“Triangular deterrence” occurs when one state uses threats and/or punishments against another state in order to coerce it to prevent nonstate actors from conducting attacks from its territory. Under what conditions will triangular deterrence be successful? Such triangular deterrence has long been one of Israel’s primary strategies in dealing with the PLO, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other armed nonstate threats to its security. This talk analyses Israel’s attempts to deter against Palestinian groups operating from Egypt and Syria from the 1950s to the 1970s, and projects the policy implications for current day Israeli policy towards Lebanon and Syria.

Boaz Atzili
School of International Service

Friday, March 25th
2:00 to 3:30 PM
Training and Events Room, Bender Library, 115

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