initiate the Women’s Movement. Hole and Levine allude to the black women’s “dual jeopardy” identity that Flammang discusses in her book, Women’s Political Voice. Hole and Levine address how during the Civil Rights Movement black women realized their abilities and capabilities in such a way that they broke off into consciousness raising groups and discussed society’s ill treatment of them as not only members of a second-class race but as members of a second-class gender group. The second chapter of Hole and Levine’s book confirms the existence of the participatory democracy practices which Grant’s earlier mentioned biography explains as characterizing the Civil Rights Movement.


Kocks, a professor at the University of Utah, uses landscapes to elaborate Americans’ dreams for social justice. Kocks’ Dream a Little examines geographic locations that encourage these dreams including the West, family farms, and the local community. Ella Baker symbolizes the great role local communities play in a democracy. Kocks describes Baker as a “localist,” someone who developed a philosophy of community that beginning with the location of the people. Baker’s distrust for big government and devotion to local politics as a setting in which to promote democratic ideals are the cornerstones of “participatory democracy.” Kocks emphasizes Baker’s contributions to democracy in a chapter entitled “Acting Globally, Thinking Locally.” Kocks’ description of Ella Baker’s contribution elaborates on the descriptions offered by annotated authors Mueller and Grant. Kocks’ chapter on Ella Baker provides more examples of tactics Baker used throughout the Civil Rights Movement to achieve equality, tactics whose presence in the second wave of the Women’s Movement may become more visible following an understanding of Kocks more elaborated description of Baker’s employment of “participatory democracy.”


Mueller defines “participatory democracy” as a fusion of ideas emphasizing political involvement and organization at the grass-roots level, absence of one solid leader or hierarchical structure, and a call for direct action as a result of fear and alienation. Mueller attempts to convince students of Civil Rights history that participatory democracy did not originate with the student leaders in the Students for a Democratic Society. She argues that Ella Baker first articulated the concept of “participatory democracy,” with later Civil Rights participants, including the students, adopting the same concept. Mueller’s work provides both the definition and origin of the “participatory democracy” which contributed to the success of the Civil Rights Movement. By examining the elements of Baker’s “participatory democracy,” it becomes possible to understand to what extent grassroots involvement and mobilization in later social movements, such as the Women’s Movement, either deviated or conformed to Baker’s definition of “participatory democracy.”


Polletta, a professor of sociology at Columbia University, focuses on both the Civil Rights Movement and the second wave of the Women’s Movement as she examines the role democratic ideals play in social movements. Like Mueller, another annotated author, Polletta does provide a description of “participatory democracy.” However, Polletta’s definition reflects the definition formulated by white members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee with less emphasis on Ella Baker’s involvement in the formulation of the definition. Polletta’s examples of women’s massive participation in the Women’s Movement highlight the significant impact the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee’s definition of “participatory democracy” had on the organization of future Women’s Movement groups. Like the Civil Rights Movement, women promote equality among each other by discouraging one-spokesman leadership. Polletta’s book has great meaning to this research project because it really demonstrates how the Women’s Movement piggybacked off of the Civil Rights Movement through its incorporation of a myriad of organizational ideas that originated from the Civil Rights Movement.

Conceptualizing the Mustard Seed of Democracy

DAVID P. DORÉ
Justice, Law and Society

Abstract

Charles Van Doren, in A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future, identifies “the triumph of democracy” as one of the defining characteristics of the 20th Century. He assuredly predicts that even China will succumb to the wave of democracy. He tells the story of how in 1989 dissidents proudly erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. While it was subsequently pulverized by the authorities, the visionary gesture and “the hope that the statue symbolized...was not.” Van Doren and his mentor, the philosopher Mortimer Adler, further argue “democracy is the only perfectly just form of government.” That is a sweeping statement, and it is one that we will not attempt to digest in this brief study of democracy.

Although we will not wrestle with the “justness” of democracy, we do hope to examine Van Doren’s point regarding the proliferation of democracies in the 20th Century. Why have 120 countries, or more specifically the citizens of those countries, chosen democracy over authoritarian rule? How did these disparate states start the difficult transition towards democracy? Once nation-states have decided to move in the direction of democratic rule, how do they, vis-à-vis procedures, institutions and people, strengthen the chosen governance model? In short, this paper attempts to elucidate governance theories that address those important questions, and to recognize the dynamism therein.

This paper also sketches specific factors that facilitate a country’s movement towards democratic consolidation. It maintains that not only is there a hierarchy of factors that foster the emergence and solidifying of democratic rule, but that there is also a horizontal component between the stakeholders, namely academics, practitioners, and government officials. The difficulty, of course, is identifying the precise association (along a casual-correlative continuum) between the factors and the faces in democratic
governance. This discernment is critical because as Kofi Annan comments, “Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” While we will not draw out R² values and loading factors, we do hope to broaden the discourse within the School of Public Affairs by analyzing democratic governance to understand better the relationship between justice, law, and society.

I can conceive of a society in which all men would feel an equal love and respect for the laws of which they consider themselves the authors; in which the authority of the government would be respected as necessary, and not divine; and in which the loyalty of the subject to the chief magistrate would not be a passion, but a quiet and rational persuasion. With every individual in the possession of rights which he is sure to retain, a kind of manly confidence and reciprocal courtesy would arise between all classes, removed alike from pride and servility. The people, well acquainted with their own true interests, would understand that, in order to profit from the advantages of the state, it is necessary to satisfy its requirements. The voluntary association of the citizens might then take the place of the individual authority of the nobles, and the community would be protected from tyranny and license. — Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, The Author’s Preface

Introduction

Charles Van Doren, in A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future, identifies “the triumph of democracy” as one of the defining characteristics of the 20th Century. He assuredly predicts that even China will succumb to the wave of democracy. He tells the story of how in 1989 dissidents proudly erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. While it was subsequently pulverized by the authorities, the visionary gesture and “the hope that the statute symbolized…was not.” Van Doren and his mentor, the philosopher Mortimer Adler, further argue “democracy is the only perfectly just form of government.” That is a sweeping statement, and it is one that we will not attempt to digest in this brief study of democracy.

Although we will not wrestle with the “justness” of democracy, we do hope to examine Van Doren’s point regarding the proliferation of democracies in the 20th Century. Why have 120 countries, or more specifically the citizens of those countries, chosen democracy over authoritarian rule? How did these disparate states start the difficult transition towards democracy? Once nation-states have decided to move in the direction of democratic rule, how do they, vis-à-vis procedures, institutions and people, strengthen the chosen governance model? In short, this paper attempts to elucidate governance theories that address those important questions, and to recognize the dynamism therein (See Figure 1).

This paper also sketches factors that facilitate a country’s movement towards consolidating democracy. It maintains that not only is there a hierarchy of factors that fosters the emergence and solidifying of democratic rule, but that there is also a horizontal component between the stakeholders, namely academics, practitioners, and government officials. The difficulty, of course, is identifying the precise association (along a causal-correlate continuum) between the factors and the faces in democratic governance. This discernment is critical because as Kofi Annan comments, “Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” While we will not draw out R² values and loading factors, we do hope to broaden the discourse within the School of Public Affairs by analyzing democratic governance to understand better the relationship between justice, law, and society.

Concepts

Democracy

Before discussing the factors that may influence whether democratic rule takes root in a country, we first need to lay a conceptual foundation by defining key terms. Like Robert Dahl, we posit that there are no true democracies in the world today. In fact, we argue that democracies and consolidated democracies are unattainable. Instead, we should focus on their relational terms, meaning their proximity to authoritarian rule, in the case of transitional democracies, and democratic rule, in the case of consolidating democracies (See Figure 1). Thus, we describe democracy, borrowing from President Lincoln’s 1863 Gettysburg Address, as a political system “of the people, by the people, for the people.” Furthermore, it is a human system that judiciously balances societal interests with individual ones vis-à-vis popular laws and civil society that function in: (1) social control; (2) dispute settlement; and (3) social change.

Other governance theorists have been much more rigorous, and we daresay constricting, in their characterization of what democracy is. There are four competing and, at the same time, complementary definitions of democracy that we should unpack. First, Seymour Lipset, in his seminal 1959 article “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” discusses democracy as “a politi-
cal system...[with] regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. A social mechanism...among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part...to [exercise] influence [by being able] to choose among alternative contenders for political office."18 Institutions, such as elections, figure prominently in this definition.

Second, Barrington Moore concentrates on the "development of a democracy" as a means to control the "rules" and the "rulers"; moreover, in his oft-cited expression, "No bourgeoisie, no democracy....," he develops Lipset's analysis, albeit from a grassroots perspective, that economic development is a requisite for democracy by noting the importance of a middle, entrepreneurial class.19 Arguing from a conflict perspective, Moore views "law [as] a tool by which the ruling class exercises its control...that protects the property of those in power and serves to repress political threats to the position of the elite."20

In our third example, Dahl underscores "the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals,"21 as a key feature of a democracy. As mentioned above, Dahl further cautions that there are no true democracies in the world today. Instead, polycharcties dot the earth. These exhibit three vital characteristics: (1) "political competition" with associational groups, including political parties, i.e. the Labor and Tory parties in United Kingdom, freely vying for positions of governing power; (2) "participation" by adults in "free and fair" elections such that selected adults are not denied the right to vote, as was the case in every national jurisdiction in 190022; and (3) "civil and political liberties"23 that bolster the other two components.24 Similar to Lipset, this definition focuses upon institutions, including political parties and elections. Given Dahl's criteria, it would be interesting to access whether democratically elected officials worldwide are, in fact, being responsive to their constituent's preferences as to how best to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions seeking to disarm Iraq.25

Writing twenty years after Dahl, Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl give us a fourth account of what democracy is. They assert: "Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives."26 Accountability is at the crux of this particular definition, as well as a certain distance between citizens and the rulers.

Indubitably, governance theorists consider voting as the sine qua non of democratic theory. In fact, much attention has been given to voting as a necessary, albeit insufficient, mechanism for organizing a democratic society.27 One that has a political system with a republican institutional framework: the people, demos, vote for their elected officials to articulate their interests. Elections, in turn, are the fulcrum on which everything seemingly rests. Direct democracy typified in Ancient Athens is replaced with indirect democracy that, frankly, lessens the people's engagement in the public good. A primary reason for this reliance upon elected officials is that society has become, over millennia, more fracted and specialized. Citizens just do not have the time (nor the stomach!) to spend in the public sphere; in Rousseau's terms, they entrust leaders in a contractual relationship28 to realize their interests through peaceful means.

**Transition**

Of course, there are nation-states that are quite removed from our notions of democracy. China's governance model, for instance, is an example of the Dahlian "closed hegemony" because it lacks neither "inclusiveness" in terms of participation in the political realm nor "liberalization" in terms "permissible opposition."29 But surely China is more open and concomitantly less repressive than in years past. Has it quietly entered the transition to democracy?

The concept of transition or, as Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter maintain, "the interval between one political regime and another"290 is critical to our understanding of the seed of democracy. Given that the transition is an interval, one would expect a continuum with definable end points. While the judicious identification of the start of a transition is much more art than science, "the typical sign that the transition has begun comes when these authoritarian incumbents, for whatever reason, begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups."301 The impetus for this modification may take many forms.

For instance, when the military realizes its power is all but collapsed, it may negotiate extracting pacts32 with the incoming civilian government before it abdicates. It may fear possible prosecution for human rights violations, or it may want a role in the new government. As a result, the military may offer concessions to secure a place and, more importantly, a voice in the nascent government. Although these agreements are not
“necessary features of a successful transition...they can play an important role in any regime change based on gradual installment rather than a dramatic event.” Pacts are also important because they rely upon trust to a large degree, and trust grounds the human relationship necessary in democratic governance.34

A dramatic event, such as the unexpected death of a charismatic, albeit despotic, leader, may also usher in a transitional government. Reflecting on Nigeria’s experience, soon after General Sani Abacha’s death in 1998, his successor General Abubakar announced elections and a handover of power to civilian rule within nine months.35 While Abacha’s death or Abubakar’s announcement may (or may not) be the starting point for democratic rule, the calling for elections and the subsequent capacity-building by the Transitional Monitoring Group, an umbrella group consisting of over sixty issue-oriented civil society groups (human rights, health care, juvenile, prison, etc.), symbolized an important step forward. Indeed, the elections were emblematic, if not substantive, of Nigeria throwing off the yoke of authoritarian rule. But the question then becomes, where is Nigeria in its transition? O’Donnell and Schmitter describe two additional phases within the transitional period: (1) “liberalization,” or “the process of redefining and extending rights” and (2) “democratization,” that enables citizenship to deepen, both in terms of the responsibilities of the rulers and the ruled.36 Thus, Nigeria falls in the liberalization stage of transition because they are still in the process of writing a new constitution aimed at better articulating the rights of Nigerian citizenry.37

Given the inherent difficulty in determining the actual start of a transition, we may examine, on a broader scale, Dankwart Rustow’s three phases (preparatory, decision, and habituation) in transitions to democracy. He cautions: “The factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis.”38 Before a nation-state can realistically move in the direction of democracy, it must have national unity. This does not mean national debate as to the country’s policies, procedures, and institutions is silenced or there is a forced unanimity. Rather, “it simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”39 For instance, the deep ethnic (Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomans), religious (Shi’ite and Sunni) and tribal (Shammar, Dhafir and al-Dhulaimi) divisions in Iraq will constitute a major challenge in building a stable and pluralistic post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Indeed, “the challenges of recon-

structing Iraq’s political order – either by peaceful transition or after a bloody confrontation - are immensely more complex than is usually acknowledged.”40

Only after a country has established national unity, can it move through the three phases of preparation, decision-making, and habituation. Preparation involves “the emergence of a new elite” class.41 Utilizing Iraq as a case study, if the new elites and elected officials are solely from the exiled community, such as the Iraqi National Congress, then ordinary Iraqis who have been living in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party will be ambivalent, on the one hand, and suspicious, on the other. Decision-making entails “the deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and...to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure.”42 In this phase we would find the proliferation and strengthening of institutions, including a well-functioning tax collection agency. Habituation occurs when democracy becomes, to use the parlance of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, “the only game in town” and the “contending political forces...submit other major questions to resolution by democratic procedures.”43 In essence, the compromises necessary for the nonviolent resolution of conflict become familiar and routine, encouraging more of the same.

Consolidation

As noted previously, there is a continuum that includes transitional and consolidating components to the realization of democracy. And before moving to the factors and faces that may contribute to a transitional and consolidating government, let us articulate what we mean by consolidation. As its etymology suggests, consolidation intimates the transitional democracy has sufficiently solidified and strengthened. What signifies this movement?

We will note two plausible explanations. In The Third Wave Huntington offers, on the one hand, a rather parsimonious test to access whether a country is consolidated. He argues that a state is democratically consolidated when: (1) “the initial election winner loses and turns over power peacefully (2) this happens again.”44 Take Mexico as an example: In 2000 the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) candidate Vicente Fox ousted the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) candidate Francisco Labastida. In fact, “Fox’s election as Mexico’s 62nd President marked the first peaceful handover of power to the political opposition in 179 years since indep-
en and the end of 71 years of PRI rule.” Still, according to the “two turnover test,” Mexico is not consolidated because President Fox has not lost an election.

On the other hand, Linz and Stepan view consolidation as “a complex system of institutions, rules and patterns incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town.’” They sharpen this definition to include:

Behaviorally, . . . when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, . . . when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisytem alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from pro-democratic forces. Constitutionally, . . . when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.

Using this tenuate delineation, the United States was far from consolidated even after the Civil War (1861-1865). Indeed, we maintain that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, signed into law by Lyndon Baines Johnson, represented a historic juncture in American democratic governance because it represented, for the first time, a de jure and de facto commitment to universal suffrage. It is important to note as well the fluidity associated with the move to democratic consolidation. Linz and Stepan make this point when they talk about Chile in 1996. It held free popular elections but the institutional framework was so constricted by the outgoing military, i.e. a set number of military officials in National Assembly, that although the transition was completed, consolidation was stymied.

A consolidated democracy, reason Linz and Stepan, is also bolstered by a symbiotic relationship between “civil society” and “political society,” as well as the “rule of law . . . state bureaucracy . . . [and] institutionalized economic society.” For this study, civil society consists of any non-profit and for-profit organization, including nongovernmental organizations, media, and business. Meanwhile, political society rests upon institutions, such as “political parties, legislatures, [and] elections.” While relying upon the “rule of law animated by a spirit of constitutionalism,”

democracy also flourishes under an economic society that has degrees of a market economy and a command economy that uses a Weberian bureaucracy. Let us now tum briefly to the factors and forces that may foster democratic transition and consolidation.

Soil, Water and Sun

Facilitating Conditions and Actions to Democracy

There are two main types of factors that enable countries to transition and consolidate democratically. The first consists of conditions, such as structural features (cultural, class, geographical), that each society and, equally important, each individual encounter. Colonial vestige is also included in this category—with the length and nationality of the occupying power of interest to social scientists. Conditions are inherently resistant to change as Putnam finds in his influential book Making Democracy Work. During the study of regional institutional performance in Italy from 1970 to 1989, he and his colleagues found that civic community (or lack thereof) lies at the center of whether a region is effective and responsive, two critical components of a democracy.

The second factor includes the actions of individuals and, at a different level, the actions of countries or even the international community as a whole. For instance, in 1994 United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 authorized the use of force in order to return Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. While testing the influence of economic development on democratic tendencies as hypothesized by Lipset, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi adumbrate this distinction and conclude that democracy “is not a by-product of economic development [rather] it can be initiated at any level of development.”

We agree with this analysis and argue further that the actions and choices of leaders are especially salient in a transitioning democracy. Pointedly, do the leaders really want democracy? Machiavelli scrutinized leadership and identified two complementary aspects of political adroitness, namely virtú and fortuna. The former is the toolbox of talents (oratory, intellectual, social) that a leader possesses, while the latter suggests, for lack of a better phrase, “being in the right place at the right time.” It is this fortuitous combination that is the sinew of exceptional leaders.

For our discussion on democratic transition and the movement to-
wards consolidation, we may study Nelson Mandela as the exemplar of leadership. In South Africa a cogent reason for the relatively peaceful transfer of power between the outgoing National Party and the incoming African National Congress was Mandela’s “accommodationist policies...that celebrate[d] diversity, consult[ed] with all politically significant elites, and include[d] his political adversaries in government post.”60 What makes Mandela’s example even more inspiring is the fact that he wanted a “consensus-based government”61 with the same people who had imprisoned him for twenty-seven years, eighteen of those on Robben’s Island.62

By this sustained attention to leadership, we do not mean to suggest there are not important conditions that support democracy. Rather, the seed of democracy will germinate, it is argued, only if there is a healthy combination of rich, fertile soil (the conditions mentioned above), water (the actions of leaders and societies committed to democratic ideals, such as equality under the law), and the sun (the participation of the people at the local level). Thus, this paper’s simplistic definition of democracy of, by and for the people rings hollow if the people do not actively support it.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to examine the seed of democracy by drawing key definitions, such as democracy, transition, and consolidation. Among the descriptions of democracy, Lipset and Dahl articulate institutional definitions, meaning institutions, such as elections, figure prominently in democratic theory. Moore offers a Marxian perspective that places the class struggle between the ruler and the ruled at the core of democratic development, while Schmitter and Karl stress the accountability of the rulers by the citizens. A certain palpable distance develops between citizens and the rulers, a notion that runs counter to the (imperfect!) direct democracy found in Ancient Athens.

In discussing transition and consolidation, we have also emphasized the dynamism associated with these terms, meaning their proximity to authoritarian rule, in the case of transitional democracies, and democratic rule, in the case of consolidating democracies. Recognizing the inherent difficulty in identifying where and when the transitional phase stops and the consolidating phase starts, we nonetheless defined transition as the interval between one political regime and another. Consolidation, as suggested by Linz and Stepan, represents the development and strengthening of five arenas: civil society, political society, rule of law, bureaucracy, and an economic society.

Finally, we adumbrated factors that may foster the democratic transitioning and consolidating of a state. We divided these factors into two components, namely conditions and actions. Here again, we may describe these elements in terms of their kinetic energy.63 The former therefore represents the fertile ground in which the seed of democracy may grow, while the latter is the flowing water that enables not only the germination of the seed but also its transcendent flourishing.

This study hopefully has raised far more questions than answers. In this sense, we are reminded of Socrates as a midwife of knowledge in *Theaetetus*:

> The common reproach against me is that I am always asking questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God compels me to attend the travails of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So that I am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with me it is different.64

Philosophy aside, we shall borrow from de Tocqueville and “conceive of a society in which all men would feel an equal love and respect for the laws of which they consider themselves the authors; in which the authority of the government would be respected as necessary, and not divine; and in which the loyalty of the subject to the chief magistrate would not be a passion, but a quiet and rational persuasion.”65 Justice, law, and society are therefore critical as each mustard seed of democracy takes its inimical shape.

### Figure 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authoritarian Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transitioning Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Sovereign States and Colonial Units</th>
<th>Tracking Polity in the Twentieth Century</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>743.2 (11.9%)</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>525.1 (13.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>743.2 (11.9%)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>253.1 (8.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>743.2 (11.9%)</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>10.4 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>12.5 (5.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>743.2 (11.9%)</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>10.4 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>743.2 (11.9%)</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>10.4 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>743.2 (11.9%)</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>10.4 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Endnotes
2. We borrow from S.P. Huntington’s analogy in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
4. Ibid., 303-304.
5. According to Freedom House, this figure represents 62.5% of the 192 independent and colonial units worldwide. Interestingly, this figures corresponds to over 3.4 billion people now living under democracy. See Table 1 for more information. Freedom House. 1999. Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html#table3>
6. See Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Karl. “What Democracy Is...and Is Not.” Journal of Democracy (Summer 1991): 77. They view citizens as “the most distinctive element in democracies.” What constitutes citizenship? For example, does a prisoner enjoy the status of citizen? If so, is it right and fair for jurisdictions to take the right to vote away from convicted felons or those incarcerated?
7. We use nation-states, states, and countries interchangeably.
10. We borrow from S.P. Huntington’s analogy in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
12. Ibid., 303-304.
13. According to Freedom House, this figure represents 62.5% of the 192 independent and colonial units worldwide. Interestingly, this figures corresponds to over 3.4 billion people now living under democracy. See Table 1 for more information. Freedom House. 1999. Democracy’s Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html#table3>
14. See Schmitter Philippe and Terry Karl. 1991. “What Democracy Is...and Is Not.” Journal of Democracy (Summer): 77. They view citizens as “the most distinctive element in democracies.” What constitutes citizenship? For example, does a prisoner enjoy the status of citizen? If so, is it right and fair for jurisdictions to take the right to vote away from convicted felons or those incarcerated?
15. We use nation-states, states, and countries interchangeably.
Writing in the *Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith recognized this important balance and insisted the state had a role to play in:

First, the duty of protecting the society from violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.

Quoted in Linz and Stepan, 22.

50 A professor of economics, Max Weber (1864-1920) “occupies,” as Vago contends, “a central position among the law and society theorists.” For an overview of Weber’s theoretical background, see Vago, 49-51.


52 See Putnam 1993.

53 Pastor, 135.

54 See Lipset 1959.


58 Hisloge, 142.


60 Borrowing from physics, KE=1/2(m)(v²), where KE is the kinetic energy, m is the mass, and v is the velocity. It may be said that, relative to actions, conditions have high mass but low velocity. Indeed, as Putnam says, “Social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions.” (See Makting Democracy Work, 182.) Conversely, actions, committed by an individual or a given society, have relatively low mass but high velocity.


Works Cited


