When Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House in January 1953, Republicans celebrated their return to power after a twenty-year hiatus. Not only did they win the presidency handily, but they also controlled both houses of Congress—although by narrow margins: one vote in the Senate (48-47, with one Independent) and ten votes in the House of Representatives (221-211, with one Independent). Only once during the previous twenty years had they achieved congressional majorities: In the first post-war elections in 1946, they captured control of both chambers with sizable margins (51-45 in the Senate, 245-188 in the House). That Congress produced several landmark laws with bipartisan support—for example, the National Security Act and the Presidential Succession Act both in 1947, and several foreign relief acts, including the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (the Marshall Plan). But it passed into political lore as “the awful 80th Congress” repeatedly denounced during President Harry S. Truman’s come-from-behind 1948 reelection campaign. (Because of intra-party divisions, however, Truman fared little better with the Democratic 81st and 82nd Congresses.)

*The author wishes to remember and thank David B. Truman, then of Columbia University, who initially suggested this research project as a study of local and national business interest groups; Sar A. Levitan of George Washington University, author of the original depressed-areas bill, who became a cherished friend, respected mentor, sometime coauthor, and loyal patron of my scholarly career; and Solomon Barkin of the Textile Workers Union of America, who opened many doors for me over the course of my investigations.
The last six years of Eisenhower’s presidency, however, brought on divided government. Democrats regained control of Capitol Hill after the 1954 mid-term elections, and then enlarged their majorities in the two following Congresses. With Eisenhower’s retirement, moreover, the White House as well as Capitol Hill came under Democratic rule, which eventually ushered in some sixteen years of progressive lawmaking (equally spanning Democratic and Republican presidencies)—an era recently characterized as “the liberal hour.”

The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 occupies a special niche in mid-century economic policymaking. In the landmark Employment Act of 1946, Congress had declared it the government’s duty “to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.” For the next fifteen years little was done to make good this promise, as liberals and conservatives quarreled over how, or even whether, the federal government should intervene to promote high employment. During this period, modern scholars have found that neither political party “owned” the issue of economic prosperity: following World War II, both parties shared this issue in the public’s mind; but by the late 1950s and 1960s prosperity became strongly identified with the Democratic party.

Despite general postwar prosperity, long-term joblessness in certain declining industries created persistent “pockets of poverty.” In 1955, the Department of Labor identified 33 areas of “substantial labor surplus” (annual average), at a time when overall unemployment was only 4.4 percent. Three years later, during a period of economic slack, there were 77 such areas, and nationwide unemployment stood at 6.8 percent. Eisenhower’s tenure was marked by three recessions—in 1953-54, 1957-58, and 1960-61—all of which coincided with nationwide elections. Such economic downturns hit
hardest those localities in portions of what later were included in the “rust-belt”—ranging from New England through Appalachia and southern Illinois—suffering from the collapse or transfer of traditional industries, such as coal mining, textile mills, and older manufacturing plants. Some firms—especially in textiles—simply transferred their operations to southern states, taking advantage of the region’s ample supply of non-union, lower-wage labor. (Such work would later be outsourced abroad to Central America or Asia.)

One of the era’s major economic battles was fought over federal policies regarding the “depressed areas” that such structural shifts left in their wake. Liberals argued that direct aid—in the form of subsidies, training, and rehabilitation—should be offered to unemployed people and those communities where unemployment was concentrated. Conservatives countered that government should limit its efforts to fostering a healthy “business climate,” shunning fiscal responses that could create make-work (often termed “leaf-raking”) federally subsidized jobs. It was not until the Kennedy and Johnson administrations of the 1960s that economic liberals won this policy struggle.

Eisenhower: His Public and His Party

Eisenhower’s World War II generalship made him the nation’s best-known and most popular figure. It was all made possible by his meteoric rise in the military ranks—from colonel in September 1941 to European theater commander in mid-1942, and then commander of the Allied invasion of the Continent (the personal choice of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose chief wartime advisor, General George C. Marshall, coveted the assignment). From that time on, the team of FDR and Eisenhower personified the country’s war effort. The president often declared his complete confidence in his
general: “... the fine, tough job he has done and how carefully and skillfully he is directing the soldiers under him.” Similarly, to the very end of his life Eisenhower expressed respect for FDR as a wartime leader. After V-E Day, Eisenhower reaped the rewards of a victorious commander: presidential appointments, medals from dozens of nations, the presidency of Columbia University, and a best-selling memoir that became a popular television documentary series.

Eisenhower’s wartime assignments owed much to his personal likeability, which grew into skillful diplomacy as he dealt with a cast of proud, prickly characters from several allied nations. His sunny disposition and trademark grin disarmed even his political rivals. His 1952 campaign theme was simply “I Like Ike” (with a campaign song to the tune of “Three Blind Mice”). Many saw him as an ideal harbinger of a new regime—post-war, post-Depression, post-New Deal. His fame made him the leading candidate to lead the GOP back into power.

Eisenhower was championed by a coalition of moderate Republicans (and not a few Democrats), embracing business leaders, younger partisans, and globally-minded war veterans (typified by California’s William S. Mailliard and New Jersey’s Peter Frelinghuysen—both of whom entered the House in 1953). It was GOP moderates who initially urged Eisenhower to run, and who supplied the strategy and financial backing that enabled him to wrest the GOP nomination from the conservatives’ idol, Ohio’s Senator Robert A. Taft—known as “Mr. Republican.” At the party’s Chicago convention, Eisenhower won the nomination on the first ballot, initially capturing a plurality with Taft running a strong second; but as a number of states switched their votes, he was then
nominated without the need for another ballot. (Four years later in San Francisco, Eisenhower was nominated without opposition.)

Twice Eisenhower crushed the Democrats’ liberal icon, former Illinois governor Adlai E. Stevenson. In 1952 his plurality was more than six million votes; the Electoral College margin was 442 to 89, with Stevenson’s states confined to southern and border areas. Four years later, his margins were even greater: a plurality of some nine million votes and an Electoral College blowout, 457 to 73. vi (Had the 22nd Amendment not been ratified in 1951—limiting presidents to two terms—many speculated that Eisenhower could well have won at least a third term.) His presidency began and ended with 68-percent public approval ratings; his eight-year average was an impressive 64 percent. His low point in popularity, 48 percent, occurred during the 1957-58 economic recession—a downturn that caused sizable Democratic victories that fall. vii

Not all Republicans were enthusiastic about placing the retired general at the top of the party’s ticket. The seeming closeness of Eisenhower (and his brother Milton) to FDR and his family raised suspicions among the GOP’s conservative wing, which looked to Senator Taft as their leader. Conservatives also accused the moderate “Willkie group” and the “Deweycrats” of burdening the party with unsuccessful moderate candidates: the internationalist Wendell Willkie in 1940 and New York governor Thomas E. Dewey in 1944 and again in 1948 (a year when most experts proclaimed he would crush President Harry S. Truman). Senator Taft made a robust showing on the first ballot of the 1952 GOP convention. Only after a New York City summit meeting was Taft ready to reassure his followers about his rival’s ideological loyalties:
I am completely satisfied that General Eisenhower will give the country an administration inspired by the Republican principles of continued and expanding liberty for all as against the continued growth of New Deal socialism.\textsuperscript{viii} 

Significantly, following the 1960 defeat of Vice President Richard M. Nixon (whose conservative credentials were more evident than Eisenhower’s), the party’s conservatives were able in 1964 to nominate their preferred candidate, Barry Goldwater, who outlasted several more moderate contenders but was crushed by President Johnson in the general election. Nonetheless, all subsequent GOP presidential candidates—whatever their personal ideological leanings—were obliged to cater to the party’s conservative stalwarts. By the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century this core became the center of a much-constricted Republican party.

\textbf{Eisenhower’s “Businessmen’s Administration”}

Although it was claimed that Eisenhower made the New Deal permanent by enfolding it within a bipartisan consensus, Eisenhower himself was certainly no New Dealer. Sometimes he fretted over the unyielding posture of the right-wing elements within his party; but as a small-town Midwesterner raised within a Republican family, he shared with the business community many ideological and policy views—in mid-century what was called “the business creed.”\textsuperscript{vi} These included such economic policies as tight monetary regulations, low taxes, limited welfare programs, balanced budgets, minimal governmental control over the economy, and restoration to the states of certain federal programs. Needless to say, the business community responded to such orthodox views with electoral and financial support.\textsuperscript{x} As a private citizen Eisenhower began to speak
disparagingly of the New Deal—for example, in a 1949 commencement address in which he assailed “the modern preachers of the paternalistic state.” His decision to seek the GOP nomination in 1952, he later explained, was a reaction to the Democrats’ doctrine of “spend and spend, and elect and elect. It seemed to me that this had to be stopped or our country would deviate badly from the precepts on which we had placed so much faith.”

The Eisenhower regime was often described by the press and public as a “businessmen’s administration.” The 1956 Democratic platform, for example, accused the GOP of allowing big business to dominate the economy and promised government aid for laid-off workers and small businesses. “We [the GOP] have been called the party of business,” Eisenhower remarked in a 1962 speech to party leaders. “Well, I for one am proud of that allegation, for the simple reason that the people who become successful in business have shown qualities of organization and leadership; they have led their businesses into positions of existence if not pre-eminence.”

Although the business and banking worlds provide both parties with a reservoir of political executives, Eisenhower turned to business talent for an extraordinary number of his appointees. Some 40 percent of them came from the ranks of business—almost twice the proportion found in earlier or later Democratic administrations. Probably based upon his experience in military command structures, Eisenhower “trusted and required a consensus of Cabinet or staff to shape the supreme judgments and determinations.” His initial Cabinet included several prominent businessmen who shaped the administration’s responses to the depressed-areas question. Especially influential was Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey, on leave from the Marcus A. Hanna Company, a steel manufacturer. Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks’ background—confined to banking
and manufacturing—influenced his negative reaction to job-creation programs, even when they were to be housed in his own Cabinet department. Weeks’ Assistant Secretary was Frederick H. Mueller—a furniture manufacturer in private life—who served as Secretary from 1959 to 1961. To chair his Council of Economic Advisors Eisenhower turned to Arthur F. Burns (who served 1953-1956), an economist whose specialty was measuring business cycles. With their business experiences, these individuals tended to regard business downturns as both caused and remedied by shifts in monetary rather than fiscal policies.

A notable exception was the Department of Labor. Eisenhower’s initial Cabinet choice was Martin P. Durkin, a Democrat and labor union executive. Initially Eisenhower seemed sympathetic to Durkin’s goal of rescinding portions of the Taft-Hartley Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, passed by the 80th Congress over President Truman’s veto and a source of bitter partisan debate. Realizing that the president’s support was wavering under pressure, however, Durkin resigned after less than eight months in the post. His successor, James P. Mitchell, was a happier choice. Like Durkin a “Democrat for Eisenhower,” Mitchell was a progressive labor-relations executive who had served with distinction in the War Department during World War II as well as in private business. In his post throughout the remainder of Eisenhower’s presidency, he played an active, though not always decisive, role in shaping the administration’s response to Democratic labor-sponsored bills between 1955 and 1961.

**Eisenhower Confronts Depressed Areas**

The president’s first exposure to the issue of localized chronic unemployment came in a brief encounter during his 1952 campaign. His advisors were eager to dispel
the public’s lingering image of the GOP as the party of the Great Depression and refute the Democrats’ claim that “You Never Had It So Good.” Speaking to 4,000 people in the wool textile center of Lawrence, Mass.—where about half the labor force of 50,000 was without jobs—Eisenhower promised a sympathetic response:

When it comes to a problem of the unemployment of 15,000 or more People off Lawrence, loyal Americans, you can come down to my office, and there you will be put in touch with the proper people. You will not have to meet with some third-string clerk in a back room, and you will know you are not the forgotten city.\textsuperscript{xvii}

Similar assurances were given at other appearances in New England. Although his policy commitments were never spelled out, such words were later cited as evidence of Eisenhower’s “endorsement” of federal aid proposals.

A mere eight months into the new administration, CEA Chairman Arthur Burns warned the Cabinet of a deepening deflationary trend in the economy. United Auto Workers (UAW) president Walter Reuther called for a national conference on unemployment; Senator James Murray (D-Mont.), father of the Employment Act, delivered on the Senate floor a lengthy indictment of Eisenhower’s inaction.\textsuperscript{xviii} During the recession members of Congress—included Republicans representing the affected areas—began prodding the administration to act. But “there were no signs of panic around the Cabinet table,” recalled presidential assistant Sherman Adams. The sense of urgency abated in June 1954, when Burns officially proclaimed the end of the crisis. “The recession clouds blew away without . . . pump priming,” Adams recalled.\textsuperscript{xix}

Looking forward to the 1954 congressional elections, however, Treasury Secretary Humphrey, along with Burns and his CEA staff, readied some economic stimulus plans—stressing monetary policy, tax reductions, and loans, rather than
government “pump-priming” activities. The recession also led to a CEA-sponsored interagency Task Force on Local Unemployment, whose broad mandate was to “formulate a basic federal policy for dealing with local unemployment.” The Task Force’s report—which surfaced after the November 1954 elections—contained few surprises. The group endorsed continuing and expanding the existing programs, including allocating Federal contracts to affected areas (admittedly only a modest success). State and local officials were urged to dissuade employers in labor-surplus areas from abandoning or transferring their facilities. The Small Business Administration (SBA) was tasked with surveying private credit associations to determine whether the Federal government should offer aid. Another recommendation—enlarging the Office of Area Development (OAD), a tiny staff group within the Commerce Department that had been created in 1947—became a cornerstone of the administration’s policy. Finally, the Task Force warned that “public works not be regarded as an important means” for dealing with the problem.

Even as the CEA Task Force was completing its report, the administration received a political body blow: the mid-term election returns, which ended Republican control of Capitol Hill. (The president himself declined to join the 1954 campaigns.) The president’s party lost a net of two Senate seats and 16 in the House. Democrats gained a mere one-vote Senate majority (48-47, with one Independent (Oregon’s Wayne Morse, who began his career as a liberal Republican, became an Independent in 1953, and finally a Democrat two years later) but 29 votes in the House of Representatives (232-203).

Reporting to the Cabinet, Vice President Nixon said that “such factors as unemployment in the coal fields” contributed to the GOP defeat. James L. Sundquist’s
review of the available survey data found “a decisive shift in voter sentiment” as the recession hit its low point in early 1954; voters who then expressed their discontent “did not return to the Republican side.”

In view of the narrow margins of victory in some of the states suffering from unemployment, Sundquist suggested that, with a more vigorous show of concern, the GOP might have retained its Senate majority.

Unemployment was the Democrats’ number one issue. During the campaign, they dramatized the GOP’s image of heartlessness toward the unemployed by trumpeting a careless remark by Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson—the former chief of General Motors, known as “Engine Charlie”—that he preferred “bird dogs” (the uncomplaining jobless) to “kennel dogs” (the baying jobless). Such an electoral shift might be expected in a midterm year; but Republicans from districts hard hit by chronic unemployment were especially vulnerable. A *Congressional Quarterly* study of 79 House districts with pockets of unemployment reported a seven-seat majority of Democratic incumbents (with a net gain of three seats in 1954); nearly half of the Democrats boasted a higher vote percentage than two years before. Surveys showed that domestic issues influenced voters in 1954: for example, 23 percent of Eisenhower voters—who two years later ranked domestic issues as most important—switched to vote for the Democrats. As they contemplated the 1956 reelection campaign, the president and his advisors were thus forced to reconsider their response to the depressed-areas problem.

**Senator Douglas’ Depressed-Areas Bill**

The original depressed-areas bill (S. 2663) was hastily introduced (expecting that the administration might soon unveil its own plan) in July 1955 by Illinois Senator Paul H. Douglas with seven Democratic cosponsors, including John F. Kennedy of
Massachusetts. Following his reelection tour of southern Illinois’ depressed coal-mining regions, Douglas was determined to help depressed communities rebuild their “social capital” that is, infrastructure and services that would attract new businesses. As for jobless workers, he believed that they could be retrained but not relocated; he was fond of quoting Adam Smith’s dictum that “labor is of all commodities the most difficult to transport.” His bill—drafted by a Legislative Reference Service (LRS) economist—was a $390-million package of financial and technical aid, including preferential treatment in government contracts, technical assistance, vocational retraining, and loans and grants to help lure new industry.

A combative liberal with an independent style and a mercurial temperament, Douglas typified the Senate “outsider” of his era. As a liberal outside of the southern-dominated Democratic caucus, he reasoned that he could ultimately exert influence upon Congress, if not immediately within it. His heroes included such former progressive lawmakers (whose pictures adorned his office walls) as George W. Norris (R-Neb.) and Robert M. La Follette, Sr. (Progressive-Wis.). His closest Senate colleagues were other liberal outsiders: Herbert H. Lehman (N.Y.), Joseph S. Clark (Pa.), William Proxmire (Wis.), and Hubert H. Humphrey (Minn.). Douglas himself was a renowned scholar: a professor of economics at the University of Chicago for 25 years, co-developer of the Cobb-Douglas Production Function in neoclassical economics, and in 1947 president of the American Economic Association. Although a Quaker, he volunteered to serve with the Marines in World War II, and he bore his battle wound for the remainder of his life.

Douglas’ proposals were supported by key players the “lib-lab” (liberal-labor) lobby: the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA), whose research director,
economist Solomon Barkin, was the leading organizer of the depressed-areas coalition; AFL-CIO and its Industrial Union Division (whose counsel was Arthur Goldberg, later Labor Secretary and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court); and local and state development officials (especially William L. Batt Jr., Pennsylvania’s Secretary of Labor and Industry from 1957 until 1961, when he became the first administrator of the newly-created Area Redevelopment Administration). Coordinating the efforts was a paper organization called the “Area Employment Expansion Committee,” a staff group that established lines of communication among the bill’s adherents on and off Capitol Hill.xxvi

Opponents of depressed-areas bills were led by nation-wide business lobbies—primarily the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC) and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). Both these organizations are traditional interest groups whose machinery is geared toward expensive internal and external propaganda campaigns—disseminated through such organs as the USCC’s Nation’s Business and Washington Report (weekly), NAM News, and The Wall Street Journal. These groups saw depressed areas through the ideological lenses of the competitive market model of the economy: First, labor must compete for jobs, inasmuch as workers are mobile and teachable. Second, firms also compete: for every failing industry there are growing industries elsewhere ready to absorb workers. Finally, communities must also compete to maintain a firm economic base. As Eisenhower had stated in his 1955 Economic Report, “A large part of the adjustment of depressed areas to new economic conditions both can and should be carried out by the local citizens themselves.”xxvii

A more moderate approach came from the Council for Economic Development (CED), a small but well-financed nonpartisan study group that embraced not only
business leaders but academic experts, with the goal of stimulating economic activity and influencing public policy by publishing objective reports. Other dissenters within the business community included local chambers of commerce in the affected areas, as well as industries that stood to benefit from economic development—for example, electric power companies and local or regional banks.

**The Administration Responds—Or Does It?**

Wounded by the 1954 election setbacks, the administration began to shift its stance toward the depressed areas question. In spring 1955—several months before the Douglas bill was introduced—CEA Chairman Burns revived his Task Force, which was now given “more leeway” to explore the government’s role in assisting depressed areas. At the group’s initial meeting, Burns urged that a “whole range” of alternatives be considered—from local programs through “various degrees of local, state, and federal . . . participation.” And because localized unemployment was mostly a long-term structural problem, rather than a short-term cyclical crisis, Burns told them, they should seek fundamental solutions rather than “mere palliatives.”

The Task Force soon fixed upon a broad proposal. Although some agency representatives favored beefing up existing programs with an inter-agency coordinating group, the majority adopted a bolder outline prepared by CEA staff assigned to the group. The centerpiece of the plan was a new Federal Development Agency (FDA) to administer a program of loans and grants to labor surplus areas. The new agency would be empowered to give three types of aid to localities: grants for planning and retraining; loans for capital improvement (with up to 50 percent federal participation); and technical assistance. More an outline than a specification of details, the Task Force’s proposal
nonetheless preceded Senator Douglas’ S.2663 by one month. The new program, the Task Force explained, was based on four principles: (1) Localities should take primary responsibility for planning and underwriting their own long-range economic progress. (2) States should join the federal government in any financial aid to communities. (3) Federal participation in financial help should have prescribed limits. (4) Federal aid should be made through authorized, broadly representative community organizations. These elements eventually morphed into the “four principles” enunciated when Eisenhower’s “Domestic Point Four Program” was announced.

Although not regarded as an economic liberal, Burns firmly championed the draft proposal and guided it through the numerous bureaucratic minefields. More conservative figures within the administration—including Treasury Secretary Humphrey, Commerce Secretary Weeks, and the president’s personal economic advisor, Gabriel Hauge, were skeptical of the plan. The first hurdle was the CEA itself, where Burns’ leadership won its approval. Following the administration’s practice, Burns then presented the plan—now revised and polished by his staff—to the Cabinet on October 14. Vice President Nixon chaired the meeting in the absence of the president, who was recuperating following his September 1955 heart attack. Humphrey and Defense Secretary Wilson expressed doubts. Weeks, although dubious, raised no objections: he dared not jeopardize his own department’s case for administering the program. Nixon, who helped Burns present his case, was enthusiastic, as was Labor Secretary Mitchell. Summarizing the discussion, the Vice President said he believed general agreement had been reached about the need for the aid plan. So despite its strong business coloration, the Cabinet had approved the Domestic Point Four Plan.
Burns and Hauge traveled to the president’s bedside in Denver on October 24 to report on the proposal. They told newsmen afterward that Eisenhower had expressed “strong approval” of the undertaking as a way of “extending good times” to every part of the country. Burns then noted that the plan, to be sent to Congress in January 1956, was the first federal attempt “to come to grips in a practical way” with labor surpluses. He also said the plan called for a new agency, perhaps in the Labor or Commerce departments. He cautioned against expecting miracles from it: the scheme was still only on paper and would require congressional approval. And localities must still take the lead in competing for new industries.

The project was then referred to the Commerce Department, whose OAD staff formed the vortex of the administration’s expertise on the question. Major revisions included doubling the total loan fund to $50 million per year, reducing technical assistance to $1.5 million, deleting outright grants for public works, and eliminating plans for a network of state and local organizations. The process was typical of mid-century executive bill drafting. The major players were OAD experts along with lawyers from the department’s Office of General Counsel. Other agencies and departmental officers were consulted as needed. Many of OAD’s key staff members, who were civil servants, were nonetheless somewhat suspect because they had served under previous Democratic administrations. Nonetheless, these individuals (whose personal political activities, it should be remembered, were far more restricted than those of today’s federal employees) carefully followed the Eisenhower administration’s perspectives. They also avoided contacts with Capitol Hill Democrats—a fact that hindered their subsequent relations
with Senator Douglas and his allies, who tended to lump OAD with the administration in their criticisms.)

The Domestic Point Four program became part of the president’s 1956 legislative agenda. It was mentioned in his State of the Union message on January 5, and an entire section of his 1956 Economic Report was devoted to “helping communities reduce unemployment.” Seemingly reversing his earlier stance, the president now asserted that “the fate of distressed communities is a matter of national as well as local concern.”

On January 9, 1956—six months after the first Douglas bill had appeared—Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-N.J.) introduced the administration’s Area Assistance Act of 1956 (S.2892) on behalf of himself and 22 Republican colleagues. “The bill which I have sent to the desk,” he explained, “will . . . translate into law the administration’s program for economic redevelopment in areas of low employment and is sponsored by the administration.”

GOP leaders on the Hill gave lukewarm support to the proposal; but on Capitol Hill the focal point of debate over the next six years remained the Douglas bill in its various and evolving versions.

The impetus for the administration’s actions on depressed areas emerged from at least three sources: (1) Congressional pressure, especially from Republicans from districts or states affected by chronic labor surplus; (2) Concern among Eisenhower’s political advisors—most notably Vice President Nixon, CEA Chairman Burns, and Labor Secretary Mitchell—about the issue’s impact upon the looming 1956 reelection campaign; and (3) The desire to relieve executive agencies of the growing burden of coping with citizen delegations demanding aid they claimed Eisenhower promised in
1952. In short, these considerations had little to do with business enterprise or philosophy, and everything to do with political and administrative realities.

For the next five years, the Douglas and administration bills demarked a major battlefield, involving both politics and economic doctrine. Sundquist summarizes the combatants and their arguments:

The Democrats, eagerly backed by organized labor, were able to convert area redevelopment into a powerful political issue in the affected areas, which symbolized—in their oratory—the contrast between Democratic compassion and Republican unconcern. The Republicans sought to recoup by using the bill as an example before the country at large of Republican fiscal prudence contrasted to Democratic profligacy.\textsuperscript{\textit{xxxiv}}

The differences between the two approaches (and similar bills introduced by other members along the way) were so subtle as to be invisible to all but the most dedicated partisans; yet both sides conflated minor differences of degree into major differences of principle. With neither side being able to prevail, both parties took their cases to the voters in three national elections: 1956, 1958, and 1960.

**Capitol Hill Politics: First Round, 1955-1956**

Despite his minority position as a Democratic liberal in the Senate of the mid-1950s, Douglas was strategically positioned to lead the fight for his bill. He held a seat on two relevant Senate committees. One was Labor and Public Welfare, where he chaired a subcommittee, was given free rein by committee Chairman Lister Hill (D-Ala.), and enjoyed liberal majorities in both the subcommittee and full committee. The other claimant for jurisdiction, the Senate Banking Committee, chaired by Senator J. William
Fulbright (D-Ark.), was more challenging: Douglas chaired no subcommittee there, and the membership was less favorable to such “welfare” measures as S. 2663. But Senate Rule XXV conferred upon the Banking Committee jurisdiction over “financial aid to commerce and industry.” (House Rule X gave similar jurisdiction to the House Banking and Currency Committee.) In January 1956 Senator Fulbright warned Senator Hill that the Banking panel would be “compelled to reserve the privilege of requesting an opportunity to consider the bill.” Nothing happened until June 28, the day after Hill’s committee had reported S.2663, when Fulbright wrote Majority Leader Johnson asking that the bill be referred to his Banking Committee. “I believe it is my duty to protect the jurisdiction of [the Banking] committee under the rules,” he declared. Fulbright’s real motives, however, lay elsewhere. Because Fulbright’s core interests lay in foreign affairs, not banking, he was regarded as a “service chairman” who permitted his committee colleagues and staff relatively free rein, assisting them whenever possible. In this case, however, he reacted as a spokesman for sectional interests. As a southerner and a conservative in economic matters, Fulbright regarded the area redevelopment bill as an effort to preserve “old and worn-out” industrial areas at the expense of such “new South” states as Arkansas.

Coming so late in the congressional session, Fulbright’s ultimatum had to be dealt with if the bill were to be rescued. Douglas himself had just left the Labor and Public Welfare Committee to take a long-coveted seat on the Finance Committee, and so his successor as subcommittee chair, John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, was left with the chore of bargaining with Fulbright. In a series of meetings staff aides hammered out three amendments favoring rural areas of unemployment and designed to render the bill more
acceptable to southern senators. Accepted “reluctantly” by Kennedy during the brief floor
debate, the amendments were Fulbright’s price for dropping his jurisdictional
objections—though he was assured that in the future the bill would be referred to his
committee. Once the deal was consummated, S.2663 passed the Senate easily by a vote
of 60 to 30. The bill’s inclusion of benefits for rural and southern states added to its
political appeal on Capitol Hill; if many southerners remained unenthusiastic, there were
others—most notably Fulbright’s Arkansas colleague, Representative Brooks Hays, who
were anxious to attract government aid for their constituencies.

Over in the House of Representatives, sponsors of depressed-areas legislation
were facing their own procedural challenges. As early as June 29, Democratic
Representative Daniel J. Flood’s depressed-areas bill—a companion to Douglas’ bill—
was reported by the House Banking and Currency Committee. But the Rules Committee,
facing an end-of-session logjam, showed no inclination to clear the bill for floor debate.
Although caught in the midst of an unrelated feud on housing legislation involving the
two committees, the bill finally received a Rules Committee hearing on July 21—six days
before adjournment—but the decision was deferred. It appeared that the bill was killed
for the 84th Congress.

One last chance for House passage remained. With adjournment looming, the
House was operating under an agreement by which the Speaker would recognize
members to move passage of bills under suspension of the rules—but only with the
consent of both the Majority and Minority Leaders. Speaker Sam Rayburn (Tex.) and
Majority Leader John McCormack (Mass.) agreed to allow the depressed-areas bill to be
called up. But Minority Leader Joseph Martin (Mass.) said that he would need to consult
“downtown” with administration officials. With time running out and unable to pass his bill under suspension of the rules, Flood—who represented Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal region—agreed to substitute the administration’s bill. He called Commerce Secretary Weeks: Could the administration give an answer in the next day or so? Two Pennsylvania Republicans who had authored their own depressed-areas bills—Ivor D. Fenton and James E. Van Zandt—were enlisted to help obtain administration approval. Weeks, who was known to oppose the legislation, dispatched the equally skeptical Assistant Secretary Mueller to Capitol Hill to negotiate with Fenton and Van Zandt. After two hours of discussion—during which congressional supporters repeated their offer to substitute the administration’s own bill—the two Pennsylvanians emerged to tell Flood that “the administration was adamant and against any bill whatsoever.”

Privately, administration officials claimed that they had been caught in a trap play: Had they consented to House passage of the president’s bill, the Douglas forces might have used a House-Senate conference to restore provisions of the original S.2663—thus pushing the administration into an even more awkward position. Their suspicions had some foundation—although by this point in the session it was doubtful whether a conference committee could have been convened on such short notice.

More importantly, the incident suggests a distinct ambivalence toward the issue within the Eisenhower administration. Assuming that the president personally favored the bill that was drafted and introduced in his name, there is no evidence that the administration reached out to Capitol Hill to advance the bill’s fortunes. The bill’s advocates within the administration did not communicate with their bill’s GOP supporters; nor did they seek to bargain with Democrats. The administration’s direct
involvement was apparently confined to one last-minute meeting overseen by the unenthusiastic businessmen, Weeks and Mueller

Democrats cited the incident repeatedly during the 1956 campaign as evidence of the administration’s economic rigidity. Eisenhower’s campaigners, running on a “peace and prosperity” platform,” were content to let the issue ride. Eisenhower himself appeared disengaged from the issue. His news conferences were at best lukewarm; when asked at an August 1 news conference about Representative Flood’s story, the president replied in a typical offhand manner: “You are telling me something now that I did not know . . . I was disappointed that [the legislation] was not passed, and I don’t know the reason lying behind it.”xxxvi

Capitol Hill Politics: Mid-Game Maneuvers: 1957-1958

Early in 1957 Douglas reintroduced his bill as S.964. This time it was duly referred to Fulbright’s Banking Committee and to Douglas’s new Production and Stabilization Subcommittee. Complaining that the subcommittee was stacked against him, Douglas tried to persuade Fulbright to shift the bill to the full committee, where it would receive a more friendly reception. The talks were perfunctory: the two men were never close associates, and Fulbright—a southern conservative in economic matters—still suspected that the bill would hamper newer industrial areas, which depended upon lower non-union wages to lure industries from older, heavily unionized areas.

The impasse was broken in early 1958 when Sen. Frederick G. Payne (R-Me.) let it be known that he favored a compromise. Payne faced a tough reelection fight that fall in a state where hard-core unemployment in the Saco-Biddeford-Sanford textile region was a major issue. Douglas and Payne quickly reached an accord: Payne introduced his
bill, S.3447, in what he called “a sincere effort to compromise the differences between the Douglas and Administration bills.” The co-sponsors included three other moderate Senate Republicans: Clifford P. Case (N.J.), J. Glenn Beall (Md.), and Margaret Chase Smith (Me.). The bill reached the full Banking Committee only after a tussle with Fulbright, who was ready to open a hearing on his own anti-recession measure, an ill-fated community-facilities bill (S.3497). When Payne moved that the committee go into executive session, the waiting witnesses were treated to a rare display of inter-personal senatorial warfare. Douglas called Fulbright a “deep-freeze artist,” to which the chairman replied that Douglas had been “derelict in his duty.” As the committee wound up in a parliamentary tangle, they realized that Payne’s bill was still technically before the full committee (not having been referred to a subcommittee). Douglas then moved that Payne’s bill be declared the full committee’s “pending order of business,” and his motion was adopted 8 to 5.

Once out of the Senate committee, the Douglas-Payne compromise—now revised as a “clean bill” (a new text embodying the original bill with alterations) even more favorable to Douglas’s goals—readily passed the Senate by a 46-36 vote. Over in the House, the Banking and Currency Committee trimmed it somewhat and reported it on July 1, 1958.

The bill now rested in the hands of the House Rules Committee—then controlled by conservatives, even under Democratic control. As had happened two years earlier, the end-of-session problem loomed. After some delay, Rules scheduled a hearing and cleared the bill by a 6 to 5 vote, but not before deleting a direct Treasury-borrowing (“back-door financing”) provision strongly favored by the bill’s liberal advocates. But
Rules Chairman Howard W. Smith (D-Va.) could still have delayed filing the bill or calling it up for floor action. Because adjournment was set for Labor Day, a delegation of congressmen led by Representative Dan Flood (D-Pa.) trekked to Smith’s Alexandria, Va., home where—after demanding deletion of another key provision of the bill—“Judge” Smith agreed to report a rule by August 12. Smith was as good as his word, and the Douglas-Payne bill—carrying the amendments Smith himself had exacted—passed on a standing vote. On the eve of adjournment the revised bill was sent to the White House.

These events occurred during a severe election-year economic recession. With their eyes on the fall congressional contests, Democratic leaders were anxious to pass the Douglas-Payne bill. They reasoned that Eisenhower might possibly be persuaded to sign the bill as a bipartisan solution to the depressed-areas problem. If he vetoed the bill, on the other hand, Democrats would have a ready-made campaign issue.

The president did in fact veto the measure, overruling the entreaties of Senator Payne and Secretary Mitchell. In his memorandum of disapproval, the president objected to portions of the bill that would “greatly diminish local responsibility,” and urged the next Congress to pass “a more soundly conceived” bill that he could approve. xxxviii

Some observers blamed Eisenhower’s veto for the heavy GOP losses in the 1958 congressional elections. Republicans lost 47 House seats and 12 Senate seats—including that of distressed Maine’s Senator Payne, the bill’s co-sponsor. While the 1954 and 1956 elections had given the Democrats majority status and modest gains, the recession-dominated 1958 elections gave them commanding majorities in both chambers: 65-35 in the Senate and 284-153 in the House. This Congress (the 86th) also swelled the
Democrats’ liberal ranks. In the Senate, liberal unrest coaxed Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (Tex.) to relax his heavy-handed rule based on alliances with the party’s “boll-weevil” southerners. Liberal partisans, such as Douglas, Morse, and others, enjoyed new power. The House of Representatives saw the formation of a northern and western coalition: the left-wing Democratic Study Group (DSG), which launched a prolonged struggle against the rule of senior committee chairs—many of them southerners who often forged alliances with their conservative Republican colleagues when marking up committee bills.

Capitol Hill Politics: Late-Game Maneuvers: 1959-1960

Both the administration and the Douglas camp introduced new bills when the 86th Congress convened in January 1959, and by the end of March the Senate had passed the Douglas version (S.722). Two months later the House Banking Committee reported the bill, which brought it again to the hands of the House Rules Committee, where it languished for an entire year.

The “depressed-areas congressmen,” bolstered by the newly formed liberal Democratic Study Group, attempted to enlist Speaker Rayburn’s help in dislodging the bill from Rules. Rayburn was sympathetic but cautious about expending his leverage on hopeless legislative ventures. The task of the bill’s advocates was to convince the Speaker that the bill was needed in their districts, that it would bring favorable results for the Democratic party, and—most important of all—that it could muster enough votes to pass on the House floor. Freshman Representative Clem Miller (D-Calif.), an active DSG member, wrote an engaging account of the confrontation with Rayburn: “But—but, [Rayburn] asked, could we produce the needed votes when and if we got to the floor? To
Although Rayburn promised help, he was in no hurry to act. Because Eisenhower had already vetoed a bipartisan bill, there was no reason to press the House for a more liberal measure until the 1960 presidential campaign was close at hand. The looming presidential election also discouraged Democrats from bargaining with the administration: the depressed-areas issue was too valuable as a campaign weapon. So it was not until March 1960 that Rayburn persuaded Smith to hold a hearing; on April 21 the committee turned down the rule by a 6 to 6 vote. (As long as he held the votes needed to withhold a rule, Smith was an implacable opponent. Not until 1961 was Rayburn able to enlarge the committee in order to assure a mainstream-party majority.)

House Democratic leaders were faced with finding a procedural way of circumventing Smith’s Rules Committee. Two possibilities were discarded: Suspending the rules was out of the question, because Minority Leader Charles Halleck (R-Ind.) would have to give his consent. Discharging the Rules Committee could be achieved through a petition signed by a simple majority (218 votes); but because such a move would signal a lack of confidence in the entire committee system, only two laws in recent times had been enacted via the discharge route.

So seven days after the Rules vote, Majority Leader John McCormack (Mass.) notified the House that S.722 would be brought to the floor under a third, little-used procedure, Calendar Wednesday—last employed a full decade earlier. Under this procedure (normally dispensed with by unanimous consent), the names of standing committees are called alphabetically. At that time a committee chairman may call for
immediate action on a bill stalled in the Rules Committee. The device is vulnerable to delaying tactics by the bill’s opponents: Action on the bill must be completed by the end of the calendar day, under a two-hour limit for general debate.

On the appointed Wednesday, May 4, the final “Amen” of the Chaplain’s prayer had hardly been uttered when John C. Davis (D-Ga.)—one of two “sentries” (the other was John Bell Williams, D-Miss.) stationed on the floor by Republicans and southern Democrats opposed to the bill—raised a point of order that a quorum of the (218 members) was not present. More than three hours that afternoon were consumed with quorum calls, followed by long pauses for verbatim readings of the journal by the Clerk (normally dispensed with by unanimous consent). In the end, Davis and Williams (D-Miss.) bowed to leadership pressure and allowed the House to proceed. After the journal had been approved, Speaker Rayburn ordered the call of the committees. When the Clerk reached Banking and Currency, Chairman Brent Spence (D-Ky.) called up S.722 for consideration. Minority Leader Halleck then moved for a test vote on whether the House wished to consider the bill. The motion carried comfortably, 221 to 171. When substantive debate finally began at 5:08 p.m., the House had consumed almost four and a half hours in calling the roll twelve times. Only two hours were devoted to debating the bill, but even then dilatory tactics were used. When Chairman Spence offered an amendment to substitute the committee-approved $251-million measure for the Senate’s $389.5-million bill, James Haley (D-Fla.) forced a 30-minute reading of the substitute. When William Widnall (R-N.J.) offered the administration’s $53-million version, it too had to be read verbatim. Eventually the committee substitute was accepted, and the administration’s version was rejected by a standing vote of 77 to 152.
As the debate proceeded, Halleck and his conservative allies closely watched the quorum calls to gauge their level of strength. As the day dragged on, opposition support dwindled as members drifted away. Because the depressed-areas bill clearly had the necessary votes, the opposition leaders finally relented. (Some southern conservatives were ready to fight on; but the effort seemed futile, especially as it seemed likely that Eisenhower would veto the legislation.) The decisive vote—on a motion to recommit the bill to committee—came at 9:30 p.m., and the margin was 223 to 162 against recommittal. The Committee of the Whole then dissolved and reported to the full House so that the bill could finally be approved. When the Senate voted to accept the House amendments, Senators Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey—both campaigning for a presidential primary victory in distressed West Virginia—dramatically flew back to Washington to register their support.

**Passage of the Legislation: 1961**

The 1960 Republican presidential candidate, Vice President Nixon, reportedly favored approval of the bill, to remove the issue as an obstacle to his campaign. But as predicted, President Eisenhower vetoed the 1960 depressed-areas bill—following the advice of now-Secretary Mueller and the other conservatives in charge of his Commerce Department. The president and his advisors deemed the 1960 bill even more objectionable than the 1958 bipartisan measure.

Unfortunately for the Republicans, another—more serious—economic recession plagued the nation in 1960, bringing even more acute unemployment to the depressed areas of New England, Appalachia, and the Midwest. Defeat of depressed-areas aid again provided the Democrats with a prime campaign issue. Candidate Kennedy took the
offensive on the area redevelopment bill on 61 separate campaign speeches or statements. In city after city, local leaders told him: “When you speak here, talk about unemployment and automation, and especially the depressed-area bill.” Who cared about its specific content? Kennedy simply reminded audiences that he was the bill’s floor manager in 1956, and that it was “twice vetoed by the Republicans” or “the administration” [not “by President Eisenhower”]. Nixon was forced on the defensive, replying only that the Republican bill was superior and that Democrats had deliberately provoked the vetoes in order to “play politics” with the issue. By this time area redevelopment was not just a bill—it was a symbol that contrasted the two political parties.

In terms of the popular vote, the 1960 election was the closest in modern times (a mere 112,000 votes out of 70 million cast); but the Electoral College count was more decisive: 303 to 219. Following traditional fault lines, the Democratic coalition linking the urban Northeast and the rural South held together to provide Senator Kennedy with his razor-thin margin of victory. Republicans retained their strongholds in New England, a majority of the Midwestern, Plains, and Rocky Mountain states, along with the Upper South and Florida. But a number of the economically depressed locales went Democratic—in southern Illinois, West Virginia, and the Northeast. (Nixon privately believed that the administration’s foot-dragging on relief bills had affected the outcome.)

The closeness of the election was reflected also in the congressional election results: The Senate’s party division remained unchanged (65-35 favoring the Democrats), whereas Republicans gained nine House seats.
Conclusions

Eisenhower’s business-oriented administration was persuaded in 1955 to develop its own modest legislative version of Senator Douglas’ depressed-areas bill. Even as a candidate in 1952, Eisenhower expressed sympathy with the plight of locales hard hit by chronic unemployment. Pressures for action intensified with the 1954 recession with CEA Chairman Arthur F. Burns’ championship of a moderate response to the problem. Intra-administration pressures—from the Labor Department’s Bureau of Economic Statistics (BES) and the conservatively-led Commerce Department’s Office of Area Development (OAD) were urging action—reinforced by Republican legislators from affected areas, not to mention Democratic lawmakers and labor leaders.

Eisenhower and his chief advisors reacted initially with business-friendly solutions: strict definition of the problem; local initiatives; and only minimal government intervention. The administration’s enunciation of business perspectives, however, was mostly independent of the voices of business organizations, such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and especially the United States Chamber of Commerce (USCC). The so-called business creed worked in rather than upon Eisenhower and his colleagues. In submitting their own bill, therefore, the administration departed from the business posture in deference to political realities. Although the bill (and its successors) provided a talking point, it was “half a loaf” that satisfied no one. Especially after CEA Chairman Burns’ departure in 1956, the administration seemed less than serious about its own plans—as witness its rejection in 1956 of having its own bill substituted in Congress.
The five-year impasse between the GOP administration and Democratic congressional majorities forestalled passage of area-redevelopment legislation in any form. Eisenhower’s antipathy toward the Douglas bills led him to use the veto power in 1958 and 1960—in both cases at considerable risk to his party, and even to advocates within his own administration. In 1956 the president was also forced to prevent passage of his own bill in the House—on the pretext of avoiding a potentially dangerous trap. Having chosen this stance, the administration was faced with a perplexing task of defending it before Congress and the voting public. This dilemma was thrown into bold relief by Vice President Nixon’s 1960 campaign strategy—favoring federal aid at a moment when area redevelopment was a major issue. The election of Senator Kennedy marked the final defeat of the administration’s strategy: the voters made inevitable the passage of Senator Douglas’ prolonged offensive.

The Area Redevelopment Act—in the Senate, it was designated as S.1—was finally enacted into law in 1961. It was Senator Douglas’ first and most cherished legislative victory and the first legislative result of President Kennedy’s “New Frontier” agenda. It was also the first measure to give concrete substance to the pledge made by the 1946 Employment Act. “A decade of conflict, groping, and experimentation with the problem of depressed areas appeared to have led at last to consensus,” Sundquist concludes. “We are not helpless before the iron laws of economics,” President Kennedy remarked on signing the bill. “A wise public policy uses economics to create hope—and not to abet despair.”

In the 1960s there followed scores of new federal programs designed to enhance the skills, employability, and welfare of those who encountered difficulty in competing in
the economic system. The much-debated “war on poverty” was one of these programs—all of which owed their form to the debate first fought out in the 1950s depressed-areas controversy. (Ironically, the Area Redevelopment Act—expanded to cover rural as well as industrial areas—eventually covered one-third of all the nation’s counties, thus diluting its impact upon the hardest-hit areas.)

The scholarly evaluation of President Eisenhower’s stewardship of the economy is mixed. On the one hand, his first administration saw “modest expansions of the coverage of Social Security and unemployment insurance.” Although Eisenhower’s policies produced slow growth, they guarded against inflation—not to mention the acute income inequality that occurred under later presidencies. “The net decline of real income during the 1950s,” M. Stephen Weatherford concludes, “registers Eisenhower’s consistent concern with quelling inflation at the first sign of rising prices.” Skeptical of Keynesian activism, Eisenhower and his advisors focused on the specter of inflation—which could occur if the economy rose beyond full employment (at the time, above 5 percent) and created pressures on prices. Sophisticated models of presidential economic leadership—legislative success and public approval—also suggest that Eisenhower’s performance was somewhat below par: more in the ranks of Jimmy Carter and George H. W. Bush than of, say, Lyndon Johnson, Gerald R. Ford, and Bill Clinton. These measures are experimental and open to debate. However, it is clear that Eisenhower’s record of legislative and public success was affected in a major way by his administration’s response to the three recessions that occurred during his watch. The failure to articulate a vigorous program in the face of these challenges helped to cost the Republicans the control of Congress, and may even have contributed to the eventual
passage of the 1960s fiscal programs to aid the poor and disadvantaged. In these developments, the 1955-1961 history of the depressed-areas problem played an essential part.

REFERENCES


16 Burns arrived in the U.S. as a child with his Austrian Jewish parents and graduated from Columbia University, where he went on to earn his Ph.D under Wesley Clair Mitchell, a pioneer in business-cycle research. On Morningside Heights he was known informally as “Business-Cycle Burns,” as opposed to his Columbia colleague, Arthur E. Burns, who studied government spending.


18 Congressional Record 100 (83rd Cong., 2nd Sess.), pp. 1335 ff.


*Congressional Quarterly*, “Fact Sheet on Depressed Areas” (November 10, 1955).


This discussion of the proponents and opponents of depressed-areas bills derives from research contained in Roger H. Davidson, *Coalition-Building for Depressed Areas Bills: 1955-1965* (published for the Inter-University Case Program by Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).


Task Force on Local Unemployment, Minutes (April 19, 1955), pp. 1-2. As an expert on business cycles, Professor Burns had devoted a lifetime to studying “emergency” problems caused by inflationary or deflationary shifts in the economy. Now, however, he apparently realized that preventive rather than corrective measures were needed to cope with the structural problem of long-term unemployment.


An account of the session is recorded in Donovan, p. 382.


*Congressional Record* 102 (84th Cong., 2nd sess.), pp. 185-186. Co-sponsors were mostly centrist Republicans and those from states with areas of chronic unemployment. For the record, they were: H. Styles Bridges and Norris Cotton (N.H.), Everett M. Dirksen (Ill.), Edward Martin and James H. Duff (Pa.), Leverett Saltonstall (Mass.), Charles E. Potter (Mich.), Prescott S. Bush and William A. Purtell (Conn.), Margaret Chase Smith and Frederick G. Payne (Me.), George H. Bender (Ohio), Edward J. Thye (Minn.), J. Glenn Beall and John Marshall Butler (Md.), Frank Carlson (Kan.), Irving M. Ives (N.Y.), Clifford P. Case (N.J.), George D. Aiken and Ralph E. Flanders (Vt.), Homer E. Capehart (Ind.), and Gordon L. Allott (Colo.).

Sundquist, p. 64.


The typical liberal-conservative split on the Rules Committee was 6 to 6, with Chairman Smith and William M. Colmer (D-Miss.) voting with the four Republicans. On the depressed-areas bill, Hugh D. Scott Jr. (R-Pa.), who was running for the Senate, provided the pivotal vote by voting for the rule. Another “liberal,” James W. Trimble (D-Ark.), was absent.

See Sundquist, p. 69.


Weatherford, p. 546, and Figures 7 and 10.

Weatherford, Figures 1-4.