Working in the Nexus of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building
Case Studies and Insights from the World of Practice

The Conflict Resolution and Change Management in Transitioning Democracies Practicum Group, School of International Service, American University, Spring 2013
By Meagan Allen and Cate Broussard with Adam Gould
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Executive Summary

Democracy is widely assumed to be a stabilizing and contributing force to the attainment of Peace Writ Large, while peacebuilding is often assumed to support democracy promotion efforts. Given these assumptions, substantive focus has been placed on utilizing peacebuilding activities and knowledge in democracy building initiatives, especially in post-conflict environments and transitioning societies. However, despite this growing practice, there has been little systematic research undertaken to support these assumptions.

In order to better understand the role of democracy building in bringing about sustainable peace as well as the role of peacebuilding in supporting democratic processes, Partners for Democratic Change commissioned a research team from American University’s School of International Service to further explore these relationships. The findings presented in this report build on those findings of “A Conceptual Model of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building: Integrating the Fields”.

The project began by conducting a comprehensive literature review of the theories and principles used to explain peacebuilding and democracy building. The literature review was then used to develop a conceptual framework that integrates both peacebuilding and democracy building by drawing on theoretical models and underlying principles from both areas of work. The framework identifies three distinct spheres of focus that are key elements of the overlay of peacebuilding and democracy building: democratic institutions, civil society, and local capacity. The mutually reinforcing nature of these spheres is depicted in “The Nexus Model” of the framework (see Annex 2). Through the analysis of seven case studies (Section 2), this report builds on that framework by identifying examples and drawing insights from the world of practice where peacebuilding has been used to strengthen democratic processes or where work on governance or participatory democracy has been used to support or underpin peacebuilding efforts.

The project found that while having an integrated approach aimed at supporting democratic institutions, civil society, and local capacity is important for organizations that work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building, it is equally important that practitioners understand how each of these spheres affect the others, either positively or negatively. The project also found that peacebuilding contributes to work in these areas by emphasizing social cohesion, accountability, and local ownership, which are all essential to supporting democracy and Peace Writ Large.

The report identifies the important themes that emerged throughout the case studies that provide excellent examples of how these spheres interact to support each other and ultimately long-term sustainable peace. Having diverse vertical and horizontal partnerships strengthens an organization’s ability to have effective interventions and coordination at multiple levels, allowing for positive interaction between the spheres. The theme of inclusion emerges as central to the work in the nexus because it ensures the legitimacy of the process as well as the outcomes of interventions. Another central theme is the importance of accurate and open information, whether it is an individual’s knowledge of her civil rights or a constituent assembly’s understanding of what youth see as important to democracy.

From a policy perspective for donors and practitioners, this research produces insights for future work in the nexus:

- inclusionary approaches are crucial because they yield more accurate and sustainable outcomes as well as build trust and social capital;
- an understanding of an intervention’s role in bringing about long-term peace will support the initiative’s sustainability;
- a diversity of partners increases a program’s legitimacy;
• including multiple levels and directions of intervention will strengthen the overall effectiveness of the program;
• guaranteeing the free flow of accurate information between institutions and individuals is vital to ensuring accountability; and
• the innovative use of technology can be used to support more traditional approaches

Each of these findings in turn support recent trends in understanding peacebuilding and democracy building as components in larger dynamic systems. Overall, the findings presented in this report are a first step in the direction of establishing a strong knowledge base of how peacebuilding can be used to strengthen democratic processes and how democracy building can be used to reinforce peacebuilding initiatives. The project is intended to spark further reflection, research, and learning to test common assumptions in the conceptual understandings of peace and democracy and ultimately improve the ability of practitioners to design programs that support stable democracy and Peace Writ Large.

Meagan Allen and Cate Broussard

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMDEP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APD</td>
<td>Academy for Peace and Development</td>
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<td>AYON</td>
<td>Association of Youth Organizations Nepal</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Constituent Assembly</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Accord</td>
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<td>CPN-Maoist</td>
<td>Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist</td>
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<td>CPPB</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding</td>
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<td>CRD</td>
<td>Center for Research and Dialogue</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development of the United Kingdom</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<td>DRL</td>
<td>Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the United States Department of State</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPCMI</td>
<td>Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEBC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Programme</td>
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<td>KCSF</td>
<td>Kosovo Civil Society Foundation</td>
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<td>KTI</td>
<td>United States Agency of International Development Office of Transition Initiatives-Kenya</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG-F</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund</td>
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<td>MMPC</td>
<td>Multimedia Production Center</td>
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<td>MoCIT</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and Information Technology</td>
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<td>MoIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Information and Culture</td>
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<td>Nai</td>
<td>Nai Supporting Open Media in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Cohesion and Integration Commission</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NINE</td>
<td>Network of Iraqi Negotiation Experts</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National System of Permanent Dialogue</td>
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<td>NYA</td>
<td>National Youth Alliance</td>
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<td>P2P</td>
<td>Pathways to Peace</td>
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<td>Pan American Health Organization</td>
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<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participatory Action Research</td>
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<td>PDRC</td>
<td>Puntland Development Research Center</td>
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<td>Post-Election Violence</td>
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<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
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<td>SMS</td>
<td>Short Message Service</td>
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<td>SNA-K</td>
<td>Sisi ni Amani-Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>TED</td>
<td>Technology, Entertainment, and Design</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TOT</td>
<td>Training of Trainers</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlement Programme</td>
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<td>UNDEF</td>
<td>United Nations Democracy Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USAID/CMM</td>
<td>The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at the United States</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>YA</td>
<td>Youth Action</td>
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Section 1: Framing Peacebuilding and Democracy Building

1) The World of Practice

In contexts of democratization and transition, practitioners at times leverage peacebuilding approaches to strengthen efforts at building local capacity in order to support democracy. Progress towards a participatory democracy with strong democratic institutions in turn can help to ensure stability and development, which can contribute to Peace Writ Large. An overlay of peacebuilding and democracy building generates three areas of practice: local capacity, democratic institutions, and civil society. In transitions to stable democracies in a context of peacebuilding, none of these spheres should stand alone. “The Nexus Model” (see Annex 2) depicts a visual representation of the mutually reinforcing nature and theoretical underpinning of their interactions. The need for local capacity for strong democratic institutions and civil society is strongly grounded in the theory of democracy building. Peacebuilding theory cannot be divorced from these concepts; rather it articulates the essential material needed for success by prioritizing social cohesion, human capital, and accountability. The weight placed by peacebuilding theory on local ownership and capacity to peacefully address conflict is never more pertinent than in contexts of devolution of power from central to local authority structures.

Over decades of practice, organizations at every level have crafted interventions that mirror this conceptual understanding of the advantage of combining peacebuilding and democracy building. Their programmatic designs demonstrate an awareness of the need to focus simultaneously on strengthening democratic institutions, empowering civil society, and building local capacity, as well as the value added of utilizing peacebuilding activities. Whether implemented by local civil society or nongovernmental organizations, large international institutions, or a combination thereof through vertical or horizontal partnerships, the theories of change of these programs value integrated and comprehensive approaches to supporting democracy and peace. They cover a range of initiatives from training local leaders in conflict mediation to developing radio programs designed to educate communities on the importance of voting. Many of their activities emphasize multiple components of democracy promotion, while also utilizing the techniques and expertise of the field of peacebuilding, such as focusing on grassroots interventions, dialogue, community building, and supporting the voices of marginalized populations.

In order to learn from the world of practice, this report presents a series of rich cases of programmatic interventions embedded in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. After a discussion of the case selection criteria, the following section, “Examples from the World of Practice,” presents seven case studies. Each case begins by orienting the reader to the contextual dynamics of the intervention and provides a description of the implementing organization and partners. The cases then summarize the programmatic purpose and strategy as well as any notable outcomes of the intervention. Finally the authors situate the case in the conceptual model described above to explore what contributions the case makes to our understanding of work in the nexus. The third and final section of the report, “Insights,” identifies cross cutting themes from the case studies, discusses the major constraints faced by practitioners in the field of practice, and concludes by bridging challenges and innovations to draw preliminary insights for those who would value future interventions at the nexus of democracy building and peacebuilding.
2) Case Selection Methodology

The field of practice that exists in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy is extensive and difficult to represent in one report. In order to capture some variation in the range of interventions in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building, the authors established case selection criteria that would ensure a diverse group of cases. Figure 1 depicts the selection criteria and an expanded discussion of the methodology can be found in Annex 3. Though diversity in cases was obtained, the sample is not representative and therefore cannot allow for direct comparisons between cases. The overall analysis is meant to be descriptive not evaluative. Insights are drawn from an analysis of emergent themes from the cases and presented in the final section of this paper.

A significant challenge encountered in data collection was obtaining sufficient and accurate information on each intervention. In some cases, programs that clearly fit the criteria of “work in the nexus” in content could not be included in the analysis because reports were not made public and the implementing organization was either unable or unwilling to provide the necessary data upon request. Moreover, cases that have been cited are not entirely definitive because they were either ongoing or recently completed, meaning a final program evaluation was unavailable. For the majority of programs (6 of 7), data for the case studies were obtained from some type of summative evaluation. When information was insufficient, the authors sought feedback from the organization in order to ensure the accuracy of the case study analysis. Although the majority of the information was obtained from evaluation reports, each report did not measure outcomes and impact to the same extent. The authors of this report acknowledge the difficulty of evaluation of impact in peacebuilding and democracy building programs and note the trend to promote more rigorous evaluation; however, it is clear that donors and implementers have not always prioritized the monitoring and evaluation of program impact beyond output level indicators. Further discussion of evaluation is not within the scope of this paper, though it would be an important consideration in future analysis.
Section 2: Examples from the World of Practice

The seven cases presented below are ordered by both scope and level of intervention from smallest to largest. This section of the report is not designed to compare the cases with one another, but to draw out central themes and insights from an analysis of their relevance to “The Nexus Model” presented in “A Conceptual Model of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building.” It is our expectation that this foundational effort will inform the design of future research examining the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. In each case, the context of the intervention is given in order to provide the reader with relevant information on the type of deficit that the intervention is attempting to address (e.g., governance, security, etc.). There is also a brief description of the organization with an emphasis on its mission, followed by a more detailed account of the program’s strategy, activities, outcomes, and the challenges faced in implementation. The second section of each case presented addresses the relevance of the program to the nexus model as well as offering recommendations and highlighting key takeaways.

IRAQ: Mercy Corps - Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq (GPCMI)

Training Iraq’s leaders in negotiation skills in order to mitigate conflict and improve governance.

Contextual Dynamics of Intervention

In its turbulent recent history, Iraq has been plagued by violence and economic insecurity stemming from the Gulf War, internal uprisings by Shias and Kurdish Iraqis in the early 1990s, the 1998 U.S. aerial bombing campaign and the subsequent disarmament crisis, and finally Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. In the past few years Iraq has seen several critical transitions including provincial elections in January 2009, the handover of security to Iraqi forces in July 2009, the March 2010 parliamentary elections, and the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops in August 2010. While these developments indicate Iraq may be on a long-term trajectory toward greater stability, they were each followed by periods of acute violence and instability. Disputes over issues such as lack of services, land ownership, and business deals are common and the resulting violence is cast in tribal, sectarian, regional, and political terms. Given these challenges, Iraq has both security and governance deficits.

Organization

Founded in 1979, Mercy Corps aims to alleviate suffering, poverty, and oppression worldwide by helping people build secure, productive, and just communities. Its programs focus on increasing interaction between and accountability of the private, public, and civil society sectors as well as increasing inclusive participation within those sectors and creating mechanisms for peaceful change. The organization works in areas that pose great risk to human security including failing states, conflict zones, and countries that have endured natural disasters.

Program Purpose and Strategy

The goal of the Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq (GPCMI) program was to support influential Iraqi leaders to become capable of addressing tensions and conflicts in order to prevent
further violence and subsequently enable Iraq’s peaceful transition to democracy. Three main objectives were outlined as part of the program: establish an independent, sustainable network of negotiators; enable participants to use negotiation skills to improve governance and mitigate conflict; and strengthen the capacity of local leaders to address governance issues. The program, which was funded by a $2.5 million grant from the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) at the United States Department of State (DOS), was based on almost eight years of the organization’s previous operations in Iraq and ran from January 2009 through December 2010.

The GPCMI program brought together a network of 87 Iraqi leaders from both formal and informal governance structures - local government officials, political party leaders, tribal elders, religious leaders, and civil society representatives - who were committed to promoting good governance and reconciliation. The objective of the program was to provide training in new dispute resolution skills. This network, called The Network of Iraqi Negotiation Experts (NINE), includes Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurd, tribal elders, religious leaders, government officials, politicians, and civil society representatives from every region of Iraq. The network members were given basic and advanced training in negotiating as well as mentoring and other support. The successes of the network were widely publicized in order to increase the legitimacy of the group and instill confidence in the public. This legitimacy was further increased through the organization’s efforts to make this a locally owned initiative, giving the program a strong Iraqi “face.”

**Main GCPMI Activities:**
- Held four rounds of training for 87 participants (22.9% women) on basic concepts of negotiation including problem solving, communication skills, and framing messages.
- Held two rounds of advanced training for the same participants on advanced negotiation skills such as coalition and consensus-building techniques.
- Provided two Training of Trainers (TOT) sessions for 28 network members.
- Produced and disseminated a Conflict Management and Negotiation Toolkit.
- Participants gave 16 interviews to Iraqi media on their efforts and dozens of other media outlets covered their follow-on training.
- Facilitated a wrap-up conference, which was covered by over 12 media outlets, in Suleimaniyah that brought all of the participants together.
- Participants outlined plans to establish an NGO, the Negotiation and Conflict Management Center, which will carry their work forward.
- Established a website and Facebook group to help network members stay in regular contact with each other.

**Notable Outcomes**

The participants in the trainings have utilized the negotiation skills they learned, taking on more dispute resolution cases and negotiating successful agreements more frequently, resolving almost 130 local disputes. They also appear to have become involved in more complex dispute resolutions since the start of the trainings. The participants also experienced increased confidence in their ability to resolve disputes (from 66% to 80% of the participants), while more of the participants consider themselves highly expert in negotiation (from 27% to 54%). Furthermore, over 35 participants have led negotiation training workshops throughout the country, training a total of 1,530 people, over half of which were government or elected officials. One of the most significant outcomes of this program is that the frequency of violent incidents or threats of violence is measurably lower.
Challenges and Pitfalls to Implementation

One of the most significant challenges that program participants reported was political interference in their negotiation efforts. This is emblematic of the program’s lack of focus on policy debates. While government officials were included in trainings, this did not result in institutional reform, which may be a necessary step to enable the participants to act. In addition, while women were some of the most active and dynamic network members, they accounted for less than 25% of the total participants. This is likely due to a combination of facts; that negotiation in Iraq is an activity dominated by male elders, and only one of nine Mercy Corps Iraqi staff was a woman. Another challenge was that the trainings did not include more advanced areas of expertise such as land reform and commercial law, which was needed by network members as they began to take on more complex disputes. Finally, a major programmatic issue was the lack of measurement tools for evaluating how Iraqi citizens actually feel about the NINE network negotiated agreements. One of the primary underlying assumptions of GPCMI is that as leaders use problem solving techniques that address more inclusive interests, such as those of women, minorities, and people with disabilities, perceptions of governance will improve. Without proper operationalization of this assumption, there is no way to understand the true effectiveness of the program on democracy in the region.

Relevance to the Nexus

Mercy Corps designed the GPCMI program with both short- and long-term goals for peace. This is seen in the attempts to make the program’s initiatives “Iraqi-owned” through the activities related to publicity and future coordination, as well as the significant role given to local staff. The program’s emphasis on sustainability is also exemplified by the training of trainer activities.

The program’s approach matches “The Nexus Model” well through its use of applied conflict resolution methods to support democracy promotion. The program is based on the recognition that the existing formal institutions of democratic governance in Iraq were insufficient in effectively managing local conflict, and that individuals working both within and around those institutions needed conflict management and resolution skills and knowledge. It strengthens democratic institutions through training government officials, builds civil society by creating new networks and plans for an NGO, and builds local capacity throughout the initiative by training local leaders. While the program addresses all three spheres of the model, it only does so to a limited degree. As mentioned above, GPCMI lacked an explicit focus on policy and institutional reform, leading to significant interference by political actors in the negotiation efforts of the network members. While it may not have been in the scope of this program to address institutional reform, it would have strengthened the effectiveness of the program if Mercy Corps would have included procedures for participants to follow in the event of political interference or, better yet, would have partnered with organizations or other actors in the area who were able to focus on institutional reform.

The diversity of the program participants offered a unique opportunity for the leaders from different regions to interact and work with each other. While this diversity also increased risk of noncooperation, most participants cited it as a programmatic strength. This is likely because the interaction between network members offered by the trainings essentially acted as a trust-building opportunity. The inclusive nature of the training program reflected the larger need for inclusivity in the democratization process.
Recommendations/Takeaways

- Mercy Corps’ selection of diverse participants significantly contributed to the effectiveness of the program, but a lack of emphasis on women’s representation prevented it from reaching its full potential. A truly comprehensive program will consider both diversity and inclusion of women.

- Peacebuilding and democracy building programs are likely to be more sustainable when they are designed with an understanding of how they affect long-term peace. A forward-looking approach forces program designers to plan for post-program sustainability.

- Organizations focusing on promoting democracy should consider how applied conflict resolution methods, such as negotiation training, could be used to address the multiple aspects of democracy building and promote coordination, compromise, and cooperation within the competitive democratic system of conflict management.

- Programs that primarily include grassroots level interventions may need to be paired with interventions (possibly through partnerships) at higher levels to ensure their effectiveness. The GPCMI program encountered issues because it did not adequately anticipate all the levels of necessary intervention.

For more information on this program, visit: http://www.mercycorps.org/.
SOMALI REGION: Interpeace - The Pillars of Peace Program (Pillars)

Consolidating peace and establishing community responsive governance through consensus-oriented approaches.

Contextual Dynamics of Intervention

Somalia has been in a state of civil war since 1991, leading to a protracted problem of state collapse, resulting in a widespread humanitarian crisis and a lack of functioning central government. The country is divided into three semi-autonomous regions: Somaliland in the north; Puntland in the northeast; and south-central Somalia. The south-central region has been the area most plagued by heavy fighting, mainly between pro-government forces and jihadist insurgents. In 2011 and 2012, Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops made some significant military gains, including securing control over Mogadishu. These gains have given rise to optimism for peace in the region’s near future. However, radical religious armed factions, such as Al-Shabaab, still pose a serious threat to the region’s stability. The prolonged violence has resulted in a region-wide lack of economic and social development as well as a lack of confidence in the democratization process. These challenges were drastically increased with the onset of severe drought and subsequent famine in mid-2011.

Organization

Interpeace is an international non-profit peacebuilding organization that was created in 1994 by the United Nations (UN). The organization became independent in 2000 but maintains its strategic partnership with the UN. Interpeace’s approach to peacebuilding focuses on inclusive, nationally led processes of change as well as localized capacity building and conflict management in order to ensure local ownership of initiatives. In the Somali region, Interpeace works with three partners: the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Somaliland; the Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC) in Puntland; and the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in the south-central region of Somalia. While Interpeace provides strategic and institutional support, these organizations are staffed and led by Somalis who take the lead in the implementation of projects.

Program Purpose and Strategy

Launched in 2009, the Pillars of Peace Programme (hereafter referred to as “Pillars”), funded by the European Commission (EC), Denmark, DfID (UK), Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), builds on the organization’s twelve years of previous work in the area. The program aims to consolidate peace and establish community responsive governance in the region through consensus-oriented and integrated approaches. In this program, Interpeace utilizes a peacebuilding approach to support state building by using a Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology, which enables communities to create approaches to address social, economic, and political issues that are standing in the way of sustainable peace. The assumption is that the PAR methodology builds trust and understanding among community members and instills local ownership of the initiatives.

Pillars focuses on key areas of peacebuilding and state building that were identified by the local partners and confirmed by the participating communities. There are three pillars per region based on what was deemed of highest priority in each region:
- Democratization; Decentralization; and Social Reconciliation (Somaliland)
• Security and Rule of Law; Democratization; and Decentralization (Puntland)
• Social and Political Reconciliation; Decentralization and Governance; and Strengthening of Civic Actors, Diaspora, and Business Community (south-central Somalia)

The Pillars of Peace Programme began by bringing together community members, civil society actors, business leaders, political leaders, traditional elders, and representatives of youth, women’s groups, IDPs, minority groups, professionals, and NGOs in a county-wide consultation process, the “Pillar Mapping Exercise”, which was conducted between 2009 and 2012, in order to identify what they thought were the main barriers to peace and how to address them. Through dialogue and consensus building, these stakeholders were able to collectively establish mechanisms for moving forward. Key activities in the exercise included literature reviews, interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), consultations, and debates. Many of these activities were filmed in order to capture the views expressed with an aim to further stimulate discussion by linking different populations. Over 1500 Somalis participated in the mapping exercise, which was facilitated by the CRD in the south-central region, the APD in Somaliland, and the PDRC in Puntland.

CRD Pillar Mapping (over 500 participants)
• Facilitated a Reconciliation Pillar Mapping Exercise in Galgaduud, Hiiraan, and South Mudug in order to identify obstacles to social and political reconciliation.
• Facilitated a Decentralization Pillar Mapping Exercise in South Galkayo, Hobyo, Wesil, Addaad, Abudwak, Guriceel, and Dhusamareeb in order to identify challenges to an effective decentralized governance system and map out existing governance structures and practices.
• Facilitated a Civil Society Pillar Mapping Exercise in Galgaduud and South Mudug in order to map the civic actors in the region and identify the challenges hindering the civil society, business community, and Diaspora’s engagement in peacebuilding activities.
• Facilitated a preliminary Hiraan Region Mapping Exercise in order to capture the current political, economic, and social reconstruction issues facing the Hiiraan region.

APD Pillar Mapping (over 600 participants)
• Facilitated a Democratization Pillar Mapping Exercise with the aim of promoting community dialogue on the state of political pluralism in Somaliland, identifying key issues pertaining to the democratization process, and highlighting sustainable mechanisms for public involvement.
• Facilitated a Decentralization Pillar Mapping Exercise in order to identify challenges to decentralized local governance in Somaliland, identify solutions to those challenges, raise community awareness of these challenges, and create a space for dialogue on these issues.
• Facilitated a Social Reconciliation Pillar Mapping Exercise with the objective of identifying the root causes of the existing conflicts in and around the country, highlighting the state of reconciliation among communities in Somaliland, identifying early warning signs of conflict, identifying challenges to social reconciliation mechanisms, and engaging stakeholders, especially marginalized community members, in open dialogue about these challenges.
• Organized a three-day National Program Group Meeting in Hargeysa in October 2010 with 120 participants in order to validate and prioritize the ADP Pillar Mapping results.

PDRC Pillar Mapping (over 700 participants)
• Facilitated the Security and Rule of Law Pillar Mapping Exercise in order to identify the major problems surrounding the security situation in Puntland and the challenges to achieving security, rule of law, and social reconciliation in the region.
• Facilitated the Democratization Pillar Mapping Exercise with the purpose of identifying the challenges to creating a functioning democracy in Puntland and determining the stakeholders’ perspective on the democratization process.
• Facilitated the Decentralization Pillar Mapping Exercise in order to identify major obstacles to establishing effective local and municipal district councils, assess what social services are provided by local governments, and determine the level of community participation in local governance decisions.
• Organized a Puntland Stakeholders’ Meeting in Garowe in May and September 2010 with 150 participants in order to validate and prioritize the PDRC Pillar Mapping results.

Notable Outcomes

Through the various Pillar Mapping Exercises facilitated by Interpeace’s local partners, program participants identified several crosscutting themes. First, there was a significant level of overlap between the pillars that each region identified, with the most common pillars being Democratization, Decentralization, and Social Reconciliation. Second, there was also some overlap in many of the challenges identified by participants, cutting across all of the identified pillars. Common challenges included mistrust among communities, poverty and unemployment, lack of necessary skills, security issues, limited collaboration and communication (both horizontally and vertically), weak institutional capacity, lack of public confidence in institutions, issues resulting from clan-based cleavages, and lack of public understanding and participation. Third, several of the recommendations made by participants were rooted in the concepts of local ownership and inclusion. For instance, the CRD Reconciliation Pillar Mapping Exercise concluded that reconciliation processes are more successful when they are locally led. In addition, recommendations such as enlisting the support of Somali diaspora, supporting the role of civil society in peacebuilding, and engaging local actors in political processes are all methods of advocating for inclusive processes.

The mapping process also provided a strong foundation for the more participatory action-oriented phase of Pillars in which Steering Committees, comprised of key stakeholders, took the lead on translating recommendations from the mapping exercise into concrete policies and outcomes, supported by the partners’ continual engagement with the population and provision of supporting research.

Challenges and Pitfalls to Implementation

The overall context presented immense challenges with the volatile political landscape and escalating violence in south-central Somalia impacting all areas of the Somali region with renewed displacement of people from Mogadishu and other parts of south-central Somalia. For instance, CRD’s Pillar Mapping Exercise had to be reduced in early 2011 to only the central regions and did not include Hiraan until later in 2011 and 2012. An increased incidence of targeted assassinations and use of improvised explosive devices was also seen in Puntland.

Additionally, this phase of the program was challenging as it marked a transition from community-based peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives (in some cases considered “fire-fighting,” or responding to conflicts that had already arisen) to a more institutional form of peacebuilding that deliberately brought together all stakeholders with relevance to a particular theme. This connecting of the dialogue-based peacebuilding to a more institutionally-based peacebuilding was very important, but as with any transition, challenging as well.

Relevance to the Nexus

The PAR methodology employed in the exercise provides an appropriate example of “The Nexus Model” because its ultimate aim was to build trust and understanding between participants through inclusion of a
diverse representation of communities with a special focus on youth, women, and minorities. Both the concepts of trust and inclusion are central to the model because, as the model highlights, the interactions between the different “spheres” of peacebuilding and democracy depend on relationships of trust built through systems of accountability. The exercise’s methodology also contributed to the sustainability of the program because it relied heavily on local implementing partners to facilitate the focus group discussions and interviews, creating a sense of local ownership. The program’s sustainability is further enhanced by the plans for follow-up by the steering committees as well as the innovative use of filming in order to induce future dialogue between communities.

The Pillars of Peace that were identified by participants in the exercise paralleled the “spheres” highlighted in the model. The Democratization, Decentralization and Governance, and Security and Rule of Law pillars are all well identified in the model’s Democratic Institutions sphere, while the Strengthening of Civic Actors pillar is identified in the model’s Civil Society sphere. The Social and Political Reconciliation pillar does not directly parallel a sphere, but is represented in the interaction of each sphere of the model because community cohesion and trust is necessary for each interaction to be successful. The common challenges identified by participants are also paralleled in the model. There were several challenges that are well addressed by the Local Capacity sphere, including lack of skills, poverty and unemployment, limited collaboration, security issues, and generally weak institutional capacity resulting from lack of finances. These challenges show how local capacity is an important aspect of both democratic institutions and civil society because they were challenges identified in all of the pillars. Other challenges, such as lack of public understanding and participation, are also represented directly in the Civil Society and Local Governance spheres.

**Recommendations/Takeaways**

- Inclusionary peacebuilding approaches like the PAR methodology used in the Pillar Mapping Exercise are important strategies not only because they yield more accurate and sustainable outcomes, but also because the process entails vital trust building, which is essential to both democracy and Peace Writ Large.
- The pillars and challenges identified by participants indicate that democratic institutions, civil society, and local capacity are essential and constantly interacting aspects of sustainable democracy.

For more information on this program, visit http://www.interpeace.org/.
AFGHANISTAN: Internews Network - Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP)

Supporting an independent media to increase civic participation and government accountability.

Contextual Dynamics of Intervention

Afghanistan has been in a state of war for twenty-five years, leading to a ruined economy, failed institutions, and devastated people. While “Operation Enduring Freedom” has involved the support of the U.S. Government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other international partners to rebuild and reconstruct the country as well as to combat terrorism, it is likely that the Afghan government will continue to have security issues once those forces leave the country. Although President Karzai’s current government has been in place since 2001, it has several weaknesses that can be associated with a new government, such as its inability to independently and effectively provide services and security for its citizens.

Organization

Formed in 1982, Internews Network is an international non-profit organization that aims to empower local media worldwide in order to ensure that people have the ability to connect, have access to the information they need, and are able to make their voices heard. Many of its efforts focus on capacity building at the community level through training media professionals and citizen journalists, providing innovative media solutions, enabling increased coverage of important issues, and helping to establish or reform policies which ensure open access to information. Internews’ programs create spaces for dialogue and debate with the goal of bringing about social and economic progress.

Program Purpose and Strategy

The USAID-funded Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) is designed to support the development of an independent, legitimate, and pluralistic media sector that provides accurate and trusted news throughout Afghanistan. The project, which built on eight years of previous USAID media activities in Afghanistan, began in November 2010 and is scheduled to finish in September 2013. The premise of AMDEP is that a strong and independent media is essential to building a sustainable democracy in Afghanistan and that greater exposure to national, regional, and international news coverage encourages greater citizen participation in democratic processes.

AMDEP utilizes a media value-chain approach. The project strengthens local media through engaging civil society on democracy and governance, providing equipment and technical assistance to media outlets, training journalists and organizations, increasing public access to information and multimedia resources, creating forums for dialogue between citizens and government, and providing technical and policy advice to government bodies responsible for media regulation. AMDEP is also providing training to Afghan lawyers on media law, fostering innovation among youth, and increasing media professionalism and standards of practice.

Regional Broadcast Media Support:

- Provided training (broadcast journalism and studio operations) and satellite equipment to partner stations of Salam Watandar, an independent broadcasting organization established by Internews in 2003, which now broadcasts to all 34 provinces and over 12 million citizens.
- Provided training and technical support to TV and radio stations in multiple provinces.
Working in the Nexus of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building

• Supported the efforts of Nai Supporting Open Media in Afghanistan (Nai), a media advocacy and vocational training organization, which offers a variety of training courses, including training of trainer (TOT) courses, that are designed to increase the capacity of media professionals.
• Established the Journalism Training Center in Herat, which offers training in radio journalism, TV journalism, and journalism essentials.

Multimedia Production Centers (MMPCs):
• Established four Anaar Multimedia Centers, which are free Internet facilities, to provide multimedia training and access to new media and web-based platforms for citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs).
• Hosted iHub (Innovation Hub) meetings, a forum of information and communication technology (ICT) professionals, at the MMPCs.

Media Solidarity, Advocacy, and Literacy:
• Strengthened media literacy and advocacy through broadcasting educational radio and TV programs on issues ranging from child abuse to agricultural advice.
• Produced an interactive radio program and accompanying website called “Fix It” in which citizens are enabled to communicate service delivery issues to government representatives.
• Assisted in the development and broadcasting of events designed to empower individuals to express their concerns on security and economic issues, including a TEDx event (independently organized TED event) in Kabul.
• Provided media law training on core concepts of media law and established forums for lawyers and law students in Afghanistan to meet and advocate for freedom of expression.
• Produced and disseminated the Media Law and Policy Training Manual to Afghan lawyers and government representatives and created the Media Law and Policy training of trainers curricula.
• Established the Afghan Youth Voices Festival, a program that includes training courses for youth on the use of multimedia tools.
• Organized a three-day conference that brought together government, commercial, and civil society experts to discuss ICT in Afghanistan.

Technical Assistance to Ministries:
• Provided capacity building and technical assistance, including the completion of a licensing assessment and spectrum management training, to media-related government ministries.
• Coordinated meetings between the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MoCIT) and the Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC) to enhance communication and coordination between as well as within the two ministries.

Notable Outcomes

While project implementation remains ongoing, AMDEP reports a number of significant outcomes to date. First, there has been a noticeable increase in interest for trainings that are supported by the project, namely for AMDEP-funded Nai training courses as well as the trainings and services offered by the MMPCs. This increased level of interest is likely a result of the tentative training successes. For instance, the MMPC in Jalalabad has played a vital role in increasing the area’s computer literacy. In addition, both radio and TV station managers have reported that those staff members who participated in studio operations trainings have been able to solve many technical issues on their own using skills gained during the trainings. There has also been an increase in coordination between the different Afghanistan media stakeholders. Media outlets and local businesses have formed new commercial agreements as a result of a Nai conference on advertising and the benefits of partnerships. Provincial TV stations have dramatically increased their content sharing, which is a sign of increased technical capacity as well as increased...
confidence among staff regarding their ability to produce quality content (a sign of successful broadcast journalism trainings).

Overall, the interim outcomes of the AMDEP project include an increase in the capacity of citizens to produce online social media content, an increase in the ability of the media sector to network and advocate for a free media environment, an improvement in the ability of the media to empower civic participation and community engagement, and improved interaction between government ministries, including the MoCIT and the MoIC. Further evaluation is required to know the extent to which the project contributes to sustainable democracy and Peace Writ Large.

Challenges and Pitfalls to Implementation

Some major project constraints that were encountered include funding fluctuations and uncertainties, shifting design priorities, staff turnover, and security-related delays and limitations. Environmental constraints included restrictive social norms that inhibited women’s participation in activities as well as security issues stemming from the state of conflict in the country. The most significant challenge faced in project implementation is that of sustainability. Many AMDEP initiatives lack effective income generation and are therefore unsustainable beyond the grant. This has been a challenge in the initiatives of Nai, Salam Watandar, the provincial TV stations, and the MMPCs.

Relevance to the Nexus

AMDEP provides a valuable example of “The Nexus Model” because its diverse set of activities aims to strengthen democratic institutions, build local capacity, and empower civil society while also encouraging accountability and combating corruption through enabling dialogue between the government and citizens. The project takes an integrated approach in its programming through promoting dialogue, providing technical assistance and training, and increasing public access to information and resources in order to support the overall programmatic goal of creating an independent, legitimate, and pluralistic media. The focus of these activities ranged from building the capacity of local media outlets to providing policy advice to government ministries. Despite the challenges discussed above, AMDEP may yet produce sustainable results due to its strong focus on building the capacity of local organizations and individuals as well as promoting innovation through initiatives such as the MMPCs.

However, AMDEP lacks an explicit long-term focus on how the media can or will affect the development of Peace Writ Large in Afghanistan. The project has an implied assumption that its efforts at democracy-promotion will support peace, but this is not entirely clear considering its activities. This lack of a long-term focus is seen in the weak planning for the financial sustainability of its initiatives. Additionally, certain key assumptions of this project may lead to dangerous unintended consequences if not addressed properly. The expectation that greater access to information through the media will lead to a more democracy-minded populace should be qualified. While the project already includes training on media standards and professionalism, it could benefit from more specific safeguards to prevent future exploitation of AMDEP initiatives by extremist groups, which are the primary regional security threat.

Recommendations/Takeaways

- AMDEP’s inclusive approach, using activities that involve a significant amount of discussion between different groups, including civil society and government actors, illustrates the importance of participation and legitimacy to any democracy building initiative.
- The project’s approach was integrated but lacked an explicit focus on its role in promoting long-term sustainable peace. Democracy-promoting organizations should design projects not only to
address multiple aspects of democracy, including strengthening democratic institutions, civil society, and local capacity, but also to be rooted in an understanding of how they support Peace Writ Large.

- Projects working in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building should also include a careful consideration of their assumptions and attempts to mitigate any unintended results of such assumptions.

For more information on this project, visit: http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/.
NEPAL: Search for Common Ground - Pathways to Peace (P2P)

Mobilizing youth in the democratic process by leveraging existing networks of local partners to create a joint statement to advocate for youth needs in a new constitution.

Contextual Dynamics of Intervention

In 2006, the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) ending a decade-long armed insurgency. The CPA called for the election of a Constituent Assembly (CA) under a transitional constitution that would be tasked with drafting Nepal’s permanent constitution as a Federal Republic. The new constitution, intended to establish the devolution of power to local communities, elicited high domestic and international expectations of peace dividends in this divided society. Yet, political instability and changing coalitions of governments ensured a prolonged and fraught constitution-making process within the CA, which was elected in 2008. Political maneuvering repeatedly delayed the deadline set for completion of the constitution. By 2010 and the time of implementation of this program, groups that had been marginalized for centuries had begun to advocate for their rights and place in society and its decision-making mechanisms, but community-level conflicts were erupting in the context of a large security and governance deficit.

Organization

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) was founded in 1982 with a mission “to transform the way the world deals with conflict: away from adversarial approaches, toward cooperative solutions”. Today it is an internationally recognized organization that implements programs in Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, with funding from various governments and multilateral institutions. SFCG has built a reputation in the field of peacebuilding by tapping into societies through radio and other innovative media programming. The organization also has a strong practice of working to empower and build the capacity of youth and women to engage in advocacy, while at the organization’s core is a fundamental belief in bottom-up peacebuilding.

Program Purpose and Strategy

Youth in Nepal played a significant role in the democracy movement that began in 1990 and later in the armed struggle. A baseline assessment of the context conducted by SFCG found that many young people in Nepal felt marginalized from the democratization process, though they had high expectations that their voices would be included in the constitution-making process. What’s more, ethnic division and political wrangling had sharply divided youth, potentially making them vulnerable to political manipulation. SFCG’s baseline also found youth were engaging in violence and participating in extremist political groups that acted as the primary spoilers of the peace and democratization process.

SFCG designed the Pathways to Peace program (P2P) with a long-term goal to structurally transform the ways in which youth participate in the civic and political arena of Nepal. By doing this, SFCG theorized youth could then make a substantial and positive contribution to the overall peace and democratic processes. In the short term, the P2P program sought to use civic education, leadership training, and applied conflict resolution to reduce the manipulation of youth to violence and to prevent them from playing a spoiler role in the peace and democratization process.
To accomplish these large goals, P2P designed activities to bring youth into the mainstream of civic engagement with a special emphasis on fostering cooperation among youth from different backgrounds and with varying political affiliations. Grants from the US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and the Asia Foundation allowed SFCG to establish partnerships with local civil society organizations to build local capacity in order to advocate for democratic change. SFCG worked in partnership with local NGOs to implement four key streams of activities:

- Civic Leadership Training: A Nepalese CSO, The Youth Initiative, conducted an experiential learning program training for emergent leaders from civil society, the private sector, political student unions, and youth organizations to strengthen participants’ leadership and non-adversarial advocacy skills and to build their capacity to build relationships across dividing lines.
- Civic Education through College Seminars: SFCG conducted seminars on university campuses in partnership with campus-based student organizations on democratic institutions, rule of law, constitution development and political affairs.
- Policy Development and Advocacy: The Association of Youth Organizations Nepal (AYON) facilitated the establishment of a National Youth Alliance (NYA) to represent youth wings of political parties, youth-focused civil-society organizations, and youth-led groups. Another local partner, Youth Action (YA), also facilitated Youth Constituent Assemblies at the regional and national levels, enabling young leaders from diverse political, caste, and ethnic backgrounds to write a youth constitution.
- Youth Media in Print, Radio and TV: SFCG partnered with Y! Magazine to publish a quarterly youth magazine aimed at providing an outlet for young people's perspectives. Each issue of the magazine had a circulation of 4,000 copies. SFCG also incorporated democracy, governance, and peacebuilding themes into its existing radio program. SFCG and a local media NGO co-produced the youth drama series that reached approximately 3.2 million youth in 75 districts and incorporated civic ideals.

The intended results of the program were a more politically aware youth, youth inclusion in dialogues on key civic and political issues, and youth participation in democratization process from the grassroots to the national level.  

**Notable Outcomes**

There were a number of important outcomes determined by an evaluation of P2P. From a peacebuilding theory standpoint, the project successfully brought youth from different sectors, geographic locations, genders, and ethnic and professional backgrounds into a consolidated advocacy platform. Moreover, the majority of program participants reported changes in awareness at the individual level. However, the most tangible outcome of the program was the creation and promulgation of the Youth Charter, which received widespread support, recognition, and ownership. In the creation of the charter, P2P succeeded in facilitating the involvement of youth from different regions and socio-political arenas and CA members, especially young CA members, leaders of students’ wings of political parties, and young political leaders. Prior to the dissolution of the CA in 2012, the Youth Charter had been used as a reference document for youth agendas while drafting a new constitution, which was an important attempt to strengthen this quintessential democratic institution.

**Challenges and Pitfalls to Implementation**

P2P operated in a context of political instability, as best evidenced by the dissolution of the CA by the Prime Minister in 2012. P2P was also one of SFCG’s first interventions in the country with local partners. As a result of the organization’s inexperience in the country with local partners, feedback from local
partners indicated that SFCG focused more on accomplishing programmatic goals rather than on the experience of P2P to develop partnership systems. Program documentation made clear that SFCG as well as its local partners faced numerous significant contextual constraints to implementation. Of note, however, are those that could be addressed through a more integrated and sustainable project design. A final evaluation of the project suggested that certain project design aspects could have worked around the constraints. For example, the evaluation reported that P2P failed to engage senior political party leadership, which suggests the program could have been more strategic in engaging political leadership had it expanded its focus to include addressing issues of power and centralization of political leadership. As it was, the P2P project activities were insufficiently robust to promote democratic practices in the political party structures, a feat which requires a larger and continued direct engagement with political party leadership. A second major challenge identified in the evaluation was sustainability. For example, P2P’s civic education-based collaboration with universities became a one-time event whereby the program was replicated in only a handful of colleges without larger effect. For this component, as well as the others, the evaluation found that there were no specific follow-up mechanisms established to support ongoing needs of capacity building and advocacy, which indicates design flaws rather than contextual constraints.

Relevance to the Nexus

The ongoing transition of Nepal into a federal republic presents the case of a complex process of democratization and devolution in a country of multiple groups vying for power. Since the 1990s, Nepalese civil society has been working to engage in the democratic process, particularly those marginalized groups who might not currently have a say in existing power structures. Interventions such as P2P, supported by foreign donors but implemented by a civil society-focused international NGO in partnership with local CSOs, rest within an important and frequented functional area within the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. SFCG explicitly targeted its program to align with the larger goals of participatory democracy and sustainable peace. In its approach, SFCG used a focus on the democratization process to promote the finding of common ground across the dividing lines within the youth population. In this way, SFCG deployed democracy building to reinforce peacebuilding. In terms of “The Nexus Model”, P2P promoted civil society development in a way that buttressed institution building (the constitution), while simultaneously promoting “good” civil society that bridged ethnic divides.

There is much to be learned from the Pathways to Peace program. Much of its design targeted key elements of the best practices of peacebuilding and democracy building, and was expressly aligned to work within the larger system to contribute to Peace Writ Large. The intervention tapped into the concepts of pluralism and inclusivity as it engaged with and built the capacity of youth, a clear programmatic focus based on the findings of a baseline needs assessment. The resultant project design targeted youth as marginalized but important stakeholders in the democratic process. Rather than accepting youth as the key spoilers of the peace and democratization processes, P2P intentionally mobilized youth from diverse backgrounds to build their individual capacities to improve the democratic institutions through leadership and conflict resolution skills. It also sought to increase their collective strength through fostering the networks of relationships that are critical components of a strong civil society (see “A Conceptual Model of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building”). P2P brought numerous organizations into a single, consolidated platform to work on a common goal of youth participation in the democratic process and peacebuilding in Nepal.

P2P supported peace and democracy by channeling the energy of youth movements into the constitution-writing process, giving them a stake in the democratic transition and demonstrating that they could pursue their interests within a democratic system, thus reducing the tendency to destabilize or reject the process. This further emphasizes the importance of making the process of democracy building pluralistic and inclusive, especially in post-war situations, and demonstrates one way in which the peacebuilding field
can help to inject pluralism and inclusiveness into a democracy building process (constitution making). In spite of the challenges to engaging political leadership, ensuring sustainability, and fostering new local partnerships, activities specifically worked to create a tangible outcome in the form of the Youth Charter that would be used in the constitution writing process to document the advocacy of this group. The final evaluation makes clear that without SFCG’s support for the local NGOs that convened larger subsets of the target group from across the nation using their existing network, the youth assemblies that produced the charter would have not been as successful.

**Recommendations/Takeaways**

- SFCG conducted a baseline needs assessment that allowed them to articulate how a program that would bring together youth could fit in the overall process of promoting Peace Writ Large. Rather than solely implementing one-off capacity building activities with youth, local NGOs organized youth to come together to practice their leadership skills and write a document that could assist in the constitution writing process.
- When programs that aim at capacity building do so with the intermediary goal of fostering a network of relationships between otherwise adversarial communities, they are likely to foster greater applied knowledge of conflict resolution, advocacy, and acceptance of pluralism. While all work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building faces stark challenges and daunting constraints, strategic project design and good monitoring of project implementation can assist in the sort of adaptive implementation necessary to reach desired outcomes.

For more information on Search for Common Ground visit [http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_mission.html](http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_mission.html)
KENYA: Sisi Ni Amani-Kenya (SNA-K) – Peace TXT

Kenyan NGO uses SMS to promote civic education and peace, while connecting grassroots to institutions.

Contextual Dynamics of Intervention

Over 1,000 people were killed and 350,000 internally displaced in the violence that erupted after the 2007 disputed election in Kenya. This post-election violence (PEV) pitted ethnic groups against each other in the slums of Nairobi and the western regions of Kenya. Analysts predicted Kenya, once touted as a beacon of stability in Africa, was on the precipice of collapse and civil war. While some believe ancient ethnic hatreds were unearthed, and the elections triggered the inevitable, the majority of observers saw the PEV as a continuation of a cycle of violence in Kenya around elections. Politicians in Kenya often mobilize their ethnic groups as voting blocks, even paying youth to engage in incitement and violence against the political competition.

In 2010, Kenyans accepted a new constitution that would institute devolution of power to the county and district levels. This fundamental reorganization of governance was premised on the assumption that local governance promotes greater accountability and engagement. The 2013 elections marked an important moment for Kenya’s democratization towards the larger goal of Peace Writ Large. Many local and international organizations operated reconciliation, civic education, and conflict prevention programs before and during the elections.

Between 2008 and 2012, international actors funded and implemented projects for conflict prevention, intervention, and resolution. Most critically, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funded the creation of institutions for conflict warning and peace and reconciliation within the government of Kenya, at a cost of $2.525 million. With the support of development partners and CSOs, the government established the National Secretariat for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (NSC), whose mandate is to coordinate peace building and conflict management interventions in Kenya. The UNDP also funds “District Peace Committees” (DPC), mandated by the peace agreement mediated by Kofi Annan. DPCs reportedly prevented post-election violence from spreading to the normally volatile northern and coast provinces during early 2008, compared to large-scale violence in areas such as Nairobi’s slums where such structures did not yet exist. NGOs have also positioned themselves as key players in supporting this peace infrastructure and addressing tensions at the community level, mainly through the use of media as a means of promoting reconciliation and peace.

Organization

Founded in 2008 in response to the PEV, Sisi ni Amani (SNA-K) is a Kenyan NGO that partners with a range of organizations and institutions within Kenya and internationally to promote civic education and peace in communities. Since 2010 the organization has been operating programs in the slums of Nairobi and rural communities in Narok County to promote peace through the use of Short Message Service (SMS) technology. The organization engaged these communities, and the youth in particular, in a civic engagement and violence prevention campaign that leverages SMS interventions to provide needed civic education, mobilize for community-level debates and forums, and prevent and mitigate violence. SNA-K considers partnerships and collaboration key components of the credibility of its brand. Between 2011 and 2013, SNA-K partnered with district peace committees, local churches, grassroots civil society and NGOs and media, as well as a large African media corporation to expand its text messaging intervention. SNA-K also worked closely with diverse state institutions such as Kenya’s National Steering Committee.
on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).

SNA-K believes that access to credible information can help to reduce tensions that escalate to violence. It sees its combination of voter education, civic engagement, and reaching individuals at key times to “help them think twice about their actions” as the most effective response to politicians’ attempts to manipulate and mobilize the public through fear and rumors. The context of devolution and the new constitution in Kenya created an important gap in civic knowledge among the population. SNA-K attempts to address that gap through SMS-based programming in conjunction with horizontal and vertical partnerships.

Program Purpose and Strategy
Prior to the 2013 elections, SNA-K received funding from three foreign donors and one Kenyan company to scale its SMS-based programming for civic education and peace to major hotspots throughout Kenya. Each of the following funders offered expertise in addition to funding to support the integrated approach to civic engagement:

- Poptech, a “global community of innovators, working together to expand the edge of change,” contributed funds to SNA-K to scale and test outreach as well as to improve message creation processes and guidelines. SNA-K’s work under this support contributes to the global PeaceTXT initiative, which seeks to understand how and when mobile technology can be used to prevent violence.
- The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives-Kenya (KTI) funded the piloting of SNA-K’s methodology during a 2011 election in a Nairobi constituency, a project that combined SMS and community forums to mitigate land conflict in Narok. The project expanded SNA-K’s SMS service through partnerships in seven new communities.
- The Indigo Trust supported the development of the open-source Vumi Go SMS platform by Praekelt Foundation to include several key features on the platform.
- Safaricom, a large multi-media corporation in Kenya, donated 50 million messages to promote peace during the election cycle.

SNA-K’s overall goal for the scaled intervention was to promote peaceful elections in Kenya. To do this organization operated a complex and integrated intervention under an untested theory of change: a targeted short message from the right source at the right time can provide critical information to change an individual’s actions and if done strategically can interrupt behavior chains that lead to violence.

The organization expanded from its original communities to identified conflict hotspots prior to the election through the following phases:

- Forming Relationships: The first phase of activities was the process of gaining the credibility as a source of information. SNA-K built relationships with key community leaders and members, creating a network of SNA-K affiliates in each new community. In Nairobi and Narok, SNA-K’s initial and long-term areas of focus, debates and forums were ongoing; each brought community members together for civic education and invited political aspirants to engage with constituents on policy issues. Debates, SMS messages, radio programs, and work through ongoing activities of existing peace networks were used together for the most in-depth programming in Nairobi and Narok.
- Creating SMS: Subsequent to establishing its brand in all beneficiary communities, SNA-K engaged target communities and stakeholders in focus group discussions (FGDs) to develop SMS messages. SNA-K also received pro-bono consultation from Ogilvy & Mather, an advertising
firm, to use corporate expertise on messaging for behavior change to develop relevant and effective messages. The company trained the SNA-K team to use information from partners and FGDs to construct strategic and contextually relevant messages.

- Establishing Protocol and Training Partners: SNA-K then solidified its SMS protocols, which did not simply establish when to send an SMS; the SMS protocols also included guidelines based on local FGD research, conflict sensitivity, and advertising expertise. Prior to the election, SNA-K partnered with and trained peace workers in communities to monitor conflict (and the elections) and feed information to the SNA-K staff. Incoming information from the ground fed into the SMS protocol system to generate appropriate civic education and peace promoting SMS messages, which SNA-K considered targeted interventions and conflict mitigation mechanisms.

**Notable Outcomes**

SNA-K has yet to systematically evaluate the results of its intervention in the lead up to and throughout Kenya’s March 2013 elections. Nevertheless, initial unsolicited feedback indicates that SNA-K’s intervention had numerous positive outcomes. SNA-K community organizers received a high degree of respect in communities. Kenyan and international media coverage also showed a positive brand. It has documented cases of where it was able to provide information from its local partners to the NSC. The following was a typical success story from the intervention:

*During and following the elections, SNA-K sent messages and helped flag security concerns in Dandora to the NSC. Dandora was one of the areas that experienced the most tensions and incidents in the days leading up to and following the elections. On election day, youths supporting a particular political party overwhelmed police in Phase 4 to prevent voting. This was brought under control by backup security, and SNA-K sent a message.*

*Feedback from residents included comments that, the message “helped to calm down the situation” and “was sent at the right time,” because, according to partners “they think the whole world was watching Dandora. Everyone knew what was happening.”*

*Following a second message, our Dandora co-ordinator summarized feedback from eight outreach workers in the area. They said: “the message helped to maintain calm, reminds us of our community, makes us be united, shows someone thinks about Dandora, reminds us to be peaceful all the times, and thanks for reacting and responding to our concerns.”*

SNA-K’s CEO noted that it was most important that SNA-K had diverse national-level partners. The NSC in particular was a very important partner: SNA-K staff reported every instance of tension/violence to NSC officials, including in the case above. In one case the Inspector General followed up on information from SNA-K about local arming and used this information in a public announcement. SNA-K also reported when there were incidents of police violence; these were then communicated to the highest levels in the police department. SNA-K found that their invention relied on the mutually reinforcing nature of a combination of messages, on-the-ground work, and effective collaboration with relevant institutions. This was demonstrated by situations in which sending a messages would not have been appropriate though SNA-K was still able to report to relevant institutions for rapid response. The organization believes this ultimately helped both to mitigate conflict and to increase its reputation in the target communities. Nevertheless, the key assumption made by the program (that SMS would interrupt behavior chains that lead to violence) has yet to be assessed. The organization intends to complete an
evaluation by July 2013 and will continue the interventions to support the process of devolution and land reform in Kenya in the coming months and years.\textsuperscript{33}

**Challenges and Pitfalls to Implementation**

SNA-K was challenged to scale their model quickly throughout the country prior to the election. Since the organization had worked for two years in some communities and less than two weeks in others, initial reflection indicates that the model of understanding the nuances of the community to send targeted messages works better given the time to establish in-depth connections within a community by working with and training local partners. In scaling their operation throughout the western regions of the country in the build up to the election, SNA-K faced a primary time bound constraint: after the funding was granted, there was not enough time to build authentic and trusting relationships in all areas throughout the country. In addition, SNA-K found that even when they were able to expand and train local coordinators in new areas, their operation ended up competing with politicians in outreach and in the attempt to establish its nonpartisan reputation.\textsuperscript{34}

While one of the organization’s strengths was its ability to combine funding from a range of donors, this also presented SNA-K with a significant constraint: its multiple stakeholders each required the small staff to fulfill different administrative and reporting mechanisms while implanting the program. The CEO added as well each funder wants to know the impact of SNA-K’s intervention, but did not contribute additional funds for an evaluation. Therefore, the program’s assumptions and theory of change remain unexamined by an evaluation. However, SNA-K hopes to be able to conduct an evaluation shortly that will determine the extent of impact for both its long term and short term approaches to establishing partnerships and relationships with communities.\textsuperscript{35}

**Relevance to the Nexus**

In the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building, civil society can act as a bridge between the people and the government, allowing for mutual communication. In Kenya, the democratic election contested in 2007-2008 tipped the balance within the system of Kenyan society producing a negative spiral to violent conflict. While it is clear that no one intervention can restructure the system, SNA-K’s integrated approach to peacebuilding reflects an understanding that conflict is a complex and holistic system, not a simple linear process.\textsuperscript{36} Its SMS program aimed to strengthen the institutions of Kenyan democracy (the new constitution, the devolution process, and elections) by increasing information flows and education in the hopes of reducing violence, which reflects a critical understanding of the interdependent relationship of peace and democracy. The organizations engages beneficiaries at the individual, community, and institutional level to create structures (through the use of mobile phone technology) to facilitate communication at its most simple level and to engage Kenyans in the building of civic culture at a more complex outcome level. SNA-K explicitly taught communities the devolution process through community debates and civic education events, building local capacity for local good governance, which is essential given that Kenya, like many nations, is undergoing democratization in tandem with devolution.

Community level change has not always had enough of an effect to produce a larger impact. SNA-K, therefore, strategically partnered with a diverse set of national institutions before and during the elections. Diversity in this regard proved important to protect the reputation and brand of the organization. Within its approach, the organization makes an important assumption that the right kinds information – e.g., voter education and civic education – can lessen uncertainty in a population (during elections) and potentially reduce a population’s vulnerability to manipulation. From the experience from 2013, it would appear that civic education and engagement has a positive effect, but SNA-K’s key assumptions remain to be tested.
Recommendations

- Based on SNA-K’s experience, organizations working in tense environments undergoing democratization would do well to seek diversity in national partners. This could be critical to ensuring the legitimacy of the intervener. Civic education requires credibility and inside sources of information from communities to understand social needs, particularly in a country undergoing the process of devolution. Moreover, these organizations should consider establishing mechanisms for connecting grassroots organizations to diverse national institutions.

- The integration of technology with local networks and other innovative approaches can bolster more traditional approaches. A key overall takeaway, however, is that SNA-K found that technology should be seen as a supplement to traditional peacebuilding programming, not a replacement. In an interview with SNA-K’s CEO, she said: “one of the most important parts of our work is integrating traditional and innovative communication. So while the SMS provide info on, for example, how to vote, and that can prevent confusion; the debates let people practically come together based on shared issues to build cohesion and a culture of peaceful resolution of issues.”

- The intervention is also informative and worth further research because of the potential for using SMS technology in programming of peacebuilding and democracy building. SNA-K’s initial findings suggest that there is a need for a nuanced and detailed understanding of when and how to use SMS based on local contexts. As SNA-K noted and implemented, there are certain situations in which messages cannot or should not be used, but further evaluation is needed to determine the extent of the intervention’s impact on Kenya’s largely peaceful elections.

- This local NGO relied on donor funding, but has a proven record of combining funding streams in a manner that enables them to keep their mission and activities focused on their primary goal of promoting peace in Kenya. The case highlights the role a local NGO can play in connecting grassroots movements to institutions working for peaceful democratic transitions through the use of information and communication technology.

For more information on this program/project, visit http://www.sisiniamani.org and http://sisiniamaniblog.wordpress.com.
KOSOVO: Kosovo Civil Society Foundation (KCSF)-
Empowering Civil Society Inclusion on Democratic Policy-
making in Kosovo

Creating structures for information flows between civil society and government in order to facilitate inclusion and engagement.

Contextual Dynamics of Intervention

Since the end of the war in 1999, Kosovo has been inundated with a range of actors seeking to consolidate peace and promote democracy. February 2008 saw Kosovo’s achievement of independent statehood with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. By 2009, Kosovo was undergoing a more homegrown process of democratic consolidation, where new institutions and structures for democratic governance were developing along with an increased demand from civil society and others for more inclusive government policymaking processes. Yet while Kosovo had over 3,000 national NGOs, there was little substantive policy engagement of Kosovar civil society. At the time of intervention, formal mechanisms for the inclusion of NGO and CSO perspectives into policy discussions with the government of Kosovo were weak and underutilized.

Organization

The Kosovo Civil Society Foundation (KCSF) is a national NGO that aims to build a strong civil society movement that will promote a democratic culture and be responsive to the socio-economic needs of the citizens of Kosovo. It has been active in initiatives to strengthen civil society in Kosovo since 1999, primarily acting as a capacity building and grant-making entity that facilitates information sharing within civil society and between it and the governmental and international actors.

Program Purpose and Strategy

The Empowering Civil Society Inclusion on Democratic Policy-making in Kosovo project sought to strengthen the capacities of civil society to play an active role in public policy shaping and the law drafting process. Its main objectives were to: build capacity of CSOs to influence policymaking; assist CSOs with immediate action on policy shaping; promote debate within civil society on CSO involvement in the public policy and law drafting processes; and increase the awareness of government on the enabling environment for participatory democracy. Its intended outcomes were for civil society to become an active, informed, and key partner in public policy and law making, able to react instantly on key public policy areas, and with an enabled environment to play this role.38

Over the time of implementation, the government was in the process of updating and consolidating its national framework for democratic governance. KCSF designed the program to act upon this opportunity. With support from the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), KCSF implemented the two-year, $325,000 project with a six month no-cost time extension from November 1, 2009, to April 30, 2012. Its main activities were to:

- Build CSO capacity through training and workshops on civil society inclusion in the policy process and develop and disseminate a user-friendly manual of European best practices;
- Provide legal assistance, coaching, and mentoring for the most active CSOs on key contributions to the policy making process;
Disseminate information and provide regular space for debate and experience sharing for CSOs and other stakeholders; and

Raise awareness of main state institutions on the role of CSOs in the processes and on the government role to create an enabling environment for participatory democracy through conferences, trainings, workshops, and publications.  

KCSF intended to improve the environment for citizen participation by addressing the consultative processes between the government and CSOs. The foundation felt that the lack of adequate public consultation had resulted in public policies and legislation that did not reflect citizen needs, resulting in citizen apathy and noncompliance. Using the Council of Europe’s approach to public participation, which presents the four steps of participation as information, public consultation, dialogue and then partnership (Diagram 1), the foundation located Kosovo in the first two steps of the diagram (information and consultation) and designed this project to strengthen both of them.

The intervention assumed that Kosovo’s democracy could be improved by increasing the amount of information available to CSOs on draft policies and legislation, which would improve the quality of public consultation on both the government and CSO sides. To do so the project supported a space for shared information through a CSO coordination platform, trained both CSOs and government, and widely disseminated best practices on public consultations and the benefits of a participatory, inclusive process.

The project targeted the willingness of the government to support a more engaged and constructive role for civil society in policy development, as well as civil society’s need for more information and consultation from the outset of these processes. There was a substantial level of interest and participation in the project from both sides and it was believed that the two-sided approach would strengthen the overall process. To coordinate its efforts in government ministries and CSOs, the KCSF built on an existing CSO forum in Pristina, the NGO Advisory Group (funded by an earlier UNDEF project), that had brought together CSOs advocating with the Assembly of Kosovo for legislative changes and expand it to include a broader range of CSOs and issues related to government policy making and drafting.

Notable Outcomes

KCSF reports that project results reflect the cumulative effects of civil society, international community, and government efforts to improve citizen participation in Kosovo. This project claims to have contributed to these efforts by moving gains forward and broadening their base. The overall approach of the intervention enabled more systemic outcomes. Because the project worked to change the structure of consultations rather than working on a specific law or case, it could potentially have a widespread impact. The project directly resulted in improved formal structures for public consultations. Moreover, the institutionalization of reforms made consultations less dependent on the good will of an individual public official.

The Advisory Group mechanism provided CSOs and government with a one-stop shop for acquiring and sharing information, discussing issues, and obtaining consolidated feedback on policies and legislation. The intervention developed partnerships with the key officials who were driving the reform process and with the group of CSOs in an Advisory Group. It continued and expanded the type of e-mail system started under the earlier UNDEF project where NGOs were able to receive regular e-mails with information on their sectors of indicated interest, such as upcoming consultations, legislative drafts, and
comments from other Advisory Group members. The foundation saw this a useful mechanism for the government officials because it meant they could reach most of the relevant CSOs through a single e-mail. While coordination mechanisms are not new among CSOs in Kosovo, previous efforts were seemingly less effective. It is likely that this intervention was more effective in this regard because of continuity of funding that allowed the project to build on the foundations of the Advisory Group and expand it as needed. The group also lacked a board of directors, enabling it to prevent repeating past negative experiences in which board members established other NGO that competed with the group for funding. Finally, the group appears to have remained above politics, serving an impartial role and promoting the principles and structures for public consultation rather than specific causes, which makes the mechanism useful for all CSOs regardless of their sector of interest.

An evaluation commissioned by UNDEF found that the project increased the awareness among CSOs and key government officials of the rationale for public consultation and the manner through which CSO input could improve public policies. It improved the government’s rules and procedures and ensured that relevant legal officers at the ministerial and municipal levels knew the changed procedures through training and development of an official manual. The revised rules require public consultations at an earlier stage in the process of policy formation, when the drafts are still in their formative stage. The program complemented the government side (democratic institution building) intervention with a complementary focus on civil society. KCSF increased the capacity for some CSOs to participate effectively and improving the enabling environment for civil society to engage in public policy and law making processes. Thus, the project increased CSO access and ability to make a more substantive contribution.

**Challenges and Pitfalls to Implementation**

The major challenges to the project include the fact that attitudes and long-standing practices take time to change, its impact was difficult to measure, and Kosovo’s society continues to struggle to include its Serb minority. It will take time and continued pro-active engagement by civil society to overcome Kosovo’s tradition of centralized decision-making and its tradition of limited public involvement in decision-making. KCSF was challenged to measure its overall impact. The coordination platform used by CSOs to enhance the content of different laws, not just to increase civic participation, expanded the impact of the project into the different public sector areas, but this impact was not captured. The project worked with some minority groups, primarily Kosovo-Bosnian CSOs in Prizren, but it did not work with Kosovo-Serb groups as anticipated in the project design. According to KCSF, it intended to bring in a Serbian trainer from Belgrade to mentor these CSOs, but an incident of ethnic violence at the start of the project made it difficult to work with them at the time.

**Relevance to the Nexus**

Kosovo has struggled to promote inclusive peace and democracy since the end of the war and the UN intervention in 1999. The case epitomizes many of the challenges of working to support peace and democracy in divided societies. It speaks to how certain democracy building initiatives, such as the KCSF, can help bridge the gap between civil society and democratic institutions, but without key approaches and techniques of peacebuilding, alienated minority groups might remain on the margins. At the core of the intervention was KCSF’s recognition of the power of information: the project worked to improve the flow of information between government officials and NGOs, which it saw as key to the creation of a proactive civil society and a responsive government. Yet while the project shows the important role civil society can play in expanding lines of communication through local capacity building, it risks producing more entrenched marginalization by building communication and linkages with some and not all of civil society.
The massive international intervention that, by the time this project was implemented, had lasted ten years had failed to build a democracy or progress towards Peace Writ Large. While much could be said on the failures and minor successes of this experiment in international peacebuilding, it is clear that one implication for our study of the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building is that external forces will not necessarily be able to facilitate the growth of civil society. Though democracy building is frequently attempted, theories of peacebuilding argue that there must be local ownership and that civil society is in essence a space that must emerge organically within a society, to receive later support from external interventions. The point, moreover, needs to be made that just as external actors cannot create civil society, nor can they exclusively define how civil society negotiates its relationship with its government. In this case, a local CSO organizing body was able to build relationships within the government to affect change from the inside with funding from UNDEF, in part because UNDEF did not “micro-manage” the funding. In an important contribution to practice, KCSF intentionally built upon work already done by CSOs and government offices with the Advisory Group who wanted to increase both the demand and supply side for public consultations.

**Recommendations/Takeaways**

- In contexts of post-conflict democratization, interventions can target policy makers and create structures and mechanisms to institutionalize information flows between government and civil society. It can be helpful to see such interventions from a demand and supply side perspective.
- Work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building can and should look for existing efforts upon which they can build (such as the Advisory Group) in order to increase their efficiency by decreasing duplication. To be clear, as with this case, any continuation of existing efforts must be analyzed and modified to improve its effectiveness and relevance for new initiatives. This speaks to the need for a community of reflective practitioners within lead CSOs such as KCSF.
- Facilitation mechanisms can also help ensure inclusion of minority groups when government officials and CSOs are trained in the legal codes for the process of participation. Although as the case points out, even when minorities are intended beneficiaries, their grievances towards the rest of society might exclude them from participation. This can lead to more entrenched marginalization.

For more information on this program/project, visit http://www.kcsfoundation.org
GUATEMALA: MDG-F Joint Program (JP) - Consolidating Peace in Guatemala through Violence Prevention and Conflict Management

*Strengthening democratic institutions to increase social inclusion and end structural violence in a post-war setting plagued by ongoing conflict.*

**Contextual Dynamics of Intervention**

Following an internal armed conflict that lasted nearly four decades, Guatemalan leaders signed a series of landmark Peace Accords in 1996. Years after the official end of the war, however, the country is plagued by both new conflict dynamics and persistent racial and gendered inequality. Sexual and gender-based violence is widespread, which is symptomatic of a lack of effective policies to promote gender equity. Legal protection for indigenous groups is even more severely lacking and the legal instruments to prosecute those who engage in hate crimes or economic exclusion of the indigenous are often too weak or entirely unavailable. Violence among youth, often gang-related, has spiraled out of the government’s control. This troubling pattern seriously threatens the already precarious state of socio-political stability and human development, frustrating the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The homicide rate has risen 12 percent since 1999, hindering the fulfillment of the Peace Accords, which sought an end to the violence and unrest. Weak state institutions are, in general, unable or unwilling to effectively address the potential for conflict.

**Organization**

The Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F) began its work in 2007 following the signing of a major partnership agreement between the Government of Spain and the UNDP. With a total contribution of US $900 million to-date the MDG-F’s mission is to accelerate completion of the MDGs. To this end, the organization focuses on poverty reduction and public policies that are more responsive to the needs of the poor and marginalized. Programming ranges from youth employment and gender equality to environment, culture, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. The MDG-F uses a Joint Program (JP) model of intervention, working with a core group of six UN agencies: UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, and PAHO. Interventions are developed around national priorities and MDG-F collaborates extensively with governments and civil society groups to implement the 130 Joint Programmes currently approved.

**Program Purpose and Strategy**

The JPs based in the UNDP’s thematic funding window of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) aim to support achievement of the MDGs in 20 countries including Guatemala. CPPB programs are united by the belief that people who know and exercise their rights are essential to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The Guatemalan JP, “Consolidating Peace in Guatemala Through Violence Prevention and Conflict Management,” was implemented in Guatemala City and the Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, Cobán, and Chiquimula municipalities.

MDG-F identified two key outcomes for this intervention and a three-part value-chain to accomplish each outcome. The first is an improved legal and political framework that would enable the state to address the potential for conflict and social violence and consolidate peace. This improved framework would be the result of key initiatives including: the reform or correct application of policies, laws, regulations, and plans related to addressing unrest and social violence; enhanced application of existing public policies
concerning prevention of youth and gender-based violence; and the articulation and strengthening of a monitoring and evaluation system for the impact of policies on violence and unrest. As a result of these actions, the Guatemalan state would be better prepared and better equipped to tackle the challenges of socio-political unrest and gender-based violence. In practice, this shoring-up of state structures involved a greater degree of communication and collaboration between various government agencies and more culture- and conflict-sensitive application of national policy. Particularly innovative activities included:

- Initiation of a National System of Permanent Dialogue (NSPD), an early-warning system for conflict and violence prevention, and the creation of the Ministry of Security and Justice to support the NSPD.
- Establishment of specialized gender and ethnicity units in the Ministries of Education and Public Health and Social Assistance, and improved application of the National Policy on the Promotion and Integral Development of Women.
- Training of National Civil Police on issues of women’s rights and gender sensitivity.

Of course, the mere existence of policy instruments to tackle conflict and violence are only one part of the solution. The ability to actually address conflict and violence is another matter. Thus, MDG-F saw the need for a second outcome: capacity building at the local and national levels to prevent conflict and address both the causes and symptoms of social violence. This branch of the JP included: strengthened technical capacity of governing bodies and civil society to address social violence and unrest; implementation of the Safe Communities and Spaces pilot program in three communities with particular attention to age, gender, and cultural relevance; and a strengthened culture of peace through a communication strategy focused on gender and cultural relevance. With the completion of this outcome, state and civil society would develop both the will and the capability to confront social violence. Capacity building activities included:

- Development of three models of “Safe Cities” in the communities of Cobán, Chenenula, and Santa Lucia. A total of 210 youth were trained in human rights, and IT job training took place over the course of 6 months. Municipal security plans were developed in Cobán and Santa Lucia.
- Hosting of local capacity building workshops focused on training, socialization, and sensitivity for dialogue, conflict resolution, and prevention of violence, as well as protocols for the medical and psychological care of victims of violence.
- Targeted awareness campaigns aimed at increasing women’s understanding of their rights and fostering dialogue on sexual and gender-based violence.

**Notable Outcomes**

The Joint Programme, Consolidating Peace in Guatemala, was scheduled to end in September of 2012, and final program evaluation documents are not yet available from the MDG-F as of this writing. Based on the mid-term evaluation carried out in 2011, however, several program areas showed signs of positive contributions to the Guatemalan situation. In general, the spirit of interagency and inter-institutional collaboration promoted by the intervention has done a great deal to both create and fortify space for a productive dialogue on violence prevention. One particularly relevant example can be seen in the cooperation between the Presidential Commission for the Coordination of Executive Policy on Human Rights Matters and the National Civil Police. These two historically antagonistic institutions now find themselves working collaboratively to meet the challenges of social conflict and violence. The “Safe Cities” models implemented in Cobán, Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, and Chiquimula municipalities have been adapted for implementation in communities around the country, which is a sign of their pertinence and innovative character. This second round of Safe Cities gave special focus to violence prevention and protection for adolescents, women, and community organizations. At the national level, perhaps one of
the most salient and important outcomes is an increased emphasis on combating sexual and gender-based violence and the corresponding strengthening of legal and policy frameworks for the protection of women from violence and exclusion. Gender-sensitivity training of the National Civil Police, for example, resulted in the creation of an Office of Gender charged with continually sensitizing police in matters of gender and human rights. Coupled with the aforementioned capacity building and awareness raising campaigns designed to counsel women in their right to participate in public spaces and be free from violence, these policy tools do a great deal to mitigate gendered exclusion and inequality.

The MDG-Fund’s Joint Programme in Guatemala is making great strides in the building of democratic institutions sensitive to conflict and capable of addressing violence and conflict, as well as the ability of marginalized or excluded populations to advocate for their own needs for security and meaningful participation in peacebuilding.

Challenges and Pitfalls to Implementation

Despite the important contributions made by the Joint Programme, several critical weaknesses were evident by the time the midterm evaluation was conducted. Chief among these was a crippling set of design flaws that weakened internal coherence and cohesion within the MDG-Fund. From the beginning, the commencement of program planning and development of key indicators was delayed by about 9 months due in large part to the rapid succession of three Ministers of the Interior following the first disbursement of program funds. Apparently, this delay rippled throughout the rest of the design process, as the system of indicators was later found to be of little use in monitoring and evaluation. The difficulties inherent in coordinating action between six UN agencies and a host of Guatemalan local and national entities resulted in a lack of unified action in the implementation of program activities.

Relevance to the Nexus

While the Joint Programme is, by its very nature, primarily a development-focused intervention, it engages in work of paramount importance to the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. Through the thematic window of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, the Fund attempts to address the governance deficit in Guatemala by fortifying democratic state institutions with political and legal instruments that enable them to better protect the rights of historically marginalized groups like women, youth, and indigenous communities. When government engages with and represents all of its constituents, instead of only a select few, those constituents see the value of pluralism and are encouraged to be more politically engaged. This in turn strengthens democracy and moves society one step closer to attaining Peace Writ Large.51 The creation of democratic institutions that open up space for societal engagement plays a key role in strengthening CSOs like the Guatemalan Academy of Mayan Languages. TV Maya, a broadcast station run by the Academy, achieved a major boost in both quality and coverage as a result of the JP, reaching many more people with programming that promotes cultures of peace and intercultural dialogue. As a socially conscious media outlet, TV Maya and the Academy can hold the state accountable as it enacts necessary reforms. The local capacity building workshops and Safe Cities programs develop human capital that will be important to long-term development, sustainable peace, and inclusive democracy.

Throughout the implementation of the JP, the MDG-F has sought to ensure sustainability of the gains made by the Guatemalan intervention. It has arguably succeeded at the national level, with a high degree of involvement from partner agencies in the Guatemalan government in the planning, implementation, and administration of program activities. It has struggled somewhat at the local level, however, with some municipalities slow to engage or suffering from political gridlock. If the MDG-F cannot effectively communicate the need for local stakeholders to participate, the benefits of local capacity building
workshops may be erased after the conclusion of the program. Another severe shortcoming is the JP’s ineffective set of indicators, which stymies monitoring and evaluation and makes an honest assessment of sustainability or program success much more difficult.

Recommendations/Takeaways

- The early successes in sensitizing state structures, from high-level ministries to the national police force, to issues of social identity in conflict suggests the need for incorporation of these identity lenses into any attempt to promote peace by building the capacity of democratic institutions. Doing so can create opportunities for unprecedented cooperation between state systems that have long been at odds, and allow them to meet cross-cutting challenges much more effectively.
- On the other hand, paying inadequate attention to the gendered, ethnic, or age-based experience of violence, conflict, and underdevelopment risks buttressing structures of oppression that lend themselves to ongoing exclusion and a resultant renewal/intensification of violence.
- The difficulties experienced by the MDG-F in implementing program activities at the local or municipal level present an important caveat to “The Nexus Model’s” position that devolution and local governance are always positive dynamics. If local government is not technically or operationally competent to take stewardship of a program, or politically opposed to doing so, the sustainability of the project will be jeopardized.
- In order to make collaborative interagency efforts such as the MDG-F more streamlined and cohesive, contingency plans should be put into effect to better handle the eventuality of a leadership change at the implementer level and political considerations at the local government level. While it is too early to know for certain how this lack of planning prejudiced the outcomes of the Joint Programme in Guatemala, such a complexly interrelated field as the nexus of democracy building and peacebuilding cannot easily absorb failures in any one area without suffering severe shortcomings in another.
- In addition, implementing agencies should work together to develop a coherent system of baselines and indicators to be used in monitoring and evaluation activities.

For more information on this program, visit http://www.mdgfund.org/.
Section 3: Insights

1. The Importance of an Integrated Approach

To be effective in complex environments of democratization and post conflict transitions, organizations must be aware of how their programmatic interventions fit into and affect larger societal systems. The above cases were chosen to highlight existing models and scales of integrated approaches of work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. While all democracy promotion programs inherently target at least one focal point identified in “The Nexus Model” (democratic institutions, civil society and local capacity), the seven cases analyzed above provide clear examples of interventions that draw on multiple spheres of the nexus while utilizing peacebuilding and democracy building techniques. For instance, the Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) attempted to address all three spheres through engaging civil society on issues such as democracy and the use of information and communication technology (ICT), enhancing coordination between government institutions, and building capacity of both CSOs and Afghan ministries, all while using peacebuilding activities such as dialogue and other forms of collaborative discussion. A program such as AMDEP relies on a large body of theoretical knowledge (see “the Nexus Model” in Annex 2) and decades of learning from the world of practice.

In analyzing how each case contributed to the understanding of work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building, it is clear that there are nuances to designing and implementing integrated approaches. Some more than others have found ways to enable progress towards the long-term goal of participatory democracy and a stable peace. In what follows, the authors synthesize emergent and important themes from the case studies in order to inform the conceptual understanding of how best to promote democracy and peace in the span of an intervention.

Emergent themes in the cases:

Horizontal and Vertical Partnerships

Partnerships provide excellent opportunities for coordination and are essential to most international initiatives. The included case studies indicate that simultaneous horizontal and vertical partnerships are crucial to organizations that work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. An international organization can benefit greatly from having both a partnership with a strong network of local organizations as well as partnerships with regional and state-level actors and institutions. The diversity of these partnerships is equally important. In the case of Sisi ni Amani – Kenya (SNA-K), participants and staff identified the diversity of the national-level partners as an important program strength. In addition, the use of local partners, whether they are CSOs, NGOs, or local businesses, is beneficial because it increases the legitimacy of the intervention and ensures that the intervention is implemented using accurate information and contextual awareness. This was clear in the Pathways to Peace Program (P2P) in Nepal, where Search for Common Grounds’ local partners were able to tap into their networks to convene youth from all ethnic and political backgrounds to participate in writing a national youth charter.

A Diversity of Initiatives

The diversity of initiatives, both in terms of level and direction, was an important underlying theme of the cases. In their efforts to address multiple spheres, many of the cases included multiple levels of intervention. The Joint Programme (JP) in Guatemala included interventions at the national level, attempting to improve the legal and political framework for addressing violence, as well as interventions at the local level, such as building local capacity to address conflict. In addition to the multi-level approach, several of the cases took on a multi-directional approach by including both bottom-up and top-down initiatives. The P2P program in Nepal highlights a bottom-up intervention that could have benefited
from inclusion of an intentional top-down complimentary approach as well. Participants helped develop a youth charter that was used in the most recent constitution-writing process, but the program did not include any interventions with political leaders or parties, which could have reinforced the bottom-up interventions.

**Participation and Inclusion**

The concepts of participation and inclusion, especially of marginalized groups, youth, and women, emerged as a central theme in the cases. A key assumption of several of the cases was that participation of the targeted stakeholders in society supports democracy and ultimately Peace Writ Large. The Pillars of Peace (Pillars) Program’s participatory action research (PAR) methodology provides an excellent example of this. Participatory methods assume increased participation brings about an increased level of trust and social cohesion, which increases the overall legitimacy of the process and subsequently its results. First, by including all the key stakeholders, the implementing organization and the intervention itself gain credibility. Second, the participation by these individuals gives credence to the intended outcome of the project, which in most of these cases is the democratization process. Finally, the actual process of participation often provides an important outlet for expression and opportunity for participants to voice their opinions and concerns. The case of the Kosovo Civil Society Foundation (KCSF) program highlighted the challenges of achieving participation and inclusion in post-war contexts. From KCSF it was clear that there needs to be a strategy to sequencing democracy building and peacebuilding initiatives with some populations, lest their rejection to engage in civil society or government initiatives create a negative spiral that further alienates them from the rest of civil society.

**The Value of Knowledge**

The concept that the provision of particular skills and knowledge leads to the existence of civic participation and peace is an assumption found in several cases. Guatemala’s JP was premised on the belief that a population that is educated in their rights will be peaceful. This can be seen in the program’s interventions at both the national and local level. For example, the national police force was given training on women’s rights and gender sensitivity, while there were more targeted campaigns aimed at increasing women’s understanding of their rights. Similarly, the assumption that access to credible information reduces violence was central to the SNA-K program in Kenya, whose primary activity was sending well timed and targeted SMS messages to the Kenyan populace in order to reduce tensions and violence. This program also included the valuable activity of educating the next generation of political leaders through bringing political aspirants and constituents together for debate and civic education events to spread knowledge of the process of devolution. In the case of Kosovo, the intervention valued the power of sharing information between policy makers and civil society to the extent that the project’s primary focus was to establish structures and mechanisms to enable collaboration.

**2. Innovating Sustainability**

A significant challenge faced by each program was the sustainability of the intervention after the completion of their grants from donors. Some interventions, such as the establishment of gender and ethnicity units within Guatemalan government ministries, which was part of the JP, were automatically sustainable given that they were essentially institutional reform. However, even such institutional level interventions are not guaranteed to continue beyond the life of the program. The primary challenge of most the cases was a lack of financial sustainability of the interventions. For instance, the Multimedia Production Centers (MMPCs) that were created under the AMDEP had issues generating revenue because they were originally designed to offer most services, such as Internet access and training on basic software, for free. Including business models for the media centers in the design stage of the program could have better mitigated this issue. Other strategies that could be employed by interveners to ensure
sustainability are creating follow-up mechanisms, developing local partnership systems and building the capacity of local partners, and institutionalizing approaches. All of these approaches can also be considered legitimizing forces because they increase the credibility and effectiveness of the interventions. While the themes outlined in the above section can be considered strengths of the cases, the overall approach taken in most of them could have better planned for sustainability by using one or more of these strategies.

Innovation provides another pathway to programmatic sustainability. There were numerous innovative uses of technology used throughout the cases to support sustainability. Perhaps the most innovative approach was that of the SNA-K program which used SMS as its primary means of intervention. This technology is effective primarily because it is so simple, inexpensive, and ubiquitous. SMS enables an organization or just a single person to reach thousands of others simultaneously and almost immediately with very little cost incurred. The Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq (GPCMI) program offers another interesting case of innovation. As part of the intervention, the local leaders that were trained in negotiation established a Facebook group in order to maintain contact and share ideas. By establishing the Facebook group the implementers were ensuring that there would always be a free space, in this case virtual, in which participants can connect in the future. Innovation is by no means necessary to ensuring the effectiveness or sustainability of an initiative. However, with constantly evolving technology opening up more space for innovative techniques that are both simple and cheap, it seems impractical not to include them in integrated approaches to peacebuilding and democracy building.

### 3. Conclusion

In post-conflict and transitioning contexts, practitioners will often work towards creating a participatory democracy through leveraging peacebuilding approaches. This work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building primarily aims at strengthening local capacity, democratic institutions, and civil society. “The Nexus Model” provides a visual representation of the mutually reinforcing nature of the interactions between these focal points or spheres. Peacebuilding theory contributes to work in these areas by prioritizing social cohesion, accountability, and local ownership, which are all essential to supporting democracy and Peace Writ Large. The organizations working at various levels of intervention presented in this report have demonstrated this conceptual understanding of the advantage of combining peacebuilding and democracy building through the design of their interventions, which frequently focus simultaneously on strengthening democratic institutions, empowering civil society, and building local capacity while utilizing peacebuilding activities.

The themes identified from the case studies presented above provide strong examples of how these focal points interact to support each other and ultimately facilitate progress towards long-term, sustainable peace. The cases show that having diverse vertical and horizontal partnerships strengthens local and international implementers’ ability to have effective interventions at multiple levels as well as better coordination between those levels of intervention. Coherent coordination of interventions allows for positive interactions between the spheres of the model. The theme of inclusion is also central to the focal points because it ensures the legitimacy of the process as well as the outcomes of interventions. An
Working in the Nexus of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building

initiative that aims to strengthen democratic institutions without including those people who are most affected by the institutions will fail to generate legitimacy, which will ultimately lead the institutions to be either unsustainable or unaccountable, or likely both. These negative effects can be prevented, for instance, by understanding the role that civil society can play in the process. Another central theme of the reviewed initiatives was the importance of accurate and open information and communication, whether it is an individual’s knowledge of her civil rights in Kenya, a constituent assembly’s understanding of what youth see as important to democracy in Nepal, or clear regulations for policy engagement by CSOs and government in Kosovo.

While this report has generated some important insights, its scope is limited and includes only a brief picture of the field of work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. Initial findings suggest it is not enough for an organization to simply implement interventions aimed at supporting democratic institutions, civil society, and local capacity using peacebuilding activities. Rather they must demonstrate an understanding of how activities in each sphere will either positively or negatively interact with other elements of peacebuilding and democracy. If a program seeks to contribute to democracy or peace, it has an improved chance of success if it frames its intended intervention as one part in a moving system. Careful systems-thinking that prioritizes an integrated approach requires an understanding of the importance of coordination and collaboration of interventions across levels. Through attempts to understand and flexibly embed their work within the moving parts of a larger system, organizations will increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable outcomes and, potentially, contribute to Peace Writ Large. More research and conceptual work is needed to build on the findings of “A Conceptual Model of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building” and this report, which are together only one step towards a better understanding of the relationship between peacebuilding and democracy building.
Annex 1. Terms of Reference

1. Consultants will identify examples and draw out insights from the world of practice
   a. where peacebuilding has been used to strengthen democratic processes
   b. where work on governance or participatory democracy has been used to support or underpin peacebuilding efforts.

2. Consultants will demonstrate how the academic or theoretical dimensions play out in the practitioner’s “real world” of donor constraints, resource constraints, geopolitics, biases, etc.
Annex 2. The Nexus Model
Annex 3. Case Selection Methodology

Methodology

This report, meant as a complement to the theoretical piece, “A Conceptual Model of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building,” was commissioned to showcase examples of work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. Given the array of programming context and actors, the analysis is descriptive—it does not attempt to be evaluative and concludes with insights rather than recommendations, except on a case-by-case basis. That said, the authors established a case selection criteria in an attempt to systematically capture the variation in the range of interventions in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building.

Based on the findings of conceptual work on “The Nexus Model,” the authors chose two requirements that must be met by programs in order to be eligible for consideration as a case study. First and most important, the program’s approach must have been embedded in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. Work in the nexus included work to build democratic processes in post-conflict situations and work using applied conflict resolution and other peacebuilding techniques to promote democracy. Peacebuilding programs without a focus on democracy or democracy building campaigns without an integration of peacebuilding techniques or expertise were excluded. The second requirement was that the contextual dynamics of intervention be in one or a hybrid of the following deficits:

1. Security deficit
2. Governance deficit (new government)
3. Governance deficit (transitional)
4. Civic Culture deficit
5. Hybrid

Data Collection

As noted in the body of the report, the availability of information became an important factor in case selection. The authors conducted initial research on organizations that work in the nexus, after which the target organizations were contacted when more information was needed. The response rate was very low, however, and information for almost all cases was obtained through open source platforms of evaluation reports. The documents reviewed included program documentation as well as external and internal evaluation reports, which when necessary were triangulated with email and phone interviews with program staff.

Case Selection Criteria

Case selection criteria attempted to ensure coverage of the range of interventions in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. The first phase of data collection was to complete a list of approximately 30 possible cases, for each of which the information in Figure 1 (see end of section) was recorded. Once data was collected on these various programs, they were coded and used to select a sample that could capture their diversity.

The selection criteria established quotas and a ranking system. The first quota ensured that selected cases represented regional and temporal variation in the field of peacebuilding and democracy building. Ultimately, the authors decided on the following regional distribution for case selection:
Table 1. Regional Quotas in Selection Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Desired Quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1-2 Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2-3 Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1 Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/North Africa</td>
<td>2 Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1 Case</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The weighted selection considered a time sensitive frequency distribution by region, prioritizing where the majority of the work in this domain is currently taking place. Over the course of the review of available documentation, the entire practicum team weighed in on the degree of how crosscutting each program was on peacebuilding and democracy building themes. Given that the report sought to showcase specific cases of work in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building, the team knew that it was inevitable that a number of included cases would focus on engaging civil society in peace and democracy promotion. However, to ensure that the cases captured diversity, the selection criteria required that other interventions of nuanced approaches such as work directly with leaders and at the institutional level must be included as well. Overall, to be selected, an intervention had to include a key peacebuilding goal and be situated in a process of democratic institution building or democratic consolidation.

The next important criterion that was intentionally considered to ensure a diversity of cases was the type of intervening organization, where the case selection sought a balance between:

1. Local (NGOs, CSOs)
2. International/Foreign (Partners, SFCG)
3. Institutions (UNDP); and
4. Partnerships (a hybrid of the above)

Because the majority of the documentation reviewed was program evaluation reports, the initial case selection considered the programmatic theory (both implicit and explicit) versus practice, questioning the extent to which stated program logic was followed through in practice. For example, if the program claimed a bottom-up approach, was it actually subject to elite capture? A number of cases were excluded from consideration because they failed to match the stated theory of change and initial goals with activities in practice. Secondary considerations also included the timeframe of programming (short-term vs. sustainable/long-term) and the level of interventions (top-down vs. bottom-up vs. integrated approaches).

Variation in the sources of funding was also an important component to capture, though an initial review of data quickly found that funding from the US Government, particularly from USAID, is prevalent in the nexus of peacebuilding and democracy building. That said, other selection priorities (such as considering local NGOs and multilateral institutions) allowed for the inclusion of organizations and initiatives that pooled funding from multiple donors.

Finally, in order to contribute to the learning of PDC, the case selection process gave special consideration to programming that targeted the youth and that used innovative programmatic approaches that could bring the intervention to scale, e.g., ICT, GIS Mapping, film, media.

In the following pages, Figure one presents the entirety of the selection criteria, as referenced above. Tables 2 and 3 present the classification of the seven cases included in the report.
### Figure 1. Case Selection Criteria

#### 1. Primary Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funder</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Intervention/Program</th>
<th>Ensuring Distribution</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Quotas</td>
<td>Must be work in the Nexus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy Building</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Ensuring Diversity of Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Deficit</th>
<th>Theory of Change</th>
<th>Quotas/Capturing</th>
<th>Diversity of Cases</th>
<th>Project Size/Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative Peace</td>
<td>Short-Term or Long Term</td>
<td>Top-Down or Bottom Up</td>
<td>Type of Intervener</td>
<td>Source of Funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. Capturing Innovations in Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Consideration (Tie breakers!)</th>
<th>Uses of Innovation</th>
<th>Type of Innovation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
## Classification of Selected Cases

### Table 2. Primary Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case #</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Intervention/Program</th>
<th>Ensuring Distribution</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>Governance Promotion through Conflict Management in Iraq (CPCMI) Program</td>
<td>US Dept. of State: Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
<td>MENA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interpeace</td>
<td>Pillars of Peace Programme (Pillars)</td>
<td>EC, Denmark, DFID, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and USAID</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Internex</td>
<td>Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>Pathways to Peace (P2P)</td>
<td>US Dept. of State: Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and The Asia Foundation</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sisi Ni Amani- Kenya (SNA-k)</td>
<td>Peace TXT</td>
<td>PopTech, USAID: Office of Transition Initiatives, Indigo Trust, and Safaricom</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kosovo Civil Society Foundation (KCSF)</td>
<td>Empowering Civil Society Inclusion on Democratic Policy-making in Kosovo</td>
<td>UNDEF</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Classification of Selected Cases

**Table 3. Secondary Considerations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case #</th>
<th>Intervention/Program</th>
<th>Type of Deficit</th>
<th>Theory of Change</th>
<th>Project Size/Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CPCM Program</td>
<td>Negative Peace</td>
<td>Short-Term or Long Term</td>
<td>Top-Down or Bottom Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pillars</td>
<td>Hybrid (security, transitional govt)</td>
<td>mix</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AMDEP</td>
<td>Hybrid (security, new govt)</td>
<td>mix</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>P2P</td>
<td>Hybrid (security, new govt)</td>
<td>mix</td>
<td>bottom-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Peace TXT</td>
<td>Hybrid (security, transitional govt)</td>
<td>mix</td>
<td>bottom-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>KCSF</td>
<td>Hybrid (security, new govt)</td>
<td>short-term</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Hybrid (security, weak govt)</td>
<td>mix</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4. About the Authors

Meagan Allen
Meagan Allen is a Master of Arts candidate at American University’s School of International Service, graduating in Spring 2013. She is getting her degree in International Politics with a substantive focus on human rights and a concentration on international development. She received her bachelor’s degree from James Madison University in International Affairs with a regional concentration on the Middle East and Africa. She specializes in human rights advocacy, focusing on government relations regarding human rights issues in the Middle East and North Africa. While interning with Amnesty International USA’s MENA Advocacy department, she developed an outreach strategy for reaching student groups nationwide as well as developed materials used in advocacy discussions and public education. She also developed a monitoring and evaluation plan for AIUSA’s Human Rights Education Service Corps, a human rights education program implemented in charter schools throughout Washington, D.C. Meagan grew up in Virginia Beach and now lives in the Washington, D.C. area with her husband.


Cate Broussard
Cate Broussard specializes in the monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding programs. She has designed monitoring and evaluation frameworks and built the capacity of NGO staff in evaluation skills in Washington, DC and Kenya. In particular, she designed the framework through which Sisi ni Amani-Kenya will evaluate its interventions during the 2013 election. She also assisted in the creation of conflict monitoring mechanisms and the SMS protocol currently used by SNA-K and its partners. Cate served as a document coder and data analyst for a desk review of USAID/CMM’s People to People programming for Social Impact, Inc. She also participated as an assessor in a meta-review of peacebuilding initiatives in active conflict zones in Africa called “Linking Program Design and Evaluation in Peacebuilding: A Challenging Task” for the Center for Peacebuilding and Development. In 2013, Cate will graduate from the School of International Service at American University with a Master of Arts in International Peace and Conflict Resolution, specializing in peacebuilding and evaluation. She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and African Studies from the University of Pennsylvania.

Annex 5. Notes

2 Ibid, pg 10.
6 Email exchange with Jessamy Garver-Affeldt, Programme Officer, Somali Programme, Interpeace, 15 April 2013.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
11 Additional information on outcomes was obtained from the AMDEP Quarterly Report, October-December, 2012, Report received from Ellen Boccuzzi, Senior Civil Society and Media Advisor, USAID/Afghanistan, 2 April 2013.

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid
19 Ibid.
21 CIPEV (2008).
24 Ndung’u and Wepundi, 12. Mercy Corps’ two-year Local Empowerment for Peace program (LEAP II) brought together a number of theories of change in peacebuilding. Its goal was to “strengthen the ability of local, district, and provincial structures to address the causes of postelection violence and promote sustainable peace and reconciliation.” In addition to supporting the peace infrastructure, Mercy Corps supported community dialogues and youth integration. Like the government, Mercy Corps youth unemployment as a key cause of violence; their program emphasized youth leadership training, small-scale cash-for-work community reconstruction projects, and income generation activities.
25 A successful example of this is Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and Media Focus on Africa (MFA), with support from DFID and USAID, developed and produced a TV and radio drama called “The Team,” which used football (soccer) to engage viewers in discussions around changing perceptions of the other. This media project targeted behavior changes, asking a central question: “can Kenyans find a way to put the past behind them in order to have a better future?” An evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of The Team in addressing the themes it presented found that the project was successful.
26 Interview with Rachel Brown, CEO of SNA-K, 4 April 2013
27 Interview with Rachel Brown, CEO of SNA-K, 4 April 2013
32 Interview with Rachel Brown, CEO of SNA-K, 4 April 2013
33 Interview with Rachel Brown, CEO of SNA-K, 4 April 2013.
34 Interview with Rachel Brown, CEO of SNA-K, 4 April 2013.
35 Interview with Rachel Brown, CEO of SNA-K, 4 April 2013.
37 Interview with Rachel Brown, CEO of SNA-K, 4 April 2013.

40 Diagram 1 came from the final evaluation report, in which the program cites http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/Post%20project%20evaluations/69-UDF-KOS-08-265_evaluation%20report_Kosovo.pdf


42 See the discussion in the evaluation conducted by external UNDEF evaluators at http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/Post%20project%20evaluations/69-UDF-KOS-08-265_evaluation%20report_Kosovo.pdf


46 See Deliverable 1, “A Conceptual Model of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building”


50 Ibid, pg 15.

51 See Deliverable 1, “A Conceptual Model of Peacebuilding and Democracy Building,” pp. 12, 15