Mined but Unrefined: European Critical Minerals Strategy
Since 2023, the EU has recognized 34 critical raw materials (CRMs) as strategically important to its domestic economy. Currently, the EU is overwhelmingly dependent on foreign suppliers for many of these CRMs. In recent years, the EU has taken steps to reduce its foreign dependence on CRMs, with mixed results. In order to tackle this vulnerability, the EU should redouble these efforts, focusing on proven methods to expand domestic production of CRMs.
CRMs are vital for cutting-edge industries like renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and defense manufacturing. Supply chains for these CRMs and their dependent industries between EU member states are highly interconnected due to free trade in goods and regulatory alignment within the EU. As a result, it is difficult for any single member state of the EU to disentangle its own supply chains in CRMs from those of the rest of the bloc.
Domestic extraction and refining of CRMs have been in broad decline within the EU for decades. High operating costs, driven by high labor and environmental compliance costs, make it difficult for European mines and refineries to compete with low-cost rivals elsewhere in the world. Securing regulatory approval for new projects is an uncertain process that can stretch to years or even decades, scaring away private investors. Geological deposits of certain CRMs simply don’t exist within the EU at all.
Foreign Dependence
As a result, the European market has become highly reliant on imports from non-EU countries for most of its CRM needs. In many cases, the supply of a specific material is dominated by a single producer country, leaving the European economy exposed to geopolitical disruptions from the producer country.
The risk of CRM dependence is most acute in relation to China, which has built an overwhelming dominance in many global CRM markets over the last 20 years. China mines or refines more than half of the global supply of 16 of the 34 materials on the CRM list. China has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to weaponize its economic heft in pursuit of political goals. In 2022, China imposed trade restrictions on Lithuania in retaliation for Lithuania opening a diplomatic mission to Taiwan. In 2025, China imposed a regime of export controls on rare earth elements and derivative products; while these controls were suspended shortly after being announced, they are due to resume in late 2026.
European Responses
The EU’s flagship effort in reducing CRM dependency is the 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA). This act sets the following binding targets for the EU’s consumption of CRMs by 2030:
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At least 10% must be domestically extracted.
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At least 40% must be domestically refined.
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At least 25% must be sourced from recycled goods.
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No more than 65% of any one CRM must come from a single non-EU country.
The CRMA also sets guidelines for regulatory streamlining: all EU member states must adopt a CRM security strategy and publicly identify the official responsible for CRM security. The act also allows the EU to designate certain extraction, refining, and recycling projects as “Strategic Projects,” which will benefit from public funding and expedited permitting. So far, 47 Strategic Projects have been approved within the EU, with a further 13 approved in non-EU partner countries. The EU followed up in 2025 with the ReSourceEU Action Plan, which promised a further 3 billion Euros of public funding to fulfill the CRMA goals. National governments have made large commitments to CRM production projects as well; early in 2026, Spain pledged €400 million for mining and refining projects, while in 2025, Germany pledged €100 million towards Lithium mining projects.
Steps Towards Independence
These actions have led to real growth in the mining and refining sector across the EU. A series of copper, nickel, and tungsten mines in Spain are set to either reopen or expand before 2028. Finland has begun work on mining and refining operations for cobalt and other minerals in the far north. France and Germany have heavily invested in domestic refining and recycling of graphite and lithium.
Despite these achievements, EU member states are unlikely to attain CRM independence before 2035. A February 2026 report from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) identified significant deficiencies in the structure and implementation of the CRMA; goal-setting was arbitrary, provisions were not uniformly adopted by member states, recycling efforts remain substantially below required levels, and regulatory streamlining is insufficient for projects without the “Strategic Project” designation. Furthermore, the EU and its member states have not allocated sufficient public funding to provide certainty for mining and refining initiatives. In competition for foreign projects with non-EU countries, the EU and its member states frequently lag behind the United States, Japan, and China in both the speed and scale of investment. Consequently, the EU is not expected to achieve the 2030 targets established by the CRMA.
The EU should redouble its efforts to build CRM independence, investing in what measures have been effective and addressing weaknesses. The EU should take the critiques of the ECA report seriously. The goals laid out in the CRMA should be reassessed, and the EU should increase pressure on national governments to adopt the regulatory streamlining mandated by the act. Open calls for “Strategic Project” proposals should be put out quarterly, rather than once or twice a year. Most importantly, the EU and national governments should pledge more public money to support new projects. Even if the EU is unable to reach full independence on its initial timetable, reducing its degree of dependence—especially from untrustworthy suppliers such as China—will have significant impacts on Europe’s economic resilience in the future.
About the Author
Charles Smith is an alumnus of the School of International Service at American University, where he completed a master's degree in International Affairs Policy and Analysis with a concentration on U.S.-EU trade. He is currently a graduate fellow at the Bertelsmann Foundation - North America, where he works on a variety of topics including global trade, critical minerals security, and the transatlantic relationship. He is fluent in German and proficient in Dutch and Spanish.