Rural Development (ARD), Management Systems International (MSI), and AMEX International, Inc. (the first four are medium to large development contractors; the fifth is a small business). These for-profit companies may give out parts of the work to other groups, such as NGOs and universities (this is called a sub / prime relationship). Therefore, the IQC holders are considered consortia. For example, CMM relies heavily on University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management, under the auspices of ARD.

The way the IQC works is that CMM staff send out a short document called a "RFTOP" (request for task order proposals) to the IQC holders. The size of these task orders can differ widely; no lower limit exists, while the upper limit for the entire IQC is $500 million. According to Walker, a recent task order was issued for just $25,000, while the largest task order to date was for about $85 million, for work in Afghanistan. One contractor (AMEX) is a small business, so it can
receive work without the proposal process, because the USG provides incentives for using small businesses.

Other forms of contracting include research contracts and purchase orders. CMM contracts out some of its research. CMM staff members come up with an idea of what they want to do and then contract the project out through a competition.

Grants

CMM's sole granting mechanism is the Annual Program Statement (APS), an announcement for grants from a particular pot of money earmarked by Congress for "people-to-people" reconciliation work. The fund has existed for five years, and much of the funds are designated for the Middle East. There are two different competitions, one for the Middle East and one for other regions.17

The APS solicitation states:

DCHA/CMM manages this APS in accordance with a Congressional appropriation to provide a central source of funding for reconciliation activities (see Public Law 111-8, Division H, Section 7065). To meet Congressional intent, this APS will support people-to-people reconciliation programs and activities which bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious or political backgrounds from areas of civil conflict and war in the countries listed in Section I. above. Programs that provide adversarial individuals or groups opportunities to meet and work together to address issues around potential, ongoing, or recent conflict will receive consideration for funding under this APS.18

Examples of the kinds of work eligible for funding under the APS are mediation of disputes across religious, ethnic, and political divides; restorative justice processes; dialogue and training activities; and programs that build grassroots support for peace processes.19 The APS is limited to selectee countries.

Dr. Walker explained some of the issues with this earmark. Previous CMM leadership had given out the money with a very broad definition of “people-to-people” activities. Recently, however, Congress said they were not spending the money the right way. Dr. Walker expressed a sense of frustration at the limitations placed on these funds; people-to-people activities are not the answer in all cases, he said.20

For more information on the APS, see the Grants.gov website.21

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17 Interview with Walker.
19 ANNUAL PROGRAM STATEMENT: CONFLICT MITIGATION AND RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES (with Possible Multiple Awards) APS Solicitation #M/OAA/DCHA/DOFDA-08-319, CMM, USAID, 2008.
20 Interview with Walker.
Staff Roles

All of CMM's staff work on all five core areas outlined above, but in different proportions. For example, the training coordinator naturally focuses more on training than the other areas. Additionally, each staff member is part of a regional cluster, with two to four people in each cluster. Four people work on Africa; four people work on Middle East, Asia, and Eurasia; two people work on Latin America.22

Job Competencies & Opportunities

Many interviewees encouraged graduate students to think more broadly about the development field, rather than focusing on jobs with “conflict” in the title. Craig Zelizer emphasized the importance of “mainstreaming” conflict resolution into different agencies and fields. Walker pointed to job opportunities within USAID generally, in the contractors, and to a lesser extent in CMM.

General USAID

Since CMM's goal is creating officers who can deal with conflict throughout USAID, Kvitashvili also encourages CR graduates to think of the agency as a whole, and not just CMM for jobs. The CMM approach is not about building an empire, but mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches. The vision is that many people would have a “conflict minor”; a typical USAID officer could switch from Costa Rica to Afghanistan and do fine. Therefore, conflict resolution graduates interested in international work should consider becoming a development officer.

A specific opportunity is "Backstop 76," a new cadre of officers for crisis, stabilization, and governance. These officers receive training on conflict issues and then go overseas. USAID is currently recruiting through former President Bush's Development Leadership Initiative (DLI) to hire Junior Officers (JOs). A foreign service position, most JOs have masters degrees and a few years of work experience. USAID is especially looking for diversity in the applicants, and they could have a recruitment officer come to AU.23

Additionally, some USAID missions have positions that specialize in conflict. This depends on the country and the mission director. Every mission has a democracy and governance officer, but only some have a conflict person (e.g. Philippines, Nepal).

Another place to look for employment opportunities is the new Office of Civilian Response (OCR), announced in 2009 within USAID. This is USAID's branch of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), S/CRS's flagship initiative (see below). About six different USG agencies will have CRC members. USAID will have 41 positions in OCR, and they are hiring from external and internal applicants.

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22 Interview with Walker.
23 Interview with Kvitashvili.
Finally, graduates may also look to OTI's Surge team and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance's Disaster Assistance Response Team (OFDA DART).

**Contractors**

Furthermore, job opportunities could exist in the organizations CMM contracts with (both the large consulting firms and the members of their IQC consortia). A few of the large contractors have dedicated conflict units and people—not only for CMM projects, but for other funders' conflict programming as well. MSI, DAI, Creative Associates, and ARD are examples of contractors that have positions specializing in conflict. However, contractors often engage conflict specialists on a project-by-project basis. Many companies maintain databases of consultants, through which graduates might find work opportunities.

**CMM**

As for CMM itself, the opportunities are quite limited at the present time. According to Walker, there could be a few openings in the next few years. Most of the positions are at the GS 12 or 13 level, i.e., Masters or Doctorate, with 5-8 years of development experience (most current members of the office are in their early 30s). Recent hires to CMM have had considerable experience in NGOs, and until now CMM has hired "conflict generalists." Dr. Walker predicts this changing somewhat in the future; he wouldn't be surprised if individuals start being hired for particular academic or regional specializations. For example, CMM might hire a staff member stationed in West Africa, a region with a lot of conflict activity.

**The Future**

**Future Directions**

The administrators interviewed offered predictions and hopes for the future of the USG's approach to conflict, particularly in relation to CMM.

As a long-term goal, many hope to see more AID officers doing more of the work and relying less on contractors. Kvitashvili expressed this hope, and it was echoed in a panel event sponsored by the 3D Security Initiative. In order to do this, there will have to be more specific technical skill sets in the agency, e.g. health and mediation. USAID would still need partners, Kvitashvili said, but should need *less reliance* on partners in the future.

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24 Interview with Ulman.
25 See Appendix C for full list of IQC holders and subcontractors.
26 Interview with Ulman. Also, see Appendix 4 for table of contractor companies and their conflict wings.
27 Interview with Walker.
28 Ibid.
Kvitashvili predicts that conflict work will grow, especially prevention, analysis, early warning and response. Also, the USG will increasingly need help in the security and justice sector, e.g. policing, DDR, and rule of law.\textsuperscript{30}

Furthermore, there is speculation that CMM might eventually be brought under S/CRS since they are doing similar work and USAID tends to look to State for foreign policy guidance. Dane Smith advocates for such a move.\textsuperscript{31} However, others might not be so keen for such a change; for example, Walker supports having more distance between CMM and S/CRS, not less.

\textit{Other Issues}

As alluded to previously, the developments in the USG’s relationship with the CR field has both created tremendous opportunities and raised critical issues. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but the following are a few of these issues, identified by interviewees.

According to Walker, one difficulty is that CMM has been unable to work directly with the Alliance for Peacebuilding (allianceforpeacebuilding.org), the network organization that represents and coordinates CR activities among over 40 US based ngo’s in the field. He would like to be able to work with the organization directly, but because of its representative relationship with member organizations, the Alliance is proscribed from working with CMM or any other office in ways that compete with its member organizations. Though CMM cannot work with the Alliance directly, they sometimes can work with specific talented individuals in the Alliance network: they either scour the IQC holders to see if any of these people are affiliated with one of the contractors or ask the individuals to freelance for one of the contractors.\textsuperscript{32}

On a different note, Kvitashvili identified a challenge for conflict work as a whole: the field does not yet have the tools to deal with corruption or with weapons and narcotics trafficking.\textsuperscript{33} This makes sense because the CR field was not developed to deal with hard security issues involving conflict management or control, but to find creative ways of resolving conflicts toward mutual benefit.

\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Kvitashvili.
\textsuperscript{31} Dane Smith, “Peace-building and Stabilization.”
\textsuperscript{32} Interview with Walker.
\textsuperscript{33} Interview with Kvitashvili.
Section III: USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)

Brief Description & Overview

OTI was created in 1994 to “provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance to take advantage of windows of opportunity to build democracy and peace.” It aims to lay the foundations for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, jumpstarting economies and helping stable democracy take hold in countries of strategic interest to the US.34

With its unique funding structure, OTI can deploy more rapidly during critical windows of opportunity than other branches of USAID.35 OTI is an important part of USAID's expeditionary capacity, i.e., people who go out to the field on short notice (the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is another example).36 Because of its fast-moving and political nature, OTI has been referred to as the “cowboys”37 of USAID.

To succeed in transition initiatives, OTI has instituted a distinctive mode of operations. First, OTI specifically encourages a culture of risk-taking, political orientation, and swift response among its staff and partners. Second, OTI is funded by a separate "Transition Initiatives" budget account with special authorities that allow immediate spending where it is most needed. Finally, OTI created an innovative contracting mechanism that preserves the principle of competition while allowing quick start-up in new countries and direct grants to small, indigenous organizations.38

OTI engages in countries only when the situation meets four criteria:

1. Is the country important to U.S. national interests?
2. Is there a window of opportunity?
3. Can OTI's involvement significantly increase the chances of a successful transition?
4. Is the operating environment sufficiently stable?39

Acting Director Rob Jenkins further articulated OTI's unique approach in a recent interview. “When our reality meets our rhetoric,” he said, “there's not a cookie cutter approach.” OTI staff identify what needs to happen depending on the particular context. “Of course we have some biases,” he explained, toward small grants, community-focused initiatives, bottom-up approaches, and finding change agents at the local level. Although many of OTI's activities don't necessarily "look like" peacebuilding, they are part of a larger peacebuilding and stabilization effort. The strategy depends on the country situation; in some countries, the strategy is conflict resolution-based, whereas in other countries they may not employ traditional conflict resolution activities. Jenkins mentioned that one of OTI's frequently used methods is radio PSAs (public

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35 McDonald, “Developing Peacebuilding.”
36 Dane Smith, “Peace-building and Stabilization.”
37 Ibid.
38 OTI website.
service announcements), which are relatively inexpensive and quick ways to influence communities.\textsuperscript{40}

The following are a few examples of OTI's approach to peacebuilding (“OTI” here signifies the office itself, its contractors, or its subcontractors):

Pakistan: In the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), OTI promotes opportunities to build confidence between the Government of Pakistan and tribal communities through community improvement projects, such as repairing drinking water supply systems, constructing flood protection walls and irrigation channels, distributing wheat seeds and fertilizers to farming communities, and rehabilitating schools.\textsuperscript{41}

N. Uganda: As part of a final peace deal, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are moving home. As means of reconciliation after conflict, the culture has a traditional cleansing ceremony which symbolically cleanses the land of evil spirits believed to linger in areas where civilians were massacred during the conflict. OTI supported the community elders to go from place to place to perform the ceremony.

Lebanon: In this volatile situation, OTI is working with youth of different backgrounds, Sunni, Shia, and Christian, to build up a moderate middle way. They bring youth together to work on a non-controversial community project, e.g. a park, art exhibit, street festival, or conference. The approach here is to influence youth while they are young and open to change and to provide opportunities outside of political parties.

Sudan: In Darfur, OTI worked on prevention of violence against women. Condoleeza Rice was impressed when she visited, so project was funded to $15 million. One of the occasions when traditionally all the different tribes would come together is the annual equestrian festival. Though a long-standing tradition, the festival had not happened in years. OTI enabled the festival to happen again, and from there started a low-profile reconciliation process. While people were all together for the event, they literally held dialogue sessions on the outskirts of the festival.

Many of OTI’s efforts are quiet or low-key, according to Jenkins, trying not to put local people at risk by being seen as cooperating with the US government. Also, OTI does not do a lot of workshops or conferences, and they do not usually talk about peace directly. Instead, their work is about "the action and the doing," said Jenkins, to make concrete, immediate changes.\textsuperscript{42}

OTI prizes its risk-taking and learning dynamic. In its first decade, according to the ten-year report, OTI learned the following lessons about working on political transitions:

1) Coordinate within USAID and with other government agencies.
2) Go beyond capital cities to regions of conflict.

\textsuperscript{40} Interview with Rob Jenkins, Acting Director, OTI, USAID. Washington, DC, March 12, 2009.
\textsuperscript{41} Email interview with Sven Lindholm, Program Officer for Outreach & Public Affairs, OTI, USAID. August 14, 2009.
\textsuperscript{42} Interview with Rob Jenkins.
3) Be aware that the country must have political will for transition.
4) Plan for long-term development to continue momentum after OTI leaves.
5) Insure funding flexibility and staff deployment-readiness.
6) Engage grassroots leadership.
7) Expect setbacks; steady progress is often elusive.
8) Make democratic principles part of the process, not just the product. Each project is an opportunity to influence public perceptions of democratic political transition.  

The 15-year report adds the following lessons learned:

9) Employ dynamic and adaptive performance management processes.
10) Support “action research” and constantly adapt the strategic course.
11) “Look beyond the ‘usual suspects’ for local partnerships, including spontaneous groups of active citizens.”
12) Pair quick intervention with sustained effort and support, in order to be most effective.
13) Empower field personnel to make quick program decisions.
14) Use a “venture capitalist” approach by starting small, taking risks, and growing good ideas.

Background & History

USAID's institutional culture has not historically been conducive to fast, flexible, overtly political activities. When OTI was formed in 1994, that began to change. Upon leaving office, Lawrence Eagleburger, Secretary of State under President George H. W. Bush, urged USAID to find ways to respond to national security priorities in the post-Cold War world. Then incoming USAID Administrator Brian Atwood proposed the creation of a USAID Office of Crisis and Transition Management. Congress approved the addition of $10 million into OFDA's budget for “transition” activities, forming the entity now known as OTI. During the first year of funding, programs were launched in Haiti and Angola.

In its first 15 years, OTI has carried out 45 interventions in 36 countries, according to Sven Lindholm, Program Officer for Outreach & Public Affairs. OTI has used relatively limited amounts of money to accomplish small, concrete projects ($750 million total during the first ten years). During the Clinton administration, they went to Haiti, Bosnia, Serbia, Liberia, etc. In the Bush administration, the focus shifted to Afghanistan and Iraq, with missions to Macedonia and Liberia as well. One example of OTI's projects in Iraq was literally furnishing the new government ministries in Baghdad in 2003. They then supported civil society groups, distributing 5,000 grants in three years.

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44 OTI: 15 Years, 3.
46 Ibid, 5-6.
47 Email interview with Lindholm.
48 Dane Smith, “Peace-building and Stabilization.”
General Statistics of OTI

About 75 to 100 people work for OTI at any given time, including the field and Washington, DC posts. In FY2008, OTI received $44 million in Transition Initiative funds, and in FY2009 the figure increased to $50 million. OTI receives its core funding from the "Transition Initiatives" account, a budget line in the yearly Foreign Operations law. OTI also manages funds transferred from other accounts (Development Assistance (DA); Economic Support Fund (ESF), funds which often come from US embassies or USAID missions; and funds transferred from the Department of Defense (DoD) and others in support of its programs.49

Support & Scope of Conflict Resolution Work

OTI describes its approach to peacebuilding as follows:

The underlying objective can often be even more important than the actual project. A rebuilt market's immediate impact is to allow local women to sell agriculture products, but the longer-term impact is bringing rival ethnic groups to one place to work productively.... While many of its activities can be categorized as traditional development programs—micro-enterprise, income generation, education, community development, etc.—OTI designs its activities through the prism of the anticipated positive impact on resolving or reducing local disputes and conflict.

—Office of Transition Initiatives 15-Year Report50

Because of OTI's unique approach, one could consider all of their work as part of a peacebuilding effort. However, for the purposes of this report and IPCR job seekers, we will focus on conflict resolution activities, including mediation, negotiation, problem-solving workshops, dialogue, and some media work.

Content of the Work

Conflict Resolution Activities

The following are examples of OTI's programming which falls under our working definition of conflict resolution:

Kenya, 2008
After the post-election violence, OTI projects were "designed to engage and build bridges among Kenya's ethnic groups."51 At dialogues where the two communities could air grievances, new joint project ideas were generated. OTI worked there through a local NGO and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission.

Lebanon, 2006

49 OTI website.
50 OTI: 15 Years, 21-22.
51 Ibid, 22.
After the Cedar Revolution in 2005 and the Lebanon/Israel War in 2006, OTI encouraged cooperation between hostile local groups by bringing together farmers from different identity groups (Shia, Sunni, Christian). Farmers shared stories of agricultural successes and challenges.

DRC, 2003
After Sun City Peace Accords, OTI aimed to increase accessibility of "balanced, accurate information." To do so, they supported Radio Okapi, run by a UN peacekeeping operation, which disseminated info about humanitarian assistance, the peace process, demobilization and reintegration. OTI supported a radio show focusing on the effects of war on youth, which was broadcast in the war-torn eastern provinces. The show was written and produced by an ethnically diverse group of youth, including former child soldiers. The show received a UNICEF/One World award.

Macedonia, 2002
OTI supported dialogue among Macedonian and Albanian teachers, as well as a multicultural youth project. They launched media reports on positive interethnic collaboration in schools and issued public statements by respected local leaders against school segregation.

Indonesia, 2000-02
In the Aceh province of western Indonesia, OTI provided conflict management skills training for community leaders, sponsored events to promote positive interaction between dissenting groups (such as peace concerts), developed PSAs calling for peace, helped Acehnese NGOs publish calls for both sides to respect the ceasefire, and supported the Henry Dunant Centre of Switzerland to mediate negotiations between the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia.

Nigeria, 2000-01
In partnership with 90 Nigerian NGOs, OTI sponsored a nationwide conflict management network; trained 1,200 trainers to teach how to avoid, mitigate, and resolve disputes; facilitated dialogues, third-party consultations, joint problem-solving workshops, and local peace commissions; and helped establish local councils of elders representing diverse groups that could prevent tension from escalating.

Sierra Leone, 1999
OTI aided the Reintegration of former child soldiers through a non-formal education network, which taught academic and vocational skills, as well as interpersonal conflict resolution and civic participation.

Other Peacebuilding Activities

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52 OTI: 15 Years, 23.
53 Ibid.
54 OTI Tenth-Year Edition.
The following are examples of OTI's programming which do not quite fall under our working definition of conflict resolution, but are clearly connected to peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{55}

Bolivia
Encouraged civic participation among indigenous groups.

Venezuela
Public campaign to promote peaceful coexistence. Organized civic forums for opposing political groups, built ties between groups.

Colombia
Built confidence in government among marginalized populations.

Nepal
Educated youth on political tolerance and nonviolent means of political expression.

Haiti
Offered alternatives to gang violence.

Mindanao, Philippines
Provided economic incentives for Muslim insurgents to disarm, and as a result, Christian government officials began to visit Muslim villages.

Peru
Gave technical and media assistance to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Sri Lanka
Encouraged intergroup contact through multireligious participation in Buddhist festival. Disseminated pro-peace leaflets, radio interviews, and a student survey.

Burundi
Promoted participation in elections, launched information campaign to encourage support for peaceful transition. One participant said, "If we had had these trainings, activities, and sense of solidarity and responsibility as a community in 1993, things would be different for Burundi today."\textsuperscript{56}

Kosovo
Fostered civic participation through town hall meetings organized in seven municipalities. Out of these meetings, Community Improvement Councils formed, each comprising 12-15 people reflecting the regional diversity (political, social, intellectual). Many council members were later elected to office, bringing moderate voices to politics.

\textit{Ten-Year Assessment}

\textsuperscript{55} Selected from \textit{OTI Tenth-Year Edition} and \textit{OTI: 15 Years}.
\textsuperscript{56} OTI: 15 Years, 23.
In an assessment of OTI's first ten years, Robert Rotberg identifies which of OTI's activities have been most effective. The relevant areas Rotberg considers are sustainable peace and conflict resolution; media; demobilization, disarmament, and youth reintegration; and justice and reconciliation.

1) Sustainable Peace and Conflict Resolution
   The more successful initiatives in this area, according to Rotberg, were:
   a) The comparative peace in Macedonia (where OTI held community conversations and problem-solving, supported moderate mayors, etc.)
   b) East Timor's rapid transition (where OTI worked to strengthen political institutions, increase citizen participation and access to information, and strengthen rule of law)
   c) Sierra Leone, which may not have had a transition at all without OTI (OTI facilitated the actual negotiations of the peace process and worked on community-building)

   Less successful were:
   a) Indonesia, with its long-standing separatist conflicts
   b) Nigeria, where educating conflict management trainers “proved an exercise in futility” given ongoing political turmoil

2) Media
   The report extols OTI's media initiatives as one of the organization's most impactful niches. For example, in Sierra Leone, OTI backed the creation of Talking Drums Studio, a civil society radio station which launched soap operas about reconciliation (this is a Search for Common Ground project).

3) Demobilization, Disarmament, and Youth Reintegration
   DDR was more successful in East Timor than Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, youth were trained for opportunities that did not exist in their society.

4) Justice and Reconciliation
   OTI helped Peru's TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) emerge quickly, but it broke no new ground and has made “little discernible difference.”

Lindholm noted that OTI has continued to develop its approaches during the subsequent five years since Rotberg's assessment.58

Process of the Work

Contracting Processes

OTI has several contracting processes. The main one is their series of SWIFT (Support Which Implements Fast Transition) indefinite quantity contracts (IQC). The IQC is pre-competitive, and

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58 Email interview with Lindholm.
six partners were selected. Then when projects come up, these partners are available to quickly jump into action. SWIFT III is currently in progress, nearly three years into the contract. With a cap of $1.5 billion, SWIFT III partners with AECOM, Casals & Associates, Chemonics, Creative Associates International, Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), Development & Training Services (dTS), and the International Resources Group (IRG).

How does OTI decide what type of intervention to implement? The strategy and project design is an iterative process, according to Jenkins. When OTI is considering whether to work in a country, first they send a team for two weeks to conduct an assessment. Then the whole OTI office discusses whether the situation meets their criteria (listed above) and decides whether to “go into” the country. The intervention approach then starts to form out of the assessment.

Next, OTI writes a Request For Task Order Proposal (RFTOP), and partner organizations write proposals, in which they may further shape the approach. The winning proposal gets approved by OTI and OAA (Office of Acquisition and Assistance, USAID's contracts office). This process usually takes about six weeks from sending out the RFTOP to having an approved proposal.

Once the initiative is launched, local staff design and implement the specific projects. The initiatives are completely field-driven, according to Jenkins; for example, the country representative in Kathmandu makes the decisions "out there."

The initiatives can then be adjusted as they progress. The approach is entrepreneurial and flexible, especially because the context can shift. OTI and its partners learn through the first few months of grants, and subsequently monitor the project every few months, sending a team from OTI for a peer review. Lindholm explained:

The Program Performance Review (PPR) is an objective, internal process of assessment and review of an OTI country program’s performance at all levels of implementation undertaken at key points in the life of the OTI program. The PPR is done annually, but also may be done after a major structural event changes the policy and operational environment.\(^{59}\)

OTI views the contractors as if they were part of their own team, and seeks to manage them as such. Although OTI is in charge, ideally they try to work as a seamless team with partners.

Another contracting mechanism is the PDQ (Program Development Quickly), for which AU's Center for Global Peace (CGP) is a sub-partner. The primary partner on the contract, the QED Group, LLC, is mandated to provide services for OTI under the broad categories of monitoring and evaluation, personnel development, and short term technical assistance.\(^{60}\) Under this contract, CGP has completed five task orders to date: four have been facilitation of meetings such as a curriculum review and an annual meeting, and one has been an evaluation in Nepal.\(^{61}\) While CGP manages the contract, IPCR and PDI could participate in the task orders.

\(^{59}\) Email interview with Lindholm.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
\(^{61}\) Interview with Jenkins.
Staff Roles

As noted above, OTI employs 75 staff members in Washington and globally. OTI's Washington-based staff is divided into the following teams: Field Operations (three regionally focused teams for Africa, Asia and the Middle East, Latin America and Caribbean), Operations and Management, and the Program Office. Each country where OTI is currently involved has a program manager in DC. Amongst the DC staff, everyone does a little bit of everything. The program office supports all the country programs. In addition to the 37 Washington-based staff, OTI employs 38 field staff, including local nationals. These numbers do not include the “bullpen,” Transition Advisors who are called on to assist in all aspects of OTI's work. Lindholm projected that these staff numbers will increase as OTI's Afghanistan program grows.

Job Competencies & Opportunities

About 100 people work for OTI at any time, and most are Personal Services Contractors, employed by the US government, on a one- to five-year contract. The jobs are competed, and can be found on Globalcorps.com as well as the USAID website. Job seekers can sign up to be alerted when new jobs are posted.

The qualifications OTI expects are different for field and Washington jobs. For field jobs, field experience is required. For Washington jobs, most are program managers, and field experience is desired but not required. The positions are at the GS 11, 12, and 13 levels; team leaders are GS 14.

According to OTI's website, general qualifications for employment include:
- U.S. Citizenship
- Advanced degree in international or development field, economics or management, or equivalent experience
- Experience in and knowledge of developing countries
- Demonstrated analytic, speaking and writing skills
- Ability to work effectively as a team member
- Ability to interact with counterparts on both the lowest and highest political, social and economic levels
- Familiarity with international development community, including USAID and/or contracting partners
- Foreign language desirable

Usually OTI is looking for generalists with experience doing similar work. In other words, they would ask “have you designed, implemented, managed, evaluated political, development, human rights, peacebuilding projects?” Furthermore, experience in transition environments is a “huge

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62 OTI website.
63 Interview with Jenkins.
64 Email interview with Lindholm.
65 Interview with Jenkins.
66 OTI website.
plus, and USAID experience is useful. On rare occasions, they are also looking for a country expert.

Another place to look for jobs is the contractors. For every job at OTI, Jenkins noted, there are several in the contractors. Job seekers can look at the websites of the SWIFT III partners and contact the staff in charge of these programs. Additionally, job seekers might look at other contracting organizations such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM).

The Future

Strengths

Though a relatively small office, OTI does some of the most cutting-edge peacebuilding and conflict resolution work in USAID. According to Dane Smith, OTI did a good job in Iraq, and their work there should be a model to other operations. They made grants to local Iraqis, and the work got done quickly.

In the assessment study based on a sample of countries (East Timor, Indonesia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, and Peru), Rotberg found the main strengths of OTI to be:

1) Civil society focus. OTI's strongest legacy is what it has done to empower stakeholders and civil society. In all the sample countries, OTI initiated intercommunal dialogue/conversations. Though intangible, the effects of dialogue are important and contribute to the goal of societies being politically self-sufficient after OTI leaves.

2) Overcoming urban bias. OTI pays attention to non-metropolitan areas, which is crucial.

3) Ability to act quickly, flexibility, and innovatively on a relatively low budget. Outside of its work in Iraq and Afghanistan, OTI only spent $500 million in ten years. OTI has been able to accomplish a lot because it is bound by fewer bureaucratic constraints than most US overseas operations (though it is not independent of USAID, the State Department, and the White House).

Weaknesses

Sources also indicate some of OTI's limitations and challenges. On the flip side of the strength mentioned above, although OTI has done good work, having its resources focused in Iraq has reduced its capacity for the rest of the world.

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68 Interview with Jenkins.
69 McDonald, “Developing Peacebuilding.”
70 Dane Smith et al, “U.S. Peacefare.”
71 Rotberg.
72 Interview with Chic Dambach, President and CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding. Washington, DC, February 9, 2009.
Rotberg offers several specific critiques of OTI:

1) Spread too thin. Better to do a few things well?
3) The policy of giving primarily small, in-kind grants may be hindering effectiveness.
4) May not be suited to work in large, complex countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria.
5) Not enough attention to improving governance and training emerging political leaders.
6) Respond earlier, at first sign of transition, with political sensitivity?73

Rotberg continues with lessons learned from OTI's first ten years:

1) The best interventions come from diagnosing the country's needs, targeting the most critical areas, and innovating on the ground.
2) Country directors in Washington should support and guide, but without heavy oversight. They should be flexible and adaptive.
3) Core personnel who embody the OTI mission are crucial. Contractors and sub-contractors must be in line with the OTI mission and methods.
4) OTI should focus on its strengths rather than trying too many different strategies. Be explicit about what OTI's “toolkit” is. Do focus on media, accountability, empowering civil society, and dealing with ongoing sources of conflict. Do not focus on reconciliation and justice.
5) OTI should avoid cases where its chances of effectiveness are limited, i.e., intractable situations where OTI could not exit within two to three years.74

While Rotberg's critiques seem apt, number 4 appears to be in tension with numbers 1 and 2. The degree of flexibility and innovation is in question. This likely reflects an important debate in the office and the development and peacebuilding field more broadly.

In the more general picture, OTI is still bound by many of the constraints of USAID, which include budget constraints, a shortage of talented and energetic personnel, bureaucratic inefficiency, late adoption of new technologies, and being a procurement agency rather than carrying out its own projects. Any change in these areas would take a while to implement.75

Lindholm emphasized that OTI has continued to address and grapple with the issues outlined by Rotberg during the intervening five years.76

Future Directions

73 Rotberg.
74 Ibid.
75 Interview with Sean McDonald, Washington, DC, November 20, 2008; and Shonholtz et al, “A New Direction for USAID.”
76 Email interview with Lindholm.
With the new Obama administration, changes are afoot. Chic Dambach of the Alliance for Peacebuilding said that OTI will hopefully be expanding, along with other parts of USAID. ⁷⁷

In a recent panel presentation on the US’s civilian capacity, Amy Frumin, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, called for wider implementation of OTI’s principles. She said that if USAID and S/CRS’s new Civilian Response Corps are to be effective tools, they need to be fast, flexible, and field-driven. As in OTI, the Washington bureaucracy should “flex for the field.” ⁷⁸

**Other Issues**

As alluded to previously, the developments in the USG’s relationship with the CR field has both created tremendous opportunities and raised critical issues. A key issue surrounding OTI is whether conflict resolution work should be done with a particular country’s interests as the guidepost (in this case the United States’). Where is the line between peacebuilding and meddling?

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⁷⁷ Interview with Dambach.
⁷⁸ Dane Smith et al, “U.S. Peacefare.”
Section IV: US State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

Brief Description & Overview

Over the past few years, as the field of CR has been evolving, the USG has increased the use of conflict resolution language and claims a more in depth interest in conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution. This evolution is demonstrated through DoD Directive 3000.05 and NPSD-44. The DoD directive placed conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities on par with military preparedness and intervention (a position since modified), while the Presidential directive established the current role of the S/CRS Office at the State Department (see below).

S/CRS’s main objective is to better coordinate peacebuilding, reconstruction and conflict resolution activities of various USG agencies. According to Howard Wolpe, former Director of the Africa Program and Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity at the Woodrow Wilson Center, S/CRS is an attempt toward a holistic approach to reconstruction and stabilization, but it does not include psychological or social approaches.79

The Coordinator of S/CRS leads and oversees a government wide effort to prevent conflict and to assist nations in transitions out of civil strife or conflict situations to a path that leads toward peace, democracy and stability. S/CRS takes a three step approach in coordinating USG efforts to assist in conflict situations. The first step is establishing goals and developing major mission elements. Step two develops the strategy for achieving the established goals and mission elements by identifying essential tasks and determining the lead agency for each task. The third and final step is to develop an implementation strategy, which includes establishing essential task indicators and budget inputs, and developing a means for tracking program management. At each phase of planning, S/CRS is not intended to be the lead planner or strategy developer; rather, S/CRS is tasked with coordinating a government wide effort to accomplish each step.

Several USG agencies are involved in the decision making process; the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, other State Department bureaus and offices, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Forces Command, Department of Justice, Army Corp of Engineers, Department of Treasury and USAID (including OTI and CMM). S/CRS works to build strong civilian-military partnerships among USG agencies.

Inter-agency meetings are intended to produce the best approach for responding to conflict situations as they arise throughout the world. Aside from coordinating planning meetings, S/CRS is tasked with incorporating the best practices and learnt lessons for future training, planning and implementation of policies. S/CRS must also develop clear policy options for at-risk states and regions and lead appropriate planning for future endeavors and coordinate the deployment of USG resources with international and local partners to provide the quickest and most effective means for assistance and mission implementation.

S/CRS developed and continuously improves the outline for interagency cooperation, risk assessment matrixes and project evaluation frameworks. The bureau is also responsible for the

management of the Section 1207 funds (see below), but the resource that S/CRS has taken great pride in establishing, managing and deploying is the Civilian Response Corps. “CRC members will participate in the range of areas needed to help fragile states restore stability and the rule of law and achieve economic recovery and sustainable growth during post-conflict periods.”80 The CRC is composed of three levels of corps. The active component was developed quickly at S/CRS, but the Office initially had limitations, primarily funding, in developing the other two components. Five to ten people staff the Active Response Corps (ARC) and are direct hires of S/CRS. These “first responders” are ready to deploy within forty-eight hours and can be deployed individually or as a group. While stationed in Washington, DC, the ARC is either training or “backstopping” as one S/CRS employee phrased it.

The Standby or Reserve Response Corps is composed of USG government employees from several different agencies who are able to deploy within thirty days of notification. While in Washington, DC, these reservists maintain their normal USG jobs and duties and participate in S/CRS training seminars and programs, but they must receive permission from their supervisor before deploying. At present, eight agencies contribute to the standby component of CRC – State Department, Department of Commerce, Department of Treasury, Human and Health Services, USAID, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security. Ambassador Herbst, the current Coordinator of S/CRS, is working to expand the number of contributing agencies, but these eight agencies already contribute because each agency posses a specialty that is vital for post conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention.

The final component of the CRC, the Civilian Response Corps, is intended to be a civilian surge and not a USG surge. Members of this component possess essential skills for post conflict stabilization and development such as those possessed by lawyers, nurses, doctors, construction workers, police officers, etc. Reserve officers are intended to fill the capability gaps the USG employees either lack in expertise or in number and must commit to deploy within forty-five to sixty days of notification. In late 2009, Congress finally provided funding for recruiting and training the CRC (see below).

S/CRS is geared toward relief and response, not the political side of conflict resolution. Once in place and fully implemented, S/CRS will resemble DEFCON (Defense Readiness Condition) – “a number or code word indicating the readiness posture of a unit for actual operations or exercises”81 – but S/CRS will maintain a much larger scope of responsibility. S/CRS will be responsible for coordinating response levels and activities of multiple government branches and bureaus within each branch. For the time being, S/CRS supports the Secretary of State by leading USG planning efforts for countries and regions of concern and coordinating the deployment of CRCs to respond to conflict.

**Background & History**

In late 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, led by Senators Joe Biden and Richard Lugar, pushed to create a civilian partner, ideally within the State Department, to work with the

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Department of Defense as a response to the chaos unfolding in Iraq.\textsuperscript{82} Then Secretary of State, Colin Powell created the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July of 2004. S/CRS had existed for over one year before President Bush tasked the office with a specific agenda. On December 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2005 President Bush issued NSPD-44 with the subject line “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” The directive designated the Secretary of State to coordinate and lead all USG agencies reconstruction and stabilization efforts through S/CRS. S/CRS was to provide the platform for developing programs and strategies and coordinate these decisions among all USG agencies. NSPD-44 tasked “the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization with leading the development of interagency capabilities to plan, prepare for and conduct stabilization and reconstruction missions.”\textsuperscript{83}

NSPD-44 was issued as a means of bolstering the security of the United States. The objectives of coordinating and planning reconstruction and stabilization for foreign nations at risk, in or emerging from conflict are deeply entwined with the USG’s fight against terrorism. According to NSPD-44, the establishment of S/CRS as a direct tool of the Secretary of State would help to eliminate safe havens for terrorist networks. “Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”\textsuperscript{84} Several USG agencies had been working toward similar goals, but NSPD-44 funneled all conflict resolution work through the State Department. This may have initially led to some anxiety and criticism directed toward S/CRS from other agencies and offices.

Although President Bush designated S/CRS as the overarching policy development office for foreign reconstruction and stabilization, NSPD-44 did not provide a means of funding the assigned tasks and goals. This has been the greatest burden for S/CRS in their quest to implement their policies and practices.

**General Statistics of S/CRS**

As mentioned earlier, there are several objectives assigned to S/CRS, so it has been organized into several smaller offices which comprised of a total of one hundred and fifteen staffers as of early 2009. At this time, the Front Office had fourteen employees including a representative from DoD (the Senior Military Advisor) and a representative from USAID (the Principal Deputy Coordinator). The Office of Civilian Response Operations had thirty-one State employees, including eight CRC-Active Officers and four Training Specialists. The Office of Conflict Prevention was composed of eleven people, while there were thirty-five in the Office of Planning, including a representative from DoD (Planner), the Department of Justice (Special Advisor Rule of Law), the Army Corp. of Engineers (Senior Planning Officer – Infrastructure Development Advisor) and the Army (Army G3 LNO – Senior Civilian-Military Planning Officer). The Office of Resource Management had thirteen employees and the Office of

\textsuperscript{82} Dane Smith, June 3, 2008.
\textsuperscript{83} Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, May 2, 2007.
\textsuperscript{84} NSPD-44, December 7, 2005.
Strategic Communications was composed of ten employees and one intern. Each office is headed by a Director that reports to the Coordinator.

The Office of Civilian Response Operations attempts to overcome institutional challenges by bringing USG agencies together to develop a team approach for intervention. Different agencies desire similar outcomes, but often do not agree on the same approach to achieving the similar goals and therefore are unlikely to work with one another; S/CRS works to instill the philosophy that reconstruction is not a zero-sum game and works on bridging these differences in order to accomplish the similar goals. S/CRS looks at long-term peace, S/CRS works on conflict transformation, it looks at what is driving the conflict and developing institutional capacities so that they are stronger than the drivers of conflict.

The Office of Conflict Prevention is tasked with coordinating interagency processes to identify states at risk and to take the lead in planning to prevent or mitigate conflict. One of its tasks has been to manage the Section 1207 funds, transferred from DoD to State for stabilization and reconstruction projects (see below). Another prime engagement has been the development of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) in conjunction with CMM and its application to a variety of countries engaged in or at risk of violent conflict (see below).

The Office of Planning focuses on post conflict and stabilization. This office starts with the desired end product and then maps out how to achieve this product. This approach is an interagency collaboration setting goals, and establishing when, how fast and how to integrate USG efforts.

The Office of Strategic Communication is responsible for dissemination and outreach to academic and civil society organizations with respect to CRS’s role, including forging partnerships with similar government bodies in Canada and the United Kingdom. The office is also tasked with briefing the Hill, developing press releases, and managing the flow of information about projects emanating from S/CRS.

The financial element of S/CRS can be a confusing multi-track monetary flow. As mentioned earlier, NSPD-44 did not authorize a budget or even suggest a budget for the newly tasked S/CRS. Therefore, S/CRS’s budget has been composed of a variety of monetary sources that continue to evolve over time. Funding for S/CRS projects originally came from DoD transfers through Section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. By passing this Act, Congress enabled the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million per year for two years to the State Department for use by S/CRS. Any transfers of money were intended “to assist the State Department [with] immediate reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.”85 In FY 2006 and FY 2007 Section 1207 transferred $100 million for reconstruction and stabilization projects. This method was proving successful so Congress renewed Section 1207 for an additional $100 million for FY 2008. Although this method of funding proved successful, there were strings attached; it was part of DoD’s budget so S/CRS had to apply for each project and meet certain guidelines and stipulations. S/CRS was granted the ability to budget projects, but before a project could be undertaken and officially funded,

DoD maintained the authority to amend, veto or approve any project that was funded under Section 1207.

The process of obtaining Section 1207 funding supports the intentions of NSPD-44 by requiring State Department offices and bureaus to coordinate efforts with DoD branches. A proposal is the product of a coordinated effort among the U.S. Embassy in the project receiving country, USAID mission in-country, the State Department regional bureau and the regional Combatant Command. While the proposal may originate from several offices, it may only be submitted by the ambassador to the country the money is intended to aid. Upon submission, the proposal is reviewed by two interagency committees. The Review Committee and Selection Committee are composed of representatives from S/CRS, the Office of Foreign Assistance, DoD, the Joint Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy, and USAID. These committees determine which proposals and programs will be most beneficial and warrant Section 1207 funding.

There are also limitations on what the 1207 fund can be used for. The money cannot fund NGOs or academic institutions. The money also cannot be used fund proposals where there is an active budget request pending on Capitol Hill, for programs that appear to create a means of circumventing the appropriations process or for payment of assessed UN contributions.

As early as 2004, the National Security Council worked to obtain funding for the new S/CRS Office. After a series of meetings, a request for $100 million for a Conflict Response Fund – S/CRS was to receive no more than $25 million – was submitted to Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee continued to support the formation of S/CRS, but the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs did not. The subcommittee urged that the $100 million request be omitted from the FY 2006 budget. Therefore, S/CRS had to rely on Section 1207 funding in order to operate and undertake any projects. In FY 2008, $25 million were designated for the Conflict Response Fund, but nothing was budgeted for the CRC.

By 2008, S/CRS had gained traction on Capitol Hill which resulted in the beginning of a steady funding stream. In February 2008, President Bush requested $249 million for FY 2009 in order to develop the CRC, but once again, Congress declined to approve the request and limited the budget to $45 million for a Civilian Stabilization Initiative. This allowed S/CRS to create the first two levels of the CRC – the Reserve Corp cannot be created without Congressional support and funding so S/CRS continued to lobby the Hill for support in creating the civilian response level of the CRC. In mid-2008, Congress authorized a supplemental appropriation of $55 million to expand the CRC, but once again refused to support the establishment of a reserve corp. This supplemental appropriation aimed to increase the Active and Standby components to one hundred and five hundred members respectively.86 In 2009, CRS received the first directly appropriated funding under the 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act to support the Active and Standby of the CRC with $65 million shared between CRS and USAID.87

President Obama’s proposed FY 2010 budget requested $323,272,000 for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative and an additional $40 million for a Stabilization Bridge Fund. The large increase in the request is geared toward fully establishing and implementing the CRC. Under

86 Dane Smith, U.S. Peacefare. 2010, p. 98
87 S/CRS, “2009 Year in Review.”
President Obama’s request, all three levels of the CRC would be established, trained and be ready to deploy upon notification. The budget plans for a 4,250 person CRC – 250 Active members, 2,000 Standby members and 2,000 reserve members. In late 2009, Congress included funding for stabilization and reconstruction in the omnibus appropriations bill for state and foreign operations (HR 3288). In response to the Obama administration’s request for approximately $323 million, it provided $150 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative plus $50 million for a new contingency account titled the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF) and located at USAID. The above allocations replace the 1207 transfers from DoD, and provide responsibility to both State (S/CRS) and USAID (CMM) for civilian elements of stabilization and reconstruction activities.88

Support & Scope of Conflict Resolution Work

As determined by the complexities of S/CRS’s budget, the office’s ability to perform “on the ground” conflict prevention, mediation and resolution work has been somewhat limited. Also, due to the essential task of coordinating interagency and whole of government approach to conflict prevention and reconstruction, much of S/CRS’s work has taken place in Washington, DC.

Soon after its conception, S/CRS developed and released several frameworks for conflict analysis, interagency cooperation and CRC training courses and modules. In 2005, S/CRS released two documents – “Planning Framework for Stabilization, Reconstruction and Conflict Transformation”89 and an “Essential Task Matrix.”90 In 2006, a third publication was released entitled “Metrics for Interagency Planning for Conflict Transformation.” The first document has been incorporated into the curriculum of several military training schools.91 The “Essential Task Matrix” serves as a guide to reconstruction and stabilization action for U.S. embassies and regional military command posts. The third publication provides a standard for evaluating the major mission elements.

S/CRS staff have also developed courses for the Foreign Service Institute. “The Foreign Service Institute is the Federal Government's primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs community, preparing American diplomats and other professionals to advance U.S. foreign affairs interests overseas and in Washington.”92 These courses are required for CRC members and include classes on failed states and advanced planning. S/CRS has been invited to analyze the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan and develop a Foreign Service Institute training course based upon the lessons learned and developing a better strategy for newly deployed PRTs. The Conflict Prevention unit has hosted several roundtables and planning sessions at the bequest of regional bureaus. Roundtable groups have discussed post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, post-Kosovar Independence and

89 http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&id=c065fc4e-065b-4c47-ab16-0acdd1807ede
90 http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=J7R3
92 http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/
post-Castro Cuba. Some of the most important planning exercises have been applied to Sudan, Haiti, and Kosovo.

The bureau has also develop the Interagency Management System (IMS) and worked with USAID/CMM to develop the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) (See Appendix G). The IMS establishes operational procedures for a “whole of government” approach for stabilization and conflict resolution; it was adopted by the National Security Council in 2007. The ICAF is useful for people from different departments and agencies to develop a shared understanding of conflict dynamics and potential entry points for additional USG efforts. The ICAF has been utilized for conflicts in Tajikistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sri Lanka; it was officially approved by the U.S. Government Policy Coordinating Committee in July of 2008.

As noted above, “on the ground” work by S/CRS has been limited due to the lack of funding and the 1207 requirements. S/CRS is a functional bureau and since regional bureaus decide policy, S/CRS is responsive to requests from the regional bureaus. S/CRS analyses the problem(s) detailed in the request and then decides what tools to use and how to help. Conflict resolution proposals can also emanate from embassies and the NSC. S/CRS’s role is to facilitate interagency processes such as conflict assessment, strategic planning or implementation planning toward more effective coordination of USG interventions.

When the USG strategy involves mediation or negotiation, the process is driven by S/CRS, but the actual dialogue is not. S/CRS will coordinate interaction among the appropriate USG agencies to develop goals for a successful negotiation, but the actual mediation activities are spearheaded by the appropriate U.S. embassies with high level State Department engagement and/or by the White House. S/CRS is equipped and tasked to participate in “on the ground” work when embassies with regional bureau endorsement offer a 1207 funding proposal for civilian agency-led stabilization. After review and approval, implementation is carried out by the respective embassy. S/CRS and other agencies can also support a request by providing civilian experts from the CRC.93

Since the inception of CRC, the active component has been deployed in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres in countries as diverse as Iraq, Nepal, Haiti and Liberia. In FY 2006, CRC undertook only one project, but this number has steadily grown in the past two fiscal years. The remainder of this section will outline specific CRC deployments by continent and then country. Unfortunately, several aspects of each project remain classified, so only basic details of each project will be described.

AFRICA

- Somalia – In FY 2007, $25 million was approved for the Somalia Reconciliation and Stabilization Program. $17.5 million was earmarked for bilateral assistance in funding civilian police reform, security and justice infrastructure rehabilitation, youth employment and income generation activities. The additional $7.5 million was intended to enhance community-police coordination for cross-border security and to establish border neutral zones.

93 http://www.crs.state.gov
• Mali, Niger and Mauritania – In FY 2007, Section 1207 provided $15 million dollars for a Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership. This program was intended to reduce terrorist recruiting in the three African countries. The program also worked to reduce safe havens and sanctuaries for terrorist organizations.

• Liberia – In FY 2008, an active member of the CRC was deployed to the U.S. embassy in Monrovia for two, ninety day missions. The CRC member assisted in interagency security sector reform assessment and oversaw the development of police capabilities. A second CRC member was deployed to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs for a ninety day mission. This assignment was intended to manage police and rule of law programs supporting ongoing stabilization prior to UN withdrawal. A third CRC representative was stationed in the Monrovia embassy for ten days to aide the embassy in developing a proposal for stabilization funding focusing on increasing the ability of the Liberian Government to rule effectively through democracy.

• Sudan – S/CRS has had a continuous presence in Sudan since 2005. S/CRS had been tasked with developing an interagency approved Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the northern and southern factions. After the May, 2006 signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, S/CRS has taken the lead in establishing a monitoring office in field. One month later, four CRC members and a senior S/CRS adviser undertook this task. Two members remained in the Khartoum embassy while the other two and the adviser traveled to Darfur to establish an embassy field presence. S/CRS continued to ensure staffing for this office by deploying a total of ten CRC members (including one standby member) through July 2008. Once in field, officers track UN peacekeeping force deployment, human rights and humanitarian issues, public diplomacy, security and local political developments and peace process efforts.

• Chad – In 2006, S/CRS led an interagency team to investigate causes of unrest and conflict in Chad. This team produced the 2008 Mission Strategic Plan for the U.S. Embassy in Chad. Following this assessment, two CRC members were deployed (one active and one standby) to monitor internally displaced persons and the rebel activity that was a spill over from Darfur. Their deployment was split between the capital of N’djamena and the town of Abeche.

ASIA

• Iraq – In 2007, one active member of the CRC was deployed to Iraq to support the civilian surge and increase in PRTs. The member’s job was to evaluate the types of civilian specialist required by the PRT leaders and then consult with the embassy in drafting position descriptions and recruiting notices. The officer also continuously evaluated changing field conditions to ensure that the civilian support was appropriate and beneficial.

• Lebanon – In FY 2006, $10 million was transferred to S/CRS through 1207. $5 million was earmarked for the clearance of unexploded ordnances posing a threat to noncombatants. The additional $5 million was allocated for training and outfitting additional Lebanese national police so that the Lebanese Army could be redeployed to southern Lebanon to enforce the Israeli-Hezbollah cease fire instead of performing the jobs of the national police. An active CRC member was deployed to Beirut to assist in this process and coordinate the USG agencies involved. An additional CRC member was
deployed to the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey to assist in processing the evacuated Americans.

- Yemen – In FY 2007, $8.5 million was approved for the Yemen Stability Initiative. This project was also geared toward reducing terrorist activities. The funds were intended to serve rural areas where the central government lacks a presence in an attempt to deter youth from joining terrorist groups.

- Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia – In FY 2007, a multi-year interagency initiative was established to reduce terrorist recruitment. The Southeast Asia Tri-border Initiative received $17 million in funding to accomplish a “3D” (development, diplomacy and defense) approach for deterring terrorist recruitment and safe havens in the tri-country area.

- Nepal – Also in FY 2007, $10 million was approved for deterring communist presence in four Nepalese districts. The Local Stabilization Initiative was intended to expand the Nepalese police presence to the four districts the USG deemed at risk of communist domination. “The program aims to build the capacity of local authorities, including elected officials, civil society, service providers and civilian police, to address the needs and grievances of marginalized groups in conflict-affected areas.” The fund was also intended to create community-based infrastructure projects in the same four districts. In 2007, S/CRS deployed a conflict prevention officer to the U.S. embassy for nine months to aid in the design of an interagency stabilization program in conflict-plagued regions of Nepal.

- Afghanistan – There have been ten to fifteen CRC staff in Afghanistan at any given point over the past year. The CRC members deployed are tasked with coordinating civilian efforts among the PRTs and other projects in country. CRC members have also worked to improve civilian-military coordination and to revise and improve the provincial support plans and missions of the PRTs.

**EUROPE**

- Kosovo – After preparing an interagency four year plan for post independence Kosovo, S/CRS was requested to send CRC members to aid in the establishment of the plan. Seven members had been deployed to aid in staffing shortages at the U.S. embassy and to work with the International Civilian Office (ICO). S/CRS was also tasked with ensuring protection of U.S. financial interests in Kosovo. S/CRS officers also worked closely with the ICO in establishing a preliminary budget. Upon the declaration of independence, S/CRS deployed two additional CRC members to assist in budgeting and auditing processes. In 2008, S/CRS also assisted in establishing the State Department’s Kosovo Monitoring Group and composed fifty percent of the staff.

**NORTH AMERICA**

- In FY 2007, $20 million was designated for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI). The project was intended to develop Cité Soleil, Port au Prince’s largest slum. The Initiative attempted to enhance security and stability and extend federal authority by funding community policing programs, small scale employment projects, judicial sector expansion and training and infrastructure development. An active member of CRC was

94  S/CRS website.
95  Interview with Daniel Rogers, 2009.
deployed with the Initiative team to support the Embassy in administrative and logistical plans and budgeting for a new seven person office intended for coordinating HSI with the Haitian government, the UN, and ongoing U.S. bilateral development programs.  

SOUTH AMERICA
- Columbia – In FY 2007, $4 million was approved for the Columbia Initial Governance Response Program. The program was developed through S/CRS by State Department and the U.S. Southern Command. The 1207 allocation provided programs in the areas recently reclaimed from insurgents. These programs included providing basic education and health needs and developing local infrastructure.

Job Competencies & Opportunities

One of the goals of this research was to understand if new employment opportunities were being created by the evolving USG approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution and what competencies and skills these new opportunities required. According to one FAO who is an IPCR MA graduate, “theory should be studied, but grads should know how to apply theories in real life scenarios, the application of theory is crucial.” Utilizing theory is important in conflict mapping which is also a practice graduate students should be familiar with. If graduate students are interested in working for S/CRS, they should have knowledge of and experience with the ICAF conflict assessment tool. Mapping skills are good for a resume; possessing these skills increases the employer’s desire to bring the applicant onto the team. Grant-writing skills are equally as important as conflict assessment and mapping skills.

International exposure and experience is also important. Programmatic travel relating to stabilization and mitigation issues is ideal. Graduate students at American University should partake in AU abroad trips that focus on conflict assessment and mapping. Ideally, summer institutes would be combined with the summer abroad programs.

“S/CRS focuses on management and facilitation.” Graduate students should take a management course, one that focuses on managing and coordinating people and activities, not a business management course, i.e., a human resources management course. Grads need to know how to communicate effectively and bring people with different personalities together to accomplish tasks. S/CRS has a weeklong facilitation course, so listing facilitation and managements skills on a resume is obviously a highly desired skill.

Although officers and employees of S/CRS can easily identify skills and competencies, they have trouble identifying job opportunities within S/CRS. This is due to the limitations in funding and budgets, and not an avoidance to hiring. S/CRS strongly wants to increase their size and capacity by hiring additional officers and expanding the CRC. People are able to apply specifically for the CRC; if they are hired they become a State Department contractor for one year. Anyone who is hired would become a USG employee, but not a direct State Department hire. S/CRS officers provided a short and direct list of competencies and experiences CRC

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96 S/CRS website.
97 Interview with Clint Fenning, 2009.
98 Interview with Layla Bashan, 2009.
applicants should possess. Theses include sectoral experience (i.e., health, economic
development, justice, security, etc.), international experience, grant or RFP writing skills,
knowledge on how to establish governance projects, knowledge of setting up work with
contractors, understanding of conflict, conflict assessment skills and demonstrated availability to
deploy on short notice. Employment opportunities are posted on the S/CRS website and can be
found at http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4TWM. The
Congressional response to President Obama’s FY 2010 budget request should provide some of
the necessary funding to expand staff and further develop the CRC.

The Future

S/CRS’s future heavily depends on the Obama administration’s budget requests and the
Congress’ responses to these. Given that Congress has increased the budget for the Conflict
Stabilization Initiative to $150 million rather than the requested $323 million, S/CRS will
continue to be limited by their allocation. S/CRS desires to increase the size of the CRC to three
thousand members within three to five years, and it remains to be seen how the allocation for FY
2010 will affect this intention.

The Coordinator is currently working to expand the number of USG agencies that provide
employees for the standby component of CRC. Ambassador Herbst is also working to expand
coordination efforts among S/CRS and international conflict response units, especially with
Canada and Europe. S/CRS has a strong desire to strengthen their relationship with other USG
agencies and provide the melting pot of interagency ideas and programs.

S/CRS’s future depends upon President Obama and his commitment to conflict stabilization.
Thus far, his statements and appointments, including Secretary Clinton, demonstrate his strong
desire to increase the USG’s and America’s ability to respond to international conflicts and crises
with a civilian surge and ongoing response. The position and functioning of S/CRS within the
USG can be strengthened in both foreign relations and conflict resolution with an increased
budget and a fully integrated CRC.
Section V: Conclusion and Implications

Conclusion

International peace and conflict resolution is a dynamic and continuously evolving academic and applied field, and the IPCR Program strives to reflect that dynamism and currency. Due to their relatively new emergence into the social science and political arena, conflict resolution and peacebuilding are ambiguous words that can include a multitude of activities and practices. One thing that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught USG agencies and other organizations is that human level activities are required in order to promote and maintain peace. For example, building a new court house will not in itself result in an increased level of transparent civic law. This administrative and technical approach to social change has held sway for many years, but recently it has become strikingly obvious that this strategy must be revised. In order to promote an increase in transparent civic law, for example, more than a new courthouse is needed; civilians must be trained to operate the courthouse, police must be trained, mindsets must be altered and, most of all, people of rival factions, ethnicities, religions, etc. must be able to come together and move beyond their differences in implementing a new legal system. These changes in orientation and relationship require “human-level” peacebuilding efforts – dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution training, etc – not just institutional and technical developments.

USAID has been working through both mediums of peacebuilding to achieve their goals in a number of countries. While their work is commendable, the agency faces significant funding limitations. This has often resulted in USAID contracting the work to for-profit companies and other organizations. USAID does not have the capability to support every project with internal employees. From the beginning of the Obama administration, there has been hope of an increased piece of the budget; Secretary Clinton made one of her earliest public appearances as Secretary of State at USAID and in her speech stressed the importance of the work performed by USAID and implied her support of an increased budget allocation to USAID.

S/CRS has been vigorously working to support USG peacebuilding efforts. Similar to USAID, S/CRS faces continuous budget shortcomings and funding limitations. A majority of their funding has been deferred to them from DoD, but under the Obama administration this appears to be changing. S/CRS has finally been granted the funding required to assemble the civilian response corps; a vital component for government response and action in conflict prevention and resolution. Assembling and training the CRC will allow USG agencies such as USAID to use internal employees and other government officials to carrying out projects rather than having to outsource the bulk of the work to private contractors.

Although there have been numerous steps taken in enlarging USAID and S/CRS budgets, DoD continues to be the USG agency that is properly, if not overly, funded. This has allowed the military to undertake peace operations. In fact, the military has placed peace operations on par with war operations. While several “peace people” may be opposed to the military putting their hands into conflict resolution and peacebuilding, someone has to do the work. If DoD is where the required monetary capabilities are for such functions, then it will have to be appropriate for them to contribute to peacebuilding missions. Their work has been exemplified by the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Pentagon has been accepting “peace people” with open arms and collaborates with them in planning and evaluation. The military has taken a keen interest in peacebuilding, and has vigorously worked to incorporate peacebuilding and conflict resolution practices into their field manuals.

When assessing the innovations in USG peacebuilding efforts, the lack of funding continuously comes to the forefront. Therefore, the greatest limitation to expanding USG peacebuilding operations may be the current economic crisis and the effects it may have on future budgeting. Unfortunately, as the world continues to experience the current recession and face worsening scenarios, conflict is likely to increase rather than decrease. This combination of factors will place further stress on the USG’s response to conflict in terms of its prevention and resolution efforts.

Even with the difficulties USG agencies have faced, they have maintained a high degree of influence and involvement around the world and have achieved many of their goals. S/CRS has increased collaboration and coordination among the various agencies tasked with peacebuilding and conflict resolution. USAID continues to provide programming options throughout the world and DoD has worked extremely hard to incorporate peacebuilding efforts into all overseas mission planning and implementation. Yet, several questions remain – budget allocations, leading agency, impact of the financial crisis, and so on. Although the future is bright for USG-led peacebuilding efforts, the path forward appears uncertain and challenging.

**Implications for the IPCR program**

As noted earlier, the purposes of this report are to a) track developments in the USG’s international conflict resolution activities, and b) to identify job opportunities for IPCR graduates and ways the IPCR program can prepare graduates for this area of the conflict resolution field. The underlying assumption is that this work of the USG is a potentially fruitful and appropriate place for emerging conflict resolution professionals to apply their skills and passions. Therefore, the following implications should be seen as related to IPCR's goals. Given that the IPCR program wishes to prepare graduate students for employment in the State Department, USAID or related organizations, then the following implications should be given strong support.

When asked what competencies graduates should have in order to be excellent candidates for employment in their field, interviewees from government agencies and contracting companies offered the following recommendations, which are summarized here and supported by example comments:

1) IPCR should prepare students with **general conflict literacy**. For example, Walker spoke on a panel recently at a conference presented by One Studentry (a network of conflict resolution and international development students in the DC area) and asked the audience basic questions like, “Since the end of the Cold War, have conflicts increased, declined, or stayed the same?” He was disappointed that their knowledge did not seem to exceed that of your average USAID officer. In his opinion, conflict resolution students should know what the main conflicts are now, what are main the risk factors, etc.
2) IPCR should insure that graduates have **significant overseas experience**. Graduates are far more marketable if they have significant international exposure, whether it is specifically conflict-related or not (e.g., Peace Corps or similar experience). Such experience demonstrates that they can operate in a different cultural, political and economic environment, which is very important to employers. For OTI and similar types of employment, preferably the experience would be in the same region or type of environment they would like to work in later. Needless to say, language skills related to the region in question are also extremely valuable (see below).

3) IPCR should take advantage of its location in Washington to connect students to a variety of sources in order to **provide leading edge information** about what is happening in the peacebuilding and conflict resolution field. For example: a) Engage adjunct professors. b) Make sure students understand what is going on “inside the beltway.” c) Insure that students coming out know the current trends in current thinking, such as greed versus grievance, counter-insurgency, monitoring and evaluation, early warning and conflict prevention, etc. d) Take advantage of resources here, e.g. USIP, World Bank, and Capital Hill.99

4) IPCR should prepare students to **solve real-life problems**. For example Kvitashvili said that while the university community is doing a good job teaching the theory, students are not getting enough practical hands-on application. When she taught at Georgetown this year, she aimed for students to take the theory and make it practical. “What happens on the ground is not what you learn in the books,” she noted, so students must engage with conflict and development from an operational perspective. Students need to be versed in creative ways of adapting what they learn to operational realities on the ground. On the job, she said, if you hit a bump in the road, you need to be flexible in how you think so that you can get around the bump. To develop these complex problem-solving skills, Kvitashvili suggested working through problem sets in class. Students would grapple with how to stay true to your principles and adapt to on-the-ground realities. Students could also work through problem scenarios similar to the ones OTI staff and contractors face when designing country strategies and activities.

5) IPCR should prepare students to **think outside the Western cultural framework**. The solutions to conflict-related problems need to be less like "us" and more like "them," according to Kvitashvili. Conflict professionals need to be aware of culture, history, local dynamics and develop an anthropological understanding of the situation. Kvitashvili works with her colleagues on implementing this culturally sensitive approach, asking hard questions such as: What do people actually want out of a democracy? Is a "tolerable" amount of corruption okay? Maybe sending war criminals to the ICC is not likely to lead to reconciliation in a particular country, but world leaders want to send a strong message about the consequences of committing war crimes—who should make that decision, the country or the international community? While approaches should be driven by local dynamics and priorities, this can create tricky dilemmas that effective practitioners must grapple with.100

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99 Interview with Walker.
100 Interview with Kvitashvili.
6) IPCR should prepare students with *general knowledge of development, reconstruction, and government work*. Graduates interested in this type of work should have familiarity with development and USAID’s approach. Ulman said that you can't work on development in a conflict country without conflict knowledge; but also, you can't just be a conflict person without the knowledge of other aspects of development work. She also noted that different graduate programs compete with each other and focus on different aspects, e.g. SAIS specializes in the economic development angle. One implication is that IPCR should maintain its broad peace and conflict resolution scope, which includes a receptivity to development and other domains of activity.

7) The School of International Service (SIS) and IPCR should offer students *more opportunities to develop language skills*. For example, IPCR could a) advocate for American University to offer the national FLAS scholarship through the US Department of Education, b) allow students to audit language classes at the university for free (as Georgetown's CR program does), c) provide stipends for language study outside the university, d) allow students to replace an elective with a language class, or e) organize language tables and language exchanges among students.

8) IPCR should help students develop *conflict mapping/assessment skills* as well as skills for *managing and facilitating* in the workplace. The USG’s emphasis on conflict assessment calls for the annual offering of IPCR’s new course in Conflict Prevention and Assessment to complement the conflict mapping and analysis work that is done in the core course on Conflict Analysis and Resolution. The IPCR Skills Institutes should continue to provide practical ideas and skills for managing conflict in various settings.

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101 Interview with Ulman.
102 For more information, see: [http://www.ed.gov/programs/iegpsflasf/index.html](http://www.ed.gov/programs/iegpsflasf/index.html)
Section VI: References and Appendices

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Appendices

Appendix A: Note on terminology

The USG does not typically use term "conflict resolution." In courses Ulman teaches through MSI, she uses “conflict resolution” to refer to a field of study, while “stabilization and recovery” is becoming a well accepted term. USAID tends to use "conflict management and mitigation," while State and DoD use "reconstruction and stabilization" or "R & S operations." Various contractor companies employ different titles for this work, ranging from “Conflict Management and Recovery” to “Communities in Transition” to “Stability Sector.”

Appendix B: Glossary of Acronyms

AED Academy for Educational Development
AID See USAID
AMEX AMEX International (contractor company)
APS Annual Programming Statement (granting mechanism through CMM)
ARC Active Response Corps
ARD ARD, Inc. (contractor company)
AU American University
CAF Conflict Assessment Framework
CAI Casals & Associates, Inc. (contractor company)
CCF Complex Crisis Fund (created 2009)
CGP AU's Center for Global Peace
CHF CHF International (contractor company)
CMM USAID’s Office of Conflict Management & Mitigation
CR Conflict Resolution
CRC Civilian Response Corps
CVA Conflict & Vulnerability Assessment

103 Interview with Ulman.
Appendix C: CMM's IQC Holders: Primes and Subs

Please see attached document.
Appendix D: Table of Contractors with Conflict Departments

The following is a contact list for select government contractors doing conflict-related work. This is not an exhaustive list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Conflict Practice</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Contact Title</th>
<th>Contact Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management Systems International (MSI)</td>
<td>Stabilization &amp; Recovery</td>
<td>Jennifer Ulman</td>
<td>Conflict Specialist</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Julman@msi-inc.com">Julman@msi-inc.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative Associates</td>
<td>Communities in Transition Division</td>
<td>Pablo Maldonado</td>
<td>Senior Vice President</td>
<td><a href="mailto:PabloM@caii.com">PabloM@caii.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative Associates</td>
<td>Creative Center for Stabilization and Development</td>
<td>Jessica Kruvant</td>
<td>Senior Associate</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Jessica@caii.com">Jessica@caii.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casals &amp; Associates, Inc.</td>
<td>Conflict Management and Recovery</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td><a href="mailto:info@casals.com">info@casals.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Alternatives International (DAI)</td>
<td>Stability Sector</td>
<td>Bronwen Morrison</td>
<td>Team Lead, Stability Operations</td>
<td><a href="mailto:bronwen_morrisonen@dai.com">bronwen_morrisonen@dai.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemonics International, Inc.</td>
<td>Conflict &amp; Disaster Management</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td><a href="mailto:info@chemonics.com">info@chemonics.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associates for Rural Development (ARD)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Lewis Rasmussen</td>
<td>ICRP IQC Manager, Senior Associate</td>
<td>lrasmussen@ardi nc.com</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional contracting organizations that could be explored: Institute for Sustainable Communities (ISC), Development & Training Services Inc (DTS), International Resources Group (IRG), AECOM International Development Inc, Academy for Educational Development (AED), CHF International.

Appendix E: DEFCON

In laymen’s terms, DEFCON is a system in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military commanders institute the activation and readiness level of the US military. There are five levels, level five is normal peace time military activity and each subsequent reduction in number implies a heightened security risk and greater mobilization of the military and intelligence collecting.
Appendix F: The Role of DoD in Peacebuilding

In the fall of 2005, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld endorsed a majority of the recommendations in DoD Directive 3000.05. The directive established the Stability, Security, Transitions and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) office in the DoD. For the first time, stability operations became a component of the core mission of the DoD. This Directive “provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop…establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.”104 SSTRO’s mission is to establish and provide a safe and secure environment, essential government services, reconstruct necessary infrastructure and humanitarian relief through various military activities. Directive 3000.05 also provides guidance for interagency cooperation. The DoD will work to provide peace, security and reconstruction in all militarily entered countries or states. This directive has placed reconstruction on par with military action;105 it has given the military the capacity and consent to engage in civilian tasks such as establishing institutions, building infrastructure and overseeing elections. This will require the DoD to be as good at making peace as it is at making war. Directive 3000.05 grants the military the power to maintain order when civilians cannot. The directive was established as a direct response the ongoing secretariat violence and reconstruction delays in Iraq and Afghanistan. The directive allows the DoD to focus on improving stability through internal, USG interagency and international approaches. SSTRO will ensure that all stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition plans advance USG interests.

While DoD’s newfound mission components frighten numerous peace studies practitioners and scholars, but it may be necessary to rely on DoD to aide, if not lead peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts due to the budgetary restrictions facing OTI, CMM and S/CRS. DoD has the financial ability to organize, lead and undertake reconstruction projects. According to Dr. Charles Hauss, Alliance for Peacebuilding’s Government Liaison, “senior people at DoD want peace people as partners, not pawns…peace people who have begun working with DoD have not had to be assertive because peace people have been wanted there…my experience shows that DoD really wants peace people at the table working on the issues.”106

DoD has made the transition to a 3D (defense, diplomacy and development) approach to military activity and intervention. Fort Leavenworth spent much of 2008 developing a new Stability Operations Field Manual for the Army; according to the Washington Post, the manual states “stability operations will last longer and ultimately contribute more to the military’s success than traditional combat operations.”107 The military has taken their duty to heart; until sufficient funding is available, and even after the funding has been allocated, to other conflict resolution and reconstruction oriented USG agencies, it will be necessary to work with the DoD to develop interagency cohesive approaches to peacebuilding. S/CRS greatly aides in this effort and its role

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105 Lisa Schirch.
as an interagency planning board will only increase as time passes under the Obama administration.

**Appendix G: ICAF Analysis**

Task One: Conflict Diagnosis

The first task in conducting an ICAF analysis is diagnosing a conflict. There are four steps involved in this process.

**Step One:** Evaluate the Context of the Conflict  
**Step Two:** Understand Core Grievances and Social/Institutional Resilience  
**Step Three:** Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors  
**Step Four:** Describe Opportunities for Increasing or Decreasing Conflict

**Step One: Evaluate the Context of the Conflict**

In order to determine the preceding elements of the conflict dynamic, the Assessment Team should follow a series of analytical steps. First, the team should evaluate and outline key contextual issues of the conflict environment. Context does not cause conflict but describes often long-standing conditions resistant to change. Context may create pre-conditions for conflict by reinforcing fault lines between communities or contribute to pressures making violence appear as a more attractive means for advancing one’s interests. Context can shape perceptions of identity groups and be used by key actors to manipulate and mobilize constituencies. **Context includes, for example: environmental conditions, poverty, recent history of conflict, youth bulge, or conflict-ridden region.**

All ICAF steps begin with acknowledging the context within which the conflict arises. This is depicted in the graphic by placing each analytical task within a larger oval labeled “Context”. The arrows going in and out of the concentric circles, the triangle and the rectangle remind the analyst that context affects and is affected by each of the other components.

**Step Two: Understand Core Grievances and Social/Institutional Resilience**

The team should understand, agree upon and communicate the concepts of Core Grievance and Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience as defined here and describe them within the specific situation being assessed.

**Core Grievance:** The perception, by various groups in a society, that their needs for physical security, livelihood, interests or values are threatened by one or more other groups and/or social institutions.

**Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience:** The perception, by various groups in a society, that social relationships, structures or processes are in place and able to provide dispute resolution and meet basic needs through non-violent means.

On the graphic on the proceeding page, the concentric circles labeled “Identity Groups,” “Societal Patterns” and “Institutional Performance” interact with the Context identified in Step 1. In Step 2, the Assessment Team should:
1. **Describe Identity Groups who believe others threaten their identity, security or livelihood:**

Identity Groups are groups of people that identify with each other, often on the basis of characteristics used by outsiders to describe them (e.g., ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, economic activity or socio-economic status); Identity Groups are inclined to conflict when they perceive that other groups’ interests, needs and aspirations compete with and jeopardize their identity, security or other fundamental interests.

2. **Articulate how Societal Patterns reinforce perceived deprivation, blame and inter-group cleavages and/or how they promote comity and peaceful resolution of inter-group disputes:**

Societal Patterns associated with conflict reinforce group cleavages, for example: elitism, exclusion, corruption/rent-seeking, chronic state capacity deficits (e.g., systematic economic stagnation, scarcity of necessary resources, ungoverned space), and unmet expectations (e.g., lack of a peace dividend, land tenure issues, disillusionment and alienation). Impacts of societal patterns often include negative economic consequences for disadvantaged groups.

3. **Explain how poor or good Institutional Performance aggravates or contributes to the resolution of conflict:**

Institutional Performance considers formal (e.g., governments, legal systems, religious organizations, public schools, security forces, banks and economic institutions) and informal (e.g., traditional mechanisms for resolving disputes, family, clan/tribe, armed groups and patrimonialism) social structures to see whether they are performing poorly or well and whether they contribute to conflict and instability or manage or mitigate it. In assessing institutional performance it is important to distinguish between outcomes and perceptions. Institutional outcomes are results that can be measured objectively; perceptions are the evaluative judgments of those outcomes. Understanding how outcomes are perceived by various groups within a society, especially in terms of their perceived effectiveness and legitimacy, is an important component of conflict diagnosis.

The Assessment Team completes Step 2 by listing Core Grievances and Sources of Social and Institutional Resilience.

**Step Three:** Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors

The team should understand and outline Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating factors as defined here and enumerate those identified within the specific situation being assessed.

**Drivers of Conflict:** The dynamic situation resulting from Key Actors’ mobilization of social groups around Core Grievances. Drivers of Conflict can be understood as active energy, while Core Grievances are potential energy.

**Mitigating Factors:** The dynamic situation resulting from Key Actors’ mobilization of social groups around Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience. Mitigating Factors can be understood as the kinetic energy produced when key actors mobilize the potential energy of Social and Institutional Resilience.

In Step 3 of the analysis, the Assessment Team identifies Key Actors that are central to producing, perpetuating or profoundly changing the Societal Patterns or Institutional Performance identified in Step 2. The Assessment Team should identify whether Key Actors
are motivated to mobilize constituencies toward inflaming or mitigating violent conflict and what means are at their disposal. To perform the analysis in Step 3, the Assessment Team should:

1. **Identify Key Actors:**

   **WHO:** People, organizations or groups who, because of their leadership abilities and/or power (e.g., political position, moral authority, charisma, money, weapons):
   - Have an impact on Societal Patterns/Institutional Performance
   - Are able to shape perceptions and actions and mobilize people around Core Grievances or Social and Institutional Resilience
   - Are able to provide the means (money, weapons, information) to support other key actors who are mobilizing people around Core Grievances or Social and Institutional Resilience

   **WHERE:** Look for Key Actors in:
   - Leadership positions in governing, social or professional organizations or networks (either within or external to a state or territory), including private business, religious organizations, government positions (including, police forces, judicial system and military), informal and illicit power structures, media and academic institutions

   **WHAT & HOW:** Understand Key Actors’ Motivations and Means by describing:
   - What motivates Key Actors to exert influence on each of the political, economic, social and security systems in a country or area
   - How they exert influence (e.g. leadership capacity, moral authority, personal charisma, money, access to resources or weapons, networks or connections)

2. **Determine Key Actors’**

   **OBJECTIVES:** that promote violence or promote peaceful alternatives and

   **MEANS AND RESOURCES:** that are available to actors to accomplish those objectives, including:
   - Capacity for violence/intimidation
   - Financial resources (including taxes, “protection” fees, support from external actors or parties)
   - Valuable primary commodities (labor, information, forest products, minerals, high value crops, etc.)
   - Control of media outlets
   - Mass support
Using the information generated on Key Actors, the Assessment Team should draft brief narrative statements describing “why” and “how” Key Actors mobilize constituencies around Core Grievances and, separately, around sources of Social and Institutional Resilience. Each statement relating to Core Grievances becomes an entry in the list of Drivers of Conflict and each relating to sources of Social and Institutional Resilience becomes an entry in the list of Mitigating Factors.

The Assessment Team completes Step 3 of the analysis by listing the Drivers of Conflict and, separately, the Mitigating Factors by the strength of their impact on the conflict.

**Step Four:** Describe Opportunities for Increasing or Decreasing Conflict

The team should specify near-term events or occasions likely to provoke negative or positive changes in the status quo. In the ICAF, these events are referred to as Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity.

**Windows of Vulnerability:** Windows of Vulnerability are moments when events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally change the balance of political or economic power. Elections, devolution of power and legislative changes are examples of possible windows of vulnerability. Key Actors may seize on these moments to magnify the Drivers of Conflict.

**Windows of Opportunity:** Windows of Opportunity are moments when over-arching identities become more important than sub-group identities, for example, when natural disaster impacts multiple groups and requires a unified response. These occasions may present openings for USG efforts to provide additional support for a conflict’s Mitigating Factors.

In Step 4 the Assessment Team should:

1. **Identify potential situations that could contribute to an increase in violent conflict.**
   - Windows of Vulnerability are potential situations that could trigger escalation of conflict (e.g., by contributing to confirmation of the perceptions underlying Core Grievances), and often result from large-scale responses to: an increase of uncertainty during elections or following an assassination; an exclusion of parties from important events such as negotiations or elections; or attempts to marginalize disgruntled followers.

2. **Identify potential situations that might offer opportunities for mitigating violent conflict and promoting stability.**
   - Windows of Opportunity describe the potential situations that could enable significant progress toward stable peace (e.g., through conditions where Core Grievances can be reconciled and sources of Social and Institutional Resilience can be bolstered) such as those where overarching identities become important to disputing groups; where natural disasters impact multiple identity groups and...
externalities require a unified response; or a key leader driving the conflict is killed.

The Assessment Team completes Step 4 by considering Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity and prioritizing Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors identified in Step 3.

The Assessment Team uses the list of prioritized Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors as the basis for its findings, whether those findings are, for example: priorities for the whole-of-government Assistance Working Group that is setting parameters for the State Department’s Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance’s Country Assistance Strategy; recommendations to a Country Team preparing an application for NDAA Section 1207 funding; or recommendations to a whole-of-government USG R&S Crisis Response Planning or Contingency Planning team.

Task Two: Segue into Planning

When an ICAF analysis is undertaken to support USG R&S Crisis Response Planning or Contingency Planning, the findings of the conflict diagnosis feed into situation analysis and policy formulation steps of the planning process in the USG Planning Framework. When an ICAF analysis is undertaken to support interagency steady-state engagement or conflict prevention planning, after completing the diagnosis, the Assessment Team begins pre-planning activities. During the segue into these types of planning, the Assessment Team maps existing diplomatic and programmatic activities against the prioritized lists of Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors. This activity identifies gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict dynamics and is not intended as an evaluation of the overall impact or value of any program or initiative. The Assessment Team uses these findings as a basis for making recommendations to planners on potential entry points for USG activities.

Steps for Steady-State Engagement and Conflict Prevention Planning

Specify current USG activities (listing USG agencies present in the country and the nature and scope of their efforts)

- Identify the impact of these efforts on Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors
- Identify other efforts targeting similar outcomes and whether coordination mechanisms are in place

Specify current efforts of non-USG actors, including bilateral agencies, multi-lateral agencies, NGOs, the private sector and local entities

- Identify the impact of the efforts on the Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors
- Identify other efforts targeting similar outcomes and whether coordination mechanisms are in place

In addition, the team should also:

- Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors not sufficiently addressed by existing efforts, i.e., gaps
- Specify challenges to addressing the gaps
• Referring to Windows of Vulnerability, describe risks associated with failure to address the gaps
• Referring to Windows of Opportunity, describe opportunities to address the gaps

The Assessment Team draws on the information generated in Task 2, Segue into Planning, to determine potential entry points for USG efforts. The description of these entry points should explain how the dynamics outlined in the ICAF diagnosis may be susceptible to outside influence.