
Monitoring reforms for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying

Janos Bertok Head of Public Sector Integrity Division OECD







Lobbying timeline




Transparency drives lobbying reforms







Trust in government is low & has been decreasing: Limited data on impact of lobbying reform




2. Lobby regulations were scandal-driven Scope reflects the concerns

Actors covered by lobbying rules/guidelines

| | Lobbyist from a lobbying firm or a self- employed lobbyist | ative from | Private sector represent | ative from a non- profit | ative from | Lawvers / | Law firms | Think tanks | Media organisations | Churches | Charities | Others, please specify |
|---------------|--|------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|----------------|------------------------|----------|-----------|------------------------------|
| Austria | • | • | • | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Canada | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 0 |
| France | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Germany | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Hungary | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 0 |
| Italy | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 0 |
| Mexico | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • |
| Poland | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Slovenia | • | • | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| United States | • | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total OECD10 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| • Yes | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| O No | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 |


3. Levelling the playing field is also a concern in defining the scope

Stakeholders are generally of the opinion that actors that receive compensation for carrying out lobbying should be defined as lobbyists



4. Legislators and lobbyists are more open to a mandatory system - compliance

Stakeholders believe that transparency of lobbying activities should be mandatory for all lobbyists






5. What to disclose: Focus on names and subject matters

Disclosure and public availability of lobbying information

| | names (of individuals or organisatio ns) | contact details | whether the lobbyist was previously a public official | the names of clients | the name of the lobbyist employer | company that would | the specific subject matters lobbied | the name or description of specific legislative proposals, bills, regulations , policies, programm es, grants, contributio ns or contracts sought | the name of the national/fe deral departmen ts or agencies contacted | the source and amounts of any governmen t funding received by the entity represente d by a lobbyist | lobbying expenses | turnover from lobbying activity | telennone | contributions to political campaigns | Other |
|--|--|--------------------|---|-------------------------|--|-----------------------|---|---|---|--|----------------------|--|-----------|--|-------|
| Australia | • | 0 | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Austria | • | • | 0 | • | • | 0 | • | • | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Canada | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | • |
| France | • | • | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Germany | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • |
| Italy | • | • | 0 | • | • | 0 | • | • | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mexico | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Poland | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Slovenia | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | • | • | • | • |
| United States | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 0 | • | • | 0 | • | 0 |
| EP/EC Joint Transparency Register | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | • | 0 | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | • |
| Total OECD10 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| The information collected is publically available | 10 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Information is collected but not made publically available | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| O Information is not collected | 0 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 |

6. What to disclose: Campaign contributions are the highest concern

Types of information that according to stakeholders should be made publicly available, for example through a register




7. Implementation measures are rather the exception than the rule: Raising awareness

Initiatives carried out on a regular basis in the government's work of promoting <u>awareness</u> or <u>educating</u> public officials in the executive branch (POE), in legislative branch (POL) or lobbyists (L) on the lobbying rules/guidelines

| | Briefings | | riefings Lectures | | | Lectures | | | Lectures | | | .ectures | | | ; | Online trainings | | | Conferences or learning events | | | Direct communication | | | Scenario-based trainings | | | Provision of training material | | | Information on the website of the office responsible for lobbying | | | The government is not promoting awareness or educating on the lobbying rules/guidelines | | |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----|-------------------|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|----------|-----|-----|---|---------------------|-----|---|-----------------------------------|-----|----|-------------------------|-----|---|-----------------------------|-----|---|--------------------------------------|-----|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | POE | POL | L | | | | | | |
| Austria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | |
| Canada | • | ٠ | ٠ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ٠ | • | 0 | ٠ | ٠ | • | ٠ | 0 | 0 | 0 | ٠ | ٠ | ٠ | • | ٠ | ٠ | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | |
| France | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | • | • | | | | | | |
| Germany | • | ٠ | ٠ | • | ٠ | ٠ | • | • | ٠ | • | • | ٠ | • | ٠ | ٠ | ٠ | • | ٠ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | |
| Hungary | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | | | | | | |
| Italy | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | • | 0 | | | | | | |
| Mexico | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | • | 0 | | | | | | |
| Poland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | 0 | 0 | | | | | | |
| Slovenia | • | • | • | • | • | ٠ | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | • | • | ٠ | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | |
| United States | • | • | • | 0 | • | • | 0 | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | 0 | 0 | • | • | • | 0 | • | • | 0 | 0 | 0 | | | | | | |
| Total OECD10 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Yes | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | | | | | | |
| O No | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | | | | | | |


8. What measures are considered effective? Raising awareness with tailored measures

Most effective ways to <u>learn</u> about lobbying rules/guidelines according to legislators; and integrity standards and transparency tools according to lobbyists



9. What measures are considered effective? Incentives for compliance


There are generally no effective rewards for agreeing to comply with lobbyist codes of conduct



Source: OECD 2013 Survey on Lobbying for Lobbyists




Are there compelling sanctions for breaching the lobbyist code of conduct?




Source: OECD 2009 and 2013 Survey on Lobbying for Lobbyists

11. Closing the revolving door remains a challenge Can a former lobbyist be hired as a government regulator or advisor?



12. The reform journey is far from over: Few countries restrict insider lobbying



Thank you

For more information on OECD work on public integrity









www.oecd.org/gov/ethics



