

The Evolution of Black Neighborhoods Since Kerner

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Abstract

This paper studies the evolution of African American neighborhoods since the Kerner Commission issued their groundbreaking report on the causes of the rioting and social unrest that marked the 1960s. We first examine how black neighborhoods evolved in four representative cities—Detroit, Newark, Los Angeles, and Washington DC—that experienced severe rioting during this period. Neighborhoods directly affected by rioting saw substantial population declines and stagnation of several key neighborhood amenities relative to those that were not directly affected. Focusing specifically on black neighborhoods in these riot cities, those neighborhoods not directly affected fare better, but trend in similar fashion to those that were. We next expand the scope of the analysis nationally to study how black neighborhoods fared relative to non-black neighborhoods over the period. We note that disparities identified as policy priorities by the Kerner Commission—primarily income, poverty, and unemployment—persist over the observation period despite declines in extreme segregation and increased suburbanization of blacks. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the Kerner Commission report, these findings suggest that the ostensible progress experienced by some blacks has done little to close large gaps across neighborhoods in poverty, income, and unemployment.

Keywords: Neighborhoods, Urban Economic Development, Race, Kerner

Prompted by unprecedented levels of rioting nationwide, President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) established The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, colloquially known as the Kerner Commission, to both determine causes and propose solutions to the destructive violence.¹ The commission's report was remarkably direct in its diagnosis: in short, they concluded that the rioting was a direct consequence of conditions created by white racism. They focused specifically on living conditions in African American communities driven by rampant and persistent labor and housing market discrimination concomitant with episodes of African American (black) maltreatment by police (Kerner 1968). The commission noted that these institutions helped form and maintain black “ghettos,” places often characterized by extreme segregation, concentrated poverty, poor public good provision, and limited access to mainstream labor markets. The commission predicted that, without direct government

¹ The chairman of the commission was former Illinois governor Judge Otto Kerner.

intervention aimed at mitigating the difficult living conditions that characterized many black neighborhoods, rioting would persist. Their solution called for large-scale government investments in housing, education, employment, and welfare transfer programs that would help mitigate the ongoing impacts of racism and discrimination coupled with commitment to integration, especially in suburban areas. Deemed radical by many then (as well as by many today), the commission's omnibus recommendations were largely ignored by LBJ (Russell 2004).

The Kerner Commission's most dire warnings ultimately never came to pass. Aside from several major episodes such as the Liberty City (1980), Los Angeles (1992), and, more recently, Baltimore (2015) riots, the incidence and severity of these events never returned to 1960s levels. Moreover, in the roughly fifty years since the report's publication, many blacks have made substantive gains both socially and economically; overt efforts to exclude blacks or constrain where blacks can live have largely disappeared. In particular, as described in Farley (2017) elsewhere in this volume for the specific case of Detroit, peripheral city neighborhoods and formerly white suburbs now boast large or majority-black populations. Yet, despite these apparent advancements, a broad array of social science research demonstrates that racial segregation and disparity in educational attainment, employment, income, and wealth continue to persist at a level near that described by Kerner and his colleagues five decades ago.

Neighborhoods were considered as a key factor in black well-being by the commission. As such, this paper studies how black neighborhoods have changed over the decades since the report was initially issued. We begin first by examining how black neighborhoods evolved in four representative cities that experienced highly publicized and particularly severe levels of unrest and violence: Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington, DC. We focus explicitly on how neighborhoods directly affected by rioting generally and, more specifically, black neighborhoods that were directly affected by rioting evolved, relative to black neighborhoods that were not directly affected. We are interested in whether these neighborhoods were "worse off" as measured by a number of characteristics and whether such neighborhoods remained so; did the riot and non-riot affected black neighborhoods converge in terms of measured characteristics in the intervening decades? We then expand this analysis to study, more

generally, how black neighborhoods rank relative to non-black neighborhoods nationally, with the goal of understanding how, in light of the attention brought by the Kerner Report and others focused on urban blight, these black neighborhoods have evolved vis-a-vis their white and other non-black counterparts. Given reductions in racial animus and discrimination over time, we ultimately seek to better understand what, if any, relative progress in neighborhood quality has occurred since the Kerner Report introduced their call for black neighborhood improvement 50 years ago.

To conduct our analysis, we combine U.S. Census data harmonized across 5 decades in the Neighborhood Change Database with tract-level information on the location of riots in the U.S. from Collins and Margo (2004). We match these geo-coded census data to tracts in our set of cities where rioting occurred. We compare these areas to those with high proportions of blacks that did not directly experience rioting. We focus particularly on the re-sorting of residents: what were the characteristics of those who remained with a high proportion of black residents? How did neighborhoods elsewhere change? We characterize population counts, racial composition, educational levels, income, poverty, and public assistance use across five decades spanning 1970-2010 for black and transitional neighborhoods, and then compare these outcomes across (1) census tracts representative of America's urban core, with disproportionately higher shares of black and other minorities, (2) census tracts outside of this core, and (3) urban core census tracts directly impacted by rioting of the 1960s.

We establish a number of stylized facts. In particular, and consistent with earlier research, we find that tracts impacted by the riots of interest, on average, shrank in population dramatically between 1970 and 2010. Importantly, we document that these areas initially became more non-white and poorer. However, by 2010, the fraction white, incomes, and other markers of neighborhood quality had improved, at least partly reflecting gentrification forces that are currently reshaping the central areas of many large cities. By contrast, tracts in riot-affected cities that did not directly experience rioting violence had relatively stable populations. However, they have evolved to become much more diverse racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically in part via the large growth in the Hispanic population.

We then broaden our analysis to examine how the racial re-sorting that occurred in the wake of the riots affected the development and evolution of black neighborhoods more broadly. We focus specifically on a number of socioeconomic indicators that help characterize how conditions in the neighborhoods where blacks largely reside have improved or worsened over time relative to neighborhoods where whites (and other non-black people) typically reside. Finally, we draw upon the existing literature to discuss several policies in the spirit of those advocated by the Kerner commission that have been adopted in recent years and their impacts, or lack thereof, on black neighborhood quality.

Our analysis concludes the following: (1) neighborhoods directly affected by riots in the cities we study remain among the most economically disadvantaged today; (2) black movement from the urban core to peripheral city neighborhoods and suburbs accelerated after 1970; (3) amenity declines consistent with neighborhood divestment coincided with urban riots and ultimately helped foster ongoing gentrification observed in many urban neighborhoods (e.g. Hyra 2012); and (4) socioeconomic gaps continue to persist between black neighborhoods—with and without any history of rioting—and neighborhoods without a large concentration of black residents.

Background

Neighborhood living conditions are a large component of individual and family-level socioeconomic well-being. The Kerner report noted that in the years leading up to the 1960s riots, neighborhood conditions facing blacks in northern and California cities were essential to understanding the incidence and scale of socio-political turbulence observed outside of the southern states. Though largely liberal relative to the restrictive Jim Crow regime that many black migrants fled in the south, black life in northern cities was characterized by segregation, reinforced by rampant discrimination and, often, aggressive policing (Kerner 1968). The “promised land” in the north that blacks sought provided little pathway to economic prosperity. These conditions facilitated the rioting later observed in the sixties.

Rioting, of course, occurred in 100s of U.S. cities. As noted elsewhere, (e.g. Aldrich and Reiss 1970; Spilerman 1971; Wilson 1987; Collins and Margo 2004) the incidence and the severity of riots

observed in the 1960s was especially intense relative to historical U.S. standards. In particular, they were characterized by two distinct features relative to most of the earlier “race” riots: (1) blacks were the primary participants and (2) riots were very destructive to local businesses and the local economy.² Furthermore, we now understand that these riots were an important contributor to white exit from central cities, helping to exacerbate the social and economic harm independently caused by riots (Frey 1979).

Interestingly, the most intense rioting followed or coincided with the adoption of War on Poverty and similar policies promoted by the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations designed to provide resources to poor families and more equitable access to poor minorities. The battery of programs offered included increased access to cash assistance and health care, and proposals also sought to improve employment opportunities. Then, as now, racial inequality and socio-political perceptions of race played a pivotal role in shaping policy proposals (Fording et al. 2011; Lieberman 1998).

The Kerner Commission’s charter was, in part, a consequence of a growing recognition that ostensible progress on civil rights culminating in civil rights legislation and the adoption of “Great Society” programs were insufficient to quell rising discontent over living conditions within many black communities. In many respects, the often-quoted statement from the Kerner Commission Report regarding the U.S. becoming “two societies, one white, and one black – separate and unequal” was inaccurate. In fact, the nation had long been divided by race (Kerner 1968). The commission was generally correct, however, in its diagnosis of the problem. Racism and discrimination not only limited life opportunities and outcomes for black Americans, it rendered their living situations demonstrably worse. The Kerner report described the key role of white racism and discrimination in establishing “racial ghettos” with poor and cramped living conditions in metropolitan areas (Chs. 6 and 8, Kerner 1968), leaving many blacks isolated and trapped, thereby contributing to persistently high unemployment and underemployment rates in black communities. These problems, in turn, were linked to a rise in documented family instability (Ch. 7, Kerner 1968).

² Up until that point, many of the earlier race riots were the consequence of white aggression in response to blacks asserting political and/or economic rights.

The Kerner Commission made a number of concrete recommendations aimed at improving the lives of black Americans. They pushed for government initiatives that improved the quality and supply of housing in ghettos through direct public investment and by subsidizing private development, substantial investments in improving access to educational and employment opportunities, and direct government intervention aimed at reducing de facto segregation. These recommendations were notable both in terms of their specificity and their goal to directly help black Americans. LBJ, however, found them politically infeasible and ultimately declined to run again for president; thus, almost none of the recommendations were directly implemented.³ Nonetheless, the report's publication was significant in that it provided a forceful argument based on the premise that the government had a responsibility and role to play in mitigating the social and economic harm imposed on blacks by racism and discrimination. Injecting this premise into the national discourse, with the validation of being convened by way of executive order, may stand as the Kerner Commission's lasting legacy.

Data and Empirical Analysis

Our data are drawn from two sources. First, we use information from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB). The NCDB, originally constructed by the Urban Institute and sold commercially by Geolytics, Inc., creates harmonized census tracts using 2010 boundaries that span the five census decades since 1970. In general, census tract boundaries and definitions change over time limiting the ability of researchers to perform longitudinal analyses using census tracts as the unit of analysis. The harmonized tract definitions provided by NCDB therefore allow us to study how specific places have changed over time. We augment the NCDB files with additional information from the Decennial Census and the American Community Survey (for 2006-2010) between 1970 – 2010 to better characterize neighborhood environments. Finally, we then match these data with tract-level information denoting the location of riots

³ Though a number of policies later adopted by the federal government as well as some state and local governments were both similar in spirit and as well as aspiration to policy proposals introduced in the Kerner Commission Report.

occurring in 1967 for our representative riot cities: Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, NJ, and Washington, DC.⁴

Table 1 presents a descriptive breakdown of the neighborhoods used in the final analysis dataset. Our data include 2,978 tracts located within our representative riot-affected cities and roughly 12,718 elsewhere.⁵ We define a “black” neighborhood as a tract whose population was 40 percent black or higher in any census year. Admittedly, this cutoff is somewhat arbitrary but believe, given the size of the black population and level of segregation that exists in most cities, that neighborhoods near this threshold likely would have been characterized as black in past decades. In addition, as noted in Card et al. (2008) and Casey (2017), prior to 2000 almost all neighborhood transitions are one-way and complete. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that neighborhoods with such high shares of blacks were likely to continue to trend in that direction.

It is notable that our riot cities generally had a higher percentage of neighborhoods, on average, classified as black between 1970-1990. In 1970, approximately 19 percent of neighborhoods in these cities were black. This percentage grew to approximately 23 percent in 1980 and 1990. However, in the most recent Census, this fraction decreased to around 20 percent. This pattern is consistent with reports elsewhere suggesting that many of the non-southern riot-affected cities are losing black population and becoming more integrated through gentrification and immigration.

To better understand any differential trends within and across these neighborhoods, we examine neighborhoods from a set of “comparison” cities that were not directly affected by the riots that we study. These are defined as the 100 largest municipalities appearing in the 2010 Decennial Census, ranging from New York City to Des Moines, IA.⁶ It is important to note that a number of these cities were affected by riots—in some cases much earlier in the decade or in the aftermath of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in 1968—so the comparisons are not perfectly stratified on riot-status. However, for the

4 Census tract-level information on riot events for the four cities are provided by William Collins.

5 Note that we focus on riots within these four major cities during 1967, while we acknowledge, as mentioned above, that 100s of riots occurred in cities throughout the nation during the late 1960s.

6 Appendix Table 1 provides a list of the 100 comparison cities.

purpose of this study we focus on the areas within four cities affected by major riots immediately approximate to the establishment of the Kerner Commission Report, as they likely provided the immediate impetus for establishment of the commission and they remain among the most prominent examples of such rioting in the late 1960s.

In these comparison cities, the percentage of black neighborhoods in 1970 was lower than in the riot-affected cities at roughly 16 percent (Table 1), and the fraction of neighborhoods classified as black grew monotonically over this period. By 2010, nearly a quarter of these neighborhoods would be classified as black under our definition. This pattern, a nearly 9 percentage point increase in the fraction of neighborhoods classified as black, suggests that not only did the populations of blacks in these cities grow but that they were strongly sorted into particular neighborhoods. In what follows, we explore the features of these neighborhoods in more detail.

The Evolution of Neighborhoods in Riot-Affected Cities and Nationwide

We turn next to studying riot-affected neighborhoods in more detail. Figures 1 and 2 present population trends for several comparisons of neighborhoods within riot cities, those that directly experienced riots versus neighborhoods overall within riot cities, and black neighborhoods that experience rioting and those that did not. Figure 3 presents these trends for black and non-black neighborhoods from our comparison cities nationwide.

In Figure 1, neighborhoods in our riot cities that experienced rioting depopulate, on average, in the period after 1970. The most pronounced drop occurred between 1970 and 1980, falling from roughly 4500 to less than 4000, declining in more gradual fashion thereafter. This depopulation does not occur when looking over the pooled set of neighborhoods in the riot-city metro areas overall. After a relatively constant population of approximately 3,250 over the 1970-1980 period, these neighborhoods grow over time to almost 4,000 people per tract, on average, by 2010. Figure 2 compares the same population trends restricted to black neighborhoods that directly experienced riots and those that did not, within these same riot cities. The similarities are striking, as the depopulation of riot-affected neighborhoods mirrors that of

unaffected black neighborhoods within these 4 cities. Figure 3 provides a national look at these neighborhood population trends, comparing non-black neighborhoods to black neighborhoods from our large 100 “comparison” cities. We observe that population in black neighborhoods falls through 1990, eventually reversing trend and rising throughout the 2000s. Non-black neighborhoods on average, on the other hand, are initially significantly smaller than black neighborhoods in 1970 but eventually overtake them in population by 1980.

Central to the Kerner Commission’s concerns was desegregation and increasing the quality of living conditions for black citizens. However, as noted above, most neighborhood diversity outside of the core black neighborhoods in 1970 has been driven by growth in the Hispanic population. Neighborhood changes involving black migration into former white neighborhoods have largely been one-way and complete (Card et al. 2008). In an era of gentrification, however, there remains the possibility that desegregation will occur through the mechanism of white entry into black neighborhoods.

In Tables 2-7, we summarize changes in the racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods since 1970. Riot-impacted neighborhoods transitioned from being overwhelmingly black in 1970 to later being almost evenly split across black and non-black residents (Table 2), including a rising share of foreign-born and Hispanic residents. Within our riot-affected cities, the neighborhoods become increasingly racially and ethnically diverse (Table 3). This shift holds for the full set of black neighborhoods as well, including those impacted by riots (Table 4), those in riot-affected cities (Table 5), and those in non-riot affected cities (Table 7)—though it is worth noting that black neighborhoods in non-riot affected cities look to have an approximately 6-8 percentage point higher share of black residents. Comparing neighborhoods in non-riot affected cities nationwide via Table 6, these areas are majority white, though with rapidly increasing racial and ethnic diversity over the 40 year period. Interestingly, the share Hispanic (12 to 26 percent) and foreign-born (7 to 20 percent) more than doubles over the period, whereas the share black rises (17 to 26 percent), but at a far slower pace.

Having now documented key race and ethnicity trends within neighborhoods, Table 8 examines transitions among black neighborhoods since 1970. Specifically, among neighborhoods that were

classified as black in 1970, what was their classification in 2010? Panel A presents these statistics for the riot-affected areas we study, Panel B for neighborhoods not directly affected by riots in the cities we study, and neighborhoods in the comparison cities in Panel C. Concentrating first on Panel A, nearly 60 percent of neighborhoods classified as black in 1970 remained as black neighborhoods in 2010. Among those black neighborhoods that transitioned away, almost none became a white neighborhood: 2 percent of neighborhoods classified as black became white neighborhoods whereas 40 percent became Hispanic. By contrast, of the areas classified as white in 1970, 64 percent transitioned to black by 2010.

Among neighborhoods in the riot-affected cities not directly affected by riots and the comparison cities, the racial compositions were even more stable. In these areas, 67 percent of black tracts in 1970 remained black in 2010. Only 1 percent of these neighborhoods transitioned to white over the period. In contrast to the riot-affected neighborhoods, only 7 percent of the neighborhoods initially classified as white transitioned to black over the period. In the comparison cities, 84 percent of black neighborhoods remained black over the period. A somewhat smaller percentage, 12 percent, transitioned to Hispanic, and about 2 percent of the neighborhoods transitioned to white.

While the differential population trends across neighborhood types are interesting, the Kerner Commission was specifically concerned with neighborhood quality experienced by blacks who lived in these neighborhoods. In Figure 4 we turn next to describing educational attainment levels within the neighborhoods of riot-affected cities. We observe that, initially at baseline in 1970, educational attainment levels are higher in neighborhoods overall as compared to riot-affected neighborhoods. College attainment in riot-affected neighborhoods rises at a rate similar to neighborhoods overall, but these neighborhoods fail to catch up to the higher attainment within the average neighborhood—roughly a quarter of residents in the average neighborhood of a city that experienced rioting hold a college degree by 2010, compared to less than 15 percent in riot-affected neighborhoods. As the value of a college degree rises in the latter part of the 20th century, the share of residents in riot-affected neighborhoods with a high school degree alone overtakes that for the average neighborhood (neighborhoods overall) between 1980 and 1990. This is consistent with increasing returns to education and the changing economy.

Overall, this fits a pattern that emerges across subsequent indicators: riot-affected neighborhoods—and black neighborhoods more generally—lag behind the nation as a whole on a broad range of amenity and socioeconomic indicators. Restricting to black neighborhoods within our 4 riot-affected cities in Figure 5, we see a similar pattern repeated for college attainment. Overall black neighborhoods look slightly better than riot-affected neighborhoods with respect to the proportion of residents with college degree attainment, though both follow the same trend over time. For high school degree attainment, riot neighborhoods that are black generally track with black neighborhoods overall within these cities, though it is worth noting that from 1970 to 1990 riot neighborhoods initially have a higher proportion of residents with a high school degree only, though this is reversed to overall black neighborhoods in 1980, and back again in 1990. Still, by 1990 high school attainment rates only differ by a few percentage points. Figure 6 provides the starkest contrasts on the margin of educational attainment differences across neighborhoods. Here, we compare black neighborhoods overall nationwide to non-black neighborhoods. In 1970, nearly 20 percent of residents in black neighborhoods boast a college degree or more, compared to less than 15 percent in non-black neighborhoods, but this difference is quickly reversed in the foregoing decades, such that college attainment in black neighborhoods remains flat until 2000 while attainment in non-black neighborhoods rises from 14 percent to 30 percent by 2010. Black neighborhoods, meanwhile, have slightly higher high school degree attainment than non-black neighborhoods. These rates follow a similar trend over time across neighborhood type, although by the end of the period non-black neighborhood high school attainment falls to roughly 1 in 4, whereas high school degree attainment holds around 1 in 3 for black neighborhoods—again mirroring individual-level shifts in educational attainment concurrent with the changing structure of the economy favoring higher-level skills (e.g. Autor 2014).

We next examine household income within neighborhoods. Within the four selected riot-affected cities (Figure 7), riot and non-riot neighborhoods follow a similar trend with respect to income growth, but with large, persistent gaps. In 1970 there is a roughly \$20,000 income gap between riot and non-riot neighborhoods, and the gap widens between 1980 and 2000 to \$25,000 by 2000. By 2010, non-riot

impacted neighborhoods in these cities are well above the national average for household income at roughly \$71,000, while riot-affected neighborhoods within these cities remain below the average, at around \$45,000; these neighborhoods experience only \$10,000 of real income growth over a 40 year period. When we examine differences between black neighborhoods and riot-impacted neighborhoods within our 4-city inquiry (Figure 8), black neighborhoods overall fare better than riot-impacted neighborhoods, though not by much. A modest \$3,000 to \$4,000 advantage persists for black neighborhoods relative to riot-affected neighborhoods, but they follow an almost identical trend over time. As was the case when assessing neighborhood differences in educational attainment, on a national level black neighborhood household income looks quite similar to our select riot-affected neighborhoods. Specifically, in Figure 9 black neighborhoods overall experience a slightly higher income growth rate than the select riot-affected neighborhoods over time. This stands in stark contrast to non-black neighborhoods; these areas begin the period at nearly \$50,000 in average household income, a level black neighborhoods will not attain until 2010—40 years later.

We close our discussion of neighborhood economic and amenity trends by examining poverty and public assistance within neighborhoods. Starting in Figure 10, within our 4 city riot-affected sample, poverty rates in riot-affected neighborhoods are roughly 15 percentage points higher than in neighborhoods overall within these cities. Riot neighborhoods experience trend growth in poverty from 1970 through 1990 with a leveling off thereafter, whereas average neighborhoods (neighborhoods overall) within these cities experience very gradual growth in poverty over time, and from a much lower baseline. A sharp decrease in public assistance use occurs between 2000 and 2010 for both riot and overall neighborhoods, with an overall convergence in public assistance use between both types of neighborhoods to less than 10 percent. In Figure 11, upon comparing black riot-neighborhoods in the riot-affected cities with riot-neighborhoods, we observe that black riot-affected neighborhoods face even higher poverty rates than the already-elevated levels generally exhibited by black neighborhoods, by approximately 3 to 5 percentage points. These rates, over 20 percent, are above national averages for poverty. Public assistance use again falls and converges between 2000 and 2010 to under 10 percent.

Figure 12 reinforces these trends on a national basis, as we compare black and non-black neighborhoods. For black neighborhoods, poverty rates roughly mirror trends at the individual and family level for black Americans, where poverty has approximately held between 1 in 4 for individuals and 1 in 3 for families (Semega et al. 2017). The average poverty rate for riot-affected neighborhoods—black or otherwise—is only a few percentage points higher than that for black neighborhoods overall. We again observe that public assistance departs from poverty trends between 2000 and 2010; given that there was no comparable, large reduction in poverty, this seems broadly consistent with major policy changes to the nation’s cash welfare program for the poor in 1996 (Blank 2009; Ziliak 2016), that, by many accounts, have led to poverty without welfare benefits (Shaefer, Edin, and Talbert 2015).

Racial Sorting and Access to High Amenity Neighborhoods

Given that black neighborhoods remain largely stable and persistently segregated, it is of interest to explore the degree to which blacks have access to higher amenity neighborhoods. Table 9A explores how such access has evolved over time by exploring the joint distribution of average educational attainment and percentage black. While not a perfect proxy, the educational level of residents is usually correlated with a whole host of related components of neighborhood quality. In particular, highly educated neighborhoods typically have higher quality schools, more diversity in food and grocery options, and lower crime. Scholars (e.g. Putnam 2015) have speculated that the prevalence of socio-economically stratified neighborhoods is contributing to social inequality. Studying how this joint distribution changes over time should provide some insight into how the neighborhoods where blacks reside have changed.

We begin by exploring black neighborhoods overall. As shown in Table 9A, we focus specifically on neighborhoods with at least 20 percent or more (plus) black share and those that were 60 percent or more black, respectively. Panel A (20 percent or more black) shows that the secular rise in college degree attainment does appear at the neighborhood level. Whereas only 5 percent of neighborhoods with 20 percent or more blacks boast a population where 20 percent or more of the population graduated college,

this share rises to 30 percent by 2010. However, the bottom of panel A points to a more mixed story; there are very few neighborhoods where 20 percent or more of the population identify as black, and where 60 percent or more are college educated. While there is a large increase in percent terms, the 1970 baseline is practically zero. Specifically, the share with college attainment of 60 percent or more rises from less than 1 percent in 1970 to 5 percent in 2010. Recent concerns surrounding the societal implications of class-based segregation, driven by differences in income and education (e.g. Putnam 2015), very clearly have a racial component as well. Tracts with large shares of highly educated residents rarely contain large shares of black residents.

This same trend follows when examining majority-black neighborhoods in Panel B of Table 9A. Relative to panel A, there are fewer neighborhoods either in 1970 or 2010 where substantial shares of the resident population hold the college degree. By 2010, roughly a quarter of neighborhoods with 60 percent or more black residents also report college attainment levels approaching 25 percent. Following the pattern of panel A, only 1 percent of these majority-black neighborhoods have a college educated resident population of 60 percent or more in 2010. We also examine the same race-education evolution of neighborhoods in our data sample that are affected by riots in Table 9B. Here, we find the same pattern as that in evidence for all tracts pooled together, but with one exception: In 1970, there are no recorded tracts within our sample with a 60 percent or more black population and where 60 percent or more hold a college degree. Riot-tract educational attainment in this context—black neighborhoods—lags that of black neighborhoods pooled across the entire nation.

Neighborhood Policy Since Kerner

Aside from its ostensibly controversial assignment of blame, the Kerner report was notable for proposing a broad set investments—“enrichment” in their language—in the areas of housing, education, employment and general welfare coupled with “integration.” The commission members believed investments in these areas would satisfy the aim of reducing the likelihood of additional violence and improving the life conditions and future prospects of black families and their children. The

recommendations and observations of Kerner, many of which are summarized by Loessberg and Koskinen (2017) in this volume, turned out to be especially prescient, given the link between neighborhood-level conditions and long-term individual-level socioeconomic outcomes. Almost none of these proposals, however, were directly implemented in the immediate aftermath of the report's publication. While a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this article, we discuss briefly several of these programs that have had impacts on black (and other) neighborhoods and comment on their progress relative to the goals outlined by the Kerner Commission Report.

A range of federally funded place-based policies, whether focused directly on "people" or indirectly by facilitating business growth to address poverty, high unemployment, and urban blight, have been implemented since the late 1960s. Though these policies were not necessarily as ambitious and targeted as those described in the report, they were similar in spirit to the commission's desiderata, particularly in terms of neighborhood economic development and improving access to quality education in desegregated schools. In addition, though not place-based, transfer programs also had disproportionate impacts on economically disadvantaged communities, and recent evidence suggests they improved long-term outcomes for recipient children (Hoynes, Almond, and Schanzenbach 2017).

The passage of legislation such as the Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibiting discrimination in housing, the Housing and Urban Development Acts of 1968 which provided funding for integrated developments outside of central cities, and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 which established a block grant program to support community development in the decade subsequent to the Kerner Commission report's publication represent, in part, steps towards the twin goals of improving the quality and stability of neighborhoods, and desegregation that the Commission considered of paramount importance. Since this early legislation much neighborhood development policy has come in the form of place-based economic development initiatives, some of which are also discussed in this volume by Cunningham and Gillezeau (2017).

Among the most ambitious of these policies that are in the spirit, if not in the implementation, of the ambitious Kerner Commission report has been the establishment of enterprise and empowerment

zones primarily beginning by federal initiative in the 1980s and 1990s and later by states (Neumark and Simpson 2015). These areas were established to promote economic development and private investment. Initially conceived as a federal intervention, states have adopted these strategies, which vary in intensity and size across jurisdictions; they are often organized as tax incentives to promote hiring local workers, firm location, and investment within the distressed area (e.g. Ladd 1994).

Evaluations of the net benefits of establishing such zones, however, is somewhat controversial (e.g. Neumark and Simpson 2014). Neumark and Kolko (2010) for example, in an evaluation of California's enterprise zones, argue for the ineffectiveness of the program. Similar to a number of studies published prior to their paper, they find little evidence of an impact from designating a place as an enterprise zone on economic activity. In contrast, recent evidence on empowerment zones presented in Busso, Gregory and Kline (2013) suggests that, in areas where they were instituted, place-based policies substantially increase jobs and wages relative to places that were considered for status but were rejected. Even if the establishment of such zones was beneficial, there are additional concerns that such policies help spur gentrification forces that raise rents and other costs in recipient neighborhoods, leading to fears of displacement of typically poorer, nonwhite incumbent residents. As a consequence, potential benefits accruing to existing black residents may be limited.

Education policies that have been implemented since Kerner include expansion of the federally funded Head Start pre-kindergarten program, enacted in 1965 to provide educational programming, meals, and other developmental activities to 3 and 4 year-old children living in poor families. The program was part of LBJ's war on poverty and expanded in generosity throughout the 1960s and early 1970s with the goal of improving child development and subsequent outcomes during school-age years and into adulthood. Today, several states supplement Head Start with their own pre-k and early pre-k programs (Garces et al. 2002; Currie 2006).

Within the domain of secondary education, policy responses to the racial stratification inherent in many cities sought to achieve the twin goals of integration and improving school quality experienced by blacks. The chief exemplar policies in this context are school district-level efforts to equalize educational

opportunities across neighborhoods via the busing and transfer of students into higher quality schools and neighborhoods, oftentimes based on race and economic status. Frequently the result of court-mandated intervention to desegregate schools, such efforts have borne positive results for students while, at times, meeting with resistance from families who fall within the school boundary (e.g. Billings et al. 2013); many of these programs have been abandoned throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

As a consequence of the pushback stemming, in part, from the altered racial composition of schools and removal of students from their neighborhoods, decentralized school choice mechanisms to improve educational opportunities among black students became increasingly attractive. School choice approaches to improving educational quality among low-income children in disadvantaged neighborhoods introduce competitive market principles into the secondary educational space by providing cash support for low-income families, via vouchers, to purchase tuition at local charter schools. While proponents laud competition and accountability with low-income students and families as consumers with increased market power, the evidence on school choice and academic achievement is mixed at best, and in several instances negative (e.g. Dynarski and Nichols 2017). Thus, while redistricting and busing showed some positive impacts, neither approach has equalized achievement gaps between blacks and whites over the past 50 years, nor substantially reduced racial segregation of schools since the Kerner report was initially published.

In the same vein, neighborhood-level economic development interventions and transfer programs have not closed racial gaps in economic status. As researchers and policymakers continue to assess neighborhood economic conditions since Kerner, the role of place in shaping economic outcomes looms large. In sum, the ultimate policy goals of the Kerner Commission have yet to be fully realized, in spite of the fact that some individual programs—including school busing, Head Start, and the Food Stamp Program—have had positive impacts. While effective, such programs have been implemented with neither the scale and nor the resources suggested by the Kerner Commission.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper studies the evolution of black neighborhoods in the decades after the Kerner Commission issued their important report. We match riot locations with tract-level Census data harmonized over five censuses to assess how these neighborhoods changed over this period, focusing specifically on (1) a set of neighborhoods directly affected by rioting in Detroit, LA, Newark, and Washington DC, (2) neighborhoods in these cities that were not directly affected by rioting, and (3) how black neighborhoods evolved across the largest cities nationwide. We document a number of interesting stylized facts. First, in the years subsequent to the riots, all riot neighborhoods, but especially those that were heavily black, experienced substantial declines in a number of quality-of-life indicators. Second, the riot-affected neighborhoods in our sample are persistently among the most economically challenged to this day. Third, and probably most pressing, black neighborhoods across cities have tended to trend comparably to riot-affected neighborhoods despite generally higher average educational attainment.

Nevertheless, a number of caveats apply to the analysis presented here. The results are descriptive and thus limited in its prescription. In addition, many of the 2010 economic measures potentially reflect the residual effects of the Great Recession and slow recovery thereafter. Still, the differences in socioeconomic evolution across neighborhood types are present prior to 2010 and illustrate an important conundrum. In the fifty years since the Kerner Commission issued their report, the U.S. has seen tremendous advancements in educational achievement, access to elite employment, income, and wealth for some blacks—it has even elected a black president. Yet, black neighborhoods, including those directly affected by the period of rioting studied here, lag the nation as a whole on a number of key dimensions. These neighborhoods typically face greater poverty, lower household income, and college degree holders make up the majority in only a small fraction—5 percent.

Place matters for individual economic well-being (Andrews et al. 2017; Chetty et al. 2014; Islam et al. 2015) in large part due to the amenities available in more socioeconomically elite neighborhoods. In short, 50 years after the Kerner report, pathways for black individuals to achieve economic mobility have improved greatly, while black neighborhoods remain economically stagnant. Given that many black

Americans fail to access such pathways, understanding how and why neighborhoods thrive or struggle remains as one critical component to understanding the determinants of social and economic mobility.

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


Figure 1: Authors' calculations. Comparison of population trends in neighborhoods directly affected by riots and not directly affected by riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington DC.




Figure 2: Authors' calculations. Comparison of population trends in black neighborhoods directly affected by riots and not directly affected by riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington DC.




Figure 3: Authors' calculations. Comparison of population trends in black neighborhoods and non-black neighborhoods nationwide.




Figure 4: Authors' calculations. Comparison of educational trends for 25+ adults in neighborhoods directly affected by riots and not directly affected by riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington DC.




Figure 5: Authors' calculations. Comparison of educational trends for 25+ adults in black neighborhoods directly affected by riots and not directly affected by riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington DC.




Figure 6: Authors' calculations. Comparison of educational trends for 25+ adults trends in black neighborhoods and non-black neighborhoods nationwide.




Figure 7: Authors' calculations. Comparison of household income trends in neighborhoods directly affected by riots and not directly affected by riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington DC. Average tract-level household income is adjusted for inflation using personal consumption expenditure deflator for 2010.




Figure 8: Authors' calculations. Comparison of household income trends in black neighborhoods directly affected by riots and not directly affected by riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington DC. Average tract-level household income is adjusted for inflation using personal consumption expenditure deflator for 2010.




Figure 9: Authors' calculations. Comparison of household income trends nationally across black and non-black neighborhoods. Average tract-level household income is adjusted for inflation using personal consumption expenditure deflator for 2010.




Figure 10: Authors' calculations. Comparison of poverty and public assistance participation trends in neighborhoods directly affected by riots and not directly affected by riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington DC. Percent poor is calculated as the proportion of non-elderly families under 65 below poverty.




Figure 11: Authors' calculations. Comparison of poverty and public assistance participation trends in black neighborhoods directly affected by riots and not directly affected by riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, and Washington DC. Percent poor is calculated as the proportion of non-elderly families under 65 below poverty.




Fig 12: Authors' calculations. Comparison of poverty and public assistance participation trends in black and non-black neighborhoods nationwide. Percent poor is calculated as the proportion of non-elderly families under 65 below poverty.

Table 1: Breakdown by Neighborhood Type

| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
|--------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| <u>Panel A: Riot Affected Cities</u> | | | | | |
| Number of Tracts in Sample | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |
| Fraction Black | 19% | 23% | 23% | 21% | 20% |
| <u>Panel B: Non-Riot Cities</u> | | | | | |
| Number of Tracts | 12,718 | 12,718 | 12,718 | 12,718 | 12,718 |
| Fraction Black | 16% | 19% | 21% | 23% | 25% |

Notes: Author's tabulations. Neighborhood characteristics are estimated at the census tract using the decennial Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, as well as the 2006-2010 American Community Survey.

Table 2: Composition of Riot-Impacted Neighborhoods Over Time, 1970-2010

| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Percent White | 0.22 (0.264) | 0.15 (0.179) | 0.13 (0.160) | 0.17 (0.162) | 0.23 (0.207) |
| Percent Black | 0.76 (0.273) | 0.77 (0.249) | 0.69 (0.284) | 0.63 (0.323) | 0.56 (0.325) |
| Percent Hispanic | 0.07 (0.117) | 0.13 (0.194) | 0.23 (0.274) | 0.29 (0.321) | 0.34 (0.356) |
| Percent Foreign Born | 0.05 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.21 |
| Observations | 309 | 309 | 309 | 309 | 309 |

Notes: Author's tabulations. Neighborhood characteristics are estimated at the census tract using the decennial Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, as well as the 2006-2010 American Community Survey. Racial proportions for 2000 and 2010 allow respondents to select multiple race categories and, thus, proportions do not necessarily add to 1.

Table 3: Composition of Overall Neighborhoods in Riot-Affected Cities, 1970-2010

| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Percent White | 0.79 (0.32) | 0.63 (0.3) | 0.52 (0.29) | 0.46 (0.26) | 0.48 (0.25) |
| Percent Black | 0.18 (0.32) | 0.22 (0.33) | 0.23 (0.32) | 0.23 (0.32) | 0.22 (0.31) |
| Percent Hispanic | 0.15 (0.17) | 0.23 (0.24) | 0.31 (0.27) | 0.37 (0.30) | 0.40 (0.31) |
| Percent Foreign Born | 0.11 (0.08) | 0.19 (0.15) | 0.27 (0.18) | 0.31 (0.18) | 0.30 (0.18) |
| Observations | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 | 2,978 |

Notes: Author's tabulations. Neighborhood characteristics are estimated at the census tract using the decennial Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, as well as the 2006-2010 American Community Survey. Racial proportions for 2000 and 2010 allow respondents to select multiple race categories and, thus, proportions do not necessarily add to 1.

Table 4: Composition of Black Riot-Impacted Neighborhoods Over Time, 1970-2010

| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Percent White | 0.13 (0.119) | 0.10 (0.118) | 0.10 (0.112) | 0.14 (0.134) | 0.22 (0.186) |
| Percent Black | 0.86 (0.127) | 0.83 (0.179) | 0.73 (0.252) | 0.65 (0.310) | 0.57 (0.320) |
| Percent Hispanic | 0.05 (0.0613) | 0.11 (0.153) | 0.23 (0.257) | 0.30 (0.311) | 0.35 (0.351) |
| Percent Foreign Born | 0.03 (0.0369) | 0.09 (0.110) | 0.17 (0.182) | 0.20 (0.189) | 0.21 (0.184) |
| Observations | 263 | 263 | 263 | 263 | 263 |

Notes: Author's tabulations. Neighborhood characteristics are estimated at the census tract using the decennial Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, as well as the 2006-2010 American Community Survey. Racial proportions for 2000 and 2010 allow respondents to select multiple race categories and, thus, proportions do not necessarily add to 1.

Table 5: Composition of Overall Black Neighborhoods in Riot-Affected Cities, 1970-2010

| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Percent White | 0.17 (0.161) | 0.12 (0.147) | 0.11 (0.140) | 0.15 (0.154) | 0.21 (0.195) |
| Percent Black | 0.81 (0.160) | 0.81 (0.191) | 0.73 (0.258) | 0.67 (0.308) | 0.59 (0.319) |
| Percent Hispanic | 0.06 (0.0958) | 0.11 (0.160) | 0.20 (0.243) | 0.27 (0.293) | 0.31 (0.326) |
| Percent Foreign Born | 0.04 (0.0398) | 0.09 (0.104) | 0.16 (0.172) | 0.19 (0.179) | 0.20 (0.175) |
| Observations | 566 | 566 | 566 | 566 | 566 |

Notes: Author's tabulations. Neighborhood characteristics are estimated at the census tract using the decennial Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, as well as the 2006-2010 American Community Survey. Racial proportions for 2000 and 2010 allow respondents to select multiple race categories and, thus, proportions do not necessarily add to 1.

Table 6. Composition of Neighborhoods in Non-Riot Affected Cities, 1970-2010

| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Percent White | 0.84 (0.275) | 0.73 (0.310) | 0.66 (0.313) | 0.59 (0.298) | 0.58 (0.294) |
| Percent Black | 0.17 (0.302) | 0.20 (0.317) | 0.23 (0.317) | 0.25 (0.308) | 0.26 (0.303) |
| Percent Hispanic | 0.12 (0.212) | 0.14 (0.221) | 0.17 (0.238) | 0.21 (0.251) | 0.26 (0.277) |
| Percent Foreign Born | 0.07 (0.0939) | 0.11 (0.121) | 0.13 (0.147) | 0.18 (0.169) | 0.20 (0.169) |
| Observations | 12,718 | 12,718 | 12,718 | 12,718 | 12,718 |

Notes: Author's tabulations. Neighborhood characteristics are estimated at the census tract using the decennial Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, as well as the 2006-2010 American Community Survey. Racial proportions for 2000 and 2010 allow respondents to select multiple race categories and, thus, proportions do not necessarily add to 1.

Table 7. Composition of Black Neighborhoods in Non-Riot Affected Cities Over Time, 1970-2010

| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Percent White | 0.33 (0.324) | 0.25 (0.335) | 0.25 (0.333) | 0.24 (0.301) | 0.28 (0.304) |
| Percent Black | 0.81 (0.194) | 0.78 (0.281) | 0.75 (0.310) | 0.68 (0.337) | 0.64 (0.325) |
| Percent Hispanic | 0.20 (0.341) | 0.15 (0.281) | 0.15 (0.265) | 0.13 (0.202) | 0.18 (0.240) |
| Percent Foreign Born | 0.03 (0.0660) | 0.06 (0.0968) | 0.08 (0.115) | 0.11 (0.135) | 0.14 (0.142) |
| Observations | 2,066 | 2,066 | 2,066 | 2,066 | 2,066 |

Notes: Author's tabulations. Neighborhood characteristics are estimated at the census tract using the decennial Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, as well as the 2006-2010 American Community Survey. Racial proportions for 2000 and 2010 allow respondents to select multiple race categories and, thus, proportions do not necessarily add to 1.

Table 8: Neighborhood Transitions in Cities 1970 - 2010

Panel A: Riot - Affected Neighborhoods

| | |
|--|-----|
| Fraction Stable Black | 58% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black to White | 2% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black to Hispanic | 40% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black to Other Non white | 0% |
| Fraction Transitioned White to Black | 64% |

Panel B: Non-Riot Affected Neighborhoods in Riot - Affected Cities

| | |
|---|-----|
| Fraction Stable Black | 67% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black - White | 1% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black - Hispanic | 32% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black - Other Non white | 0% |
| Fraction Transitioned White to Black | 7% |

Panel C: Non-Riot Affected Neighborhoods in Non-Riot Affected Cities

| | |
|---|-----|
| Fraction Stable Black | 84% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black - White | 2% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black - Hispanic | 12% |
| Fraction Transitioned Black - Other Non white | 0% |
| Fraction Transitioned White to Black | 15% |

Notes: Author's tabulations. Neighborhood characteristics are estimated at the census tract using the decennial Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, as well as the 2006-2010 American Community Survey.

Table 9A: Evolution of Neighborhoods by Race and Education, 1970-2010

| | Panel A: Tracts w/ At least 20% Black Population | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|------|------|------|------|
| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
| With At Least 20% College Graduates | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.29 |
| With At Least 40% College Graduates | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.11 |
| With At Least 60% College Graduates | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.05 |
| Observations | 683 | 828 | 847 | 852 | 839 |
| | Panel B: Tracts w/ 60% + Black Population | | | | |
| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
| With 20% + College Graduates | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.20 | 0.28 |
| With 40% + College Graduates | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.10 |
| With 60% + College Graduates | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| Observations | 481 | 584 | 537 | 502 | 486 |

Notes: Author's tabulations.

Table 9B: Evolution Neighborhoods by Race and Education -- Riot-Affected, 1970-2010

| | Panel A: Tracts w/ 20% + Black Population | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|-------|--------|------|------|
| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
| With at least 20% College Graduates | 0.014 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.24 |
| With at least 40% College Graduates | 0.007 | 0.02 | 0.0458 | 0.06 | 0.11 |
| With at least 60% College Graduates | < .01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Observations | 283 | 293 | 284 | 270 | 254 |
| | Panel B: Tracts w/ 60% + Black Population | | | | |
| | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 |
| With at least 20% College Graduates | 0 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.24 |
| With at least 40% College Graduates | 0 | 0.008 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.07 |
| With at least 60% +College Graduates | 0 | < .01 | 0 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Observations | 243 | 251 | 199 | 169 | 149 |

Notes: Author's tabulations.

Appendix Table 1. List of Comparison Cities, by 2010 Population Size

| City | Population |
|-----------------------|------------|
| New York city | 8175133 |
| Houston city | 3083754 |
| Chicago city | 2695249 |
| Philadelphia city | 1526006 |
| San Antonio city | 1474691 |
| Phoenix city | 1462370 |
| San Diego city | 1335861 |
| Dallas city | 1199898 |
| San Jose city | 972437 |
| Jacksonville city | 822856 |
| Columbus city | 820334 |
| San Francisco city | 805235 |
| Fort Worth city | 767724 |
| Charlotte city | 763485 |
| Memphis city | 714804 |
| El Paso city | 659098 |
| Seattle city | 608506 |
| Las Vegas city | 604364 |
| Portland city | 601629 |
| Denver city | 600158 |
| Milwaukee city | 594786 |
| Oklahoma City city | 573116 |
| Tucson city | 545957 |
| Fresno city | 533551 |
| Omaha city | 494951 |
| Mesa city | 487165 |
| Kansas City city | 472632 |
| Sacramento city | 463193 |
| Colorado Springs city | 438677 |
| Virginia Beach city | 437994 |
| Raleigh city | 430546 |
| Tulsa city | 407595 |
| Miami city | 406587 |
| Wichita city | 399947 |
| Cleveland city | 396994 |
| Oakland city | 390733 |
| Minneapolis city | 382583 |
| Tampa city | 345751 |

| | |
|---------------------|--------|
| New Orleans city | 343829 |
| Knoxville city | 332156 |
| Greensboro city | 328824 |
| Orlando city | 320121 |
| St. Louis city | 319294 |
| Santa Ana city | 316426 |
| Stockton city | 313180 |
| Cincinnati city | 310278 |
| Corpus Christi city | 308649 |
| Pittsburgh city | 305704 |
| Toledo city | 302664 |
| Riverside city | 301887 |
| Fort Wayne city | 286137 |
| St. Paul city | 285068 |
| Durham city | 267929 |
| Lincoln city | 263313 |
| Buffalo city | 261310 |
| Plano city | 259753 |
| Henderson city | 258843 |
| Lubbock city | 255443 |
| Reno city | 253633 |
| Madison city | 253089 |
| Glendale city | 248704 |
| Chula Vista city | 247101 |
| St. Petersburg city | 246865 |
| Tallahassee city | 246698 |
| Norfolk city | 242803 |
| Chandler city | 241278 |
| San Bernardino city | 238536 |
| Laredo city | 238152 |
| Spokane city | 237577 |
| Winston-Salem city | 236395 |
| Fayetteville city | 236343 |
| Garland city | 229252 |
| Mobile city | 229085 |
| Shreveport city | 227213 |
| Fontana city | 224883 |
| Chesapeake city | 222209 |
| Hialeah city | 222047 |
| Huntsville city | 221402 |

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| North Las Vegas city | 220933 |
| Scottsdale city | 218095 |
| Irvine city | 217577 |
| Irving city | 216290 |
| Rochester city | 215084 |
| Fremont city | 214089 |
| Brownsville city | 212758 |
| Des Moines city | 212526 |